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One of the contested features in the scholarship on both anar-
chism and religion has been the question of definition. How one 
defines key terms does, after all, determine what one analyses (and 
what not), and generally reveals one’s assumptions and preferenc-
es (implicit or explicit) about what is being discussed. Also, the 
same term can mean different things in different languages, times 
and places, even if deliberately employing a pre-existing term 
does usually signal intended alignment. To make matters more 
difficult, in some cases, definitional differences are not just merely 
minor and contextual, but deliberate and fought over, sometimes 
with a clear intention to exclude particular variants that are felt 
to precisely not legitimately fit the label. Indeed, both ‘anarchism’ 
and ‘religion’ are candidates for Gallie’s definition of ‘essentially 
contested concepts’: “concepts the proper use of which inevitably 
involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of 
their users”.1 Definitions therefore require decisions, betray one’s 
particular sympathies and aversions, and reflect one’s context.
For anarchists in particular, as much as ‘protean fluid-
ity’ is a hallmark of the tradition and often a source of pride, 
some boundaries can be defended with much passion.2 For in-
stance, most anarchists are particularly insistent on excluding 
 1 W. B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” in The Importance of 
Language, ed. M. Black (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), 
123.
 2 George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and 
Movements (London: Penguin, 1986), p. 414.
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‘anarcho-capitalism’ from ‘anarchism’.3 Others reject any fla-
vour of religion.4 Some claim that only ‘class struggle’ anarchists 
should be labelled ‘anarchists’.5 Some devote much time to reflect-
ing on the place of anarchism in political thought, whereas others 
insist on the prioritisation of praxis over theory.6 Some explain 
anarchism by focusing on the writings of the ‘classical anarchists’ 
of the nineteenth century, others advocate ‘blasting’ that ‘canon’ 
and adopting a more open and critical anarchist historiography.7 
That anarchism occupies an ambiguous position in the family of 
political  ideologies – seemingly fusing a trenchant demand for 
 3 The Anarchist FAQ Editorial Collective, “An Anarchist Faq,” https://
theanarchistlibrary.org/library/the-anarchist-faq-editorial-collective- 
an-anarchist-faq#toc7.
 4 Harold Barclay, “Anarchist Confrontations with Religion,” in New 
Perspectives on Anarchism, ed. Nathan Jun and Shane Wahl (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington, 2010); Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, “Christian 
Anarchism: A Revolutionary Reading of the Bible,” ibid.; Alexandre 
Christoyannopoulos and Lara Apps, “Anarchism and Religion,” in Brill’s 
Companion to Anarchism and Philosophy, ed. Nathan Jun (Leiden: Brill, 
2018); Sébastien Faure, “Does God Exist? Twelve Proofs of the Non-
Existence of God,” The Anarchist Library, http://theanarchistlibrary.
org/library/sebastien-faure-does-god-exist; Johann Most, “The God 
Pestilence,” Anarchy Archives, http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_
Archives/bright/most/godpest.html; Nicolas Walter, “Anarchism and 
Religion,” The Raven: anarchist quarterly 257, no. 1 (1994).
 5 Nathan Jun, “Rethinking the Anarchist Canon: History, Philosophy, and 
Interpretation,” Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies 1 (2013); 
Robert Graham, “Black Flame: A Commentary,” ibid.; Michael Schmidt 
and Lucien van der Walt, Black Flame: The Revolutionary Class Politics 
of Anarchism and Syndicalism (Oakland: AK, 2009); Lucien van der 
Walt, “(Re)Constructing a Global Anarchist and Syndicalist Canon: A 
Response to Robert Graham and Nathan Jun on Black Flame,” Anarchist 
Developments in Cultural Studies 1 (2013).
 6 Nathan Jun, “Anarchism and Philosophy: A Critical Introduction,” in 
Brill’s Companion to Anarchism and Philosophy, ed. Nathan Jun (Leiden: 
Brill, 2018). More generally, unsurprisingly in light of anarchism’s rad-
icalism and its emphasis on action, debates and tensions between those 
who spend much time theorising and those keener to focus on activism 
crop up sooner or later in nearly any anarchist circle.
 7 Matthew S. Adams, “The Possibilities of Anarchist History: Rethinking 
the Canon and Writing History,” Anarchist Developments in Cultural 
Studies 1 (2013); Ruth Kinna and Süreyyya Evren, “Introduction: 
Blasting the Canon,” ibid.
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 thoroughgoing equality which is characteristic of socialism with 
an equally robust defence of liberty which is most commonly seen 
in radical forms of liberalism – can also add confusion for the 
uninitiated. Then there is the debate about political violence: for a 
political tradition that prides itself on its practical efficacy – on its 
ability to occasion change in the here and now, both in individual 
mentalities and in offering fresh models of political participation – 
the flawed but common association with seemingly gratuitous 
 destruction is unhelpful.8 Being in a position to point, instead, 
to the constructive acts of anarchists, and to their richly varied 
philosophies, including by offering a definition that either detaches 
‘anarchism’ from its narrow association with political violence or 
at least focuses on its ideological content (irrespective of whether 
it sometimes informs ‘violence’), could support an act of recovery.
As for ‘religion’, some employ the term broadly to include all 
the spiritualities and practices which can be considered ‘religious’, 
whereas others insist on the label applying more narrowly to 
more institutionalised and often Western-centric practices and be-
liefs, and do so precisely in order to differentiate such examples of 
religiosity from non-Western and less institutionalised spirituali-
ties and rituals.9 Some definitions hinge on the object of worship 
(God or gods), others on ritual practices, others still on the state 
of mind which opens itself to it.10 Some insist on religion being a 
 8 Ward Churchill, Pacifism as Pathology: Reflections on the Role of Armed 
Struggle in North America (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2007); Andrew Fiala, 
“Anarchism and Pacifism,” in Brill’s Companion to Anarchism and 
Philosophy, ed. Nathan Jun (Leiden: Brill, 2018); Uri Gordon, Anarchy 
Alive!: Anti-Authoritarian Politics from Practice to Theory (London: 
Pluto, 2008), chap. 4; Vernon Richards, ed. Violence and Anarchism: A 
Polemic (London: Freedom, 1993).
 9 Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead, The Spiritual Revolution: Why 
Religion Is Giving Way to Spirituality (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005); Philip 
Sheldrake, Spirituality: A Brief History (Oxford: John Wiley and Sons, 
2013).
 10 John Bowker, “Religion,” in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World 
Religions ed. John Bowker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
pp. xviii-xiv; John Hinnells, ed. The Penguin Dictionary of Religions, 
2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 1995), pp. 414–16; Moojan Momen, The 
Phenomenon of Religion: A Thematic Approach (Oxford: Oneworld, 
1999), pp. 26–28, and chap. 3.
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private matter, sometimes with an explicit determination to keep 
it independent from politics.11 Others argue that religion cannot 
but inevitably be political, and that its confinement to the ‘private’ 
sphere is actually the result of a political project.12 Then there is 
the category of ‘civil religion’ to describe politics that looks like 
‘religion’.13
Unsurprisingly, therefore, it is generally expected that a work 
exploring either religion or anarchist politics will, at the outset, 
offer a definition that attempts to stake out the parameters of 
these terms. The fact that our project grapples with not just one 
disputed term, but two, makes this question of definition all the 
more important. The introduction to the first volume of Essays 
in Anarchism and Religion explained how this project emerged, 
 11 Jean Baubérot and Micheline Milo, Laïcités Sans Frontières (Paris: Seuil, 
2011); Ahmet T. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The 
United States, France, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009); Erica Michelle Lagalisse, ““Marginalizing Magdalena”: 
Intersections of Gender and the Secular in Anarchoindigenist Solidarity 
Activism,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 36, no. 3 
(2011); Tariq Modood, “Moderate Secularism, Religion as Identity, and 
Respect for Religion,” The Political Quarterly 81, no. 1 (2010); Graeme 
Smith, A Short History of Secularism (London: I.B.Tauris, 2008). 
 12 Steve Bruce, Politics and Religion (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); José 
Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1994); William T. Cavanaugh, “A Fire Strong Enough 
to Consume the House: The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State,” 
Modern Theology 11, no. 4 (1995); Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and 
Anthony T. Fiscella, “‘Religious’ Radicalism,” in Routledge Handbook 
of Radical Politics, ed. Uri Gordon and Ruth Kinna, Stockholm Studies 
in Comparative Religion (London: Routledge, 2018); Jonathan Fox, 
An Introduction to Religion and Politics: Theory and Practice (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2013); Jeffrey Haynes, ed. Routledge Handbook of Religion 
and Politics (London: Routledge, 2009); Nikki R. Keddie, “Secularism 
and Its Discontents,” Dædalus 132, no. 3 (2003); Steven Kettell, “Do We 
Need a ‘Political Science of Religion’?,” Political Studies Review 14, no. 2 
(2016); Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion 
and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
 13 Robert N. Bellah and Phillip E. Hammond, Varieties of Civil Religion 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1980); John A. Coleman, “Civil Religion,” 
Sociology of Religion 31, no. 2 (1970); Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion, 
trans. George Staunton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); 
John Markoff and Daniel Regan, “The Rise and Fall of Civil Religion: 
Comparative Perspectives,” Sociological Analysis 42, no. 4 (1981).
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located it in the broader contexts of both the ‘resurgence’ of reli-
gion in politics and the increasing interest in anarchist studies, ac-
knowledged our positionality and the disproportionate focus on 
Christianity, and summarised a tentative mapping of the territory 
according to four main categories of enquiry.14 It nevertheless left 
out discussions of definitions. What follows here therefore is an 
exploration of some of the difficulties inherent in trying to define 
‘anarchism’ and ‘religion’, and an explanation of why we chose 
to adopt a flexible approach for this project, followed by a short 
introduction to each of the chapters in this volume.
‘Anarchism’
It is conventional to begin discussing the definition of anarchism 
by pointing to the etymology of the term. The suffix -archy is said 
to refer to the state or the ruler, the prefix an- to a rejection or 
negation, hence an-archy signals a rejection of the state or ruler. 
This, however, is somewhat too simplistic, as has been noted and 
discussed by a number of scholars in anarchist studies.15 For one, 
even the Greek suffix refers to more than just ‘the state’ (or ‘rul-
er’). It is akin to the Latin prefix pri-, as in: princes and principal-
ities, but also principles, primordial and priority. ‘Anarchy’, even 
etymologically, thus hints at more than just a rejection or negation 
of the modern version of princes and principalities.
 14 The four areas were: anarchist critiques of religion; anarchist exe-
gesis; anarchist theology, and religious anarchist historiographies. 
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and Matthew S. Adams, “Anarchism 
and Religion: Mapping an Increasingly Fruitful Landscape,” in Essays in 
Anarchism and Religion: Volume I, ed. Alexandre Christoyannopoulos 
and Matthew S. Adams, Stockholm Studies in Comparative Religion 
(Stockholm: Stockholm University Press, 2017). The more detailed ex-
ploration of those four main types of enquiries has now been published 
as Christoyannopoulos and Apps, “Anarchism and Religion.”
 15 Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism: A Political 
Commentary on the Gospel (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010), 269–
70; Francis Dupuis-Déri, “Anarchy in Political Philosophy,” in New 
Perspectives on Anarchism, ed. Nathan Jun and Shane Wahl (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington, 2010); Mitchell Verter, “The Anarchism of the Other 
Person,” ibid.
6 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume II
Furthermore, even though definitions of ‘anarchism’ notorious-
ly defy consensus, most anarchists today would subscribe to an 
attempt to interpret the term as indicating a critical and anti- 
authoritarian position with respect to all forms of hierarchy and 
domination. This includes top-down political structures such as 
‘the state’, but also neoliberal capitalism (hence the allergic reac-
tion to ‘anarcho-capitalism’), patriarchy and heteronormativity, 
‘religion’ (certainly hierarchical religious beliefs and institutions), 
racism, ableism, speciesism, and so on. To reduce ‘anarchism’ to 
‘opposition to the state’ therefore overlooks this set of richer chal-
lenges to the multifarious expressions of power and discrimina-
tion. The state often underwrites and polices these structures of 
oppression, and there is much about it that earns it dedicated crit-
icism from anarchists, but it is not the only object of their critique, 
sometimes not even the primary one.
Attempting to define anarchism by turning to concepts such as 
‘the state’ and ‘capitalism’ also implies an historical gaze that, for 
some, unduly circumvents a much deeper tradition that oppos-
es manifold forms of authority. For the more historically-minded 
commentator, to view anarchist politics emerging as a response to 
the centralising tendencies of the modern nation-state necessar-
ily dates its genesis to, at the earliest, the closing decades of the 
seventeenth century. Similarly, if we emphasise the importance of 
capitalism, and locate anarchism’s foundation in responses to the 
depredations of industrialism and the rise of the workers’ move-
ment, this timeline is further abridged. If it is meaningless to talk 
of ‘anarchism’ before the rise of the modern state or capitalism, 
where does this leave those that want to see the Levellers or Lao 
Tzu as essentially anarchist?
There is also the question of method and place, that is, of how 
and where this criticism is articulated. Some channel their  anarchist 
critique primarily in workplace syndicalism. Some prioritise direct 
action and street protests, some informed by a determination to 
remain non-violent, although some dismiss such determination 
in activism as an expression of dilettantism. Some focus on the 
written articulation of their ideas, from zines to blogs to philo-
sophical tracts. Some join armed struggles such as in Republican 
Spain in 1936, or in post-2011 Rojava. Some focus on prefiguring 
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political alternatives here and now. Many fuse these different pri-
orities in novel combinations of thought and praxis.
There are, in short, many varieties of anarchism. In our project, 
since the interaction of ‘religion’ and ‘anarchism’ is both under-
studied and potentially pregnant with a rich variety of fruitful 
angles of analysis, we have opted to be as open as possible to 
different declinations of ‘anarchism’. In their separate ways, there-
fore, each author in these volumes of Essays in Anarchism and 
Religion is implicated in this unforgiving task of definition. As 
editors, we remain open to the idea that anarchism remains a con-
tested category – the site of manifold, competing definitions – and 
have encouraged authors to reflect on this vexed issue.
‘Religion’
It is no less difficult to settle on a definition of ‘religion’, for a 
different variety of reasons. As Momen argues, although most 
people think they know what they mean by ‘religion’, “in-built 
cultural biases predispose us to view religion in particular 
ways”: Westerners for instance see religion primarily as a sys-
tem of beliefs; Hindus might lay more emphasis on the perfor-
mance of ritual activities; and Muslims tend to focus on how 
one’s personal and social life is to be lived.16 Moreover, the idea 
of religion as a ‘personal choice’ is relatively recent: hitherto 
your religion was usually that of the family and community in 
which you were born.17 The very categorising of ‘religion’ as 
a distinct part of one’s compartmentalised life (separate from 
work, family, hobbies, etc.) is also a product of relatively recent 
and Western contexts.18
It is perhaps not surprising if different scholars embedded in 
different academic disciplines therefore propose significantly 
 16 Momen, The Phenomenon of Religion, pp. 21–25 (the quote is from p. 21).
 17 Ibid., pp. 24–25. See also Jeremy Carrette and Richard King, Selling 
Spirituality: The Silent Takeover of Religion (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2005).
 18 Christoyannopoulos and Fiscella, “‘Religious’ Radicalism.”; Momen, 
The Phenomenon of Religion, p. 25.
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different definitions of religion.19 Some prioritise the metaphysi-
cal content, others the sociological characteristics, yet others the 
psychoanalytical impulse, others still the political function. Some 
might eschew definitions and point to a variety of characteris-
tics to be found in all ‘religion’: practical and ritual (the religious 
performances and celebrations that punctuate days, months and 
years); experiential and emotional (Paul’s or Buddha’s conver-
sions, religious music and art, etc.); narrative or mythic (the story 
of our origins); doctrinal and philosophical (theology, dogma, 
metaphysics, etc.); ethical and legal (how we are to live our lives); 
social and institutional (the community of adherents and its so-
cial function); and material (the physical buildings and sacred 
places).20 Others will define it more informally as an activity one 
is “extremely enthusiastic about and does regularly.”21 Any one of 
these definitional preferences will result in the inclusion or exclu-
sion of particular examples, the inclusion or exclusion of which 
might be disputed by others (Buddhism? Confucianism? Football? 
Shopping?). Several definitions may even result in having to la-
bel certain political ideologies as ‘religion’ (State communism? 
Nationalism?).22
A further difficulty is that what most Westerners instinctively 
understand as ‘religion’ is a product of Western history, laden, 
inevitably, with Westphalian and imperialistic baggage. There 
are therefore important reasons, from a post-colonial and post- 
Westphalian perspective, to proceed with caution before impos-
ing any exogenous definitions upon a phenomenon some variant 
of which has consistently been part and parcel of the life and 
 19 Bowker, “Religion,” pp. xviii–xiv; George Chryssides and Ron Geaves, 
The Study of Religion: An Introduction to Key Ideas and Methods, 
Second ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); Peter Connolly, ed. Approaches 
to the Study of Religion (London: Continuum, 1999); Hinnells, The 
Penguin Dictionary of Religions, pp. 414–16; Momen, The Phenomenon 
of Religion, pp. 26–28, and chap. 3; Robert A. Segal, ed. The Blackwell 
Companion to the Study of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009).
 20 Ninan Smart, The World’s Religions, Second ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp. 12–22.
 21 “Religion,” Cambridge University Press, https://dictionary.cambridge.
org/dictionary/english/religion.
 22 The World’s Religions, pp. 22–26.
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thought of every human community for millennia prior to the 
European Enlightenment. This is not to say that the word ‘reli-
gion’ is polluted beyond repair by statist and colonial Western 
history, but that the particular context from which the wide-
spread signification of the term as labelling a particular category 
of things emerged, and the implicit framing that this can still im-
pose, should not be ignored.23
With such considerations in mind, our approach has been not 
to impose contestable limits but to stay open to different defi-
nitional approaches. Where the use of a term by an author in 
these volumes might be controversial, as with ‘anarchism’, we en-
couraged some acknowledgement and discussion of those choices. 
Just as with ‘anarchism’, though, we have not sought to police the 
boundaries of the term or proscribe its use in particular contexts 
a priori.
In editing and presenting essays on ‘anarchism’ and ‘religion’, 
therefore, we adopted an open and flexible approach to both 
terms’ definitions. Our primary interest is not in excluding poten-
tial angles of analysis because they did not fit a particular kind of 
definition, but in creating a space for rigorous scholarly discus-
sion at the overlap of the two, whatever the particular definitional 
preference of the author. In that sense, perhaps, we have abided 
by one precept commonly recognised in anarchist approaches to 
consensus-building.
The essays in this volume
The first volume contained eight chapters which adopted different 
combinations of modes of enquiry: Pauli and Blanes were primar-
ily historical interventions; Galvan-Alvarez blended history and 
exegesis; Podmore engaged in anarchist theology; Meggitt was 
rooted in Bible studies; Strandberg approached anarchist critiques 
of religion from a philosophical angle; and Hoppen considered 
 23 Christoyannopoulos and Fiscella, “‘Religious’ Radicalism.”; Timothy 
Fitzgerald, The Ideology of Religious Studies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000); Luca Mavelli and Fabio Petito, eds., Towards a Postsecular 
International Politics: New Forms of Community, Identity, and Power 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
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the mystical anarchism of two particular thinkers.24 This volume 
presents a similarly diverse blend of essays considering anarchism 
and religion using a variety of modes of enquiry.
The first chapter in this volume, by Lillian Türk and Jesse Cohn, 
explores some of the tensions between anarchism and religion as 
debated in New York’s famous Jewish-anarchist newspaper Fraye 
Arbeter Shtime in the period 1937–1945. It argues that what unit-
ed those who defended religion and those who opposed it in the 
debates hosted by the newspaper is a critique of ‘domination’, 
whether religious or not. This chapter also articulates a contribu-
tion which for once does not come from the Christian tradition, 
even though the arguments that are covered apply not only to 
Jewish perspectives.
Just as recent work on the concept of domination in political 
theory has emphasised the distinctive things anarchist theorists 
have to offer to the discussion, the question of ethics has also 
been recognised as an area where anarchist critiques are espe-
cially powerful. In the second chapter, Emma Brown Dewhurst 
approaches this idea from a novel perspective, suggesting that 
ethical considerations derived from Christian Byzantine thought 
are best enacted by adopting practical ideas and critical think-
ing from communal anarchist thought. Focusing on Maximus the 
Confessor and Peter Kropotkin, she argues that despite their very 
different metaphysical starting points, they have similar thoughts 
on how human beings should act with respect to each other and 
 24 Enrique Galván-Álvarez, “Why Anarchists Like Zen? A Libertarian 
Reading of Shinran (1173–1263),” in Essays in Anarchism and Religion: 
Volume I, ed. Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and Matthew S. Adams, 
Stockholm Studies in Comparative Religion (Stockholm: Stockholm 
University Press, 2017); Franziska Hoppen, “A Reflection on Mystical 
Anarchism in the Works of Gustav Landauer and Eric Voegelin,” ibid.; 
Ruy Llera Blanes, “Mutuality, Resistance and Egalitarianism in a Late 
Colonial Bakongo Christian Movement,” ibid.; Justin Meggitt, “Was 
the Historical Jesus an Anarchist? Anachronism, Anarchism and the 
Historical Jesus,” ibid.; Benjamin J. Pauli, “The Catholic Worker, Dorothy 
Day, and Exemplary Anarchism,” ibid.; Simon D. Podmore, “The Anarchē 
of Spirit: Proudhon’s Anti-Theism & Kierkegaard’s Self in Apophatic 
Perspective,” ibid.; Hugo Strandberg, “Does Religious Belief Necessarily 
Mean Servitude? On Max Stirner and the Hardened Heart,” ibid.
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to the rest of the world, and that Kropotkin’s ideas are therefore 
particularly useful to Christian ethicists.
The notion that anarchism, and indeed socialist thinking more 
generally, may have more in common with Christian ethical ideas 
than their frequently atheistic theorists would be willing to ad-
mit, is an established theme in the history of political thought. 
Anarchists, especially when contemplating not just their thoughts 
but their deeds, are often perceived in terms of their militant op-
position to organised religion, and actions perpetrated under the 
so-called ‘Red Terror’ in revolutionary Spain might seem to cap-
ture this hostility in sanguinary terms. In his contribution, Pedro 
Garcia-Guirao adds depth and colour to this image, using film 
as a tool to probe issues of representation and historical accuracy. 
Providing a ‘panoramic overview’ of the portrayal of religion 
(specifically: Catholicism) in Spanish film productions that could 
be qualified as ‘anarchist’, he focuses particularly on films that 
interrogate the legacies of the Spanish Civil War. It considers both 
critical portrayals of stereotypical Christianity, and portrayals of 
Christianity which are more in tune with anarchist preferences.
What is certainly apparent is that rejections by anarchists of 
religious ideas frequently rest on a questionable understanding of 
the actual content of these ideas. Justin Bronson Barringer’s chapter 
highlights some of the complexity inherent in, in this instance, 
Christian thinking, and demonstrates the way in which partic-
ular reading strategies can disrupt stereotypical interpretations 
of complex bodies of thought. He offers an anarchist reading of 
First Peter, arguing that Peter proposes an unacknowledged and 
politically radical vision of non-coercion, voluntary association 
and equality. Barringer also argues that this reading offers a situ-
ation whereby oppressive power structures are subverted and the 
oppressed are freed when those with little power paradoxically 
subordinate themselves to the existing powers that be.
The role of violence in occasioning social change has been a 
point of fierce contention throughout anarchism’s history. These 
debates also sometimes have a fundamentally religious inflec-
tion, where anarchist activists inspired by Tolstoyan pacifism or 
Gandhian satyagraha both challenge the efficacy of political vi-
olence and ponder the extent to which bloodletting undermines 
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anarchism’s cardinal insistence on the necessary equation be-
tween ‘means’ and ‘ends’. In the fifth chapter, Christos Iliopoulos 
draws on Friedrich Nietzsche and Walter Benjamin in order to 
challenge the thesis that Christian anarchist activism must remain 
dogmatically pacifistic. By promoting a Christianity that, instead 
of self-negation, adopts an affirmative life stance, and by distin-
guishing between mythical and divine violence, Iliopoulos argues 
that Christian anarchists need not remain shackled by passive and 
resentful readings of Christianity.
By contrast, in the chapter that follows, Sam Underwood argues 
that Christian anarchists make a compelling and convincing case 
that nonviolence is the most consistent position with the philos-
ophy of anarchism in general, and should not be a characteristic 
unique to a specifically Christian anarchism. That is, he contends 
that the criticisms of violence articulated by Christian anarchists 
might speak to non-Christian anarchists too, and that non- 
violence is actually a central element of anarchist prefiguration.
If Iliopoulos’s chapter hints at the breadth of thinkers that are 
seen as offering something to the historic anarchist tradition – 
in this case Nietzsche, whose poetic assassination of modern 
ethical pieties inspired anarchists as diverse as Emma Goldman 
and Herbert Read – this theme is on display once more in Duane 
Williams’ chapter. Rather than Nietzsche, Williams focuses on an-
other thinker whose coruscating prose and dogged unconvention-
ality has seen him positioned within the anarchist orbit: William 
Blake. Williams examines the extent to which Blake’s writings on 
law and religion make him an anarchist, and demonstrates how 
Blake’s anarchistic and religious tendencies are fused in a novel 
intellectual edifice. He does this by exploring Blake’s opposition 
to both judicial and moral law, analysing his complete mistrust of 
institutional state religion, and examining Blake’s reading of Jesus 
as a bold and inspirational transgressor of that law.
In the final chapter, Erica Lagalisse offers a deep history of the 
interlacing of anarchist and religious ideas and practices. Lagalisse 
investigates the religious and theological roots tied to the secret 
societies of the radical Enlightenment from which modern an-
archism emerged as a distinctive politics. In the process she ex-
plores the hidden correspondences between classical anarchism, 
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Renaissance magic and occult philosophy, and questions the 
widespread attachment to the ‘secular’ on the Left, as well as its 
gendered and colonial inflections.
Lagalisse’s interrogation of the gendered and colonial im-
plications of conventional leftist secularism points also to the 
modest steps taken in this collection to deal with the enduring 
Eurocentrism and androcentrism that so often beset academic 
research. We welcome the fact that this volume has both more 
female scholars, and more reflections on non-Christian religious 
contexts, than the last, but equally acknowledge that there is a 
long way to go and that it is important to continue to broad-
en the scope of this project. Indeed, given the fluidity that this 
introduction, and the chapters comprising this volume, have all 
highlighted as a defining characteristic of the anarchist tradition, 
it is important that scholarship on this tradition should seek to 
address these problems. Nevertheless, while we are committed 
to these philosophical and methodological principles, a project 
of this nature will always come face-to-face with practicalities 
and structural biases that hinder the inclusiveness we aspire to 
achieve. The contributors remain overwhelmingly male, their 
contributions are often rooted in literatures defined by their 
Eurocentrism, and Christianity remains a hegemonic lens. We 
are determined, however, to address this issue. This is the second 
volume of a three-part series comprised of papers all emanating 
from the Anarchist Studies Conference held at Loughborough 
University in 2012, but we plan a fourth volume in this proj-
ect that addresses these issues of positionality, intersectionality, 
and inclusivity directly. In contrast to the looser organisation of 
the first three volumes, the fourth will examine these dynamics 
head on, but also interrogate the conventions that these initial 
volumes are helping to cultivate concerning our object of study. 
The fourth volume, therefore, will be concerned as much with 
the legacy that our scholarship is creating, as with the intricate 
relationship between anarchism and religion.
But these self-flagellating mea culpas do not detract from the 
power and importance of this collection. Just as with Volume I, 
we continue to be astonished by the interdisciplinary breadth 
of this scholarship, by its thought-provoking originality, and by 
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the enthusiastic and authentic commitment by its authors to ex-
plore these areas. Editing these papers has been stimulating and 
enriching, and we hope that encountering them will prove just 
as rewarding to new readers, testing in the process some prev-
alent assumptions about how ‘anarchism’ and ‘religion’ should 
be defined.
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and 
Matthew S. Adams, May 2018
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Yiddish Radicalism, Jewish Religion : 
Controversies in the Fraye Arbeter Shtime, 
1937–1945
Lilian Türk* & Jesse Cohn†
* Hamburg University
† Purdue University Northwest
“Anarchism” and “religion” are categories of belonging that 
serve as tools for identification – both of oneself and of others. 
Yiddish-speaking anarchism is overwhelmingly remembered 
as an antireligious movement, a characterization drawn from 
its  early experiences in the immigrant communities of the U.S. 
(circa 1880–1919). However, this obscures the presence of 
competing definitions of both religion and anarchism within the 
Jewish  anarchist milieu and fails to take into account the  social 
character of processes of identification unfolding over time. 
A generation after its circulation peaked, in a context of  declining 
Jewish anarchist “groupness” (1937–1945), the Yiddish  anarchist 
newspaper Fraye Arbeter Shtime hosted debates over religion 
which reveal a far broader spectrum of interpretations than 
were  apparent in the earlier period. Examining these debates 
 demonstrates the subversive fluidity more than the rigidly bounded 
character of anarchist and religious identities alike, as an emergent 
consensus among Jewish anarchists names domination rather than 
religion per se as the common enemy.
The historians refuse to confront Jewish radicalism in its own 
right, even as they make shrewd remarks about its unanticipated 
role; the Jewish radicals, in similar fashion, refused to confront 
religion in its own right, even as they made shrewd remarks about 
its unacknowledged uses. 
(Howe 1976: 323)
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Once we are liberated from the vulgar, theological model of  history 
that has been endlessly and scrupulously repeated by modernity, 
we should no longer be surprised or horrified by the “return” of 
religion [within anarchism]. Religion “returns,” but – like all  other 
things – it returns in an infinite, unpredictable series of events 
and situations [. . .]. Religion “returns” at once the same and yet 
different and surprising.
(Colson 2007: 60)
Those familiar with the history of Jewish radicalism in America 
may have heard of the Yonkiper beler (Yom Kippur Balls), 
 antireligious festivities held on the Day of Atonement between 
1889 and 1903 by young anarchists such as the illustrious 
Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, featuring outrageous 
 mockeries of ritual piety.1 Indeed, the rejection of religion has 
a prominent place in the history of Jewish anarchist ideas. The 
assumptions that society is constructed according to an arbitrary 
divine plan not alterable by human intervention, that rules estab-
lished by the will of God are the foundation of a system of law 
not accessible to reason but merely to be accepted by submissive 
believers – these were denounced in the strong critiques of religion 
issuing from Johann Most and Mikhail Bakunin.2 Religion was 
 1 On these occasions, four-page leaflets (tfile-zakes) were disseminated, 
filled with parodies and satire, lampoons of prayer and religion in gen-
eral and Judaism in particular (N. Goldberg in Tsherikover 1945: 434). 
Johann Most, Emma Goldman (1869–1940) and Alexander Berkman 
(1870–1936) gave speeches at Yonkiper beler alongside Saul Yanovsky 
(a.k.a. Shoel Yanovski, 1864–1939, first editor of the revived Fraye Arbeter 
Stime [FASh], Di Ovnt Tsaytung and Di Fraye Gezelshaft), Roman Lewis 
(1865–1918, founder of the Pioneers of Freedom (Pionirn der frayhayt), 
and Mikhail Zametkin (a.k.a. Michael Zametkin, 1859–1935, a popular 
orator and writer for the Arbeter Tsaytung); see Avrich 1988: pp. 191 ff. 
Orthodox and Reform Jews opposed the festivities, which rewrote and 
mocked Kol nidre (the recitation that introduces Yom Kippur), provided 
a buffet with alcoholic beverages, at which music was played and danced 
to and where the Marseillaise “and other hymns against Satan” were 
sung (N. Goldberg in Tsherikover 1945: 440–4, 444; transl. LT; see also 
Howe 1976: 105–107; Avrich 1973: 38–42; Avrich 1988: 176 ff., esp. 
180 f.; Rosenberg 2001).
 2 See e.g. Most 1883. Johann Most (1846–1906), next to German socialists, 
exercised great influence on Jewish anarchists in late 19th century London 
and US-American cities (N. Goldberg in Tsherikover 1945: 426; see also E. 
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interpreted as an obsolete, irrational system of ideas that blocked 
or at least distorted thought. According to the historian Nathan 
Goldberg, who describes a pervasive antireligious self-understand-
ing among Jewish immigrants until 1900, this concept of religion 
was particularly widespread among Jewish anarchists.3 Robert G. 
Ingersoll’s Some Mistakes of Moses and its two translations into 
Yiddish in 1886 and 1903 greatly influenced the militant  atheism 
of the weekly paper Arbeter Fraynt, among others. Far from 
being limited to Jewish radicals, agnosticism and scepticism were 
widespread in the East European Jewish Enlightenment (Haskole) 
and among all those who left the traditional community, defined 
by a strict interpretation of Judaism perpetuated by authoritarian 
religious and educational institutions.4 It was not unusual to 
be an agnostic, atheist or “Epicurean”5 thinker by 1880, but 
according to Goldberg, the highly distinctive means employed by 
Jewish anarchists to agitate against religion turned a great part of 
the Jewish community away from them.6
Tsherikover, Di amolike anarkhistn in gerangl kegn idishn got [The former 
anarchists in struggle against the Jewish god] in Idisher kemfer, 7.3.1941.
 3 N. Goldberg, in Tsherikover 1945: pp. 434 ff.
 4 The critique of the traditional educational system (kheyder), teachers and 
authoritarian educationalists (melamdim) and the  municipality of the 
shtetl (small town), derived from the East European Jewish Enlightenment 
(Haskole), was a widespread topos among socialist Jews by the time of 
the 1905 Russian Revolution, as reflected in numerous  autobiographies 
(e.g. I. I. Singer 1946). Many biographies of Haskole document a progress 
set in motion by newspapers and industrialization, leading to a reform 
of education; representatives of the Jewish Enlightenment (maskilim) like 
Yoysef Perl (1773–1839), Avrom Gottlober (1810–1899) or his  student 
Avrom Goldfaden (1840–1908) were teachers. This process and the 
tremendous importance of newspapers for education in the shtetl were 
both humorously and melancholically described by Sholem Aleichem 
(Solomon N. Rabinovich, 1859–1916) in Drayfus in Kasrilevke (1902).
 5 References to Epicurus often served to represent Jewish anarchists’ 
self-perceptions, perhaps evoking associations with a search for the  origin 
and meaning of human understanding and reason, a strong emphasis on 
the atomistic nature of science, and the struggle against fate and predeter-
mination. These fundamental themes were reflected in the debate in FASh, 
as we will see.
 6 N. Goldberg, in Tsherikover 1945: 418. 
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Consequently, the identification of anarchism and radicalism 
in general7 as antireligious was widespread among participants in 
the movement, and this identification is echoed by the secondary 
literature – a testament to the effectiveness of Jewish anarchists’ 
antireligious activism.8 Religion and anarchism are very broad cat-
egories of identification — categories used by activists and taken 
over by researchers when interpreting historical sources. However, 
as Paul-François Tremlett notes, contemporary social science has 
increasingly called into question the very boundaries of “religion” 
as a category of analysis, and indeed, we can discern competing 
interpretations of that category within anarchist discourse.9 We 
would suggest distinguishing between self-defined groups and the 
abstract categories applied by outsiders in order to avoid the false 
assumptions and dichotomies that are created when Jewish and 
gentile anarchisms are characterised as antireligious movements 
tout court. It is worth considering, for instance, that Bakunin, fa-
mous for his 1871 masterpiece God and the State (translated into 
Yiddish by Shoel Yanovski in 1901), argued strongly against “offi-
cial” religion intertwined with state power, but advocated a more 
nuanced view on decentralised denominations and their freedom 
of conscience and propaganda.10 To translate this into a claim that 
Bakunin was “pro-religion” would be as short-sighted as charac-
terising him as purely and simply “antireligious”.
 7 Most actors used the term ‘radical’ to describe themselves. The term 
‘anarchist’ was used less often; Yiddish anarchist writers instead called 
themselves frayhaytlekhe sotsyalistn (libertarian socialists) or Epicurean 
thinkers.
 8 See e.g. W. J. Fishman, who correctly observes that “the radical intelligent 
eschewed religion as obscurantism maintained by the rigidity of super-
stitious ritual and rabbis who acted as a brake on anti-Tsarist activity. 
Jewish tradition was associated with the physical and mental degradation 
of the ghetto; and Yiddish was despised as the jargon of slaves, while 
Hebrew was elevated to the proper form of communication between 
Jews” (Fishman 2004: 98 f.).
 9 Tremlett 2004: 367–68.
 10 In his “Revolutionary Catechism”, Bakunin demanded “[t]he abolition 
of all state religions and all privileged churches, including those partially 
maintained or supported by state subsidies”, but also “Absolute liberty 
of every religion to build temples to their gods, and to pay and support 
their priests” (77).
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Recent studies delving into the Yiddish radical milieu describe 
a range of nuanced attitudes towards religion. Annie Polland 
demonstrated the intellectual and social ties between ‘radical’ and 
‘religious’ readers of the Yiddish socialist daily Forverts at the 
very beginning of the 20th century.11 Editors of the paper sought 
ways to reach a wider audience and it becomes clear that as 
 early as in 1900 one cannot assume a clear distinction between a 
religious and a secular milieu: “The Forverts’ debates point to 
the vigour with which Jewish immigrants and their  organizations 
wrestled with religion. They are especially  significant in showing 
how religion and reactions to it did not disappear with the waning 
of religious authority, but rather became all the more pressing.”12
When we investigate the categories of religion and anarchism 
as they appear in discursive practice – i.e., in the context of an 
open-ended, contentious dialogue between multiple actors – we 
find that it was domination, not religion per se, that the “antire-
ligious” anarchists opposed, and that it was domination that the 
“religious” anarchist writers struggled to disavow while  justifying 
their self-location13 within the anarchist movement. This can best 
be demonstrated by examining a debate among Yiddish writers 
 11 Polland 2007. In her study of two debates in the Yiddish socialist  daily 
Forverts, Polland demonstrates the “shared worlds” of ‘radical’ and 
‘religious’ readers in 1904 and 1905. Letters showed similar argumentative 
strategies, but also social ties at people’s work places, in families, 
 marriages and even friendship. See also Michels 2005: 184. Other research 
(e.g. Cohn, Biagini) has pointed to themes shared by antireligious Jewish 
anarchists and the Jewish religious tradition itself (e.g., iconoclasm and 
messianism), affinities made tangible in the relations between Gustav 
Landauer and Martin Buber, for example.
 12 Ibid.: 376. Years later, in 1915, boundaries remained blurred, as “a 
reporter for the Orthodox Morgn zhurnal, noted the increasing ‘ tolerance 
on the Jewish streets,’ manifested by both the pious and the radicals. 
[. . .] he relayed spotting a ’known anarchist sitting and talking with an 
orthodox rabbi’ in a friendly manner. He also noted how Orthodox study 
groups hired leaders of the extreme left to deliver speeches of general, not 
political, interest at their meetings.“ (ibid.: 391).
 13 In order to capture some of the phenomena that are usually attributed 
to the term identity (hypostasized into a falsely concrete “thing”), the 
sociologist Rogers Brubaker offers process-oriented terms like identifi-
cation and categorization, as well as self-location and social location, 
together with terms for qualities, such as commonality, connectedness, 
and groupness (Brubaker 2004: pp. 28 ff.).
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published in the anarchist weekly Fraye Arbeter Shtime (Free 
Voice of Labor or FASh) between 1937 and 1945. Instead of a 
single, clearly antireligious point of view, as we shall see, the 
articles present a heated debate on Yidishkayt (“Jewishness”) 
interpreted in political, ethnic and religious terms, and its  relation 
to different concepts of anarchism. We begin by exploring the 
themes emerging in the unique contributions of Abba Gordin, 
then situating these within the equally unique “counterpublic 
space” that was the FASh. This, in turn, will allow us to see how 
antireligious and religious anarchist perspectives were  articulated 
in a period when Jews’ political engagement with anarchism, 
while still significant, could no longer take the same form that it 
had in the era of the Yonkiper beler.
A central figure: Abba Gordin (1887–1964)
At the heart of this debate was Abba Gordin, a philosopher, 
 social psychologist, biographer, and educationalist whom Paul 
Avrich describes as one of the most important figures in Russian 
 anarchism.14 Allan Antliff reads Abba and his brother Velfke 
Gordin, from the perspective of their Russian-Revolution-era 
writings, as antireligious “arch-materialists”, suggesting that their 
primary inspiration came from Max Stirner’s attack on “the meta-
physical thinking underpinning religion” as “the foundation for 
the hierarchical division of society”.15 However, Antliff notes that 
their 1918 Manifest Pananarkhistov (or Pan-Anarchist Manifesto) 
rather even-handedly denounced “[t]he rule of heaven and the 
rule of nature – angels, spirits, devils, molecules, atoms, ether, the 
laws of God-Heaven and the laws of Nature, forces, the influence 
of one body on another” as equally arbitrary social constructs: 
“all this is invented, formed, created by society”.16 Indeed, for the 
 14 Avrich 1973: 9. Gordin’s works Draysik yor in Lite un Poyln (1958; 
Thirty Years in Lithuania and Poland) for the period ending in 1917, 
In gerangl far frayhayt (1956; In struggle for freedom) for 1917–1919, 
and Zikhroynes un kheshboynes. Memuarn fun der rusisher revolutsye 
(1955; Memories and Accounts: Memoirs of the Russian Revolution) for 
1917–1924 are contributions to a history of Bolshevism and the facets of 
the revolutionary movement in Russia.
 15 Antliff, “Anarchy, Power, and Poststructuralism”, SubStance 36.2 (2007): 61–62.
 16 Qtd. in Antliff 61–62.
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Gordins, the materialistic and scientistic pretensions of Marxism 
were to be denounced as yet another religious illusion:
For them, science – by which they meant all rational systems, 
 natural science and social science alike – constituted the new 
religion of the middle class. The greatest fraud of all was Marx’s 
theory of dialectical materialism. “Marxism”, they declared, “is 
the new scientific Christianity, designed to conquer the bourgeois 
world by deceiving the people, the proletariat, just as Christianity 
deceived the feudal world”. Marx and Engels were “the Magi of 
scientific socialist black-magic”.17
Nor did Abba Gordin abandon this line of attack on religion and 
science alike after the collapse of the revolution: in Communism 
Unmasked, he writes that “The instinctive messianic spark  glimmering 
in the heart of the laborer [. . .] devours his hard-won common 
sense, his healthy realistic look on life, and he forgets himself and 
becomes an easy victim of fantasms”, and he denounces authoritarian 
communism precisely by calling it a “quasi-religion”.18
In these statements, Gordin clearly located himself within the 
antireligious radical narrative. In other texts, however, we find 
different shades of pro-religious arguments. Joseph Nedava, a 
historian and friend of his, writes that this “rebel” and “ iconoclast” 
promoted a revival of what he saw as the core values of Jewish 
ethics.19 God is seen as force of mutuality created by  individuals. 
The concept of deity – conceptualised as a vision of the I (Ikh) – 
was expressed by constant social and cultural  evolution. The 
process towards individualism and eventually to collective 
“inter-individualism”, as Gordin called the future state of society, 
entailed a synthesis between individuality and mutuality.20 But 
 17 Avrich, The Russian Anarchists 178.
 18 Gordin 1940: 31, 55.
 19 Nedava 1974: 74.
 20 A friend of Gordin’s, P. Gdalya, published an anthology of anarchist 
thinkers, suggesting an entire anarchist tradition set in motion and de-
veloped by certain philosophers, eventually coming to fruition with 
Gordin’s concept of “inter-individualism” (P. Gdalya 1963). The book 
is a collection of biographies starting with William Godwin, followed 
by Pierre J. Proudhon, Élisée Reclus, Domela Nieuwenhuis, Johann 
Most, Errico Malatesta, Jean Grave, Sébastien Faure, Francisco Ferrer y 
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religion and the Jewish tradition were not merely a pool from 
which Gordin took allegories and moral lessons in order to trans-
form them into a revolutionary programme. Religion, he wrote, 
must be understood in sociological and psychological terms: The 
religious feeling creates social bonds and changes them. It spans 
the abyss separating socialism and individualism and creates “in-
ter-individualism.”21 In this respect religious ideas become real as 
soon as adherents believe and make them real.
Gordin’s concept of God shifts from antireligious and 
 anticlerical barbs hurled against a supreme being to instrumental 
interpretations of God as the foundation for a higher  rationality 
and ethics to a phenomenological interpretation comparable to 
Rudolf Otto’s notion of a supernatural Sensus Numinis. The 
religious feeling and striving for justice in Gordin’s words can 
only be felt by a Jewish believer.22 Occasionally Gordin draws 
on esoteric images such as the ingestion of light23 to describe the 
purification of body and soul as a way of coming closer to deity 
and to the future state of society. These shifting concepts reveal 
the difficulty of locating Gordin’s ideas in a continuum ranging 
between Orthodoxy and free thought.
Accordingly, in his writings on religion, Gordin both shares 
and subverts the modern notion of religion as an entity  essentially 
 separate from power and politics.24 On one side Judaism is  idealized 
as a non-political entity, with a proud history of a  diasporic, 
self- governed, stateless society. Judaism or rather Jewishness 
Guardia, and Abba Gordin. Gordin himself wrote a preface, thanking the 
aid of Ashuakh, a cooperative publishing house in Tel Aviv.
 21 Gordin 1938: 103. In this respect Gordin followed principles of idealism, 
which argued that ideas formed reality. Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer 
and Max Stirner were heavily attacked as ’German idealists’ by Karl Marx 
in The German Ideology (Die Deutsche Ideologie, 1846).
 22 Judaism evokes a prophetic feeling of justice, which can be directed 
against the depravity of capitalism, militarism and imperialism (Gordin 
1940: 10). For an approach to Gordin’s Yiddish writings by the end of 
the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s, see Türk 2014, ch. 2.
 23 Gordin 1938: 291.
 24 See the essays in Fitzgerald 2007 for an investigation into the dichotomy 
of religion and power as distinct and separate alternatives, as “two essen-
tialized domains, one concerned with power and public order, the other 
the private inner world of prayer” (ibid.: 2).
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(Yidishkayt) must be seen an exception to the general rule, as 
an ethical entity, to which secular or political institutions are 
 extraneous.25 In this respect, Gordin, as an anarchist who despises 
statist and militarist societies, shares or rather hypostasizes the 
notion of religion as entity separate from politics. On the other 
side, the author subverts this notion of religion and its  separation 
from politics and official affairs. He claims that the privatized 
notion of ‘religion’ is foreign to Judaism. The synagogue has 
always been a social and secular (“worldly,” veltlekh) institution, 
next to being the house of prayer it served as club, library, lecture 
hall, guest house and playground for children. Most parts of the 
Talmud are worldly jurisprudence connected to holy texts, which 
are themselves worldly.26 Here, as in antireligious lines of 
 argumentation, the ideological and apologetical function of the 
dichotomy of religion and politics is obvious.
While Nedava and the Israeli historian Moyshe Goncharok 
give rich descriptions of Gordin’s character, a systematic history 
of his (anti-)political, religious and anarchist thinking is still a 
task to be fulfilled.27 Gordin went through a course of education 
shared by many Russian-Jewish intellectuals of his time. Along 
with his brother he attended the traditional primary school, 
learned Talmud, autodidactically learned Russian, and secretly 
acquired Russian progressive and revolutionary writings.28 After 
abetting a jailbreak in 1905, Gordin was arrested but was released 
shortly thereafter. In September 1911, the first and only is-
sue of an anarchist educationalist paper, Der Yunger Yid [The 
Young Jew], edited by the brothers Gordin, was published.29 
 25 Gordin 1940: 21 f.
 26 Ibid.: 250 f.
 27 Nedava 1974; Goncharok 2002.
 28 Gordin 1958: 12. Zeev (Zalman) “Wolf” Gordin tended to Marxism-
Zionism (Poale Tsion) during the time of the Russian revolution in 
1917. Both brothers were influential among industrial workers and 
sailors in Russian cities. Wolf Gordin underwent remarkable personal 
transformations: after leading the St. Petersburg branch of the Anarchist 
Federation, he turned to the Bolsheviki, then broke away from Lenin 
after a while, fled to the United States and eventually became a Protestant 
missionary (Avrich 1967: 237; Nedava 1974: 75).
 29 The paper was subtitled “Monthly newspaper for pedagogy, social 
life, philosophy, and the spreading of anarchism”. In Vilnius, just as in 
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Both authors supported what they called Pan-Anarchism.30 Initially, 
Abba Gordin published political and educational  pamphlets in 
Russian and became a prominent figure in the Moscow Anarchist 
Federation in 1916. He visited Nestor Makhno together with 
Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman after the civil war in 
1917.31 Makhno seems to have distanced himself from Gordin, 
characterizing him and other members of the Federation as “men 
of books rather than deeds” who “seemed mesmerised by their 
own words and resolutions and devoid of the will to fight for 
their ideals”.32 On 6 February 1926, Gordin was forced to flee 
via Siberia to the United States, where he then published mainly 
Yiddish works which he had begun in Russia.33
A Yiddish anarchist counterpublic space
The debate in which Gordin played such a central role took 
place among Yiddish-speaking intellectuals who did not in  every 
case refer to themselves as anarchists, but who, in writing for 
Białystok, existed a set of printing letters for the Russian-anarchist paper 
Anarkhiya, which was edited by someone under the pseudonym “Angel”. 
The set of letters for both papers was destroyed by Tsarist police and 
thugs (Nedava 1974: 77; Goncharok 1997: 9).
 30 In A. L. and V. L. Gordin: Manifest pananarkhistov, Moscow 1918 and 
in Br. Gordiny: Nichego ne zabyli i nichemu ne nauchilis, in: Anarkhist, 
22.10.1917, 1 f. (transl. into English in Avrich 1973: 49–52, 55) the 
brothers described pan-anarchism as a comprehensive program directed 
against five primary forms of oppression. Five ideals were posited: 1.) the 
political ideal of society’s liberation from government, 2.) the economic 
ideal of the workers’ liberation from private property, 3.) the pedagogical 
ideal of children’s liberation from authoritarian education (which they 
called “pedism”), 4.) the anticolonial ideal of the liberation of all nations 
from empires (“national-cosmopolitanism”), and 5.) the feminist ideal of 
women’s liberation from misogyny and domestic domination (ibid.: 49).
 31 Goncharok 1997: 12–14; LNYL: 139 f.
 32 Avrich 1967: 211.
 33 The details given on the year of Gordin’s emigration vary: Joseph Nedava 
refers to 1924 (1974: 73), LNYL however indicates 1926. Gordin was to 
be sent to the Manchurian border according to an order of the director 
of Cheka Felix E. Dzerzhinsky, but H. Kropsoy pled for Gordin and he 
could flee from Russia (Goncharok 1997: 13). Nevertheless, Gordin start-
ed writing Gruntprintsipn fun Idishkayt in Shanghai in 1927 (1938: ii).
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Fraye Arbeter Shtime, an organ that considered itself exclusively 
 anarchist, thereby situated their arguments within an anarchist 
counterpublic space, demonstrating an “openness to radical 
ideas” typical of Yiddish socialist circles.34 Just as the newspaper 
was open not only to self-proclaimed anarchists but also to 
socialists, Marxists, Labour Zionists, and literary critics and 
Yiddish educational reformers of various stripes, so the Jewish 
anarchists themselves did not always define themselves as 
“anarchist”, but rather shifted between socialist and libertarian 
identifications according to context. With this openness Fraye 
Arbeter Shtime played a crucial part not only for anarchists, but 
also for Jewish workers in North America. It constituted one of 
the few institutionalised forms of Jewish anarchism – the press, 
fraternal societies (faraynen), modern schools and cooperatives – 
and concurrently fulfilled a social function: newspapers and 
societies were focal points for immigrants, providing the space 
to elaborate Jewish self-perceptions. The paper was a highly 
 productive part of the “Yiddishist” culture movement; it was the 
most long-lived Yiddish anarchist periodical and along with the 
daily Forverts, one of the most long-lived Yiddish papers per se.35
It cannot be underestimated how dependably Fraye Arbeter 
Shtime served as a bridge between emerging and established 
Yiddish writers; along with the London Arbeter Fraynd and 
Zsherminal, it played an important role in establishing Yiddish 
literature by the end of the 19th and in the first decades of the 20th 
century. The prolific translation work of Yankev A. Merison (a.k.a. 
 34 Michels 2005: 103. Kathy Ferguson develops the concept of the “anar-
chist counterpublic” in the context of an analysis of Emma Goldman’s 
militant career; while this is never simply a universal “public space”, it is 
a space within which anarchists “rubbed shoulders with [those of] other 
political dispositions, inciting conversations among radicals and liber-
als over shared agendas such as freedom of speech or access to birth 
control”, extending beyond the intimate circle of “friends, acquaintanc-
es, and identifiable [anarchist] groups [. . .] into the realm of strangers” 
(2010: 197).
 35 Cohen 1945: 430–43, 431; Zimmer 2015: Ch. 1, pp. 32–37. “The 
Fraye Arbeter Shtime played a vital role in the Jewish labor movement 
in America; and throughout its long life it maintained a high literary 
standard, featuring some of the finest writers and poets in the history of 
Yiddish radical journalism” (Avrich 1988: 184).
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Jacob Maryson)36 was published alongside that of fine Yiddish 
writers, even if they did not consider themselves anarchist. This 
inclusiveness was felt as a strong connection among Yiddish anar-
chists. Yoysef Kahan (a.k.a. Joseph J. Cohen), an administrator of 
the paper, spoke of their habit of referring to themselves as FASh 
mishpokhe (the “FASh family”) at several occasions. The term 
was used to describe friendship and mutual respect.37
Not in spite of but because of this mutuality, the tensions and 
antinomies of anarchism laid the foundation of the debate we 
 36 Merison (1866–1941) was a Yiddish and Hebrew philologist, editor of 
Varhayt (“Truth”), Di fraye gezelshaft (“The Free Society”), Undzer kind 
(“Our Child” – a pedagogic journal published by Kultur lige). He also 
wrote for Arbeter fraynd (“The Worker’s Friend”), Ovnt tsaytung (“The 
Evening Times”) and Tsukunft (“The Future”), drew up the controversial 
brochure Anarkhizm un politishe virklekhkayt (“Anarchism and Political 
Reality”; New York 1906), in which he argued pro participation in elec-
tions. Others like Rudolf Rocker and Shoel Yanovski strongly opposed this 
(Goncharok 1997: 11). Furthermore, Merison translated C. Darwin, K. 
Marx, H. Spencer, M. Stirner, E. Malatesta, P. Kropotkin, J. S. Mill, H. Ibsen 
and J. A. Thompson, published own articles on philosophy, sociology, phys-
iology and pedagogy, and thus enriched vocabulary and style of the Yiddish 
language. He was founding member of the Kropotkin literatur gezelshaft 
(“Kropotkin Literary Society”) in 1913 (ibid.). This cooperative publishing 
house printed socialist and anarchist masterpieces in Yiddish until 1930.
 37 Kahan 1945: 430. Kahan named members of the editorial board (among 
others D. Izakovits, B. Aksler, Dr. Globus, Dr. Dubovski, A. Mints, Sh. 
Farber, L. Finkelshtayn, Dr. Michael Cohn, Hirsh Rayf), contributors 
from cooperative circles (among others Dr. Y. A. Merison, Vm. Natanson, 
Dr. Herman Frank, Abba Gordin, Gr. Raiva, S. Retap, S. Deyvidson, Vm. 
Shulman, A. Frumkin, R. Lazarson), from non-cooperative circles (among 
others A. Almi, A. Bukshteyn, B. J. Bialostotski, I. Borodolin, B. Glazman, 
I. B. Goldshteyn, I. Hurvits, Dr. Zeligman, M. I. Kheymovits, Daniel 
Tsharni, Leybush Lehrer, Khayim Liberman, Yankev Milkh, L. Malakh, 
Nakhmen Mayzel, Rubn Fink, Alter Epshteyn, A. M. Fuks, Oskar 
Kartazshinski, I. Kornhendler, L. Krishtal, Melekh Ravitsh, I. Rapoport, 
B. Rivkin, Dr. Yankev Shatski), from abroad (Rudolph Rocker, M. Korn, 
Dr. Max Nettlau, Dr. I. Rubin, Dr. I. N. Shtaynberg, Alexander Berkman, 
Voline [Vsevolod Mikhailovich Eikhenbaum], Vm. Tsukerman) and at 
festive occasions Yoysef Opatoshu, Ben-Tsien Goldberg, Aaron Glants-
Leyeles, Dr. Khayim Zshitlovski, Halper Leyvik, Dr. A. Mukdoni, Shmuel 
Niger, Tsivion, Dr. Koralnik, Hillel Rogof, Avrom Rayzen. Cartoonists 
and poets like Rokhl Okrent, Bimko, Deyksel, D. Gisnet, Yudkof, Tsinkin 
were innumerable (ibid.: 431; first names written out according to the 
source).
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will describe below. It should not be surprising that religion was 
not in every case part of the anarchists’ prizing of differences.38 
To illustrate the range of ideas that are to be taken into account 
when speaking of antireligiosity, we will examine antireligious 
 identifications by six authors. The second part of this essay ad-
dresses at least eight identifications, whom the antireligious de-
risively referred to as “religiously inspired souls” (di religyez 
geshtimte),39 “traditionalists” (pro-traditsyonistn),40 “seekers af-
ter God” (got-zukher),41 the “Jewish-only philosophers” (di nor-
yidishe filozofn),42 “leaders of the religious-ethical-socialist circles 
[with] their empty phrases”,43 “part-time returnees to tradition” 
(di konyunktur bal-tshuves)44 rushing “back into the ghetto”,45 or 
“pious” (frumakes),46 “reactionaries”,47 and “hypocrites”.48 Such 
phrases defined the ideal Epicurean freethinker by contrast with 
these supposedly traitorous backsliders. It will be interesting to 
note to what extent religious anarchists49 applied different argu-
mentative strategies in response to their opponents, and which 
explanatory demands were met in each case. Later, we will remark 
 38 “Anarchism, for all its international pretensions, for all its faith in the 
unity of mankind, has always been divided into national and ethnic 
groups. [. . .] Nor should this be surprising. For anarchists, cherishing 
diversity against standardization and conformity, have always prized the 
differences among peoples – cultural, linguistic, historical – quite as much 
as their common bonds” (Avrich 1988: 176).
 39 Sh. Rabinovitsh: FASh 16.09.38, p. 5.
 40 A. Gelberg, in: FASh 23.6.39, p. 3.
 41 V. Nayman: FASh 29.07.38, p. 3; Sh. Rabinovitsh: FASh 16.09.38, p. 5.
 42 Sh. Rabinovitsh: FASh 16.09.38, p. 5. Here, Rabinovitsh address-
es Shmuel Niger, Abba Gordin, Mordechai M. Kaplan, Shlomo Bager, 
Kalmen Vaytman, Itskhak Unterman, drawing an analogy to the English 
philosopher George Berkeley (born 1685), a proponent of ‘subjective 
 idealism’ and immaterialism (‘to be is to be perceived’).
 43 V. Nayman: FASh 29.07.38, p. 3.
 44 Sh. Levin, in: FASh 28.3.41, p. 5.
 45 V. Nayman: FASh 29.07.38, p. 3.
 46 T. Eyges, in: FASh 21.3.41, p. 3. The suffix -akes is attached to frum (pious) 
and adds a strong derogatory sense.
 47 Ibid.
 48 Ibid.
 49 The term is not used as self-identification. It is a provisional term applied 
to reduce complexity. 
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on the role that religious anarchists played for their communities 
and on the assumptions made by observers questioning the com-
patibility of religion and anarchism.
Varieties of antireligious polemics
The antireligious lines of reasoning present in these debates attack 
both religion and nationalism from a universalist point of view. 
However, the critique sharply distinguishes religion from ethnicity 
and conceptualizes religion as a system of private thought only. 
Public, social thought with bearing on the world of practice – 
e.g., philosophical, ethical, or legal teachings – is thus also to be 
 rigorously set apart from religion; religious practice is of  interest 
merely in its (negative) effect on the human educated mind. 
Religion is seen as detrimental to the world of politics properly 
conceived, since it is organized and advanced by reactionary forces 
in history. These arguments are unique in applying Feuerbachian 
terminology and clearly separating religion from ethnicity in the 
frame of Jewish traditions.
Such lines of reasoning can be found in the Marxist position 
brought forward by V. Nayman,50 who equated religion with 
irrationality and superstition. Nayman contrasted religion to 
 science, declaring that the call to return to religion on the part 
of “religio-ethical-socialists” was a call to return to “the ghetto”. 
Accordingly he saw religion as narrow-mindedness, whereas a 
departure from Jewish and religious education meant opening up 
people’s minds. Here, a universalistic concept of socialism close 
to Marxism can be detected, one that depreciates Jewish religious 
and ethnic particularity, which was equated with the backward-
ness of the ghetto.51 Nayman supported secular, socialist and 
 50 V. Nayman: FASh 29.07.38, p. 3. Nayman, whose first name, always 
abbreviated, has yet to be identified, used ‘’Marxism and the sciences’’ as 
synonyms, thus placing himself on the terrain of scientific socialism.
 51 Marx’s concept of religion was ambivalent and thus allowed numerous 
interpretations. It firstly was directed – according to the prevalent anti- 
Semitic Zeitgeist – against Jews, equating a Jewish “worldly religion” 
(“weltlicher Kultus”) with “huckstering” (“Schacher”) and self-interest 
(“Zur Judenfrage” 372; “On the Jewish Question” 170). It secondly treated 
both Jewish and gentile religion as equally false. The critique was directed 
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especially non-Jewish education. He argued against those who 
held, with Almi,52 that blind trust in science was to blame for 
Nazism and the persecution of the Jews. Instead, science was to 
ease people’s lives.
Nayman attacked the concept of Jewish chosenness and  compared 
it to the anti-Semitic perception of Jews as a separate group. Instead 
of locking themselves behind the walls of a ghetto,53 the Jewish 
people should act in concert with the rest of humanity in the face of 
the crisis of capitalism. The author called for  solidarity and a unified 
struggle for true socialism in which every human being might “shine 
like a brooch’s precious stone”, emphasizing purportedly ‘common’ 
interests and the need for international struggle in the face of the 
capitalist crisis.
A similar strategy was applied by Thomas B. Eyges, who iden-
tified ethnic separatism as a problem, accusing “the religious” of 
demanding ethnic unity.54 To Eyges, the call “back” to religion 
was not only chauvinistic, but also insolent, especially in “times 
against any kind of religion, as Marx wrote in the introduction to Die Kritik 
der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Here, religion was the sigh of the op-
pressed (“Seufzer der bedrängten Kreatur”), a sedative creating dependence 
and addiction while deterring from protest and revolution (MEW, vol. 1: 
378). In a different context Marx claimed that he was caricaturing economic 
relations, not persons (1867/1998: 100; see also Traverso 1994). 
 52 A. Almi (Eliye-Khayim ben Shlomo-Zalmen Sheps, a.k.a. Eli A. Almi, 
1892–1963) – an agnostic writer, author of numerous books, satirist and 
humorist, folklorist, poet and polemicist – wrote for the Yiddish dailies 
Forverts and Der Tog as well as the satirical weekly Groyser Kunds and 
the literary journal Tsukunft, but contributed primarily to FASh from 1923 
(LNYL vol. 1, 108–9).
 53 One of the leading scholars on the history of Yiddish language, Max 
Weinreich, wrote: “[. . .] in Yiddish, until the days of Hitler, geto was a 
foreign-sounding learned word, never much in vogue.” (1968: fn 10). 
Instead neutral terms like di yidishe gas or di gas (literally “the Jewish 
street”, “among Jews”) were in use. In this respect, Nayman employed 
a term that resonated with the assumptions of the Nazi extermination 
policy. It is worth noting that the mutual accusation of Nazism not only 
worked on the level of polemics to shame the opponent, but also was a 
widespread concern within 1930s and 1940s romanticism.
 54 T. Eyges, in: FASh 21.3.41, p. 3. Tuvye Borekh (Thomas B.) Eyges (1875–
1960) was author of Beyond the horizon: The story of a radical emigrant, 
Group Free Society, Boston 1944, and ran a weekly column in FASh 
(“Correspondences of a traveler”; LNYL, vol. 1, p. 57 f.). He also wrote 
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like ours”, when humanity needed to help all the victims of war.55 
Here again, common and natural interests were held up for con-
trast with the supposed divisiveness of others. Eyges reminded 
his readers that most wars, persecution, and violence had been 
triggered by religious ideas. In this sense, religion was seen as 
cause of war, not a solution. Its influence on people’s minds was 
especially dangerous when it penetrated into Yiddish secular 
schools. It was obvious to Eyges that religious zealots punished 
dissidence and called for sanctions against freethinkers and athe-
ists.56 In this case, the author no longer lamented the failure of 
transnational unity as a political strategy, as did Nayman, but 
identified religious ideas as the roots of violence, persecution and 
punishment. To Nayman’s line of reasoning, which saw particu-
larities as incompatible with universalism, Eyges added a second 
notion: religion exercised domination by imposing sanctions and 
acting on people’s minds – a point to which religious anarchists 
were quick to respond.
Shlomo Rabinovitsh57 and A. L. Goldman58 both added a wide-
spread anti-authoritarian critique of religion.59 Rabinovitsh viewed 
religious Yidishkayt in political terms as a right-wing tendency 
within the radical community. God, for Rabinovitsh, represented 
an authoritarian king who creates and supervises the world, de-
fines sin and good deeds (mitsves), and is petty-minded enough to 
arbitrarily reward or punish human behaviour. To this perception 
of God as authoritarian, Goldman added an attack on theodicy, 
for Arbeter Fraynt, the first London-based Yiddish anarchist paper, which 
often published anti-religious articles.
 55 T. Eyges, op. cit.
 56 Some letters in the 1904 debate likewise referred to a threat which 
pious Jews (e.g. by sabotaging meetings) posed to free thinking 
(Polland 2007: 395).
 57 The anti-religious writer Shlomo Rabinovitsh has yet to be identified. He 
is not listed as an author for FASh in Kahan 1945: 430–43.
 58 It is conceivable that this was Abraham Leib Goldman (1885–1970). 
Born in Szreńsk, Poland, Goldman taught in Canada (from 1907) and the 
US (from 1912 in New York City) at Yiddish secular schools, like Sholem 
Aleichem shul and Arbeterring. He developed a Yiddish stenographic 
alphabet (see Yivo archives, RG 632).
 59 Sh. Rabinovitsh, in: FASh 16.09.38, p. 5.; A. L. Goldman, in: FASh 
03.12.43, p. 3.
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questioning the senseless, blind, even willing suffering of God’s 
righteous followers. He asked why a supreme power would need 
to crush the smallest little worm, and the “bird with the worm”60 
too. Here Goldman referred to the biblical narrative of the binding 
of Isaac as illustrating the cruelty of this divine authority.61
Goldman took a stand against an agnostic argument made by 
A. Almi defending science against faith in order to establish yet an-
other position within an anarchist critique of religion.62 Almi had 
earlier raised a question concerning causality (urzekhlekhkayt) in 
creation which, in Almi’s view, had not yet been resolved in the 
sciences. Almi held that the assumption that all natural  processes 
could be explained by natural law would contradict the assump-
tion that their creation was coincidence. Cosmic  order could be 
interpreted as regularity – a plan by “someone” of whom one knows 
nothing. For Goldman, responding to Almi, this was  merely pilpl 
(“splitting hairs” – the rabbinical method of a detailed discussion 
of Talmudic issues); these questions were to be solved by theology, 
not by science, thereby distinguishing between their domains of 
competence and jurisdiction. Since science and knowledge were 
in a state of constant progress, Goldman  suggested, the answers 
to what could not yet be explained could be safely postponed. He 
drew examples from mass communication and transportation – a 
 60 A. L. Goldman, in: FASh 03.12.43, p. 3.
 61 The classic example is Job’s suffering in the Book of Job. It is noteworthy 
that antireligious critics focused on specific biblical stories that presented 
mythological accounts of the world, as in the Creation (Genesis 1,1–2), 
and/or an image of God as cruel or vengeful, as in the binding of Isaac 
(Genesis 22,1–19), the stories of Babel (Genesis 11,1–9) and the Deluge 
(Genesis 8,1–14). In these episodes, human beings are made to be fearful 
of God, which antireligious thought seized on as evidence that religion 
derived from fear and ignorance of the forces of nature. This point is 
addressed by religious anarchists. Abba Gordin is one of the few to an-
swer the critique of ritual sacrifice, in stressing the outcome of the story 
of the binding of Isaac, which he read as a prevention of death (Gordin 
1939/1919: 109 ff., esp. 118). 
 62 Almi argued that the universe, including everybody and everything (mit 
hak un pak), was just a piece of human thought. For Goldman, however, 
it is not enough to “not know” about the existence of God. He was insult-
ed by Almi’s claim, that earlier generations (an amokiker mentsh) might 
have known “more” than present thinkers (A. Almi, in: FASh 05.11.43, 
p. 2). Goldman then accused Almi of idealizing the past.
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century earlier, no one would have expected to be able to fly – to 
respond to Almi’s emphasis on the uses of scientific knowledge for 
waging war and suppressing dissent.63
In this case, one could argue, it was indeed religion,  understood 
as the blurring of scientific reason, and not only domination, 
that constituted the core of what was to be rejected. Almi’s wish 
to supply answers to the unresolved question of causality in 
 science – which was linked to an anarchist critique of  knowledge 
(Erkenntniskritik) – certainly suggested that not only power, 
but also knowledge and its origins were crucial in the debate 
 illustrated here. But Goldman circumvented the problem, deferring 
questions about the as-yet unknown to the future, and instead 
stressed the question of how God could allow human suffering – 
thereby returning to the problem of domination and human 
subordination under a divine will as the core argument against 
religion. The problem of why evil was prevalent in a world God 
created remained equally unresolved, and again, raised the spectre 
of God as an arbitrary authority.
The most vigorous argument against religion was presented 
by Shlomo Sayman, who attacked the authoritarian behaviour 
of “the new believers”.64 The author drew up two exclusive and 
opposed positions: one side represented by rabonim (rabbis), 
threatening and punishing human joy, who regarded the Tanakh, 
 63 The role of science in society was heavily debated not only by Goldman and 
Almi. Here one finds problems that were addressed by Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor W. Adorno touching the intertwined productive and de-
structive elements of democratization and mass culture in their Dialectics 
of Enlightenment, a social critique published in 1944. The hypothesis in 
the book is reminiscent of Almi’s – that the scientific rationality produced 
by the Enlightenment was no great improvement over the “mythic fear” 
it sought to banish, and that a purely instrumental reason, stripped of 
ethical commitments, turned into barbarism (Horkheimer; Adorno 1967, 
16, 30, and passim).
 64 Sh. Sayman: FASh 13.11.1942, p. 3. Sayman (1895–1970), a dentist and 
teacher of Hebrew, was very active in the Yiddish secular school move-
ment; he was president of the Sholem-Aleykhem Folk-institut between 
1940 and 1955. Apart from this, he was vice-president of the New York 
Yidish-Etishe Gezelshaft, established by Abba Gordin. He wrote for 
FASh, Di Tsayt, Tog and Dos Idishe Folk (LNYL, vol. 6, 413–15). Here, 
he took a very sharp stand against public displays of religious belief.
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the Hebrew bible, as absolute knowledge, which was not to be 
modified or seen as a reflection on historical events. The other side 
was represented by the Epicurean press, that provided the privi-
lege to print without acting out censorship, even if it would not 
agree with what was being printed. After emphasizing tolerance 
towards “true” pious Jews, Sayman distinguished between modest 
Jews, not acting out their beliefs in public, and modern returnees 
to tradition (bal tshuves). For him, the “true” religious Jews were 
harmless compared to the formerly radical, who now “paraded” 
in public, dressed in arbe-kanfes (traditional cloth). The “newly 
religious” hypocrite was even more traditional than the harmless, 
naively pious Jew, who in any case did not exhibit religiosity in 
public.65
Sayman went beyond the question of authority to question the 
visibility of religious behaviour in public space. First he complained 
that former radicals now “carry their money to Lubavitch”.66 
How could writers contribute fine Yiddish pieces to the radical 
press, then pray three times a day, keep kashres (dietary laws), and 
observe the Sabbath? What is remarkable in this line of  argument 
is Sayman’s concern for literary production. He feared for what 
Pierre Bourdieu would call the radical community’s cultural 
capital – “fine Yiddish writers” – as much as its monetary  resources. 
Accordingly, he urged a separation between the “truly” pious and 
the “former radical”, whom he asked not to shout too loudly 
and parade with false piety. Thus, in a unique manner, Sayman 
 combined the rhetorical strategies used by most actors in this 
highly diverse field – blaming, accusations, and dramatization – in 
order to now silence religious actors and exclude them from the 
public space of the Epicurean press and thereby from its discourse. 
Sayman’s distinction and exclusion from the press describes a zone 
 65 Ibid. The Forverts-debates equally displayed rhetoric moves to define 
how a true believer should act: “a true religious idealist would stand 
up for his ideas and trust in God’s protection“ (Polland 2007: 385–7). 
Obviously Sayman here contradicted the claim that ‘truly’ religious Jews 
posed a threat to free-thinkers.
 66 Ibid. Chabad-Lubavitch is a collective term for adherents of Menachem 
Mendel Schneerson (1902–1994), the son-in-law of Rabbi Yosef Yitschak 
Schneersohn (1880–1950), who migrated to the US in 1940 and built the 
movement to which Sayman referred.
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of tolerance – a private sphere; but it is when belief is acted out 
in public that it becomes subject to criticism as “reactionary”, 
“chauvinistic” and even “regressive”.67 Thus, a nonconformist 
was identified by Nayman against those who were merely to be 
 tolerated (or yet to be persuaded).68
Religious anarchist subversions
Following Friedrich Schleiermacher’s distinction between “reli-
gion” and “religiosity,” Nathan Goldberg,69 Abba Gordin,70 Tsvi 
Kahan71 and Khayim Ashli (Ashley)72 held that religion was the 
institutionalised, “frozen” form of the religious feeling; it was a 
“fossilised” personal connection to higher meaning.73 In this sense, 
 67 Ibid.
 68 Nonconformity and nonconformism are terms discussed by the graduate 
school Religious Nonconformism and Cultural Dynamics (2009–2014) 
at Leipzig University. The terms help to distinguish between what is open 
to question and what is not.
 69 N. Goldberg, in: FASh 15.01.43, p. 2. In his article “Social doctrine that 
turns ‘humanity’ into a religion” Goldberg addressed the rise of positiv-
ism as a religion. In addition to the debate illustrated here, the author 
contributed to the volume “History of the Jewish labor movement in the 
United States” cited earlier (N. Goldberg, in Tsherikover, op. cit.).
 70 A. Gordin, in: FASh 15.11.1940, p. 5.
 71 Ts. Kahan: FASh 4.11.38, p. 5. Kahan addressed Shlomo Rabinovitsh 
by referring in the title of his article to “Those Who Ask: What Good Is 
Religion?”
 72 Kh. Ashli, in: FASh 13.11.1942, p. 5. Khayim Ashli is one of the pseud-
onyms used by A. Almi, but it is unclear, why Almi wrote under different 
pseudonyms for Fraye Arbeter Shtime.
 73 Ibid. An analogy to the hidden energy and heat in coal allows us to con-
ceptualise religion as a system of thought that might release an ancient 
revolutionary spirit. The motif could be taken from the Zohar, a Jewish 
mystic source (Zohar III, 70a). These characterizations of religious spirit 
also strongly parallel Gustav Landauer’s “spiritual atheist” conception of 
dynamic Geist as existing in tension with the symbolic structures erected 
to contain it in history: “Wherever men have been, they were [. . .] held 
together by a common spirit, which is a natural and not extrinsically im-
posed compulsion [. . .]. But this natural compulsion of the unifying qual-
ity and common spirit, until now in known human history, has always 
needed external forms: religious symbols and cults, ideas of faith, prayer 
rituals or things of this sort. Therefore spirit is in the nations always 
connected with unspirit, and deep symbolic thinking with superstitious 
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religion reflected human longing for higher meaning – education, 
culture, and civilization. Religiosity was rooted in this striving, 
not in fear of God or nature.74 Rather than regarding religiosity 
as entailing an abdication of choice, they reinterpreted it in ways 
that stressed the individual’s responsibility. One of these reinter-
pretations connected science to an ethical belief system. The other 
redefined tradition in a highly modern, voluntaristic manner as a 
system of core values that were to be chosen by individuals.
Whereas the antireligious polemicists were sometimes 
 concerned to isolate religion (Judaism) from secular ethnicity 
(the Yidishkayt of language, literature, and culture), the defenders 
of religion did not draw a clear distinction between religion as 
system of thought, Jewish traditions and ethnicity. Here, religion 
and the Jewish folk are often represented as intertwined  categories 
of belonging. Religion can be defined as the source of spiritual 
meaning, philosophical and ethical teachings, art and literature 
and – most importantly – as way of living with both individual 
opinion. The warmth and love of the unifying spirit is overshadowed by 
the stiff coldness of dogma. Truth, arising from such depths that it can be 
expressed only in imagery, is replaced by the nonsense of literalness.This 
is followed by external organization. The church and the secular organi-
zations of external coercion gain strength and grow continually worse: 
serfdom, feudalism, the various departments and authorities, the state.
This leads to an eventual decline of spirit among and over the people, 
and of the immediacy that flows from the individuals and leads them to 
unity” (Landauer 1978: 32–33).
 74 Ts. Kahan, op. cit. In Abba Gordin’s writings we find a critique of what 
Max Weber described as the routinization of charisma by religious offi-
cials (Weber 1979: 246). Gordin intended to keep an original religious 
feeling and called to the prophets’ revolutionary spirit. Respect and fear 
of yourself was fear of God. Idolatry was to not serve one’s own interest 
(Gordin 1938: 65). Where Stirner posited a concept of the Einzige or Ego 
possessing its own ‘truth’ (Buber 2002: 96), Gordin described the I as 
the knowledge of the Wise (medat harakhamim, Gordin 1938: 65), a 
treasure-house (ibid.: 45), provided with a prophetic gift of sensitivity and 
presentiment (ibid.: 91). The priests (kohanim) ritualised, mechanised the 
service; the prophets rejected these externalizing doctrines and favoured 
a vivid, dynamic, ethically based unity: “ethos instead of rite; solidarity, 
equity [yoysher] and justice [tsdoke] instead of uniformity!” (ibid.: 277). 
To be a radical Jew meant to be a fighter for equity and justice and to 
follow the prophetic sense for justice (yoysher-gefil) (Gordin 1940: 248).
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and social implications. In rare cases, Judaism is described as folk 
only by excluding religious and traditional contents.75
Herman Frank76 contended that science would be inferior to 
tradition if it was without ethics, whereas ethics had its founda-
tion in higher meaning – here linked to the Jewish religious tra-
dition. The question of knowledge, progress and science77 was a 
“psychological”, “internal” and “humanistic” issue. In response to 
Goldman’s antireligious argument, Frank enlisted Spinoza, David 
Hume and Immanuel Kant in order to shift the domain of compe-
tence and jurisdiction: not theology but philosophy had addressed 
the problem of causality and posited a rational concept of dei-
ty. Menakhem Boreysho78 went further than Frank in embracing 
the Jewish religious tradition: he argued that religiosity provided 
 75 E.g. Yitskhak Finkelshtayn and Anatoly Gelberg (Türk 2014, ch. 4.3).
 76 H. Frank, in: FASh 3.12.1943, p. 5. Herman Frank was editor of FASh 
(1940–1952), author of the small brochure Anarkho-sotsyalistishe idey-
en un bavegungen bay yidn. Historishe un teoretishe aynfirung, Paris/
Tel Aviv 1951 (Anarchist-socialist ideas and movements among Jews. 
Historical and theoretical introduction) and editor of Shaul Yanowsky’s 
Ershte yorn fun yidishn frayhaytlekhn sotsyalizm, New York 1948 (First 
Years of Jewish Libertarian Socialism). He became interested in the histo-
ry of Hasidic Judaism and translated Martin Buber and Gustav Landauer 
to Yiddish. In this article of 1943 he appraised a book by the Marxist his-
torian Raphael Mahler (Haskole un Khsides in Galitsye, 1942), which lat-
er was translated into English (Hasidism and the Jewish Enlightenment. 
Their Confrontation in Galicia and Poland in the First Half of the 
Nineteenth Century, trans. Eurene Orenstein et. al., Philadelphia 1985).
 77 One year before, Khayim Ashli had stated that scientists, even if starting 
from similar presuppositions, always came to different conclusions. Ashli 
was not specific, but might have referred to different interpretations of 
statistical data. It would not be contradictory if even Darwin visited a 
church, he concluded (Kh. Ashli, op. cit.).
 78 M. Boreysho, in: FASh 15.03.1940, p. 5. Boreysho (1888–1949) was a 
teacher at Yiddish secular schools (Arbeterring) and wrote for the com-
munist Frayhayt, until it justified the 1929 anti-Jewish riots in Palestine. 
He also published in Tog, Haynt, Tsayt, FASh and Literatur un Lebn. 
Overlapping ideas can be found to the prevalent introspectivist art move-
ment (Inzikhistn) in the city of New York. According to the poet Yankev/
Jacob Glatshteyn, Boreysho’s religious poetry was not seeking God in the 
“common” manner, but rather in metaphorical ways (LNYL, vol. 1: 249). 
Boreysho was not necessarily an anarchist. With regard to spirituality, he 
took a stance close to that of Abba Gordin.
42 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume II
meaning, stability and ethical values that instrumental rationality 
did not. This author expressed his valuing of subjectivity and in-
dividual perception by taking an esoteric position towards poetry, 
stressing conscience, meditation and the study of the inner self. 79 
Love for humanity was, in the terms of the traditional (“old”) 
Jews, love for Shekinah (the divine presence on earth). 80
A. Almi, too, held that truth was a matter of faith: the only 
thing one knew was what one believed to be true.81 In support of 
this proposition, Almi offered two lines of reasoning – one from 
principle and one of a personal nature. In the first place, human 
knowledge would always be limited; the origins of life remained a 
mystery. The possibility of coincidences was denied by scientists, 
who presupposed regularity in the laws of nature. Almi there-
by took an agnostic stance in rebuttal of A. L. Goldman’s argu-
ment that a belief in higher beings was superstitious. Secondly, 
while firmly proclaiming that he believed in God, and, he add-
ed, in a higher power and universal reason, in view of the dire 
circumstances of the present time, he voiced his disappointment 
in God.82 For Almi, thus, the problem of human suffering did 
not necessarily lead to a blind or abject acceptance of God, as 
Goldman thought, but would rather lead to a dispute with God. 
Almi went on to question and reject the orthodox approach to 
 79 The ‘internal’ and ‘psychological’ seemed to be of high importance. One 
can find overlapping ideas with literary artists, Inzikhistn (Introspectivists), 
of the 1930s and 1940s. Knowledge was seen as an introspective process 
and a study of the inner self, e.g. by Shea Tenenboym. Tanakh formed 
part of world literature; it was intimate and lyrical, showed social conflict, 
depicted loving, suffering, patient or just human heroes (Sh. Tenenboym, in: 
FASh 8.12.44, p. 5). We find what Max Weber described as  sanctification 
of everyday life and a glorification of the simple ways of living (Weber 
2005: 413–471).
 80 M. Boreysho, op. cit.
 81 A. Almi, op. cit. As he later wrote: “All men have faith. There are no un-
believers. Even the atheist has faith. His faith, however, instead of being 
bound up with God, adheres to nature – which actually implies faith in 
an entity synonymous with that of God” (1947: 38).
 82 Almi makes the traditional confession of faith, starting with ani maymen 
be’emune shleyme (“I believe with a perfect faith”). Other authors, de-
scribing the atmosphere of the time, speak of ani-maymens (confessions 
of faith) and bal-tshuve-shtimungen (tendencies to return to God). 
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God’s  authority alike, wherein one could not believe that anything 
happened without His will. The contention was, if one believed 
so, one must concede that evil derived from God as well. Almi’s 
response to human suffering was an individualistic interpretation 
of responsibility and belief: violence, just like domination, was 
enacted by individuals. Political authority arose from man, not 
from God.83 Gangs and thugs persecuted Jews in those days. 
Against them, he argued that one may hold a sider (prayer book) 
in one hand and – being responsible for one’s own defence – a 
gun in the other.84 In this respect, Almi subverted the prevailing 
picture of a submissive believer, redefining it in order to legitimise 
religiosity, and in so doing, provided new grounds for anarchists 
to change their hostile stance towards religion.
Similarly, Shmuel Levin argued against both knee-jerk antire-
ligiosity and thoughtless religious piety.85 In his view, anarchists 
should not transplant Jewish orthodox exegesis of Tanakh into 
their own approach, and instead should treat the scripture as 
historical documents. The Tanakh and its rich translation into 
Yiddish by Yehoash86 should be taught as literary work in Yiddish 
 83 It is worthy to note, that emancipation and secular education could be 
seen as gzeyre (anti-Jewish decree) by traditional Jews and Hasidim. The 
rejection of civil and bourgeois emancipation among Zaddikim (“just 
and pious men”, usually leaders of Hasidic groups) like Israel Kosenitzer, 
Jakob Isaak Lubliner and their adherents, not only entailed the rejection 
of equal rights, but also of polonisation, military service, and seculariza-
tion – meaning the loss of communities’ relevance and the loss of reli-
gious knowledge (Dubnow 1922: 276 f.).
 84 This picture was one strategy to encounter prejudice by telling from a 
photography of an orthodox Jew and litvak (a Lithuanian Jew stereo-
typed as strictly rational Talmud student), who was well-read in worldly 
literature, holding not only a sider but also a weapon (A. Almi, in: FASh 
11.10.40, p. 5).
 85 Sh. Levin, in: FASh 28.3.41, p. 5. See for the diametrically opposing view 
against an exegesis of Tanakh the example of Sh. Sayman, op. cit. (Haym) 
Shmuel Levin (1890–1959), who was in Berlin 1920–1934 and migrated 
to the US in 1936, wrote in New York for Dos naye lebn, Di Tsukunft, 
Morgen-Zshurnal, Tog, the communist Ikuf and Hamer and for FASh. 
His work was translated into Polish, German, English, French, Dutch and 
Hebrew (LNYL, vol. 5, 298–300).
 86 Sh. Levin, op. cit. Yehoash, a.k.a. Solomon Blumgarten (1870–1927), as a 
“Yiddishist,” not only translated the Bible into Yiddish and co-authored 
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secular schools. Levin’s argument for a different way of engag-
ing with tradition is reminiscent of Hasidic motifs: he promoted 
enthusiasm for a belief that resisted institutional structure and 
demanded subjective, intuitive understanding of the feeling and 
“taste” of Khumesh (Torah).87 Against the pious Jews, he suggest-
ed not taking the commandments literally; conversely, he advised 
radicals not to rush away from Tanakh too hastily. This act com-
mitted in the heat of the moment was not well considered and 
contradicted the true spirit of freethinking. Levin also addressed 
the classic anti-authoritarian critique of traditional learning in 
kheyder (religious elementary school), applying the same strategy 
as Almi: authority rose from human acts, not from God. Levin 
shifted the burden of authority and responsibility onto the teach-
ers: these melamdim (religious instructors) simply had been lousy 
educators.88
Khayim Ashli similarly used the anarchist tactic of claiming 
the position of the true freethinker for oneself.89 Ashli emphasised 
what had been established by Shmuel Levin to weigh up advan-
tages and disadvantages of the Jewish tradition. Thus, in the spirit 
of what he considered true freethinking, he warned against turn-
ing antireligious ideology into a dogma, a new religion.90 To make 
more careful distinctions, to select what was progressive and what 
a dictionary of Hebrew terms and expressions in Yiddish, but also was a 
poet and editor of Tog.
 87 Sh. Levin, op. cit.
 88 In fact, this view on melamdim and kheyder was a widespread topos 
among thinkers of East European enlightenment and Yiddish writers. The 
classic critique was coined by maskilim like Perets Smolenskin (1842–
1885) and Judah Leib Gordon (1830–1892), who brought up the use of 
corporal punishment symbolised by the kantshik (a stick) and the tight 
curriculum. Mendele Moykher Sforim (Sholem Yankev Abramovitsh, 
1835–1917) and Sholem Aleykhem (Sholem Naumovitsh Rabinovitsh, 
1859–1916) – both classics of Yiddish literature – were equally promot-
ers of modern education and wrote against the kheyder, a mode of edu-
cation that had existed since 17th century.
 89 Kh. Ashli, op. cit.
 90 Similarly Shmuel Niger argued, a well-known literary critic, who claimed 
that so-called freethinking was only to break shabes (Shabbat) and 
kashres (the dietary laws) as pithy phrase and in a rather knee-jerk man-
ner. Niger is quoted in V. Nayman, op. cit.
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to discard – this was, he argued, what the ignorant (ameratsim) in 
“our radical swamp” had failed to do. Tradition was to be chosen 
and selectively changed.
A. Gelberg and Yankev Levin addressed the Yiddish secular 
schools’ curriculum,91 reconsidering the contents of the Jewish 
holidays and redefining them for educational purposes. Peysekh 
(Passover), Khanike (Hannukah) and Purim could be interpreted 
as celebrating a tradition of revolutionary liberation, as opposed 
to the New Year’s observance, Rosh Hashone, and the Day of 
Atonement, Yom Kiper, which were religious “as seen from any 
perspective” and in their very essence.92 They differentiated be-
tween different kinds of holidays, to keep some and redefine their 
content, and distance themselves from the contents of the others 
in order to remain within an anarchist logic. Holidays, especially 
Shabes (the Sabbath), were to be interpreted in social terms as 
days of rest from work.93
Still, those authors who called for a reinterpretation of tradi-
tion did not speak with one voice. For instance, Gelberg criti-
cised so-called “traditionalists” (pro-traditsyonistn) like Abraham 
Golomb, arguing that while holidays were reinterpreted in every 
historical period, the constant fact in Jewish history was the na-
tional, so holidays were to be seen as national holidays. Therefore, 
 91 A. Gelberg, in: FASh 23.6.39, p. 3; Y. Levin, in: FASh, 17.01.41, p. 7. Tony 
Michels explained in detail, that one central point of the Yiddish schools 
was to give secular and socialist education. Still, this did not exclude to 
teach Hebrew and Tanakh (Michels 2005: ch. 4, esp. 207–210). Naftali 
(Anatol) Gelberg (1894–1958), a Bundist and advocate of Yiddish ed-
ucation, taught in Toronto and New York City at the Yiddish secular 
schools (Arbeterring mitlshul and Arbeterring Perets-shuln) and wrote 
for socialist, here anarchist, and also general-interest daily papers like 
Keneder Adler in Toronto (LNYL, vol. 2, 301–2).
 92 Y. Levin, op. cit. Yankev Leyb Levin (1884–1958), in St. Petersburg one 
of Simon Dubnov’s students, was a Labor socialist (Po’aley Tsien), later 
territorialist, and pioneer for Yiddish socialist education in Warsaw and 
New York (Harlem). He wrote for Tsukunft, Tog, Idisher Kemfer, FASh, 
Sotsyalistishe shtime. It is interesting to note that Levin edited Oyfn veg, 
a series devoted to creating a codex (Shulkhn-orekh) for secularizing the 
Jewish tradition (LNYL, vol. 5, 276–8).
 93 Cf. recent Reform theologians’ attempts to reimagine “Sabbath, sabbat-
ical, and jubilee” together as linking traditions of social justice and eco-
logical balance (Waskow 2000, 51).
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he suggested adopting a pragmatic stance and – as Almi and 
Shmuel Levin had argued – contesting the religious “zealots’” 
(shvitspeltsn) monopoly over interpretation of the tradition.94 
What is noteworthy here is that “tradition” could be interpreted 
both in religious and national terms.
In short, Yiddish-speaking writers for FASh who defended 
religion did so on grounds emphasizing religious pluralism within 
the Jewish tradition, which entailed an individual’s  responsibility 
to choose among these different concepts in Judaism. To the 
individual belonged the competence and jurisdiction over any 
redefinition of religious concepts and practices. At the same time, 
a particularistic notion of anarchism was stressed – a “specific” 
and intrinsically Jewish contribution to radical ideas was  valued. 
Judaism was not seen as identical to Orthodoxy. On the  contrary, 
it was the antireligious anarchists who endorsed an orthodox 
concept of God in assuming that God enjoyed sole authority 
over human action, while “believing” anarchists like Almi broke 
away from this deterministic concept, stressing self-responsibility. 
Thus, we might say, religious anarchists in the Jewish  community 
embraced an individualistic concept of responsibility, which 
had been shifted to a supernatural power by anti-religious 
anarchists.
Conclusion
Writing from the perspective of the early 1950s, just past the cat-
aclysm that marks the period of our study, Herman Frank reflect-
ed that while “the initial stages of the movement in England and 
the United States” were indeed marked by “[t]he identification 
of Jewish Anarchism with atheism and anti-religious campaigns,” 
that moment had gone: “With the passing of time [. . .] a more 
refined and profound approach to all kinds of problems concern-
ing ethical and spiritual life became increasingly noticeable in the 
press and literature of the Jewish Anarchists, while the shallow 
and vulgar anti-religiousness of yesteryear rapidly declined and 
 94 Ibid.
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disappeared.”95 What were the consequences and implications of 
this transformation?
The debate illustrated here reflects the emergence of growing 
tendencies towards religiosity (bal-tshuve shtimungen) among 
Yiddish radicals during a time when Jewish anarchism was in de-
cline. Joseph J. Cohen described the 1920s and 1930s as an ideo-
logically “defensive” phase of the Yiddish anarchist movement, 
as anarchists were driven back by the influential communist and 
Zionist movements and by their own factionalism, uncertainty, 
and even disillusionment.96 Plus, the loss of a Yiddish reading rad-
ical audience may be attributed to immigration restriction laws 
in the 1920s and to the devastating defeat of anarchism in the 
Spanish Civil War.97 Taking these ideological and historical chang-
es into account, we observe in the 1930s what Rogers Brubaker 
described as subsiding “groupness”.98 These processes explain the 
subcultural dynamics perceived on both sides of the debate: an-
tireligious actors and the “traditionalists” themselves described 
changes within the radical community. Religious Jewish anar-
chists had to locate themselves in relation to the prevailing atheist 
identifications of other Jewish anarchists. They sought to modu-
late the strong critique of religious and educational institutions 
derived from the East European Jewish Enlightenment. Religion 
 95 Frank 1954: 284–5.
 96 Cohen 1945: 528–9. Moyshe Goncharok explains the decline of 
Yiddish anarchism as a result of the disappearance of the experts and 
enthusiasts of Yiddish literature, of fiery speeches and Jewish workers’ 
pride (1997: 7).
 97 Zimmer 2015: 172–5; 196–205; 210–11.
 98 In describing the processes that shape identities, Brubaker suggests going 
beyond the level of mutual attributions and accusations to describe the 
categories being applied for perceiving the self and others. Categories 
can be assumed, claimed, circumvented, contested, subverted or sim-
ply ignored, and through this process of negotiation, identities are mu-
tually allocated. Following Brubaker, we can analyse the “tipping and 
cascade mechanisms” of commonality, connectedness and “groupness” 
(“Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl” – a term coined by Max Weber), avoid-
ing imagining groups as monolithic units: “[S]ensitivity to the variable 
and contingent, waxing and waning nature of groupness [. . .] can fo-
cus our analytical attention and policy interventions on the processes 
through which groupness tends to develop and crystallise, and those 
through which it may subside” (Brubaker 2004: 19).
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as a group-building category was embraced when activists and 
editors were searching for a wider audience, as was the case during 
the Forverts in the early years of the 20th century. We might also 
attribute the debates in Fraye Arbeter Shtime 30 to 40 years later 
to this search for a broader meaning of anarchism. Whereas 
 earlier, radicals in groups such as the Arbeterring had pleaded 
for  tolerance towards “Yom Kippur Jews” or “three-day-a year- 
Jews,”99 however, now we find writers actively incorporating 
 religion into a system of freethinking ideas.
Some similar argumentative strategies can be found on both 
sides of the debate in FASh. Nayman argued that anarchists 
should not react to Marxism in a merely reflexive manner, since 
such ideological prejudice ran contrary to the spirit of true 
 freethinking. In turn, Khayim Ashli held that freethinking itself 
had been reduced to a dogma, an antireligious religion and fanat-
ical belief system. These parallel rhetorical moves allow us to see, 
behind the antireligious/religious dichotomy, a shared pattern of 
anarchist identifications. Both antireligious and religious actors 
rejected “false” piety – assuring their self-location within the an-
archist movement. Since it was the differentiation by Friedrich 
Schleiermacher between religion and religiosity that was referred 
to, one may conclude that spiritual traditions were closer to an-
archism than others, such as institutionalised religions and the 
“fossilised” religious feeling. Abba Gordin strongly criticized 
the processes of institutionalization through routinization of the 
charismatic prophets’ originally radical meanings.
Self-identifications as Jewish anarchists and as traditionalists 
required thorough legitimation, as evidenced by their various ar-
gumentative strategies. The antireligious harked “back” to what 
they perceived as a radical tradition, reminding their opponents 
of their “radical heritage” and a shared history of persecution 
of Epicurean thinkers by religious “sects”. Those writers used 
a strategy that can be described as a listing of names, reminis-
cent of a “Wanted” poster, in order to circle the problem, a new 
development being discussed. By calling out “former” radicals 
and describing their new attitude towards Jewish religion, they 
 99 Polland 2007: 392.
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positioned themselves as defenders of the classic anarchist ide-
als. This is not a strategy used by religious anarchists (so-called 
pro-traditsyonistn), who usually wrote in response to a specific 
author, article, or topic.
Religious anarchists generally preferred to modify the terms of 
the debate, e.g., by distinguishing between “religion” and “religi-
osity” or between the concept of God as a supernatural authority 
and a more individualistic conception. Almi addressed the prob-
lem of human suffering by expressing his deep disappointment in 
God for the present-day destruction of the world, thereby relating 
his own religious attitude to that of Job’s wife, who persuaded 
Job to argue with God. In this respect, religious anarchists insist-
ed on a broader range of options for conceptualizing and talking 
about religion – like valuing the work of the skilful storyteller 
Yehoash – instead of abandoning everything seemingly connected 
to Judaism.
In this period, therefore, rejection of religion was no longer a 
sine qua non of Jewish anarchism. Identifications emerged that 
referred to a particularistic and specifically Jewish tradition, con-
necting anarchist ethics to a higher meaning. Instead, domination 
was unacceptable to anarchism, not only with regard to religion 
and spirituality. In this way, the rejection of domination came to 
characterise anarchism more specifically than its rejection of re-
ligion, even if the antireligious stance remained widespread. This 
rejection of arbitrariness, petty-mindedness and cruelty was a to-
pos shared by all participants in the debate. Antireligious authors 
opposed authoritarian systems that had no legitimacy apart from 
the force of tradition and ideologies in which the individual was 
subjugated. Religious anarchists put stronger emphasis on indi-
vidual responsibility in religious and educational matters. High 
esteem for science was prevalent and equally valued, although 
its compatibility with ethics was disputed. Religious anarchists 
could also, at need, draw support from the ideas of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, Ludwig Feuerbach, George Berkeley and Herbert 
Spencer, questioning the origins and limitations of human under-
standing and reason, placing science on the same epistemological 
level as philosophy. One could add, that religious anarchists fa-
voured a holistic approach to science in addressing the unresolved 
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question of causalities raised by A. Almi. Herman Frank shifted 
the area of competence and jurisdiction to philosophy, which in 
his view combined theology and science. Antireligious authors, 
on the other hand, exhibited a more liberal tendency to separate 
the domains of theology and science after the manner of A. L. 
Goldman or (even more so) Sh. Sayman. In their appeal to scien-
tific rationality as the sole means of salvation from reactionary 
influence, these polemics display the ideological function of the 
dichotomy of religion and ‘the secular’ or ‘politics’:
Religion did not emerge alone, but in conjunction with other cat-
egories, one of them being “the secular” (non-religion). The con-
ceptualization of “religion” and “religions” in the modern sense 
of private faith, or the related sense of a personal adherence to 
a soteriological doctrine of God, was needed for the representa-
tion of the world as a secular, neutral, factual, comprehensively 
quantifiable realm whose natural laws can be discovered by sci-
entific rationality, and whose central human activity is a distinct 
“non-religious” sphere or domain called “politics” or “political 
economy”.100
Scientific rationality was to be the essence of the public sphere, the 
political, which was to be cleansed of religious ideas. Perhaps the 
antireligious acted as modernizers, which is the ideological func-
tion mentioned in Fitzgerald’s introduction. In this way, they may 
have reproduced aspects of the ideology of “political moderni-
ty,” along with its foundational distinctions between private faith 
and public reason, privileging the latter as the sphere of universal 
truth and validity.101
Through these debates among Jewish radicals, religious anar-
chists helped to sharpen and specify the concept of domination – 
and, thereby, that of anarchism. Their opponents might argue that 
their mission was to dilute the radical impetus of anarchism. One 
may consider religious anarchists as important actors for explor-
ing the affinities between anarchism and pious Jewish movements 
such as Hasidism. Of course, their opponents resisted this develop-
ment, as exemplified by Sayman’s furious polemic. Nevertheless, 
 100 Fitzgerald 2007: 6.
 101 Jun 2012: 43–46.
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the concept of anarchism that emerges from these dialogues is 
broad enough that it may be represented even by religious actors, 
forcing historical research to re-examine its own presuppositions.
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To Each According to their Needs : 
Anarchist Praxis as a Resource for 
Byzantine Theological Ethics
Emma Brown Dewhurst 
Durham University
I argue that anarchist ideas for organising human communities could 
be a useful practical resource for Christian ethics. I demonstrate this 
firstly by introducing the main theological ideas underlying Maximus 
the Confessor’s ethics, a theologian respected and important in a 
number of Christian denominations. I compare practical  similarities 
in the way in which ‘love’ and ‘well-being’ are interpreted as the 
telos of Maximus and Peter Kropotkin’s ethics respectively. I further 
highlight these similarities by demonstrating them in action when it 
comes attitudes towards property. I consequently suggest that there 
are enough similarities in practical aims, for Kropotkin’s ideas for 
human organising to be useful to Christian ethicists.
Introduction
There has always been a radical message in Christianity that un-
dermines the importance of worldly power and wealth.1 Reception 
of this message has varied hugely across the history and geo-
graphy of the church, but it has by no means been the case that 
the full extent of its call for egalitarianism, love, inclusivity, and 
communal distribution of wealth has always remained a sidelined 
voice in the church. In this chapter, I explore the theology of one 
 1 E.g. Matt 5:1–12; Matt 19:16–24; Matt 25:34–46; Mark 12:30–31; Acts 
2:42–47
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of the greatest theologians of the early Church,2 a Byzantine monk 
called Maximus the Confessor. Whilst in his lifetime he was a vic-
tim of persecution, his theology is now upheld as orthodox in 
Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Anglican churches. This makes 
him a figure of prime importance when it comes to highlighting 
the political and ethical outworking of an interdenominational 
theology for the Christian tradition.
In this chapter I present some of the foundational ideas in 
Maximus’ theology, looking at the philosophy and metaphysics 
that he draws out of scripture, and demonstrate why this results 
in what, by today’s standards, we would consider a radical ethics. 
I suggest that a useful way to try and formalise an ethical response 
to Maximus’ theology would be to draw on anarchist literature, 
especially the ideas of Peter Kropotkin. Whilst it is clear that 
Kropotkin does not share the same metaphysical commitments as 
Maximus (or any Christian theologian), the philosophical ideas 
grounding Kropotkin’s ethical response, have enough similarity 
that a Christian can (and I argue, should) look to practical anar-
chist principles like Kropotkin’s as a possible means of living out 
their Christian ethics. If there is agreement between Christians 
that Maximus is an important theologian for us today, and that 
his thought has the full radical implications I demonstrate, then 
it should also follow that at the very least, Kropotkin’s ideas for 
anarchist living ought to be considered as a mode of living worth 
pursuing.
This chapter has three parts to it. In the first, I give a short 
overview defining terminology and introducing the lives and 
contexts of Maximus and Kropotkin. In the second section 
I lay out the key theological ideas important for  understanding 
Maximus’ ethics. In the third section, I justify a similarity that 
I believe exists between Kropotkin and Maximus in their 
 understanding of human well-being and how we ought to act. 
As a result of this similarity, I then conclude that Kropotkin’s 
practical suggestions for how to live in a stateless society ought 
to be considered as a vital direction in which practical Christian 
ethics might be taken.
 2 cf. Louth, Maximus the Confessor. (London: Routledge, 1996), i.
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1. Who is Maximus and What is Anarchism?
Maximus the Confessor was born in about 580AD and died 
in 662AD. He lived under the rule of the Byzantine Empire, 
the  power ruling most of the Mediterranean and North Africa 
between 330–1204AD. Maximus, like all theologians who lived 
prior to 1054AD, lived before the East-West Schism in the church, 
making his work important within many Christian traditions. 
In academic circles, due to poor transmission of early Greek works 
to Western Europe during the medieval period and a  variety of 
other factors, Byzantine theologians like Maximus have had 
 relatively little attention. In the last hundred years,3 and especially 
the last fifty years, this has changed, and the field of Maximus 
studies is now a rapidly growing area. This attention has  inevitably 
also given rise to an interest in the ethical  outworking of Maximus 
thought, i.e. how we should live as a result of this theology.4 I mention 
below a few of the directions in which Maximian ethical scholarship 
 3 H. Von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus 
the Confessor. Daley, B. (trans.) (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988 (first 
ed. 1946)), 23.
 4 E.g. R. Bordeianu, ‘Maximus and Ecology: The Relevance of Maximus 
the Confessor’s Theology of Creation for the Present Ecological 
Crisis’. The Downside Review 127 (2009): 103–126; D. Munteanu, 
‘Cosmic Liturgy: The Theological Dignity of Creation as a Basis of an 
Orthodox Ecotheology’. International Journal of Public Theology. 4, 3 
(2010): 332–44.; E. Theokritoff, Living in God’s Creation: Orthodox 
Perspectives on Ecology. (New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2009), 
50–90; C. Brenna, ‘Orthodox Cosmology and Modern Rights Theories’. 
NY, 20–22.09.2012 (Conference paper delivered to the OTSA 2012 
Annual Meeting, available on request). T. Tollefsen, The Christocentric 
Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 225–30; T. Grdzelidze, ‘Creation and Ecology: How 
Does the Orthodox Church Respond to Ecological Problems?’ The 
Ecumenical Review. 54, 3 (2002): 211–218; G. Popa, ‘Theology and 
Ecology: Hermeneutical Insights for Christian Eco-Theology’. Journal for 
Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science. 2 (2008): 97–128; E. 
Zelensky, ‘Nature as Living Icon: Ecological Ethos of Eastern Orthodoxy’. 
Religions: Vol. Environment, 11 (2012): 167–179; J. Chryssavgis & B. 
Foltz (eds.) Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: Orthodox Christian 
Perspectives on Environment, Nature and Creation., Fordham: Fordham 
University Press, 2013.
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is being taken. First, however, it is worth saying a bit about who 
Maximus was.
Maximus grew up either in Constantinople with ties to the civil 
service and the imperial court, or, depending on what sources we 
use, in Palestine to a relatively poor family where he had strong 
ties to the Palestinian monastic movement.5 At some point, possi-
bly around 626,6 he abandoned all this and went off to become a 
monk in a monastery in North Africa. He was heavily influenced by 
a famous theologian and monk, Sophronius, whose lead Maximus 
would eventually follow in taking a stand in Empire-wide theo-
logical controversies. Maximus appears to have remained a monk 
his whole life, never being made a priest or bishop. Despite this, 
lay, monastic, and clerical figures from all over the empire wrote 
letters to him asking for his philosophical, theological, and spiri-
tual advice on various matters. In Maximus’ later life he famously 
wrote on the two wills of Christ, taking a theological stand during 
a time when political unity rather than theological orthodoxy was 
foremost on the imperial agenda.7 He was tried for heresy and 
treason and eventually his right hand and tongue were cut off 
(these being the tools by which he spread his heresy), and he was 
exiled to what is now modern day Georgia, where he died later 
that year on 13th August 662.8 His theology on the two wills later 
 5 Andrew Louth argues that Maximus’ familiarity with court and imperial 
proceedings along with his extensive education suggest that it is more 
likely that Maximus was born and raised in Constantinople (Louth, 
Maximus, 5). Along with Brock’s earlier observation that Palestine would 
place Maximus close to his friend Sophronius, (see Louth, Maximus, 
6–7), Pauline Allen argues that Maximus’ theology retains a distinct-
ly Palestinian ascetic flavour such as his response to Origenism and 
awareness of Neoplatonism that would be made sense of if Maximus 
was Palestinian born. cf. P. Allen, “The Life and Times of Maximus the 
Confessor”, The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor. P. Allen 
& B. Neil (eds.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 9–14. The 
controversy over Maximus’ early life comes from two competing biogra-
phies of his life – an earlier Syriac one that hates him and a later Greek 
life that extols him.
 6 All dates from the tentative timeline reconstructed by Allen, “Life and 
Times”, 14.
 7 For further background see Louth, Maximus, 7–16.
 8 His first trial was in 655 after which he was exiled to Bizya/Thrace. His 
second trial was in 662 after which he was exiled to Lazica/Georgia. Cf. 
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became the groundwork for the sixth Ecumenical Council and 
he is now venerated as a saint in the Eastern Orthodox, Roman 
Catholic, Anglican and Lutheran traditions.
In current theological ethics, Maximus’ theology has become 
particularly important for environmental ethics. His work pro-
vides a strong theological grounding for the integrity of all crea-
tures (including the earth itself, and plants and minerals). Radu 
Bordeianu, for example, has explored the ecological implications 
of Maximus’ work for the current environmental crises.9 This in-
cludes considering the validity of claims pointing toward Christian 
theology as partially responsible for attitudes condoning envi-
ronmental destruction. Whilst the accusation has some validity, 
Bordeianu writes that a more responsible theology has been in our 
grasp for centuries with thinkers such as Maximus the Confessor.10 
Another important contribution to scholarship on Maximus and 
ethics is a recent collection of essays that suggests how Byzantine 
theology, and in particular the work of Maximus the Confessor, 
may be a useful resource for contemporary ethics.11 In one pa-
per in this collection, Andrew Louth admits that the world has 
changed a lot since the time of Maximus: the universe is not so 
small and young as it was thought to be, and the human and even 
the Earth are much more insignificant than the Byzantine mind 
could ever conceive.12 Despite this, Maximus’ theology offers us 
a sense of ‘the coherence of all things’,13 and an awareness of in-
terrelation between the particular and the whole. It makes sense 
of how a creature might be minuscule within an enormous cos-
mos, and yet still have purpose and responsibility because of the 
choices we can make and our ability to contemplate everything 
Allen, “Life and Times”, 14–15; Louth, Maximus, 16–18; G. Berthold, 
Maximus Confessor: Selected Writings. (London: SPCK, 1985), 31, 
note 32.
 9 Bordeianu, ‘Maximus’.
 10 Bordeianu, ‘Maximus’, 103.
 11 See section ‘I. “Knowledge United to God”: Environment, Nature and 
Creation in Patristic Thought’ in Chryssavgis & Foltz (eds.), Toward. 
9–71.
 12 A. Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos in St Maximus the Confessor’ in Toward. 
Chryssavgis & Foltz (eds.), 68–9.
 13 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 70.
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around us.14 This description of the universe need not be at odds 
with our biological comprehension or scientific explanations and 
may rather enhance our understanding of the fragility of rela-
tionships within our environment.15 Louth posits that Maximus’ 
vision offers a means of combining a holistic understanding of 
the universe with a rich sense of the place of reason. The tools of 
scientific theory and mathematical expression are tools that only 
make sense to the human, no matter how universal they appear to 
be.16 In this way, the search of the human for wisdom concerning 
its surroundings is entirely compatible with the Byzantine world 
view. In Maximus’ thought, every human is logikos, rational, with 
the capacity to choose.17 This rationality is one of the greatest gifts 
to humankind, who as a result may choose to coexist and make 
peace with one another and the natural world, or, as we will see, 
cause devastation in its misuse of choice.18 Louth’s contribution is 
particularly important as a contemporary source that recognises 
that a huge shift has taken place in our perception of the universe 
as a result of our scientific advances. He rightly points out that 
we need to justify why we are looking back to a cosmological 
theology prior to these scientific advancements for advice on how 
to live in the world today. Louth’s explanation leads us to affirm 
that spiritual wisdom that asks us to live well with other creatures 
and one another is not usurped by scientific enquires but is a nec-
essary part of what it means to be human. The utility of Byzantine 
thought for the Christian is that this inquiry is not seen as apart 
from spiritual concerns, but contextualised within a wider inquiry 
into who we are and how we ought to live.
Having given an overview of Maximus and his place in 
 contemporary scholarship, I wish to define my use of the term 
‘anarchist’, and briefly justify my choice to look at Kropotkin 
in this chapter. Following Peter Marshall’s definition, I loosely 
take anarchists to be those who “reject the legitimacy of exter-
nal government and of the State, and condemn imposed political 
 14 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 68–70.
 15 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 70–1.
 16 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 70–1.
 17 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 63–4.
 18 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 68.
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authority, hierarchy and domination. They seek to establish the 
condition of anarchy, that is to say, a decentralized and self-reg-
ulating society consisting of a federation of voluntary associa-
tions of free and equal individuals”, so as “to create a free society 
which allows all human beings to realize their full potential”.19 
It is difficult to make generalisations about anarchist thought, 
given its condemnation of set political ideologies, however, one 
thinker whose ideas continue to remain important in communal 
anarchist thought is Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921). Kropotkin’s 
writings are particularly valuable for the way that they intertwine 
philosophical critique of the status quo, anecdotal and  statistical 
evidence of differing economic systems, biological evidence to 
counter the political primacy of a social survival-of-the-fittest 
idea, and pragmatic ideas for both long and short-term changes 
that can be made to society.
In Anarchy in Action, Colin Ward goes so far as to call his 
own book “an extended, updating footnote to Kropotkin’s 
Mutual Aid.”.20 Ward believes Kropotkin’s continuing relevance is 
 abundantly apparent and that, for example, “Anyone who wants 
to understand the real nature of the crisis of the British economy 
in the 1980s would gain more enlightenment from Kropotkin’s 
analysis from the 1890s than from the current spokesmen of 
any the political parties.”21 Ward identifies a severe  paucity in 
the imagination of the left, which has largely abandoned “those 
 aspirations for the liberation of work”.22 Consequently, he 
 suggests that Kropotkin’s “decentralist and anarchist vision” may 
yet hold much for us, and he claims it is certainly much less an 
“absurd” idea than a socialist faith in the humanisation of work 
through the conquest of the state power by the proletariat.23 
I have quoted Ward writing of Kropotkin’s relevance in 1973, 
1974 and 1998, but in the wake of the 2008 economic crash, 
 19 P. Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism. 
(London: Harper Perennial, 1992), 3.
 20 C. Ward, Anarchy in Action. (London: Freedom Press, (1st pub 1973, this 
ed. 2008)), 10.
 21 Ward, Anarchy, 10.
 22 Ward, ‘Introduction’ in P. Kropotkin, Fields, Factories and Workshops 
Tomorrow. (London: Freedom Press, 1998 (1st ed. 1898)), 13.
 23 Ward, ‘Introduction’ in Kropotkin, Fields, 13.
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I think Kropotkin’s ideas are more important than they ever have 
been before. Following the systemic failures of state socialism and 
capitalism, Kropotkin’s ideas look ever more prophetic and at-
tractive. Most importantly for this chapter, the ethical commit-
ments underlying Kropotkin’s practical writings share much with 
the key features I identify in Maximus’ ethics, making his work a 
good potential resource for Christian praxis.
2. The Cosmic Theology of Maximus the Confessor
I outline here three areas that are important for understand-
ing how Maximus believes humans should live. I explain how 
Maximus believes the cosmos is held together (2a). This allows us 
to glimpse the way he believes all nature24 and creatures are linked 
to one another and to God, since for Maximus the universe is not 
merely a physical place, but also possesses a spiritual dimension. 
I then (2b) discuss the specific importance Maximus places on 
the human and the responsibilities that go with this importance. 
Lastly I look at what, practically speaking, Maximus believes hu-
man activity – ethics – should consist of (2c).
2a. Union and Distinction
Maximus’ theology can be understood in terms of ‘union and dis-
tinction’.25 He believes that all things will be gathered to union 
with one another in God, but will still retain their unique, distinct 
identity when they are united.26 This means that his theology is 
a delicate balance between a desire for harmony and unity of all 
things, and a dedication to the freedom and personal expression 
of every creature. Maximus writes that we deepen our knowledge 
of God by understanding and discovering meaning within one 
 24 Used here as a lay term for creation, especially non-human creation, rath-
er than in the theological sense of physis.
 25 Proposed as a systematic way of reading Maximus’ theology by M. 
Törönen, Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the 
Confessor. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
 26 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.1.
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another and the natural world.27 As this occurs we begin to over-
come the divisions and confusions that keep creatures at enmity 
with one another.28 Drawing on Ephesians 1:10, Colossians 1:16 
and similar passages, Maximus explores the way in which the cos-
mos is recapitulated and made whole in Christ.29 God intends all 
of creation to be drawn towards God and united in love, and God 
works towards this end continually.30 Maximus uses the example 
of travelling from the edge of a wheel down the spokes to the 
centre – in this example, creatures that move towards God (the 
centre) also move towards each other, coming closer spiritually and 
overcoming odds with each other as they are motivated by love.31 
Thus, unity, perfection and participation in God shall be reached 
when “there shall be no intentional divergence between universals 
and particulars”.32 For Maximus, the providential end for crea-
tures is to be gathered to God and all divisions overcome, while 
the identity of each creature is never at risk of being  abolished.33 
Particular creatures continue to exist, but the difference between 
one creature and the next is no longer a source of conflict, and 
is instead a cause for celebration.34 As Melchisedec Törönen ex-
plains, number is thus difference without being division,35 so that, 
just like “When we speak of a two-coloured or five-coloured stone 
(or of any multi-coloured one) we do not divide the one stone into 
two or five stones”.36 Although we can count many things in one, 
it does not make it many – and although something is one, it does 
not mean we cannot pick out the unique colours within it.
 27 Maximus, Amb. 21 1248C–D in On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: 
The Ambiguua Vol I. Constas, N. (ed.) (London: Harvard University 
Press, 2014), 434.
 28 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1313B in On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: 
The Ambiguua Vol II. Constas, N. (ed.) (London: Harvard University 
Press, 2014), 118.
 29 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308D in On Difficulties II, 106–8.
 30 Maximus, Ad Thal. 2, CCSG7:51.
 31 Maximus, Amb 7. 1081B-C in On Difficulties I, 100.
 32 Maximus, Ad Th. 2, 7:51 (Blowers (trans.), On the Cosmic Mystery of 
Jesus Christ. (New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003), 100).
 33 Maximus, Amb. 10. 1189A in On Difficulties I, 310.
 34 Cf. Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch1.
 35 Törönen, Union and Distinction, 42.
 36 Maximus, Epp. 12 PG91 476A-C (Törönen (trans.) Union, 42).
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Maximus’ vision for the world is one where there is both per-
fect community and yet distinct personal relation that comes 
about through Christ. He writes:
For the wisdom and sagacity of God the Father is the Lord Jesus 
Christ, who holds together the universals of beings by the power 
of wisdom, and embraces their complementary parts by the sagaci-
ty of understanding, since by nature he is the fashioner and provid-
er of all, and through himself draws into one what is divided, and 
abolishes war between beings, and binds everything into peaceful 
friendship and undivided harmony, both what is in heaven and 
what is on earth, as the divine Apostle says.37
Vladimir Cvetković notes that in advocating this kind of union, 
Maximus’ cosmology “abolishes all the divisions that exist in the 
humankind, not only those established by gender differentiations, 
but also those based on national, ethnic, political, cultural, educa-
tional and any other platform”.38 In proposing that we are guided 
in the direction of union, and in the overcoming of divisions be-
tween creatures, Maximus implies that there is no place for the 
judgement, exclusion or abuse of another being on the basis of its 
difference.39 Difference is not to be a dividing factor, but a cele-
bration of intended diversity that brings creation closer together 
as it exhibits love and moves closer to its intended end in God. 
The conclusion Maximus leaves us with is that there is no place 
within the cosmos for ideological, political, racial or any other 
kind of hatred. What we hate, we divide from us, and in doing so 
also separate ourselves from God.40 What we love, by contrast is 
brought to God, who is love.41
 37 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1313B in On Difficulties II, 118 (Louth (trans.), 
Maximus, 162).
 38 V. Cvetković, ‘Maximus the Confessor’s Geometrical Analogies applied to the 
Relationship between Christ and Creation’ in P. Pavlov, et al.(eds.), Orthodox 
Theology and the Sciences. (Columbia: Newrome Press, 2013), 277.
 39 Cf. Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305C in On Difficulties II, 104; Maximus, 
Myst. TCr. Ch.1; cf Col. 3:11–15.
 40 “The one who sees a trace of hatred in his own heart through any fault at 
all toward any man whoever he may be makes himself completely foreign 
to the love of God, because love for God in no way admits hatred for man.” 
Maximus, De char. PG90 963C I.15 (G. Berthold (trans.), Maximus, 37].
 41 Maximus, De char. PG90 963B I.13.
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The existence we lead and the communities we choose to be a 
part of must therefore reject persecution and social division based 
on the differences we see in one another. An ethical exploration 
of this cosmology might lead one, for example, to question the 
necessity and utility of societal and legal divisions and borders 
that discriminate on bases such as culture, ethnicity and wealth. 
Anti-discrimination ideas are often upheld in Christian ethics by 
an appeal to human rights laws,42 but the ethical possibilities that 
could be derived from Maximus might go further than these to 
challenge more basic artificial boundaries such as those of nations 
and territorial borders. The discrimination involved in the main-
tenance of borders is particularly well illustrated in the manifesto 
of the decentralised grassroots organisation ‘No Borders’. They 
point out that the maintenance of a border elevates movement 
of people into a commodity purchasable only by those with the 
economic wealth or political power to do so. The system of de-
portation and border control targets and criminalise those who 
are poor. In this way, ‘No Borders’ write, “Modern states try to 
turn movement into a right that is granted or denied according to 
economic and political power”.43
Maximus’ understanding of union and distinction brings a fur-
ther dimension to the ethical outworking of ‘love your neighbour’ 
(Mark 12:13; Matt. 22:39). It is clear that, for Maximus, diversity 
found in different communities and cultures is a cause for celebra-
tion, and is one of the ways in which creation is brought together. 
We are many in our diversities and yet one in celebration of this 
and in our day-to-day relations of love. This means that a partic-
ular culture can be celebrated, but when that identity is exclusive, 
insular and inspires hatred for what is different instead of love in 
multiplicity, it becomes a source of division that breaks apart the 
unity of the cosmos. In my mind, it would be hypocritical to con-
sider Maximus’ cosmic theology to be a call for equality between 
 42 See for example, A. Papanikolaou, The Mystical as Political: Democracy 
and Non-Radical Orthodoxy. (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2012), 128.
 43 No Borders, ‘A No Borders Manifesto’: http://noborders.org.uk/node/47 
(Accessed 20.03.14).
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the sexes44 without also considering it to be a condemnation of 
refusing asylum seekers or migrant workers entry into a country. 
Maximus’ balance between union and distinction is one that calls 
for communal care but also personal freedom through Christ-like 
love.45 This love is always about loving every particular person, 
especially the persecuted, powerless, and marginalised. Divisions 
within our society that breed hatred, alienation, or otherwise limit 
the extent to which one may love, have no place within the cosmic 
scope of Maximus’ theology.
2b. The Human as Microcosm
Within Maximus’ cosmological thought, humans play an  important 
role. With this importance, however, comes a responsibility. Humans 
possesses reason and free will. For Maximus, this means that 
humans are uniquely placed to be the voice of voiceless creation, 
and have the potential to express all creation with that voice and so 
commend the cosmos as one to God.46 Following, amongst  others, 
Gregory of Nyssa,47 Maximus understands each human to  contain 
all the cosmos within them – to be micro-cosmos.48 A human 
 partakes of and is able to contemplate both visible and invisible 
things, and is thus like a “laboratory in which everything is concen-
trated and in itself naturally mediates between the extremities of 
 44 Male and female are discussed as distinctions in humans that are over-
come in Christ. Maximus believes that prior to the Fall humans were 
without sex or gender (based on Gal. 3:28 and his reading of Genesis) 
and that procreation probably happened in a different way: (Maximus, 
Amb. 41 PG91 1305C & 1309A-1312A in On Difficulties Vol II, 104, 
110–114). See also S. Mitralexis, ‘Rethinking the Problem of Sexual 
Difference in Ambiguum 41’ Analogia: The Pemptousia Journal for 
Theological Studies 2:1 (2017), 139–144. 
 45 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308B-C in On Difficulties II, 106–8.
 46 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305B in On Difficulties II, 104].
 47 “It has been said by wise men that man is a little world in himself and 
contains all the elements which go to complete the universe.” Gregory 
of Nyssa, ‘On the Soul and the Resurrection’ in Gregory of Nyssa: 
Dogmatic Treatises W. Moore & H.A. Wilson (trans.) (New York: 
Christian Literature Publishing Co. 1892), 682.
 48 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.7.
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each division”.49 Maximus believes that the human person’s unique 
possession of both rationality and sensibility50 means that they are 
capable of mediating the differences within the created order and 
bringing it into harmony and coexistence.51
Drawing heavily on Paul’s letters, in his Ambiguum 41, 
Maximus illustrates that, when humanity chose to turn away from 
God, it was the ability to mediate between God and the rest of cre-
ation that was lost to humanity.52 When Christ became incarnate 
as both God and human, he united creation with God.53 Through 
his death and resurrection Christ makes relationships between 
creation and God possible again.54 It was humanity that caused 
the fractures in the relationships between heaven and earth, and 
within creation itself. As such it is as a human that God comes to 
restore mediation and harmony.55 Humans, then, can choose to 
partake in this restored ability to mediate through Christ. We do 
so by freely choosing to try and coexist in love, bringing together 
all of creation in unity.56 When writing on the place of mediation 
in Maximus’ cosmology and its relevance for today, Louth notes:
St Maximus’s divisions of nature may seem to us quaint, but his 
idea that within the manifold that is the created order there are 
divisions that can either, when transcended, express the richness 
and beauty of the created order or, alternatively, cause gulfs of 
incomprehension, darkness, and pain seems to me an insight of 
continuing relevance.57
Louth’s exposition, which specifically refers to the theology in 
Maximus’ Ambiguum 41, makes the point that we do not have to 
sign-up to the specific philosophical and metaphysical structures 
 49 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305A-B in On Difficulties II, 102–4.
 50 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305D-1308A in On Difficulties II, 106.
 51 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305B-C in On Difficulties II, 104.
 52 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308C-1312B in On Difficulties II, 108–114.
 53 Maximus’ theology is heavily reliant on the ‘logic’ of the Council of 
Chalcedon (451) which affirmed Christ as being one person in two distinct 
natures of human and divine.
 54 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308C in On Difficulties II, 108.
 55 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308D in On Difficulties II, 108–110.
 56 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308B-C in On Difficulties II, 106–108.
 57 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308B-C in On Difficulties II, 106–108.
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of a Byzantine worldview in order to see value in the recogni-
tion that human choices have got the world into the mess it is 
in today. Whether we are discussing environmental destruction, 
extreme inequalities in wealth, or social, political, economic or 
cultural discrimination, exploitation and persecution, the means 
to deepening these rifts or alleviating one another from suffering 
have the potential to come from uniquely human decisions and 
choices. This is one of the many reasons that, in the Byzantine 
ascetic tradition, the question of what humans should do begins 
with a reflection on one’s own actions and the way we treat oth-
ers and the world around us.58 This, in turn, is never separate in 
the Byzantine mind from the perpetual activity of Christ and the 
Spirit in our lives and a reciprocal relationship rooted in grace and 
free will that occurs between God and the human.59
For Maximus, the ability to choose and deliberate and 
 possess rationality (logos), is a natural ability of humanity. With 
 possession of this power however comes a responsibility to the 
rest of  creation. The abuse of rationality and the divisions that 
form within our societies (between fellow humans and between 
the human and the rest of the natural world) have devastating ef-
fects. The gifts humanity has been given of grace, capacity to love 
and capacity for wisdom, are ones that come with a terrible price 
for all creation when humanity falls short of its natural ability and 
potential. This foresight in the effect of human activity within its 
own societies and upon the environment is just one of the ways in 
which Maximus’ thought might challenge the Christian concep-
tion of who we are, what might be possible, and what the failures 
to love difference imply. This cosmology proposes that, because 
we can love, we have an obligation to love. To put our rationality 
purely to self-service has demonstrably destructive consequences 
for everything touched by that choice. This is a cosmology that 
 58 See for example, K. Ware ‘Through Creation to the Creator’ & A. 
Keselopoulos, ‘The Prophetic Charisma in Pastoral Theology: Asceticism, 
Fasting, and the Ecological Crisis’ in Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: 
Orthodox Christian Perspectives on Environment, Nature and Creation. 
J. Chryssavgis, & B. Foltz, (eds.), (Fordham: Fordham University Press, 2013).
 59 Maximus, Or. Dom. PG90 877A.
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speaks of the beauty of the whole, but also of its fragility as a 
cosmos built on interrelation.
2c. The Ascetic Practice of Love
Lastly then, let us look at what Maximus believes this cosmol-
ogy will translate into in terms of human action. We have seen 
that Maximus believes that the human is tasked with uniting the 
cosmos through their choice to love, but what does this mean 
and what does this look like? What does Maximus mean by love? 
How does one seek God’s meaning in creation, move towards 
God and mediate between creatures? Maximus answers that these 
hopes are made possible in Christ and by following him in faith 
and in the practice of love.60 To practise love is to follow the ex-
ample of the life and death of Christ.61 By grace we have faith, ra-
tional choice, the ability to mediate, and restoration in Christ, but 
we ourselves must have the voluntary inclination to eradicate the 
troubles (‘passions’) that run counter to human nature.62 We were 
made naturally good, but it is through the fall and our continuing 
choice to sin (to turn away from God, who is love) that human 
nature is occluded by passions that separate us from God.
Behind Byzantine cosmology, and also at its heart, is the as-
cetic way of life.63 Rooted in the Gospel and then developed by 
early Christian desert monks, ascetic thinking occasionally took 
the form of ‘centuries’.64 These were a set of one-hundred apho-
risms upon which one might meditate that would aid one in the 
struggle to live a practical, Christian, spiritual life. Through sim-
ple means of self-discipline and a life of love and humble giving, 
one might grow in wisdom, and begin to tread along the path in 
the Byzantine cosmic vision that brings all creation closer to har-
mony, unity, perfection, and ultimately to God. In his Centuries 
 60 Maximus, De char. PG90 975C I.27.
 61 On cultivating the mind of Christ: Maximus, Th.oec. PG90 1163B II.83; 
on discerning the logoi through a pure mind: De char. PG90 981C.
 62 Maximus, Th.oec. PG90 1127B II.6.
 63 Louth, Maximus, 44.
 64 P. Sherwood, The Ascetic Life and The Four Centuries on Charity. (New York: 
The Newman Press, 1955), 102; Evagrios of Pontos is credited with 
inventing the ‘century’ format of ascetic literature.
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on Love, Maximus writes four sets of a hundred statements that 
guide the reader in their search for wisdom, their internal battle 
with passions that plague them, and their struggle to live a life of 
genuine compassion and love for fellow creatures. For example, 
he writes:
If you harbour resentment against anybody, pray for him and 
you will prevent the passion from being aroused; for by means 
of prayer you will separate your grief from the thought of the 
wrong he has done you. When you have become loving and 
 compassionate towards him, you will wipe the passion  completely 
from your soul. If somebody regards you with resentment, be 
pleasant to him, be humble and agreeable in his company, and 
you will deliver him from his passion.65
Following the words of St Paul, Maximus also urges the  ascetic 
to “Rejoice with those who rejoice and weep with those who 
weep”.66 This is the way in which one may have the ‘mind of 
Christ’.67 By preparing one’s heart and mind this way, Maximus 
believes that one can begin to perceive real meaning in the world 
about us. As the intricacies of the created world become visible 
to us, so will we come to know God through all creation about 
us.68 Knowledge, harmony and holiness are pursued through free-
ly choosing to practice love. Love takes the form of learning to be 
merciful, patient, and kind even when someone frustrates or hurts 
us; it is a means to helping others see faults within themselves that 
they can learn from, rather than reinforcing cycles of alienation 
and hatred.69 This, I think, might be a suitable way of summing 
up ascetic practice according to St Maximus. The broader hope 
is union and reforging the relationship between the creator and 
all creation, but the minutiae takes place in the simple life of the 
human person, who, in possessing rationality, may choose to live 
in such a way that brings peace to those around them.
 65 Maximus, De char. PG90 1043D III.90 (Louth (trans.), Maximus, 39).
 66 Maximus, De char. PG90 1043D-1045A III.91; Romans 12:15.
 67 Maximus, Th.oec. PG90 1163B II.83.
 68 Maximus, Th.oec. PG90 1161CD II.79; 1161D-1164A 80.
 69 Contemplation of the logoi in Maximus’ writings is discussed in relation 
to contemporary ethics in D. Bradshaw, ‘The Logoi of Beings in Greek 
Patristic Thought’ in Toward, 9–22; Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 59–71.
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At its simplest, this cosmology is an exposition of the need to 
practice love in the human life. Love, as defined by Maximus with 
reference to Paul, is Christ-like love. It is the challenge that re-
quires the humility of the self and giving to the other. As Maximus 
writes, “The one who loves God surely loves his neighbour as 
well. Such a person cannot hold on to money but rather gives 
it out in God’s fashion to each one who has need”.70 The ethi-
cal implications of such a love are already being teased out by 
Maximus here. Love equates to seeing the suffering of others 
as the suffering of Christ, and to giving to others as Christ has 
 given to us. This naturally means that money and possessions go 
to those who need them. Accumulation of property and wealth 
are thus deeply problematic and sinful acts.71 Maximus has begun 
talking of the economic relationships that result from this love, 
but we can also think about the requirements of such love on our 
 political relations. In an ethics where personal care for the other 
is paramount, the structures of a system that maximises personal 
profit at the expense of others becomes unacceptable and incom-
patible with an entire Christian worldview. David Harvey gives 
us a concise overview of what he believes a neoliberal agenda to 
be, writing that it “proposes that human well-being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade”.72 Dedication 
to preserving an individual’s right to wealth and property brings 
about an attitude that cannot hope to comprehend love as the 
basis of economic relation. The telos of love73 in Maximus’ ethics 
 70 Maximus, De char. PG90 965B I.23 (Berthold (trans.), Maximus, 37).
 71 i.e. Acts that separate us from God, because they are unloving. The prob-
lem of property is discussed further in 3b. Positions on Property.
 72 D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), 2.
 73 The telos of the ethical life for Maximus is theosis, perfect union with 
God, in which we still remain distinct persons. Since God is love, and we 
have a very practical demonstration of this love in Christ’s life and death, 
we do not lose anything by simply calling the telos of Maximus’ ethics 
‘love’. For a full discussion of the telos of Maximus’ ethics, see ‘Chapter 
2: A Telos of Theosis’ in my doctoral thesis Revolution in the Microcosm: 
Love and Virtue in the Cosmological Ethics of St Maximus the Confessor. 
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brings it into direct confrontation with ideologies grounded in 
capital accumulation and protection of private property. If we 
took giving to those in need as the basis of our economic and 
political theories and relations, we would have to radically re-
structure the economic systems and policies of any current capi-
talist state. If in any of our activities, whether on an individual or 
collective basis, we perpetuate the economic, political and social 
oppression of someone elsewhere on the globe, we have by defini-
tion a lifestyle that is deeply problematic for anyone who consid-
ers love to be integral above all else. Maximus’ cosmic and ascetic 
theology points Christian ethics in a direction that seriously calls 
into question the basic premises of any society that runs counter 
to a requirement of love.
3. Ethical Commitments in Maximus and Kropotkin
Next I turn to look at Kropotkin’s ideas and some of the  possible 
compatibilities these might have with Maximus’ thought. In 
 particular I examine the way that Kropotkin’s practical ideas for 
society may be useful resources when extending Maximus the 
Confessor’s ethics to the present day. I first consider the philo-
sophical and anthropological underpinnings of Kropotkin’s anar-
chist theory. For there to be grounds for a similar ethical praxis 
(means), there must be a semblance of a shared goal (end/telos). I 
have already intimated that a shared metaphysical telos will not 
be apparent in Maximus and Kropotkin’s ethics, but I suggest 
here, that the vision for human life on earth is underpinned in 
both Maximus and Kropotkin by the same kind of philosophical 
principles. I examine the concepts of mutual aid and well-being in 
Kropotkin’s thought and compare this to Maximus’ understand-
ing of love – arguing that the character of these concepts is similar 
enough to be valuable grounds for ethical praxis. Following this, 
I discuss their positions on private property as a way into con-
sidering the commonalities in their bases for human  economic 
relationships. Lastly, I look at some of Kropotkin’s practical 
(PhD diss., Durham University, 2018) (Available online: http://etheses.
dur.ac.uk/12376/1/Brown_Dewhurst-_Revolution_in_the_Microcosm.
pdf?DDD32+), 63–92.
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suggestions for an anarchist society and indicate how these might 
be useful developments for those who use Maximus’ theology as 
an ethical basis today.
3a. Mutual Aid and Well-Being
In his autobiography, Kropotkin describes how from a young age 
he was deeply distressed by the inequality, injustice and oppression 
inherent in serfdom, and the expectations in social interaction this 
system enforced.74 As the son of a wealthy landowner, he tells of 
the horror he felt at the way that serfs were treated in his father’s 
household. After one incident when he was about ten years old, 
Kropotkin wrote of the following encounter:
Tears suffocate me, and immediately after dinner is over I run out, 
catch Makár in a dark passage, and try to kiss his hand; but he 
tears it away, and says, either as a reproach or as a question,
“Let me alone; you, too, when you are grown up, will you not 
be just the same?”
“No, no, never!”75
From then on in his memoirs, Kropotkin describes a continual 
struggle to confront the injustices he found in Russian society. 
Remaining at the heart of his struggle is the desire to give to those 
in need, to bring a measure of fairness into the lives of those 
about him and above all “not be just the same” as the privileged 
who kept others enslaved. He claimed it was no good wanting to 
change society simply through the idea of the ‘right to work’ or ‘to 
each the whole result of his labour’.76 What had to be at the heart 
of desire for change in human society was hope for ‘well-being 
for all’,77 based on a principle of ‘to every [wo/]man according to 
[her/]his needs’.78 It was in this way that common people could 
 74 P. Kropotkin, Memoirs of a Revolutionist. (New York: Dover Publications, 
1971 (1899 (1st ed.))), Chapter VIII, 48–62.
 75 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 51.
 76 P. Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread. (Milton Keynes: Dodo Press, 
1892), 10.
 77 Kropotkin, Conquest, 11.
 78 Kropotkin, Conquest, 24.
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become “the builders of a new, equitable mode of organisation of 
society”.79
Kropotkin justifies his belief in the need for a society that seeks 
the well-being of all by locating a driving factor for this in an 
evolutionary tendency of the natural world towards co-operation. 
He notes that while the traditions and history of a society play an 
important part in the development of ethics, conscience itself “has 
a much deeper origin, – namely in the consciousness of  equity, 
which physiologically develops in man as in all social animals 
. . .”.80 He writes that a key factor of evolution has been the social 
development and ability of animals to co-operate with one anoth-
er in order to survive.81 He calls this the ‘mutual-aid tendency’, 
believing it to be something more base and instinctive than human 
feeling and sympathy. For him it is a kind of natural propensity 
for solidarity, “an instinct that has been slowly developed among 
animals and men in the course of an extremely long evolution, 
which has taught animals and men alike the force they can bor-
row from the practice of mutual aid and support, and the joys 
they can find in social life”.82 At face value, there appear to be a 
number of similarities between this mutual-aid tendency toward 
co-operation and Maximus’ claim that to love is natural and in-
volves voluntarily giving, sharing and caring for others. However, 
we have quite an explicit quotation from Kropotkin claiming 
that it is not enough to say that human society could be founded 
on ‘love’.83 To address this accusation it is important to situate 
Kropotkin’s thesis, Mutual Aid, in its context.
Mutual Aid was a vital work of its time, challenging the legit-
imacy of emerging social Darwinism at the end of the nineteenth 
century and proposing that cooperation, as well as struggle, had 
foundations in evolutionary science.84 Social Darwinism exacer-
bated the struggle of the individual in nature and derived from it a 
 79 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 379.
 80 P. Kropotkin, Ethics: Origin and Development. (Montréal: Black Rose 
Books Ltd., 1992 (1922 1st ed.)), 338.
 81 P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution. (Boston: Extending 
Horizons Books, 1902), xvi.
 82 Kropotkin, Mutual, xiii.
 83 See Kropotkin, Mutual, xii–xiii.
 84 Kropotkin, Mutual, ix–x.
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series of natural facts about the capability of the human and from 
there a legitimacy in the way in which human societies operated.85 
Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid really set about challenging the premise 
that the struggle of the individual is all that can be found in na-
ture (or in Darwin’s theory, for that matter).86 However, the extent 
to which ethics should be informed by observing nature was not 
called into question. This makes sense of why, for Kropotkin, it is 
not enough to say that human society could be founded on ‘love’, 
though the concept for him is a nonetheless important emotion 
derived from this natural ‘mutual-aid tendency’.87 Kropotkin still 
holds that scientifically proven tendencies in human nature must 
dictate the shape of our societies.88 Of course, this does not really 
explain why it could not be possible for the human, which believes 
itself to have developed the capability to love, to base its societ-
ies upon such a relation. Kropotkin writes, “It is not love of my 
neighbour – whom I often do not know at all – which induces me 
to seize a pail of water and to rush towards his house when I see 
it on fire. . .”.89 But need it not be? The heart of Byzantine ascetic 
literature is the assertion that the human can precisely cultivate 
an attitude of love toward any neighbour, even one previously not 
known.90 Since we are able to cultivate such an attitude, we have 
a responsibility to live in this way, Maximus believes, as we are 
the only creatures on earth who have sufficiently developed the 
rational capacity to live in such a fashion and thus enable harmo-
ny between all creatures.91
Whilst the semantics may be debated, it is clear that Maximus’ 
depiction of love as the foundation of human relationships does 
not sit at odds with Kropotkin’s hope for ‘well-being for all’. We 
have in both Kropotkin and Maximus, a concept that extols the 
importance of particular free will and identity, whilst recognising 
 85 Kropotkin, Mutual, ix.
 86 See Kropotkin, Mutual, viii–xii.
 87 See Kropotkin, Mutual, xii–xiii.
 88 Cf. Chomsky’s doubt on the utility of this kind of thought in anarchism 
see, Chomsky, ‘Interview with Ziga Vodovnik’ in Chomsky on Anarchism. 
B. Pateman (ed.) (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005), 240.
 89 Kropotkin, Mutual, xiii.
 90 Maximus, De char. PG90 964C I.15.
 91 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308B-C in On Difficulties II, 106–8.
To Each According to their Needs 79
that we are also naturally social creatures who ought to care for 
one another’s well-being and give to one another according to the 
needs of each. Kropotkin’s scientific reasoning, although appear-
ing to conflate normative and descriptive accounts of evolution, 
is certainly not a boundary to the Christian seeing utility in his 
ideas and practices. A key part of Byzantine cosmology is that it 
is not only human well-being that is sought for, but the well-being 
of the entirety of nature, of which humanity is a part. ‘To every 
man according to his needs’ might be a key slogan of nineteenth 
century Marxist and anarchist thought, but the sentiment is much 
older and one of the places it was cultivated as a way of life was 
in the practical ascesis of Christian desert monasticism: “. . . in 
God’s fashion to each one who has need”.92 To give to another 
person is to do the work of God, according to the Gospel and 
early church.93
3b. Positions on Property
In examining Maximus and Kropotkin’s positions on property, 
we can see philosophical principles become ethical directives. 
Property is matter we become attached to, regardless of whether 
we need it, and often at the expense of another human who goes 
without as a result of our attachment. It is thus an ideal topic to 
focus on when looking at how a theoretical dedication to love or 
well-being94 takes on a practical ethical dimension.
The anarchist position on property is often summarised in 
Proudhon’s famous slogan ‘Property is Theft!’.95 The practicality 
 92 Maximus, De char. PG90 965A I.23 (Berthold (trans.), Maximus, 37)].
 93 John 15:13.
 94 In using these concepts side-by-side I do not mean to imply that Maximus’ 
‘love’ and Kropotkin’s ‘well-being’ should be used interchangeably. As a 
result of (3a), I think we have sufficient grounds to consider them similar 
ethical principles or ends, and thus to us to think of them as approxi-
mately equivalent in the context of inquiry into ethical praxis.
 95 P. Proudhon, ‘Property is Theft’ in No Gods, No Masters. D. Guerin (ed.), 
(Edinburgh: AK Press, 1998), 48–54; We can find this sentiment also ex-
pressed in early Byzantine theology. Basil of Caesarea writes “Is not the 
person who strips another of clothing called a thief? And those who do 
not clothe the naked when they have the power to do so, should they not 
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of this position however seems better expressed by Kropotkin. 
“What we want is not the redistribution of overcoats,” writes 
Kropotkin, but “. . . the day when the worker in the factory 
produces for the community and not the monopolist – that day 
will see the workers clothed and fed.”96 More important than 
who owns what possession is the creation of an environment in 
which the human person may live without being in want. The 
capitalist mentality and the ‘middle-class rule’, as Kropotkin calls 
it, has a “morality drawn from account books, [and] its ‘debit 
and  credit’ philosophy, its ‘mine and yours’ institutions” must be 
 demolished.97 The threat of Kropotkin’s anarchism is that “we will 
do our utmost that none shall lack aught”.98 Thus for Kropotkin, 
property is a resource, necessary for keeping humans alive and 
ensuring human well-being. When it is seized and commandeered 
by one class to keep another in subjection, human well-being is 
obfuscated by the violent greed of those in power. Or to borrow 
the words of St Basil of Caesarea:99
It is as if someone were to take the first seat in the theatre, then bar 
everyone else from attending, so that one person alone enjoys what 
is offered for the benefit of all in common – this is what the rich 
do. They seize common goods before others have the  opportunity, 
then claim them as their own by right of preemption. For if we all 
took only what was necessary to satisfy our own needs, giving the 
rest to those who lack, no one would be rich, no one would be 
poor, and no one would be in need.100
be called the same? The bread you are holding back is for the hungry, the 
clothes you keep put away are for the naked, the shoes that are rotting 
away with disuse are for those who have none, the silver buried in the 
earth is for the needy. You are thus guilty of injustice toward as many 
as you might have aided, and did not.” Basil of Caesarea, ‘I Will Tear 
Down My Barns’ in On Social Justice. C.P. Schroeder (trans.) (New York: 
St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2009), 69–70.
 96 Kropotkin, Conquest, 33.
 97 Kropotkin, Conquest, 156.
 98 Kropotkin, Conquest, 39.
 99 c. 329–379 AD, one of the Cappadocian Fathers – the great theologians 
of the early Church.
 100 Basil of Caesarea, ‘I Will Tear Down My Barns’ in On Social Justice. 
Schroeder (trans.), 69.
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Kropotkin’s position on property comes straight out of his com-
mitment to human well-being and the presence of the mutual aid 
tendency. How we distribute resources, and also how we struc-
ture our relationships is informed by Kropotkin’s commitment to 
his ethical principles. Hierarchies of power and class, and divi-
sions into mine and yours, disrupt not just an immediate ability 
for those in want to access what they need, but also entrench 
isolation, alienation, and exploitation in human societies. For 
Kropotkin, rethinking these relationships makes sense sociologi-
cally and anthropologically speaking. For the Christian, to give 
to the other and to overcome division in human society and the 
natural world is draw near to God and to fulfil human potential 
as made possible by Christ.101
Following in the footsteps of the Acts of the early church,102 
desert ascetics prior to and during the Byzantine empire were pro-
ponents of communal property. I wish to draw attention to the 
mindset that such an understanding of property perpetuated. This 
is point made by Maximus,103 but I think the following story from 
the sayings of the Desert Fathers and Mothers illustrates it better:
There were two old men who dwelt together for many years and 
who never quarrelled.
Then one said to the other: “Let us pick a quarrel with each 
other like other men do.”
“I do not know how quarrels arise,” answered his companion.
So the other said to him: “Look, I will put a brick down here 
between us and I will say ‘‘This is mine.’ Then you can say ‘No it is 
not, it is mine.’ Then we will be able to have a quarrel.”
So they placed the brick between them and the first one said: 
“This is mine.”
His companion answered him: “This is not so, for it is mine.”
To this, the first one said: “If it is so and the brick is yours, then 
take it and go your way.”
And so they were not able to have a quarrel.104
 101 Matt. 25:34–40.
 102 Acts 2:42–47.
 103 Maximus, De char. PG90 965A I.23; 965C I.26.
 104 J. Wortley (ed. & trans.) The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers: A 
Select Edition and Complete English Translation. ‘The Quarrel’, N.352/17.26
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The politics of possession, property and coexistence are all ex-
pressed within the ascetic life that treats the act of love as a life-
style and set of choices made in order to live like Christ. The story 
of these two old men reflects on what it means to be holy and to 
truly be at peace with another person. Not only are one’s actions 
to be unhurtful, but one’s entire attitude is to be cultivated to 
the point where to take when another needs becomes an utterly 
nonsensical and bizarre notion. Possession and property hold no 
value in an ethos where meaningful relation is expressed through 
giving. It does not matter whose brick it is, rather that it be given 
to the one in need and that the object not become the source of 
conflict between two people who might otherwise live in peace. 
Our economic relations, I think, are often the basis of our social 
relations and attitudes. To live in a society where protection of 
private property and free trade are paramount is to set an expec-
tation for social relations built upon these ideas. Our perceptions 
of value and our interactions with others are built upon deserve, 
merit and right, rather than a comprehension of compassion and 
the needs of others.
Both Kropotkin’s anarchism and Christian desert monasticism 
seem to share an understanding that along with the economics 
of giving and communal living, there must be a change in our 
mindsets and consequently our social relationships. Although 
there are many differences between the kind of communal living 
Kropotkin imagined and that of the monastic movements in the 
early church, there are certain similarities in the kinds of changes 
both communal ideas required of people. Both require not merely 
a relocation of objects but a change in the conception of how 
property rules our relationships, and how attachment to wealth 
should never come before a dedication to the well-being of anoth-
er person. The categories of ‘mine’ and ‘yours’ were as common 
in Byzantine cities as they were in 19th century capitalist states 
and allowed no space for the prioritising of people rather than 
the acquisition of things.105 What Kropotkin’s communalism and 
some desert monastic practices share, is a turning upside down of 
 105 On this see Basil’s sermons ‘To the Rich’ and ‘I Will Tear Down My Barns’ 
in Social Justice. Schroeder (trans.), 41–71.
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the idea that accumulation of material possessions has to do with 
merit, and a positive disregard of any practices that do not focus 
on the integrity and well-being of the human being.106 What is 
really required is a change in our priorities, so that instead of our 
ultimate aim being an ideal of, say, the distribution of property, 
we instead dedicate ourselves to the well-being of all and giving to 
each according to their needs.107 Outside of some present-day mo-
nastic communities, there now seems very little emphasis on either 
the economic or socio-political implications of property within 
the Christian tradition. Whilst Christianity has its own history 
of communal living and property,108 it may be that the modern 
anarchist movement will serve as a reminder in this regard, that 
neoliberal and capitalist attitudes toward property are incompati-
ble with a genuine concern for the welfare of others.
3c. The Practicalities of a Stateless Society
Having demonstrated that there are key philosophical principles 
shared between Kropotkin and Maximus when it comes to anar-
chist ‘well-being’ and Christian ‘love’, I present some of Kropotkin’s 
practical suggestions that may be of use in Christian ethics. As a 
result of his dedication to human well-being, Kropotkin presented 
ideas for anarchist organising as an alternative to exploitative so-
cietal structures premised on inequity of power and wealth. Given 
the similarities that have been explored, I believe the methods for 
organising Kropotkin suggests, can be a place of inspiration to 
 106 For the desert monastics this was also about a spiritual well-being, since 
such attachment to material possessions also distracted from attention to 
God. The rejection of worldly goods was a rejection of the wealth of the 
world, so that an ascetic might instead focus on spiritual wealth. Spiritual 
wealth was concerned with good spiritual practice, good spiritual rela-
tion with God, and good spiritual relation with human and non-human 
creation.
 107 Which may entail the distribution of resources, or the means of produc-
tion being in the hands of workers, but these things are important only in 
so far as they are part of an ethics that works toward human well-being.
 108 For example see the writings of Pelagius, 15; Joachim of Fiore, 36; John 
Ball, 41; Winstanley, 128 in A. Bradstock & C. Rowland (eds.) Radical 
Christian Writings: A Reader. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2002).
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Christian practical ethics as well. I believe that the ethical prin-
ciples present in Byzantine ascetic Christian theology have much 
more in common with Kropotkin’s ideas for a stateless society, 
than the exploitative structures of present-day states. Although 
the writings of Maximus, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil of Caesarea, 
and the desert fathers and mothers had a much more personal 
and introspective dimension, they fundamentally discuss the char-
acter and structure of personal relationships. When asking what 
it means to live in a community structured upon those personal 
loving relationships, I believe a good set of practical suggestions 
can be found in the works of Kropotkin, who at the end of the 
day, has a vision for human living that is very familiar to Christian 
ethics.
Kropotkin’s vision is that life be led in communities that freely 
cooperate with one another, and that the freedom of each never 
be compromised or subjugated. Human relations must be based 
upon free agreement, he proposes. There must be “a society of 
equals” so that it becomes “an organism so constructed as to 
combine all the efforts for procuring the greatest sum possible of 
well-being for all, while full, free scope will be left for every indi-
vidual initiative”.109 By nature of being a community built upon 
free relation,
this society will not be crystallised into certain unchangeable 
forms, but will continually modify its aspect, because it will be 
a living, continually evolving organism; no need of government 
will be felt, because free agreement and federation take its place 
in all those functions which governments consider as theirs at the 
present time, and because, the causes of conflict being reduced in 
number, those conflicts which may still arise can be submitted to 
arbitration.110
Community cannot be static because relation is not static. The 
needs of one human differ from another, and a society must have 
the flexibility to serve the needs of each as well as the needs of 
many. Kropotkin suggests a society built on federated communi-
ties, where people might regulate their own local communities, 
 109 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 398.
 110 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 399.
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so that “society will be composed of a multitude of associations, 
federated for all the purposes which require federation” and “all 
these will combine directly, by means of free agreements between 
them, just as the railway companies or the postal departments of 
different countries cooperate now, without having a central rail-
way or postal government, – even though the former are actuated 
by merely egotistic aims”.111 Kropotkin considers ways in which 
industry, agriculture, and social organisation might realistically 
exist without reliance on the perpetuation of poverty or the op-
pression of fellow humans. The kind of critical thinking he en-
couraged questioned the necessity of any system built upon the 
subjugation of another being. His ideas therefore comprise practi-
cal ways in which people might cooperate with one another with-
out exercising coercive power.112 The political critique Kropotkin 
proposes is that cooperative community and mutual aid are a bet-
ter root of human society than accumulation of wealth for the self 
and the few and coercive defence of private property. Since hu-
mans can mutually co-operate, Kropotkin’s ethics ends up saying, 
humans should mutually co-operate.
Kropotkin’s theoretical ideas for the structure of an anarchist 
society are inseparable from his concern for the human condi-
tion. His ethics does not shy away from radical socio-political 
and economic conclusions and is demonstrative of how an ethics 
of human relation must resolve itself into a new vision for hu-
man society. We can see this for example within his work, Fields, 
Factories and Workshops, which was first collected into a book in 
1899.113 In this work, Kropotkin outlines four aspects of his an-
archist vision. The first is the decentralisation of industries which 
allows us “To return to a state of affairs where corn is grown, 
and manufactured goods are fabricated, for the use of those very 
people who grow and produce them,” so that “Each region will 
become its own producer and its own consumer of agricultural 
produce”.114 The second looks at the possibilities of agriculture, 
and how the market garden might be put to good use. The main 
 111 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 398–9.
 112 Kropotkin, Mutual, 223.
 113 Ward, introduction to Kropotkin, Fields, iv.
 114 Kropotkin, Fields, 40.
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point of this section is to illustrate that it is always within our 
means to produce food locally to feed a population.115 On this, 
he says, “The obstacles against it are not in the imperfection of 
the agricultural art, or in the infertility of the soil, or in climate. 
They are in our institutions, in our inheritances and survivals 
from the past – in the ‘Ghosts’ which oppress us”.116 His point is 
that our cultural, traditional, political and economic practices are 
tied to our current institutions and prevent us from attempting 
to create local, self-sustaining economies and agriculture. In his 
third section, Kropotkin discusses the necessity of “producing for 
the producers themselves” and also the healthy need for all peo-
ple to be involved to some degree in manual outdoor labour.117 
On a similar theme, the last area Kropotkin covers is education: 
“‘Through the eyes and the hand to the brain’ – this is the true 
principle of economy of time in teaching.”118 Kropotkin is keen to 
emphasise that understanding of the theoretical comes through 
the practical, and that this is true in school-learning, but also in 
the societies that we construct. We cannot understand labour un-
less we labour.119 In Fields, Factories and Workshops, Kropotkin 
demonstrates the need for our economic and political decisions 
never to occur in isolation from our social and ethical thought. 
The two belong to one another and inform each other and are 
built on one another.
Of particular note in terms of compatibility with Maximus’ eth-
ical vision, is Kropotkin’s concern that “society will not be crys-
tallised into certain unchangeable forms”120 so as to best reflect 
and grow with the needs of its citizens. The understanding that, 
in Ward’s words, “there is no final struggle”121 but that our rela-
tionships – personal and communal – must be continually worked 
at, is one that recognises that we are demanding the impossible. 
 115 Kropotkin, Fields, 103; This is still the case today with responsible chang-
es to land use and diet, cf. S. Fairlie ‘Can Britain Feed Itself’ The Land 4 
Winter (2007–8): 18–26.
 116 Kropotkin, Fields, 106.
 117 Kropotkin, Fields, 158.
 118 Kropotkin, Fields, 175.
 119 Kropotkin, Fields, 186.
 120 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 399.
 121 Ward, Anarchy, 37.
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In always setting our sights higher, we keep our communities 
from stagnating into what is easy, and require ourselves to al-
ways seek better ways to live in compassion with those around us. 
One of the principle metaphysical differences between Maximus 
and Kropotkin, is that for Maximus, ultimately our life on earth 
is directed towards God, whilst Kropotkin’s ethics is thoroughly 
rooted in human aims and ends. Although this is a key difference 
between these two thinkers, practically speaking, it could be an-
other place of comparative similarity. For Maximus there is no 
completion point in which our ethical responsibilities are done. 
Ethics is human choice to seek love and knowledge i.e. to seek 
God. There is always more to learn about God and more ways 
to grow in love. Even then in theosis, the end hope of all creation 
for final rest in God, we still anticipate ever-moving rest,122 a rest 
in which relationship continues to ever deepen. In our lives here 
and now, we can thus also see for Maximus a dedication to the 
idea that human relationship rooted in love, is a relationship that 
must continually grow and recognise its own shortcomings. As a 
practical ethical principle, the idea that there is not one set end for 
human society, but that we must continually and consciously seek 
to revise our communities into places where particular and com-
munal well-being can flourish, is one both startlingly anarchist 
and Byzantine in character.
Conclusion
Thus we can see that there is a potential compatibility between 
the ethical vision proposed by Maximus the Confessor and the 
practical means of coexistence proposed by Kropotkin. While 
Maximus’ thought is firmly rooted within a Christian cosmos, 
and sees both the origin and end of things as being in God, the 
ethics necessitated by his theology is very close to a number of an-
archist considerations. The love of Christ explored by Maximus is 
one that upturns a status quo that places value on wealth, power, 
and coercion. In exploring the spiritual significance of rooting our 
actions in love, Maximus presents us not just with a vision for 
 122 Maximus, Ad Thal. 59 CCSG22 line 131.
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7th century ascetic living, but also an ethics that identifies care for 
fellow creatures as the root of economic and political relation. In 
likewise identifying Kropotkin’s ideas as politico-economic theo-
ries that stem from social concerns, we can see that common care 
for the well-being of others necessarily challenges us to rethink 
the structures of the societies and institutions in which we live. 
The divergence in philosophical frameworks between Maximus 
and Kropotkin does not mean there cannot be agreement as to 
what good human living looks like, and consequently a shared 
vision of how to create a better human society.
In the process of describing the utility of anarchist theory to 
Christians who wish to make use of Maximus’ thought, my hope 
is that this chapter will make some contribution towards self- 
criticism within the Christian faith, and a wider interest in the 
lessons that can be learned from others similarly dedicated to the 
well-being of the marginalised and down-trodden. I hope it has 
also become clear to those of us who identify as anarchists, that 
many of the political and historical problems associated with the 
church, are not expressive of all theology underlying the Christian 
faith. This is a theology that is not just limited to the faith of the 
apostolic era (as implied by Kropotkin),123 nor to the Byzantine 
era, since it is very much alive today in theological study and also 
in different denominations of the church.
So long as giving to each according to their need is paramount to 
human activity, which I think both Maximus’ concept of love and 
Kropotkin’s dedication to well-being both affirm, there is much 
hope to be had for united practical endeavour. At the very least, 
there is certainly a lot in the practical ideas put forward by an-
archists like Kropotkin, that can be explored further in Christian 
ethics as an alternative to complicity in societal structures that 
have no place for the love of Christ. Christ’s love challenges the 
foundations of nationalisms, racisms, classisms, sexisms, and any 
other hatreds and division. It is this specific character of love that 
Maximus suggests is fundamental to a theological cosmology that 
asks who we are as humans and where we are going. This theol-
ogy sits in firm contradiction to societies and ideologies built on 
 123 Kropotkin, Ethics, 120–1.
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the glorification of wealth and power, so at the very least, it seems 
important to explore the radical alternatives set forward by think-
ers like Peter Kropotkin.
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Representations of Catholicism in 




This essay explores the portrayal of Catholicism in eight 
Spanish anarchist-themed films. The first part discusses negative 
 representations of the Catholic religion rehearsed in these films, 
set as they are mainly in the context of the Spanish Civil War. 
Among those representations are: the political and economic 
 purpose of the Catholic Church’s control of education in Spain; 
the  breaking of the religious vows of poverty and chastity, and the 
recourse to praising the vow of obedience when under scrutiny; 
and the breaking of the seal of the confessional. In the second part, 
the essay shows that those films also portray a Christianity which 
can be more solidary, revolutionary and attached to a different 
 idealization of Christ, unlike the Church consisting of high-ranking 
members of the clergy. This second part also considers the notion of 
“secularization” and the extent to which anarchism has become an 
alternative religion in these films. The essay also reflects on the 
reliability of films as historical sources.
Like any work of history, a film must be judged in terms of the 
knowledge of the past that we already possess. Like any work of 
history, it must situate itself within a body of other works, the on-
going (multimedia) debate over the importance of events and the 
meaning of the past.1
Almost coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of 
the Spanish Civil War, two respectively anarcho-communist (and 
 1 Robert Rosentone, ‘The historical film as real history’, Film-historia online, 
1 (1995), 5–23 (p. 9).
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anarchist or libertarian)-themed blockbusters were released: Land 
and Freedom (1995) and Libertarias (1996). These films relay the 
view that for Franco the armed conflict was in large part a re-
ligious issue: a crusade against atheists, communists, Jews and 
Freemasons.2 After all, the central role of the Catholic Church in 
the conflict was illustrated by the radio message sent by Pope Pius 
XII “To the faithful of Spain” on 14 April 1939 in which he ex-
pressed support for Franco and blessed the Christian heroism of 
those who had defeated the impious red forces.3 The films touch 
on that support, but they also document the anticlerical wave 
that emerged among certain anarchist, republican and communist 
groups during the Second Spanish Republic (1931–1939) and no-
tably during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939).4
 2 “[. . .] The Spanish war was not a political conflict or a class struggle, but 
rather a war of two civilizations – a Catholic one and an alien,  anti-Spanish, 
and Marxist one. According to Pla y Deniel [a Spanish  bishop], the war 
resulted from the apostasy of the nation (the Bishop could not conceal the 
fact that most Spaniards supported the Republic), civil marriages, and the 
secular education system”. In: Tadeusz Miłkowski, ‘The Spanish Church 
and the Vatican during the Spanish Civil War’, The Polish Foreign Affairs 
Digest, 3 (2004), 207–242 (p. 208).
 3 “With great joy We address you, most dear children of Catholic Spain, 
to express to you our fatherly congratulations for the gift of peace and 
of victory, with which God has deemed worthy to crown the Christian 
heroism of your faith and charity, tried in so many and so generous 
sufferings. Our Predecessor, of venerable memory, expected, with longing 
and trust, this Providential peace, which is undoubtedly the fruit of that 
copious blessing which he sent, in the very beginning of the struggle, ‘to all 
those who had devoted themselves to the difficult and dangerous task of 
defending and restoring the rights and the honour of God and Religion’; 
and We do not doubt that this peace shall be the one that he himself foretold 
since then, ‘the sign of a future of tranquillity in  order, and of honour in 
prosperity’”. Cited in Mundabor, ‘Pope Pius XII’s Message After the Victory 
In Spain. 14 April 1939’. <http://mundabor.wordpress.com/2011/07/21/
pope-pius-xiis-message-after-the-victory-in-spain/> [accessed 26 July 2012]. 
See Mary Vincent, Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: religion and 
politics in Salamanca, 1930–1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
 4 Two good sources on Spanish anticlericalism are: Manuel Pérez Ledesma, 
‘Studies on Anticlericalism in Contemporary Spain’, International 
Review of Social History, 46 (2001), 227–255; and Julio Caro Baroja, 
Introducción a una historia contemporánea del anticlericalismo español 
(Madrid: ISTMO, 1980).
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These films, however, have a tendency to rehearse old stereotypes 
corrupted by the violent excesses of the Spanish Civil War – “the 
war that won’t die”.5 For example, in Land and Freedom (1995) 
and Libertarias (1996) anarchists continue to be “condemned as 
apostles of violence”6 while the clergy are represented as  apostles 
of fascism. Despite this, however, they also hint at a revised 
conception of religion whereby the real enemy is shown to be 
the ecclesiastical hierarchy, not necessarily all of the clergy, or all 
aspects of Christian ethics. The aim of this essay, therefore, is to 
 provide a panoramic overview of Catholicism as  portrayed in Spanish 
film productions that could be qualified as “ anarchist-themed”, 
first by considering the recurrence of old anticlerical sentiments, 
then by looking at the aspects of religion which are portrayed as 
implicitly more redeemable.
It should be clear that the contemporary Spanish anarchist-themed 
films analysed here do not belong to what might be termed 
propaganda film.7 In what follows, “anarchist cinema” (or anarchist- 
themed cinema) is defined according to Stuart Christie’s  criteria as 
“not necessarily films made and produced by anarchists – some 
of which can be very boring indeed”, but as also including “ several 
anti-authoritarian films made by non-anarchists”.8 I will also 
 follow the canon in approaching the “Spanishness” of those films 
relatively broadly, given that at present the transnational nature 
of Spanish film seems unquestionable: “To talk of Spanish cinema 
is to talk of its relations with other cinemas, through coproduc-
tions, through the sharing of actors and technical personnel, and 
 5 I have borrowed this expression from: David Archibald, The War That 
Won’t Die: The Spanish Civil War in Cinema (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2013). 
 6 Richard Porton, On Anarchist Cinema. Anarchist Film and Video 
(Oakland-Sussex: PM Press-ChristieBooks, 2009), p.vi. 
 7 See Magí Crusells Valeta, ‘Cinema as a political propaganda during the 
Spanish Civil War: España 1936’, Ebre, 38, (2004), 1–12.
 8 Cited in: Porton, On Anarchist Cinema, p. 16. In the same book, Porton 
(p.i) asked: “If we speak of ‘anarchist cinema,’ are we referring to films 
about the historical experience of anarchists and anarchism or films with 
an anarchist impetus that might have been made by non-anarchists?’”. 
For a further discussion see: Duncan Campbell, ‘A revolution in cine-
ma?’, The Guardian, 24 November 2006. <http://www.theguardian.com/
film/2006/nov/24/1> [accessed 15 July 2013]. 
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particularly through its drawing on a common fund of  formal, 
generic, and thematic concerns”.9 Thus, in addition to Land and 
Freedom (1995) and Libertarias (1996), I will also analyse La 
lengua de las mariposas [Butterfly’s Tongue] (1996); Salvador 
(2006); El corazón de la tierra (2007) also known as The Heart 
of Earth; Los girasoles ciegos [The Blind Sunflowers] (2008); La 
 mujer del anarquista (2009) or The Anarchist’s Wife, directed 
by the German film director Peter Sehr in collaboration with the 
French scriptwriter Marie-Noëlle Barré; and El cine libertario: 
Cuando las películas hacen historia [The Libertarian Film: When 
Films Leave Historical Legacies] (2011).
Similarly, taking ‘anarchism’ and ‘religion’ as  umbrella terms 
is not without its problems. ‘Anarchism’ alludes here to the 
 historical-philosophical term that was born in parallel to Liberalism 
and Utopian Socialism. Even if the word has  different implications, 
some of the common characteristics that it invoked, at least in the 
Spanish context, include the following: “. . . intellectual, political 
and social emancipation, which implies moral emancipation, and, 
upon this basis, the free development of a mature and regenerated 
humanity”.10 Nevertheless, there are several currents of thought 
and practice within anarchism that appear in these films: 
 anarcho-communism, anarcho-syndicalism, anarcho-collectivism, 
anarcho-pacifism, libertarian possibilism or ‘possibilistic  anarchism’, 
and mutualism, among others. For its part, the term ‘religion’ seems 
more unproblematic in this context: in the context of this essay it 
refers mainly to the Catholic Church (as an institution with a strong 
hierarchical structure) but also to a set of beliefs (based on the 
principles from the gospel) held by grassroots Christians.
It is also worth acknowledging at the start the highly  conflicting 
relationship between the “fictional film” genre and its approach to 
using film-as-history, as suggested by the epigraph above. On this 
issue, this essay takes film as a valid (but special) form of  historical 
discourse, as a “vital source of information on what people be-
lieved” and as “an index to the key problems of a period and even 
 9 Jo Labanyi, and Tatjana Pavlović, eds, A Companion to Spanish Cinema 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), p. 1. 
 10 Max Nettlau, A Short History of Anarchism (London: Freedom Press, 
1996), p. 44.
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more importantly, the way those problems were perceived”.11 Still, 
there is a debate condensed in one crucial question: “In what sense 
does a film reflect the society in which it is made and therefore tell 
us something about that time and that place that is of value for the 
historian?”12 Of these difficulties, three significant issues are worth 
highlighting.
In the first place, there is the issue of genre. Even though these films 
are part of a fictional narrative, we could frame them within the genre 
of “historical film”. According to two of the most  important internet 
film databases (IMDb, FilmAffinity), the majority of these films fit 
into “drama”, “history” and “war” (or “post-war”) genres. Salvador, 
for instance, is described as a “drama” and “based on a true story”, 
while El cine libertario: Cuando las películas hacen historia is classi-
fied as a “documentary” and “movie documentary”. Helpful as that 
taxonomy is for those  databases, film critics agree that categorizing 
these films is neither straightforward nor unproblematic.13
The second main difficulty for those working in film studies is 
the danger of using a film as history or as an historical document. 
Film academics call “representation [. . .] the process by which the 
media presents the real world to an audience”.14 To present films 
as history, though, can be controversial: “historians will say, films 
are inaccurate. They distort the past. They fictionalize, trivialize, 
and romanticize important people, events, and movements. They 
falsify History”.15 Rare, therefore, are the films which represent 
the past as accurate, historical documents, despite the temptation 
to present them as such.
 11 Warren I Susman, ‘Film and History: Artefact and Experience’, in 
Hollywood and the American Historical Film, ed. by J.E.Smyth (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 1–11 (p. 4). 
 12 Susman, p. 4. 
 13 See Stephen Schwartz, ‘The paradoxes of film and the recovery of historical 
memory: Vicente Aranda’s works on the Spanish Civil War’, Film History: 
An International Journal, 4 (2008), 501–507, (p. 501). 
 14 Philip Rayner, Peter Wall and Stephen Kruger, AS media studies: the essential 
introduction. (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 61. 
 15 Rosenstone, p. 1.
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The third difficulty, building on the second, concerns the degree 
to which these films in fact construct and invent “reality”.16 In that 
regard, three factors are worth bearing in mind: a) the “ideological 
positions of directors and screenwriters”; b) the “emotions” they 
choose to express to “help understand the events they relate to”; 
and c) the way they sometimes become perceived as “excellent” 
and alternative “sources of information” to contrast to the received 
orthodoxy (in other words, the history they represent is actually 
taken as a narrative to query the established one).17
Nonetheless and notwithstanding the risk of simplification, 
 history books are also created in specific contexts: historians 
write with their ideological agendas shaping the way the past is 
perceived and facing similar problems of objectivity, even though 
some would argue that there is at least one fundamental differ-
ence between fiction and history, which is that “[. . .] both tell 
stories, but history tells a true story”.18 My general assumption in 
this essay is that fictional Spanish films – understood as cultural 
products of a symbolic system19 – work as sociological indicators 
of the cosmovisión or worldview of the specific society in the spe-
cific era in which they were made.20 Furthermore, films can even 
be considered “interpreters of history”.21 Therefore, in the analy-
sis which follows, where appropriate I will touch on the chosen 
tone of the films, on the audiences and reception of the films, on 
the historical context that they purport to represent, and on their 
construction or propagation of stereotypes.
 16 José Uroz, ed., Historia y cine (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1999), 
p. 6.
 17 Francisco Javier Zubiaur Carreño, ‘El Cine como fuente de la Historia’, 
Memoria y civilización: anuario de historia de la Universidad de Navarra, 
8 (2005), 205–219 (p. 215). Unless otherwise indicated, all translations 
from Spanish to English are mine.
 18 Rosenstone, p. 8.
 19 Martín Paradelo Núñez, ‘El mundo a través de un cristal. Alcance crítico 
de los modos de representación cinematográficos’, Estudios. Revista de 
Pensamiento Libertario, 2 (2012), 76–101 (p. 78). And, Susman, p. 9. 
 20 Labanyi and Pavlović, p. 2. On this topic see: Luise White, ‘Telling more: 
lies, secrets, and history’,  History and Theory, 4 (2000), 11–22, and 
Jennifer Jensen Wallach, ‘Building a bridge of words: The literary auto-
biography as historical source material’, Biography, 3 (2006), 446–461.
 21 Susman, p. 5.
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In what follows, I will first pinpoint and discuss some of the 
old negative representations about Catholicism which Spanish 
anarchist-themed films indulge in: first, the traditional role of 
the Catholic Church as an institution that monopolized educa-
tion in Spain for several centuries; then the supposed violation 
of religious vows (vow of poverty, and vow of chastity) and the 
exaltation of the vow of obedience by churchmen under scruti-
ny, mainly in the midst of the Spanish Civil War; and then the 
violation of the seal of the confessional. Secondly, I will argue 
that despite these negative representations, there was never a 
homogeneous church in Spain either during the Civil War or 
during Franco’s Regime, and I will show that those films do also 
portray a Christianity which can be more solidary,  revolutionary 
and attached to a different ideation of Christ, unlike the Church 
consisting of high-ranking members of the clergy. This second 
part will also discuss the notion of “secularization” and the 
 degree to which anarchism has become an alternative religion in 
these films. In the conclusion, I will return to the controversial 
question of the link between anarchist films and representations 
of religion, and the extent to which films are good sources of 
historical information.
1. Negative representations
Let us start by listing the old anti-religious sentiments that ap-
pear in these films. They are replete with scenes of anticlericalism, 
and instances of spontaneous violence against Catholic symbols. 
The films similarly caricature the entire religious class, portraying 
priests as dogmatic masters of the education system. The Church 
is represented as an immoral corporation, concealing cases of 
 religious men perpetrating sexual abuse, general criminal  activity, 
and showing a lack of respect for the vow of silence implicit in 
confession. In short, these anarchist films tend to settle scores 
with old enemies: if Francoist sympathizers set out to build an 
image of anarchists focused on fanaticism, intolerance and crime, 
libertarian-themed film tends to create a similar iconography of 
the members of religious orders associated with the Francoist 
side.
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1.1 The monopoly of education22
One way to understand the roots of this anticlericalism is by look-
ing at the religious monopoly on education in Spain: “Workers 
not only believed the clergy made a profit from their schools, but 
considered them an obstacle to the development of a free public 
school system. [. . .] Articulate labour spokesmen [. . .] declared 
that the ideas taught in Catholic schools were antithetical to the 
cause of workers’ rights”.23 In 1877, an alarmingly high 72% of 
the Spanish population was illiterate.24 Thirty-three years later, the 
illiteracy rate was still high: 59% among adults and 50% among 
children over the age of 10.25 These rates of illiteracy can be 
 explained in part by the country’s economic poverty, but another 
reason could also be that education was subject to payment of a 
fee, and was in the hands of the institution that had been the most 
ideologically and economically powerful entity in Spain since the 
15th century – that is, the Catholic Church. In other words: only 
the children of the wealthy could afford to pursue an education. 
This compounded the workers’ misery, and had become a cause of 
hostility towards the Church: “One major problem was the cler-
gy’s need to finance its activities, and the corresponding resent-
ment of workers who had to pay for the services or who simply 
disliked the money-making activities of a religious institution”.26 
The long-term legacy of these injustices can be seen in both La 
lengua de las mariposas and Los girasoles ciegos.
 22 For a deeper analysis on anarchism and education in Spain see Carolyn P. 
Boyd, ‘The Anarchists and Education in Spain, 1868–1909’, The Journal 
of Modern History, 48.4 (1976), 125–170. And Pedro García-Guirao, 
‘Francisco Ferrer y las misiones pedagógicas del anarquismo español’ 
(Murcia: Biblioteca Saavedra Fajardo, 2007).
 23 Joan Connelly Ullman, The tragic week: a study of anticlericalism 
in Spain, 1875–1912 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 
pp. 326–327.
 24 Compared to other countries in 1870, illiteracy rates were 68% in 
Italy (a strongly Catholic country), 24% in Great Britain and 31% in 
France. <http://ourworldindata.org/data/education-knowledge/literacy/> 
[accessed 10 June 2015].
 25 M. Gloria Espigado Tocino, ‘El analfabetismo en España. Un estudio a 
través del censo de población de 1877’, Trocadero: Revista de historia 
moderna y contemporanea (1990), 173–192.
 26 Joan Connelly Ullman, p. 326.
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The first of these, La lengua de las mariposas, centres on the 
 relationship between a pupil (Moncho) and his schoolteacher 
(Don Gregorio) a few months before Francisco Franco’s coup 
in July 1936. Moncho does not want to go to school because 
 everyone has told him that all religious teachers beat their  pupils. 
However, Don Gregorio turns out not to be like those feared 
 religious teachers. He is a freethinker (an anarchist) and a “kindly 
if unorthodox”27 educator who believes not in God, but in what 
he calls the “Observation Method” – a scientific method based 
on empirical observation and measurable data – and he  opposes 
the repressive methods of clerical teachers committed to using 
fear and punishment. Don Gregorio – as theorised by Francisco 
Ferrer, the founder of the Escuela Moderna or Modern School28 – 
conceives of the classroom as a laboratory to change mentalities 
and as a permanent experiment based on observation and on 
Maieutic pedagogical methods rather than on authoritarianism 
and faith.29 Moncho is captivated by his new teacher and friend, 
but his educational system does not please everyone. For  example, 
the priest complains to Don Gregorio that ever since Moncho 
started his schooling he no longer cares about going to church and 
no longer wants to be an altar boy. Don Gregorio interrupts the 
conversation to say that he does not teach his students to hate the 
Church but to be free spirits: “Freedom encourages the spirit of 
 27 Nina Caplan, ‘Butterfly’s Tongue’, Daily Mail, 14 November 2000. 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-6351/Butterflys-Tongue.
html> [accessed 10 January 2013].
 28 Most of the anarchist educational projects were based on the Modern 
School. The Modern School was a progressive school founded in 1909 
by the Catalan libertarian Francisco Ferrer i Guardia. Its principles 
were free secular education, massive literacy (especially among working 
class), mixed education, and the abolition of corporal punishments. See 
Geoffrey C.Fidler,‘The Escuela Moderna Movement of Francisco Ferrer: 
‘Por la Verdad y la Justicia’’, History of Educations Quarterly 25 (1985), 
103–132. 
 29 “Considering the hostility of the Church against this conception of 
the classroom as a laboratory for change, then it is not surprising that 
Spanish authorities had received with concerns Ferrer’s proclamation 
[. . .] that ‘the child, in order to avoid errors’, must be taught that it is 
‘essential’ ‘not to admit anything on faith’”. In: Porton, Cine y Anarquismo, 
p. 195.
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strong men” (19:05). To be a free spirit means eliminating dogmas 
and symbolical chains; and Don Gregorio tries to eliminate these 
from his pupils’ brains. Moncho, the little boy, is intimidated by 
the idea of Hell. However, Don Gregorio tells him that Hell does 
not exist, or at least it does not exist in the hereafter but rather on 
earth itself. Instead he says: “Hate, cruelty, that is hell. Sometimes 
hell is our very selves” (53:23). In fact, he will suffer what could 
be considered “hell on earth” in the final scenes of the film, when 
Moncho’s mother (and the wife of a former anarchist) feels 
compelled to join a public street condemnation of left-wingers 
shouting: “Criminals, atheists, reds! Atheists, atheists, atheists!” 
(01:25:03). Even the former anarchist publicly insults the teacher 
in order to avoid suspicions falling upon him: “Murderer, anar-
chist, son of a bitch, bastard, atheist, atheist, atheist” (01:27:00).
For some film critics La lengua de las mariposas is a clear ex-
ample of “sugar-coated history”, fictional, invented, or untrue, 
and devoid of any historical value. It is:
Republican Spain seen through rose-tinted glasses; a harsh and bit-
ter world, magically transformed into an idyllic premodern utopia 
about to be cruelly crushed by fascism. There is a refusal to engage 
with a concrete historical past, and what is presented [. . .] is a 
nostalgic recreation of a republican Spain that never was.30
In the light of this criticism, the film critic Jesús Miguel Sáez 
complained about the leftist prejudices advanced in this type of 
film, made by directors that formed “The cultural humus of PM 
Zapatero’s regime”.31 For Jesús Miguel Sáez, given these ideo-
logical conditions, Cuerda’s film did not convey any historical 
learning but a pure intolerance and manipulation of religious is-
sues: “With these kind of films [certain film directors] have been 
devoted to the ‘official historical memory’, one that makes the 
Civil War a clash between the good – defenders of freedom, – and 
evil – promoters of obscurantism and crime, – and the Church has 
 30 David Archibald, ‘The war that won’t die’, The Guardian, 28 July 2000. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2000/jul/28/culture.features1> 
[accessed 9 January 2013].
 31 Jesús Miguel Sáez González, ‘Reseñas de cine’, Vivat Academia, 112 
(2008), 1–9 (p. 6).
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been included in this latter side”.32 Regardless of the correctness 
of this review, his words highlight some of the factors noted in my 
introduction, such as the importance of film contexts, production 
and history, as well as the traditional left-wing bias against the 
Church, not just during the Civil War but also today.
A good example of the representation of the clergy as “pro-
moters of obscurantism and crime” can be found in the role of 
Don Salvador in Los girasoles ciegos, the polar opposite of Don 
Gregorio in La lengua de las mariposas. Los girasoles ciegos 
 describes the terrible secret of an apparent widow (Elena) and her 
son (Lorenzo). Everyone in Orense (Galicia) believes that Elena’s 
husband (Ricardo) died at the beginning of the Civil War (1936) 
in the Republican faction. In reality, Ricardo lives hidden in a 
small secret room in their family house, translating freethinking, 
 republican and anarchist authors. Don Salvador, a priest who 
fought on the fascist side, starts a new job in Orense. He becomes 
Lorenzo’s new teacher. The child is not willing to follow Don 
Salvador’s religious teaching and the priest uses this rebelliousness 
to approach Elena sexually.
At school the children and the teacher are required to sing 
the  fascist song “Cara al Sol” [Facing the Sun]. Not  performing 
this duty involved serious punishment for the children and their 
 families. Furthermore, in the classroom we can see the three 
 compulsory symbols on display in every Spanish public school: The 
Crucified Christ, a picture of Franco and another of José Antonio 
Primo de Rivera. The priest’s teaching is based on the following 
principle: “What matters most at the end of the day is to develop 
as a good person, in other words as Christians and Spaniards” 
(16:50). His words mix politics with religion and assume that in 
order to be a good Spaniard, one has to be a good Christian. Don 
Salvador’s pupils – especially those with Republican relatives – 
return home terrified by the horrendous stories about non-believers 
told by their teacher.
In La lengua de las mariposas Moncho’s mother is afraid of her 
son’s questions regarding his father’s Republican ideology. In one 
scene of this film, he innocently points out to her: “Dad does not 
 32 Sáez González, p. 4.
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even give a shit about God” (16:20), to which she replies: “Well, 
that is a sin but Dad believes in God like every upstanding citizen” 
(16:29). In Los girasoles ciegos, young Lorenzo does not want 
to sing “Cara al Sol”, and he is constantly interrogated by Don 
Salvador, who is eager to discover what might be going on in his 
home and the political background of Lorenzo’s family, in order 
to report it to the authorities. In these scenes, both films denounce 
the sovereign “Right of Death and the Power over Life” that the 
priests had over the population. Don Salvador not only controls 
the physical punishment of boys but also, to use a Foucauldian 
expression, “governs theirs souls”. 33 As film critics have pointed 
out, the director of the film, Cuerda – who is not necessarily an 
anarchist, but is a left-wing film director – falls back on the trope 
of presenting this dark side of the Spanish Church: “[Cuerda] 
has given more minutes, or at least more kick to the conservative 
camp of history, that is, to the sphere of the church. Not so much 
to the faithful people but to the people who see everything from 
the podium”.34 A distinction is thus drawn between the clergy and 
the laity, though as we will see later, some films also differenti-
ate between a particularly reactionary church hierarchy and the 
 lower clergy.
1.2 Caricature and criticism of religious double standards
This section draws on the film representation of the three vows 
that Catholic priests have to make to become ordained: poverty, 
obedience and chastity. According to ecclesiastical law, the clergy 
must live and act in accordance with these rules. However, the 
films under analysis portray systematic violations of these vows. 
This negative and archetypal representation is a pattern with-
in anticlerical Spanish anarchist art and literature: “Priests are 
 33 Michel Foucault, ‘Right of Death and Power over Life’, in The History 
of Sexuality. Vol. 1. An Introduction (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1990), 133–159.
 34 Olmo, ‘Crítica de la película Los girasoles ciegos’, (Precríticas, 3 October 
2008). <http://www.precriticas.com/criticas/la-lengua-de-los-girasoles/> 
[accessed 10 January 2013].
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considered as fanatics, obscurantists and corrupt men, traitors to 
the Gospel”.35
1.2.1 Vow of poverty
Libertarias focuses on María’s story. She is a young nun who is 
recruited (by force) by Pilar (an anarchist woman) at the begin-
ning of the Spanish Civil War. Their plan is to create a women’s 
group to fight Francoist troops. Very soon, they discover that they 
have to fight not only Franco but also the macho attitudes of their 
male anarchist comrades. María doubts her faith in churchmen 
when she witnesses the ravages of war first hand together with the 
hidden pesetas of the Church. In Aranda’s film, militia members 
discover sixteen million pesetas in cash and abundant quantities 
of gold in the Episcopal Palace. They decide to display these trea-
sures publicly so that the people can witness the hypocrisy of the 
Church while the proletariat starves to death. As Ullman explains, 
this panders to popular perceptions at the time: “These orders 
were considered exceptionally wealthy, an opinion based largely 
on the fact that nuns performed no remunerated service”.36 This 
is also an illustration of a classic left-wing criticism of the Church, 
most famously articulated amongst anarchists by Bakunin in God 
and the State. He stated that “Christianity is the religion par ex-
cellence, because it exhibits and manifests, to the fullest extent, 
the very nature and essence of every religious system, which is the 
impoverishment, enslavement, and annihilation of humanity for 
the benefit of divinity”.37 In Libertarias, the clergy are portrayed 
as not even pursuing “the benefit of divinity” but only their own 
riches. Furthermore, in the middle of a revolutionary anarchist 
fury aimed at seeking social justice (both in film and reality), the 
discovery of such a treasure was always likely to entail: firstly, the 
immediate confiscation of the wealth and property of the church; 
secondly, the punishment of such a robbery in the name of God; 
 35 Lily Litvak, El cuento anarquista: 1880–1911: antología (Madrid: Fundación 
Anselmo Lorenzo, 2003), p. 32. 
 36 Joan Connelly Ullman, p. 327.
 37 Mikhail Bakunin, God and the State (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2008), 
p. 24 [italics in the original]. 
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and finally, the restitution of this wealth to those who really need 
it: the people.38 Similarly, popular uprisings are represented in 
these films as a form of historical revenge by the dispossessed 
against the wealthy elites and as a justification of violence, and 
especially as an excuse to search religious buildings and church-
es. In the same way, swift executions are explained and justified 
by the sheer thrust of popular uprisings. In the context of “rev-
olutionary justice” the image that anarchists hold of the Church 
was considerably influenced by the actions of its hierarchy: while 
the priests are often given the benefit of the doubt, those in the 
upper echelons of the Church’s hierarchy are deemed guilty of 
collaborating with the Franco regime and accused of plundering 
the working class.39 This tells us much about how the Church was 
perceived not only retrospectively but also today as an accomplice 
of the oppressive class.40
1.2.2 Vow of obedience
Another negative representation of Catholicism in anar-
chist-themed films is the portrayal of the vow of obedience to 
God and the Church as a way of renouncing personal freedom 
in order to obey blindly the preferences of bishops and popes, 
often against the principles of the Bible. Conceived in such a way, 
churchmen were, for anarchist militants, potential traitors of the 
social revolution which one would expect followers of Jesus to 
support. For example, the documentary film El cine libertario: 
 38 “These economic factors formed the basis for the workers’ conviction 
that religious orders and great capitalists were closely linked, and for the 
popular identification of clericalism with capitalism”. In: Joan Connelly 
Ullman, p. 328.
 39 “The abuses against clergyman (for example the assassination of the 
bishop) are justified indirectly by the authors using the pretext that they 
took control of money and riches. [. . .] The iconography is a reminis-
cence of the old Soviet films about the revolution: The hero is no longer 
the officer and gentleman of Franco’s films, but the mass [the people] 
and, within it, the individuals forming that mass”. In: Xavier Ripoll, ‘Los 
milicianos en el cine’, Film-Historia, 3 (1996), 287–294 (p. 292).
 40 Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels. Studies in archaic forms of social 
movement in the 19th and 20th centuries (London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1965), p. 82.
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Cuando las películas hacen historia portrays churchmen as part of 
a traitor “reactionary beast”. Such treason takes two forms. The 
first is that churchmen turn out to be not only politically reaction-
ary, but counterrevolutionary, at least in the context of the first 
half of the 19th century in Andalusia:
[. . .] the Church became not simply a conservative-revolutionary 
force, as among the small proprietors of Navarre and Aragon 
[. . .], but a conservative force tout court, in that it joined hands 
with the wealthy classes. [. . .] As the social bandits became 
 bandoleros protected by local rich caciques and the Church of the 
rich, the peasants’ dream of a just and a free world had to find a 
new expression.41
The other treason is that, religiously or morally, priests are seen 
as betraying grassroots Christians, or the cause of supporting the 
poor,42 remaining instead at the service of savage capitalism. In the 
Spanish imagination, this reactionary betrayal is embodied in the 
feared triad of the Civil Guard-Cacique-Parish Priest, other times 
represented as the Bourgeois Capitalist-Soldier-Priest, and even as 
the Capital/State-Religion-Army.43 The triad is synonymous with 
repression, authority and obedience.
Along similar lines is the anarchist-communist-themed Land 
and Freedom, a film that tells the story of David Carr (a mem-
ber of the Communist Party of Great Britain) who fights for 
the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War in the context of the 
International Brigades. In the very beginning coincidentally he 
joins the militias of the POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificación 
Marxista or Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification). After that 
he ends up joining the Spanish Communist Party (he perceives a 
greater military efficiency and discipline there) but he is soon dis-
appointed by the internal fights among different left-wing groups, 
 41 Hobsbawm, p. 81. A bandolero was an outlaw or bandit, who specially 
operated in the mountainous Southern areas of Spain. A cacique was a 
local political boss in Spain, who gained and maintained power thanks to 
illegal activities such as suborning Church and police, buying votes and 
terrorising people.
 42 Hobsbawm, p. 83.
 43 Lily Litvak, El cuento anarquista, (1880–1911): antología (Madrid: 
Fundación Anselmo Lorenzo, 2003), p. 31.
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and especially by the repressive ideological purges against POUM 
members and anarchists because they are the group that most 
clearly despises blind obedience to hierarchical diktats. At the 
beginning of the film, a Spanish anarchist militant spokesperson 
tries to convince the British audience to join the Spanish revolu-
tionary movement stating that: “The big landowners, industrial-
ists, churchmen and army officers feared the growing power of 
the working class” (3:46). For Spanish anarchists this reactionary 
behaviour is even more reprehensible in the case of the clergy be-
cause, on the pretext of celebrating the act of worship, they se-
cretly conspired against freedom and terrorised the population by 
associating the revolution with the realm of the devil. The battle 
is pitched as one for freedom and against obedience to the forces 
of the status quo.44
This debate over obedience and anarchist freedom is also 
 represented in Libertarias. Pilar – the anarchist woman –  discovers 
María (a former nun) praying and trying to obey and respect all 
the commandments of the Church while passively witnessing the 
 suffering of Spanish people at war because of these  commandments, 
and Pilar says: “All right, it is time for you to forget this God who 
is in heaven and for you to take charge of people who are on 
earth” (1:34). Similarly, in the same film, María  introduces herself 
with the traditional Spanish expression: “To serve God and you” 
(16:00); to which Pilar angrily replies: “Bloody hell! You must 
not serve God or anyone! From now on you are free!” (16:03), 
something that illustrates well the anarchist dislike of any notion 
of religious obedience.
The most important question arising here is: What is the  clergy 
willing to do on behalf of Christian obedience? The answer is 
 44 “The machine gun and rifle behind the altars, after saturated images of 
liturgy and incense, and later impregnated of powder and profanity. [. . .] 
There, where under the guise of Catholic worship they conspired against 
freedom, and they wilted blooming consciences, and the children’s minds. 
They protected and organized usury and all those places covered with ho-
liness fell under the pressure of the furious mass full of courage and they 
lit with flames the red dawn that was dying the Spanish horizon”. Cited 
in: Santiago Juan-Navarro, ‘Un Pequeño Hollywood Proletario: El Cine 
Anarcosindicalista durante la Revolución Española’, Bulletin of Spanish 
Studies, 4 (2011), 523–540 (p. 528).
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 provided by Don Salvador, the young priest of Los girasoles 
ciegos, who appears as a part of the crusade, as a former Warrior-
Priest with a uniform and a pistol. 45 He confesses to his religious 
superior that he did not want to fight in the war but says: “I have 
killed them; I have finished them off on the ground while they 
looked me in the eye [. . .]” (5:45). In other words, clergymen have 
felt forced to perpetrate acts they knew were wrong or at least 
contrary to biblical instruction.
1.2.3 Vow of chastity
In these films, anarchists take an almost sadistic delight in repre-
senting the failure of the clergy to keep to the vow of chastity.46 
As we can see in Libertarias, María, after the outbreak of the 
Revolution, tries to find a place to hide. Suddenly she discovers 
in a block of flats an inscription on a door with the portrait of 
Jesus Christ that says “I will reign”. The origin of that inscription 
comes from the Bible: “He must reign until he shall have put all 
enemies under his feet” (Corinthians 15:25). However, the door 
leads not to a devout place but to a brothel. There, the prostitutes 
help María and, against her will, undress her while making jokes 
regarding her odd smell. They ask if nuns do not wash their inti-
mate parts in the convents (7:20). In the next scene, they force her 
to hide under a blanket as a regular customer arrives. To María’s 
surprise (and terror), the customer is the city’s chubby and lustful 
bishop (7:30–8:35). In preparation for the sexual intercourse, he 
 45 According to Miłkowski, the direct military collaboration of churchmen 
in Franco’s trenches was not widespread but was a very limited activity: 
“Some rare, but most expressive accounts, indicate the direct participa-
tion of many Catholic priests in the war — greater than the Catholic hi-
erarchy would like to admit. ‘Heraldo de Aragón’ informed its readers 
of chaplains participating in military operations. A practical follower of 
Huidobro described how, when he was distributing the Holy Communion 
among convicts prior to their execution, one of them tried to use the op-
portunity to escape. The priest proudly described catching him himself” 
(p. 221).
 46 Pérez Ledesma devotes a very well-researched part of his article to the 
study of the priestly sexuality entitled: ‘Sexuality of the Clergy and 
Sexuality of the Anticlericals’ (pp. 233–235).
Representations of Catholicism 111
sarcastically even mentions to María that “God is in control, it 
will be ok!” (8:40–8:50). When the spectators perceive that they 
might witness the rape of the nun, and therefore the breaking of 
her vow of chastity, an armed female anarchist militant enters the 
room and threatens to kill him if he touches María (12:46–13:43). 
The scene contains a clear message for the audience: female-lib-
eration should be in the hands of active women liberating other 
women from all forms of patriarchy. Notwithstanding, this is not 
the last time that both María’s virginity and her innocence are 
under threat.
Her new life outside the monastery is packed with  challenges 
and dangers – not always originating from clergymen. For 
 instance, when María and her sisters stroll through the streets, 
they fear the lascivious and aggressive presence of a group of 
anarchist  militants dressed up in the clothes of religious  people. 
Nonetheless, one of the militants blurts out: “Little nun- 
comrades, don’t be afraid. The revolution respects women, even 
those of the clergy!” (5:40–5:55). However, such a statement is 
historically inaccurate because in fact 283 religious women were 
victims of the conflict.47 Moreover, as Adriana Cases explains, 
symbolically “[t]o rape a sanctimonious woman is equivalent to 
desecrating places of worship; to rape and kill a wealthy woman 
is equivalent to sweeping away the old order, and this is part 
of the  revolution that seeks to destroy the system that has been 
oppressing the  people”.48 In this case, María survived unscathed 
from all male attacks; she even gets horrified as she witnesses 
the execution of the same Catholic bishop she encountered ear-
lier in the brothel. She represents the “image of virginal victim-
ization”49 given that she does not succumb even to the promise 
of happiness embodied by her male counterpart; that is, by the 
anarchist ex-priest who tries to seduce her using both the gospel 
 47 Jan Bank & Lieve Gevers, Churches and Religion in the Second World 
War (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), p. 90 and Adriana Cases, 
‘La violencia sexual en la retaguardia republicana durante la Guerra Civil 
española’, Historia Actual Online, 34 (2014), 69–80 (p. 77).
 48 Adriana Cases, p. 77.
 49 Maria Van Liew, ‘Witness to War: Virginal Vicissitudes in VicenteAranda’s 
Libertarias (1996)’, Quarterly Review of Film and Video, 25 (2008), 
230–240 (p. 231).
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and anarchist principles: “His efforts to court and marry her 
serve to emphasize the bonds, stronger than her sexual desire for 
him, with her comrades. She consistently chooses Pilar over him 
for protection and affection.” 50 In these films religious women 
maintain their chastity and their gendered representations aim 
to move the spectators toward empathy and respect. By contrast, 
the representations of lascivious religious men differ radically 
from those of the religious women.
In a similar vein, in Los girasoles ciegos the young priest Don 
Salvador spends his nights contemplating pictures of women from 
the Bible trying to obtain sexual relief using a homemade  vagina 
made from cloths and a pillow. Later his sexual obsessions find a 
target in Elena López Reinares (Lorenzo’s mother). Even though 
she does not try to seduce him, he develops an unhealthy  obsession 
with her. He sees the young widow as a constant temptation, as 
the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes. He confesses this 
to his superior and even mentions his involvement with prosti-
tutes during the Spanish Civil War. His superior recommends that 
he should confess and take care of his instincts. Following this 
 recommendation Don Salvador tries everything he can to con-
summate his desperate sexual attraction for Elena. One day he 
even turns up at her house wearing his military uniform thinking 
that Elena might accept him as a man and as a fighter, rather than 
as a representative of the clergy. Nevertheless, as soon as the priest 
discovers that his lust is not reciprocated, he attacks and destroys 
the whole family. Ricardo Mazo Torralba, Elena’s husband, who 
for more than five years had remained hidden – as a topo51 – in 
the attic, cannot stand the attempted rape of his wife and leaves 
his hiding place to fight Don Salvador. Finally, knowing that he 
will probably be shot as a result, Ricardo jumps out of a window. 
For Catholic critics, such moments in the film made it “in these 
 50 Maria Van Liew, p. 237.
 51 Topo [literarily a mole] is the unofficial term used to describe those who 
lived hidden after the Civil War to avoid the Francoist repression. Two 
good researches on this issue are: Ronald Fraser, In hiding: the life of 
Manuel Cortes (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), and Jesús Torbado 
and Manuel Leguineche, eds, Los topos: el testimonio estremecedor de 
quienes pasaron su vida escondidos (Barcelona: Argos, 1980). 
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years of examining the behaviour of priests and their training, an 
intense look at the sexual conflicts of those who follow a priestly 
vocation”.52
In contrast, Jesús Arnal (Buenaventura Durruti’s53 secretary 
and a former priest) is represented differently.54 While the bish-
op in Libertarias who visits prostitutes is soon shot, Jesús Arnal 
represents a member of the anarchist militia, but a special one. 
He also is (or was) a churchman; however, he believes in the anar-
chist revolution (including the sexual one) and he tries to have a 
romantic relationship with María (the nun), although she rejects 
him.55 The spectator is left with a different representation of the 
moral and political standing of the two priests: the fascist priest is 
bad and impure, while the anarchist priest is good and relatively 
pure.
1.2.4 The seal of the confessional
In addition to their portrayal of the failure to keep to the religious 
vows of poverty and charity, and to their willingness to blindly 
follow the vow of obedience, these films further highlight the vi-
olation of the vow of silence that is implicit in confession, also 
called the seal of the confessional. To take an example from Land 
and Freedom, in one scene a parish priest indiscriminately shoots 
from the bell tower of the church to resist the collectivization of 
the building and the land. Later he denies being the gunman but 
is exposed before the crowd as a liar as he has a large bruise on 
his shoulder, a mark caused by the continued use of a rifle. In 
 52 Blind Sunflowers (Los Girasoles Ciegos), (Roma: Signis world Catholic 
association communication, March-June 2009) <http://www.signis.net/
article.php3?id_article=3163> [accessed 10 January 2013].
 53 In the Spanish anarchist movement, Buenaventura Durruti (1896–1936) 
was described as a revolutionary hero. He died shot under strange cir-
cumstances while defending Madrid from the fascists. 
 54 Luisa Marco Sola, ‘Si Jesucristo estuviera en el mundo formaría también 
en estas milicias populares. La memoria de la Iglesia disidente’, Historia y 
Memoria, 3–4 (2007), 1–14 (pp. 9–10). <http://www.todoslosnombres.
org/php/generica.php?enlace=muestradocumento&iddocumento=100 > 
[accessed 20 July 2012].
 55 Lee, p. 102. 
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the face of this irrefutable evidence, the people of the village call 
for immediate justice and instant execution. In this sequence, the 
spectator is encouraged to empathize with the act of justice that 
the pueblo demands. Nonetheless, this empathy is the fruit of the 
dramatization of history referred to earlier, “the passion trap”, 
“where the passions of the war filter into [the] construction of the 
story and infect the story with either heart wrenching shouting 
or overly emotive writing”.56 The tension of the sequence rises 
when a woman further accuses the priest of being responsible for 
the execution of five young anarchist CNT members, one of them 
having previously told the priest during confession where the men 
had been hiding from the Civil Guards. It then becomes clear that 
the priest had undeniably violated the seal of the confessional and 
gone immediately to the Civil Guards to denounce the men. Here 
again, a priest is portrayed as betraying a moral code which is 
supposed to be defining to his profession. As a consequence of his 
incrimination, the five young CNT members died in an ambush. 
Faced with the evidence of such betrayal, the militia members 
shoot the priest and burn the relics from the church.57
2. New conceptions of religion in Spanish anarchist films
Even though the old anticlerical sentiments are clearly  represented 
in these contemporary anarchist films, the emergence of new 
 conceptualizations can also be observed, which I have grouped 
under two themes outlined below.
Firstly, in those films there is a timid and conciliatory tone 
linked to a set of principles derived from the ethics of the  early 
Christians (prior to the emergence of the centralized Roman 
Catholic Church). Some parts of the films seem to seek a certain 
 56 Paul Doyle, The Anarchist’s Wife – A Review, (Seattle: By the Firelight, 
28 May 2009). <http://bythefirelight.com/2009/05/28/the-anarchists-
wife-a-review/>. [accessed 7 January 2013] 
 57 “This is in contrast to the scene in Loach’s Land and Freedom where 
anticlericalism is incidental yet explained by the priest shooting at the 
militia from his bell tower. When the priest is captured with a rifle and 
the marks on his shoulder to prove his firing, he is shot. Aranda’s anti-
clericalism is much more important but also much more muddied and 
unexplained and as a consequence, irrational”. In: Lee, p. 103. 
Representations of Catholicism 115
peace with Catholicism, but not with the Church as an  institution. 
Secondly, these films also display a certain indifference towards 
religion, which could be interpreted as a form of tolerance for in-
dividual beliefs. In other words, as long as religion is kept within 
the private domain and does not interfere with the  public sphere, 
anarchism will respect it.58 The religious issue in contemporary 
films is either simply ignored, or diluted by problems that were 
more relevant to the working class. There is arguably a third ico-
nography in the projected images of these films, which is that the 
religious class appears as ideologically sick but likely to be “cured” 
if invited to partake in “the banquet of life”,59 that is, by the adop-
tion of anarchist vital principles. However, as this  iconography is 
not as prevalent as the other two in the films analysed here, and as 
I discuss it elsewhere, it will not be discussed here.60
2.1 The other Church (Grassroots Christians)
Despite my opening description of the Francoist Christian  crusade 
against atheism, Judaism and Freemasonry, and the fact that 
some historians refer to the Church at that time as “puritan and 
pro-government”,61 there was never a homogeneous church in 
Spain either during the Civil War or during the Franco Regime. 
At the heart of these films what we also see represented is the 
so-called “ other Church”, composed of grassroots Christians. 
In some ways,  anarchists seem to be tolerant towards this early 
Christianity and also towards an ideology close to Liberation 
 58 “A common position in modern philosophy is that the religious beliefs a 
person holds are of a personal, existential nature and should play no role 
in typically secular enterprises like science and politics, where the argu-
ments offered should be accessible to anyone”. In: Hendricus Johannes 
Prosman, ‘Secularity: Premodern, Modern, Postmodern’, Ars Disputandi 
supplement series, 4, 2011, 31–70 (p. 65). 
 59 Anselmo Lorenzo, El banquete de la vida. Concordancia entre la natu-
raleza, el hombre y la sociedad (Barcelona: Sintra, 2006). 
 60 Pedro García-Guirao, ‘Pobres pero honradas: Lujuria burguesa y honorabi-
lidad proletaria en las novelas breves de Federica Montseny’, International 
Journal of Iberian Studies, 24 (2011), 155–177 (pp. 167–168).
 61 José Rubio Hernández, El movimiento obrero en el cine (Murcia: 
Universidad de Murcia, 2009), p. 27. 
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Theology that symbolically raises Jesus Christ’s flag.62 The revo-
lution becomes a bonfire upon which the old evils of the work-
ing class,  including religion as stereotypically perceived, are burnt 
in order to make way for a new world,63 but in this new world 
 religion is not  necessarily something wrong, or something that 
cannot be reconciled with anarchism. 64 In fact, these anarchists 
try to rescue the Christian principles that they are sympathetic to, 
and attempt to integrate them into anarchist ideology. For them, 
God is not the same as Jesus Christ, just as the Church is not 
the same as religion or mysticism. These ideas seem to echo Leo 
Tolstoy’s objections against the ecclesiastic faith, which he consid-
ered diametrically opposed to Christ’s teaching.65
Thus, in La mujer del anarquista, during the siege of Madrid by 
the Condor Legion, the terrified reds – including the anarchists – 
pray in the basement of a building for the bombing to end. In 
the same film, the main anarchist character (Justo) is religious-
ly married to Manuela, who is originally from a religious and 
wealthy right-wing family. Nevertheless, when they go into exile 
in France, Manuela wants to go to church to light a candle to keep 
her promise to God for safely reuniting the whole family. As for 
Justo, even though he says that he will never enter a Church again 
in his life, that does not necessarily make him an atheist. Similarly, 
in Libertarias, Floren, a club-footed anarchist who owns a library 
 62 See Linda H. Damico, The Anarchist Dimension of Liberation Theology 
(New York: P. Lang, 1987).
 63 In this sense, Pérez Ledesma states that “the destructive work of all of 
them [anticlerical movements] was a response to the need to put an end 
to the symbolic system of traditional societies, to which the Church lent 
its ideological and bureaucratic apparatus, in order to give way to a mod-
ern, middle-class, secularized and individualist society” (pp. 240–241).
 64 Some authors argue something different: “Therefore, religion is not what 
interests anarchists regarding Christianity, but the desire of Jesus to 
defend his truth, even paying with his life, which is a shared truth as a 
defence of justice and of the value of those who are unprotected and 
weak; those, by binding to a belief, can be strong inside”. In: Jorge Urrutia 
Gómez, ‘El retorno de Cristo, tipo y mito’, Anales de literatura española, 
15 (2002), 237–255 (p. 238).
 65 See Leo Tolstoy, The Kingdom of God Is Within You Or, Christianity 
Not as a Mystical Teaching but as a New Concept of Life (New York: 
Editions Artisan Devereaux, 1927).
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and who can communicate with the spirits of some presumably 
dead Spanish anarchists, discusses the existence of God with 
María, the former nun. Floren believes in God but nevertheless 
blurts out that: “God is a fascist” (31:40). She also describes Jesus 
Christ as the first anarchist in history and places her religious sen-
timents in seeming contradiction with those of the papal Church: 
“I believe in Jesus Christ but not in priests” (33:05). She shocks 
María with this assertion (even though it was a quite widespread 
belief among anarchists)66 as well as with her confessed belief that 
Jesus Christ is a woman (33:22).
That religious men and women are respected in these films only 
if they rebel against the established Church can also be seen in 
Libertarias, where María, after meeting Floren and being exposed 
to anarchist readings, becomes a new person. She still believes in 
religion, but in a polarized and revolutionary form that has no 
place for the Church hierarchy. She favours the Christian spir-
it and what might be called early Christianity, opposed to the 
papal church. All these ideas lead us to the historical figure of 
Jesus Christ, not as the passive man of the cross but as the  fighter, 
the radical propagandist, one who is principally a militant, a 
 persecuted pariah, an accused man and, above all, someone with-
out rituals, churches or intermediaries between humankind and 
its own liberation.67
In any case, the turning point in the representation of this new 
Spanish Church begins to develop in the aftermath of the Second 
Vatican Council (1962–5):
The Church in Spain was one of the most forceful democratizers 
in the Catholic wave [which is the label Diamond et al give to 
the third wave of democratisation, to note the role of Catholicism 
in it]. It is also one of the churches upon which Vatican II exer-
cised its strongest influence. Among the factors that caused the 
demise of Spanish authoritarianism, the Church’s opposition was 
 66 See Aníbal Vaz de Mello, Cristo, el Anarquista. Estudio sobre la person-
alidad y filosofía de Jesús de Nazaret (Editorial Claridad: Buenos Aires, 
1936), and Urrutia, pp. 237–247.
 67 See Matías Usero Torrente, ‘La Iglesia Católica y su Política’, Orto. 
Revista de Documentación Social, 10 (1932), 20–23 (p. 20) and Urrutia, 
pp. 237–247. 
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arguably the most formidable. Paradoxically, though, the Church 
did not apply this resistance through energetic popular participa-
tion, but rather through its power of withdrawal. It significantly 
aided democratization by deciding no longer to support the regime 
of Generalissimo Francisco Franco.68
It is worth remembering that part of the old Church had  collaborated 
directly with Francoism. The Church finally  acknowledged, some 
thirty years later, the mistake that it had committed by becoming 
directly involved with the political  purges of the Franco Regime. 
The process of separation of Church from State in Spain started 
in the late 1960s. 69 After the Second Vatican Council, the Church 
became a real driving force for  social justice in Spanish commu-
nist, socialist and trade unionist  clandestine assemblies.70 This 
social phenomenon can be seen, for example, in the anarchist 
film Salvador. The film describes the life of the Catalan anarchist 
Salvador Puig Antich, the last person executed by garrotte (a me-
dieval weapon used for strangulation) in March 1974 under the 
dictatorship of a dying Franco, who would die on 20 November 
1975. In the film, Oriol Arau, the young  lawyer who is trying 
to save Salvador Puig Antich’s life, promotes a  social campaign 
where groups of Christians play a prominent role, so much so 
that a plea of mercy is sent by the Vatican to save Salvador from 
execution. Unfortunately, Franco decides to execute the death 
sentence passed on this young anarchist.71 Despite this injustice, 
 68 Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Philip J. Costopoulos, eds, World 
religions and democracy (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2005), p. 107. 
 69 “In the sixties and seventies social secularization took a centre stage. 
[Secularization was] understood as a reduction to the private sphere of 
religion and as a desecration of a worldview. But rather than a decline 
of religious feelings, there was a crisis in the institutional and rituals of 
Catholicism”. In: Mónica Moreno Seco, ‘Creencias religiosas y política 
en la dictadura franquista’ Pasado y memoria: Revista de historia con-
temporánea, 1 (2002), 1–53 (pp. 22–23). 
 70 For an analysis on the Vatican hostility to Franco Regime see Paul 
Preston, The triumph of democracy in Spain (London: Routledge, 2003).
 71 “Franco decided to go ahead with the executions despite European 
protests, the clemency request by Pope Pablo VI, and Franco’s own 
brother Nicolás’ objections”. In: Tatjana Pavlovic, Despotic bodies and 
transgressive bodies: Spanish culture from Francisco Franco to Jesús 
Franco (New York: SUNY Press, 2012), p. 79.
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a new self-understanding of Catholicism, which had taken root 
with the Second Vatican Council, was emerging, and was based 
on three principles mentioned earlier: a) Internalized and living 
piety, that is, a religion which is more optimistic and in which the 
act of adoring God is substituted by acting as Christ; b) Criticism 
of the economic system and opposition to the dictatorship; and 
c) Plurality in understanding religion.72 As the implications of the 
Second Vatican Council took hold in Spain, the church’s view of 
the regime changed, which in time made it easier for later films to 
evoke the possibility of “the other Church”.
A matter of vital importance in the anarchist interpretation of 
“the other Church” is the figure of the militant priest, and that fig-
ure is the one which appears in Libertarias: Jesús Arnal, Durruti’s 
secretary. In fact, Durruti saved him from execution by anarchist 
milicianos. The leader of the anarchists told them: “We shall not 
do anything to the priest because he is one of us”. At the begin-
ning of the film, he has a theological discussion with María (the 
nun), who asks for clarifications on his views about religion, to 
which he replies: “Jesus Christ (your Lord) told us that the poor 
are holy” (01:03:48). And later: “On the day of the Resurrection 
Jesus Christ will emerge with a raised fist” (01:29:10). These 
words clearly illustrate a take on Christianity very different to the 
old anarchist anticlerical sentiments.
2.2 The notion of secularization
Finally, it is worth discussing the way in which religious tropes are 
“secularised” in these anarchist films. In Libertarias, an American 
journalist – presumably Ernest Hemingway – somewhat surpris-
ingly claims that: “Some argue that anarchism is just a religious 
statement” (01:32:12). What he seems to mean is that anarchists 
pay such attention to the anarchist corpus, they would put such 
effort in the dissemination of the anarchist principles, they  believe 
so blindly in the idea of revolutionary fury (as the salvation for 
the misery of the people), and they are so committed to a future 
social justice (as a kind of avenging apocalypse) that they are 
 72 Moreno Seco, pp. 25–27.
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 comparable to those faithful to their Catholic religion (studying 
the Holy Scriptures closely, having faith in the end of the times, 
spreading the word of Christ and having an intense Christian 
commitment to social justice). Anarchism, in that sense, is merely 
a transposition of religion or a substituted religion: “Anarchism 
is not in Libertarias an ideology that attracted adherents but 
rather — and certainly for María — a substitution for Catholic 
 religious faith”.73 This idea seems ridiculous for Pilar (she replies 
to the American journalist: “No God, No master!”). After all, 
perhaps she sees the characterisation of anarchism as religion as 
worrying.
In any case, Antonio Rabinad and Vicente Aranda (the film’s 
screenwriters) seemed to be hinting at this argument about tra-
ditional Spanish anarchism’s millenarian qualities74 when they 
wrote the aforementioned scene. According to Grace Duncan, 
this stereotyped identification between anarchism and religious 
millennialism has been influenced by the work of numerous his-
torians who have tended to use in their books “images and met-
aphors identifying the [anarchist] movement with the essence of 
Spain, with the biblical past, with profound emotion, and ideal-
ized childhood”.75
In the literature on secularization in political theology,76 depend-
ing on the interpretation, “secularization” works at least in three 
ways:77 1) as a transposition of religious concepts to  non-religious 
ones; 2) as an ideological transformation where religious concepts 
are reinterpreted; and 3) as emancipation from the Biblical her-
itage (as a progressive liquidation of religious rituals, symbols, 
 73 Lee, p. 103. 
 74 For a study on this debate see: Martha Grace Duncan, ‘Spanish 
Anarchism Refracted: Theme and Image in the Millenarian’, Journal of 
Contemporary History and Revisionist Literature, 3 (1988), 323–346. 
And, Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels.
 75 The historians in question include Constancio Bernaldo de Quiros, Franz 
Borkenau, Gerald Brenan, J. Diaz del Moral, E. J. Hobsbawm, Edward 
Malefakis and Stanley G. Payne. Martha Grace Duncan, p. 324. 
 76 See Jean-Claude Monod, La querelle de la sécularisation: Théologie poli-
tique et philosophies de l´histoire de Hegel á Blumenberg (Paris: Vrin, 
2002).
 77 Prosman, p. 68.
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and any public religious spheres of power, implementing a lay 
society).78 These films 1) interestingly borrow religious concepts; 
2) use symbolism and imagery and apply those to the anarchist 
cause; and 3) celebrate emancipation from religious dogma and 
rituals.
One clear example of such secularization of religious tropes 
can be found at the end of Libertarias. The film ends with María 
reciting a secular and revolutionary prayer for Pilar, who is bleed-
ing to death after Francoist Moorish troops have slit her throat:
One day that is already in our Lord’s time, this planet called Earth 
that we step on, will cease to be called Earth and will be called 
Freedom. That day the exploiters of the people will be cast into 
outer darkness where there will be weeping and gnashing teeth. 
And the angels of heaven, at the top, will sing songs of joy while 
beholding the Freedom star, bluer and brighter than ever. Because 
upon that star will reign Peace and Justice, so a paradise will be 
there forever, and Death will not exist anymore (01:56:00).
The image suggests messianic hope in the coming, not of the Lord, 
but of a revolutionary apocalypse that will sweep away injustice 
and pain from the Earth. While the film finishes with an osten-
sibly dramatic ending, María’s prayer surrounded by debris en-
compasses a promise of happy-ending for the disinherited of the 
“banquet of life”. The focus on María in the final sequence of the 
film is thus intended to further emphasize her representation as 
“the anarchist Messiah”.79
Another film in which religious tropes appear secularised and 
reproduced by anarchists is El corazón de la tierra. The film is 
based on the 1888 strikes by syndicalist miners in Rio Tinto 
(Huelva, Spain), led by the Cuban anarchist Maximiliano Tornet, 
against the Rio Tinto Company, a British multinational metals and 
mining corporation. The protests were ferociously repressed as a 
 78 See Mark Chaves, ‘Secularization as Declining Religious Authority’, 
Social Forces, 72 (1994), 749–774.
 79 Jo Labanyi ‘The Politics of the Everyday and the Eternity of Ruins: Two 
Women Photographers in Republican Spain (Margaret Michaelis 1933–
37, Kati Horna 1937–38)’, in Cultural Encounters: European Travel 
Writing in the 1930s, eds. by Charles Burdett and Duncan Derek (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2002) 85–106 (p. 91).
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Spanish mercenary army bribed by the British massacred many of 
the miners. In the film, Tornet is represented as a martyred, revo-
lutionary Jesus Christ. When Tornet comes to Rio Tinto (Huelva) 
in 1883, the British owners of the opencast mines see him as a 
dangerous “anarchist apostle”.80 He uses the Bible in his speeches, 
but revises Biblical messages to replace them with revolutionary 
ones. So, where the Bible says “Blessed are those who hunger and 
thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled” (Matthew 5:6) and 
“Blessed are those who are persecuted because of righteousness, 
for theirs is the kingdom of heaven” (Matthew 5:10), Tornet com-
ments: “No! Blessed are those who are rebels, those who fight 
for the land, those who conquered it, and those who take what 
belongs to them. [. . .] No! What about the right here and the 
right now? Don’t wait so long. Blessed are those who fight for 
freedom; blessed are those who demand their rights and blessed 
are those in whose hearts conscience and dignity lives. Yes! Let 
us be blessed!” (8:37). His power of persuasion, leadership and 
charisma inspired many and led to one of the bloodiest strikes in 
nineteenth-century Spain. Tornet’s death provides another exam-
ple of this kind of secularization: not only do his words remind 
us of Jesus Christ (Matthew 5:6 and Matthew 5:10), but so does 
his death at the hands of the powerful mine owners. After beating 
him, they slit his throat and throw his body into the sea where, as 
it is slowly sinking, the movements of his body are clearly remi-
niscent of the Crucifixion. A new anarchist martyr was born. We 
also see this kind of secularization permeating non-religious hu-
manist and civil funeral ceremonies held in these anarchist films. 
For example, in Land and Freedom, during Coogan’s (an Irish 
Republican member of the International Brigades) funeral his 
compañeros sing “The Internationale” instead of praying, and the 
same happens with Blanca’s funeral. The religious content of the 
ritual is emptied and replaced with new anarchist imagery. In any 
case, like Pilar in Libertarias, not everyone accepts such a mille-
narian reading of Spanish anarchism. For example: “[. . .] Kaplan 
feels that to call anarchism a quasi-religious or secular millenarian 
movement is to denigrate it: ‘In a secular age, the taint of religion 
 80 Hobsbawm, p. 80.
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is the taint of irrationality’”.81 I have shown, however, that secula-
rised religious tropes are visible in some of the anarchist practices 
as portrayed in these films.
3. Conclusion
The historical tensions between anarchists and churchmen during 
the Spanish Civil War were real. As put in Libertarias (12:23), 
“Priests and nuns [had to] flee to hide like rats in view of the rising 
sun of proletarian justice”. Needless to say, this “ proletarian justice” 
was just a euphemism for the use of violence against the clergy as a 
social group: “On the whole, about seven thousand members of the 
clergy were killed, including 13 bishops, 4184 priests, 2365 monks, 
and 283 nuns during the Civil War in Spain”.82
In the end and despite the above discussion, it seems that nei-
ther the passage of time nor the democratization of Spain have 
yet brought an attempt to reconcile anarchist principles with 
those of the post-Second Vatican Council Catholic Church. The 
two positions remain far apart. One reason for this irreconcilable 
conflict is precisely the continued prevalence of those anticleri-
cal sentiments inserted deeply in the anarchist worldview which 
are so well represented in these films. Perhaps another reason 
can also be found in the problematic depictions of history which 
can be reinforced when films such as those discussed here are 
accepted as historically accurate. My contention is that the au-
thors and film directors did not necessarily aim to tell the his-
torical truth of the events portrayed, yet their rendering of those 
events are interesting indicators of the way those are remembered 
and interpreted by the society the films were made in. Moreover, 
the historians, academics and critical analysts among us must 
guard against the risk of taking as accurate the potential and 
intentional lies, reinventions of history, and silences contained in 
these anarchist films. Besides, “An uncovered lie might function 
as a red flag, alerting a historian to an area where she should dig 
 81 Martha Grace Duncan, p. 334.
 82 Miłkowski, p. 210.
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little deeper”.83 The films discussed here should therefore not be 
read in isolation, but along with secondary scholarship about the 
time-period in question – both of the film and the history.
As I have shown in this essay, from Land and Freedom (1995) 
to El cine libertario: Cuando las películas hacen historia (2011), 
contemporary Spanish anarchist-themed films have been engaged in 
representing the history of Spain using old antireligious  sentiments 
and new representations of religion. However, in all of them the 
conception of the Church as a counterrevolutionary force and as 
a corrupt and greedy institution tends to dominate portrayals of 
religion. To a large extent, these films indulge in a long tradition 
of anticlericalism in Spain: “Anticlericalism was a decisive trend in 
Spanish political, social and cultural life from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century until the Spanish Civil War”.84 The films there-
fore embrace a social tension that has operated in Spain for at least 
two centuries, between the forces of secular ideologies (sometimes 
with outright hostility to religion) and those that treat traditional 
religious values and institutions as necessarily a matter of identity 
(Spanishness, in this case).
At the same time, the films also represent the prelude to a new 
secularized world which, in the case of Spain, arguably started in 
1931 with the Second Spanish Republic, stopped violently in 1939, 
and restarted after Franco’s death. In this sense: “[. . .] historical 
films too should be seen not as a return to the past but as a means 
of negotiating the relationship of the past to modernity. That is, 
the spectator travels to the past temporarily so as to rework his 
or her position in the present”.85 Therefore, contemporary viewers 
of these films are made to contemplate the unstoppable process of 
secularization that Spain has been experiencing since the adoption 
of the 1978 Constitution. In the end, this historical process is a key 
factor for understanding the relationship between  contemporary 
Spanish anarchist films and religion. Moreover, the major Spanish 
 83 Jennifer Jensen Wallach, ‘Building a bridge of words: The literary autobi-
ography as historical source material’, Biography, 3 (2006), p. 450.
 84 Pérez Ledesma, p. 227.
 85 Jo Labanyi, ‘Negotiating modernity through the past: costume films of 
the early Franco period’, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 
13 (2007), 241–258 (p. 241).
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anarcho-syndicalist union, the CNT, regards religious issues in 
a more conciliatory way than any stereotypical depiction might 
 assume. According to the CNT’ statutes:
Any worker can join the union, regardless of their political or 
 religious views. They only have to accept our associative agreement 
and respect the decisions made in assembly. CNT is an  independent 
organization [. . .]. To preserve this independence, members of 
political parties or religious organizations cannot use the union as 
a forum in which to promote those organizations and cannot hold 
offices.86
This official position coincides with most of the new representations 
of religion analysed in this essay. These new representations suggest 
that religion must be kept within the private domain, that the official 
Church and the individual practice of religion or mysticism must be 
distinguished, and that early Christianity, and the idea of practicing 
what Jesus Christ preached are worth recovering and giving space 
to in an anarchist society.
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Subordination and Freedom : Tracing 
Anarchist Themes in First Peter
Justin Bronson Barringer
Southern Methodist University
First Peter seems an unlikely place to look for anarchist inspira-
tion. In fact, at first glance it seems to offer support for the very 
sorts of domination that anarchists so adamantly oppose: govern-
ments over citizens, masters over slaves, and husbands over wives. 
Drawing on Petrine scholarship, historical insights, political phi-
losophy, theology, and biblical exegesis, this paper will argue that, 
in fact, First Peter contains several anarchist themes. The paper 
shows that Peter advocates non-coercion, voluntary association, 
equality of all persons, and subversion of the powers that be. By 
examining some key debates in Petrine scholarship, the essay ex-
amines some relevant points of contention like debates over the 
meaning of Peter’s use of the haustafeln tradition and proper trans-
lations of key Greek words related to government and submis-
sion/subordination before showing that the best interpretations 
point to something at least akin to anarchism in this text. Peter’s 
concerns are moral and ethical as well as political and this essay 
weaves together all of those areas on inquiry to put forward a 
reading that offers a Christian anarchist ethic and political theol-
ogy. Two millennia after it was written, Peter’s epistle still offers 
a compelling vision for an alternative society, a society that em-
braces anarchist values and works to subvert the powers intent on 
maintaining their perceived control of the world.
Introduction
First Peter seems an unlikely place to look for anarchist inspiration. 
At first glance it seems to support the very sorts of domination – 
governments over citizens, masters over slaves, and husbands over 
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wives – that anarchists oppose.1 This paper will examine wheth-
er, and to what extent, First Peter contains themes that inform an 
anarchist position.2 First Peter is a short letter attributed to the 
Apostle Peter (1:1), though its authorship is still contested by schol-
ars.3 Likewise scholars argue about when exactly the letter was 
written, but most agree that it is written to address the persecution 
of Christians that was either already going on or was expected in 
the near future. Peter’s first letter is addressed to exiles scattered 
throughout Asia Minor, perhaps people who had fled Jerusalem or 
Rome due to persecution.4
Peter is concerned about the welfare and the witness of his fel-
low Christians. First Peter in many ways reflects Jesus’ words to 
be “wise as serpents and innocent as doves”5 because the letter 
offers these Christ-followers advice about avoiding persecution, 
 1 Peter’s letter to “exiles” in this world exhorted early Christians to embody 
this movement toward anarchy as they adopted a certain way of being in 
the world, a way of being that would ultimately point to another, better 
world. It was by adopting non-coercion, voluntary association, and the 
equality of persons that these early Christ-followers put themselves in a 
place that necessarily subverted coercive hierarchies. 
 2 Jonathan Bartley, Faith and Politics After Christendom: The Church as 
a Movement for Anarchy (Milton Keynes: Paternoster Press, 2006), 8. 
Bartley suggests that in a post-Christendom world it is right to recognize 
“the church as a movement for anarchy.” I believe Bartley is right, but I 
argue Peter had this vision in mind well before Christendom. It is anach-
ronistic to call Peter’s writing anarchist, but anarchist themes are found 
throughout his first letter. The themes that will be examined include 
non-coercion, voluntary association, equality of persons, and subversion 
of the powers that be, all for the sake of Jesus. 
 3 I am most persuaded by arguments for the traditional position that this 
letter was indeed written by Peter, so I will attribute it to him throughout 
this essay. 
 4 Craig Keener, The IVP Bible Background Commentary: New Testament 
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1993), 706. Christians were lumped to-
gether with other minority religions in the minds of many in the Roman 
Empire. Naturally they were directly linked to the Jews, and “Romans 
viewed Christians, like Jews, as antisocial” (706). However, they were 
also viewed with suspicion because they had superficial similarities with 
other despised religious sects like the cults of Isis and Dionysus. See also 
David L. Balch, Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter 
(Chico: Scholars Press, 1981), 65–73.
 5 Matt. 10:16
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yet instructs them how to live courageous and moral lives in the 
face of slanderous accusations and oppressive violence precisely 
because they have faith in the Christian God.
This is a good place to mention definitions. I have little con-
cern with the idea of “religion.” Following William Cavanaugh, 
I would assert that “there is no such thing as a transhistorical or 
transcultural ‘religion’ that is essentially separate from politics,” 
and that “the attempt to say that there is a transhistorical and 
transcultural concept of religion that is separable from secular 
phenomena is itself part of a particular configuration of pow-
er, that of the modern, liberal nation-state as it developed in the 
West.”6 Rather, I am concerned to address the faith broadly called 
Christian. As for “anarchism”, I have essentially adopted a com-
bination of the definitions offered by Vernard Eller and Jacques 
Ellul later in the essay.
One of Peter’s main purposes is, as Joel B. Green puts it, to 
answer questions such as: “What to do with Rome? What to do 
about Rome? What to make of Rome?”7 Green explains that “For 
Peter, of course, ‘Rome’ really was the issue: its sanctioned reli-
gions, its imperial and colonizing presence and practices, its world 
system, its matrices of honor and order.”8 Should they rebel? 
Should they acquiesce? Should they withdraw? Should they make 
compromises? Or, should they do something altogether different? 
Green then points out that “Peter understands that the problem 
is not about Rome per se, though, and so he refers to Rome not 
by its real name but as ‘Babylon.’ ‘Babylon’ was a cipher for a 
world power hostile to God, and, for Peter, this is what Rome had 
become.”9
In order to articulate the view that Peter’s letter proposes sever-
al ideals compatible with anarchism, this essay will first offer some 
preliminary definitions of anarchism in general and Christian an-
archism in particular by briefly surveying some of the relevant 
literature. The following section will then describe one of the key 
 6 William Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology 
and the Roots of Modern Conflict (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009), 9. 
 7 Joel B. Green, 1 Peter (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 1.
 8 Ibid., 1.
 9 Ibid., 1.
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interpretive considerations: the ancient household code, a literary 
form Peter uses in his letter to instruct his readers. From there the 
essay will turn to the specific themes Peter addresses that corre-
spond with an anarchist vision for society, including  non-coercion 
and voluntary association, equality of persons, and how each 
of those empowers individuals and communities to subvert the 
powers. The essay will conclude by arguing that Peter’s vision for 
this alternative sort of society is wrapped up in his understanding 
that it is not those who seek power who will ultimately shape 
the world, but those whose humility is evident that will make 
this reality, inaugurated by Jesus, manifest in the world until it is 
someday likewise consummated by Jesus.
This essay argues that Peter proposes an unconventional 
 vision whereby oppressive power structures are subverted and 
the oppressed are freed when those with little power, counter-
intuitive as it may seem, subordinate themselves to the powers 
that be. While this argument may not be particularly popular, 
it is not unheard of amongst self-proclaimed anarchists and 
those offering anarchist-friendly theologies, but it is uncommon 
enough that it is worth briefly exploring here before delving into 
the specifics of Peter’s own arguments for subordination as a 
subversive practice.
Tolstoy argues, in the opening of his short essay “On Anarchy,” 
that “[anarchists] are mistaken only in thinking Anarchy can 
be instituted by a revolution. . . But [anarchy] will be instituted 
only by there being more and more people who do not require 
 protection from governmental power, and by there being more 
and more people who will be ashamed of applying this power.”10 
Peter instructs his readers to subordinate themselves rather than 
attempt a revolution or rebellion. His readers, largely, did not have 
the option to seek government protection anyway, but Peter’s case 
is that they did not require it because they put their trust in the 
Lord. Nevertheless, they were able to shame oppressive powers by 
living morally upright lives.
 10 Leo Tolstoy, “On Anarchy” in Pamphlets Translated from the Russian. 
Accessed on December 30, 2013 at https://archive.org/stream/
pamphletstransl00tolsgoog#page/n250/mode/1up
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Late theologian and ethicist John Howard Yoder talks about 
“revolutionary subordination”11 as the way in which Christians 
work for social change (including, problematically, the sub-
ordination of women to men, which I will anyway return to 
below).12 He makes the important observation that something in 
the Christian religion had already prompted subjugated classes to 
embrace freedoms that they had never known before.13 Thus they 
were tempted to a certain unruliness that would, in its context, 
be shameful because women and slaves were expected to show 
certain decorum, and presumably doomed to failure. The peculiar 
revolutionary element, for Yoder, is that, “after having stated the 
call to subordination as addressed first to those who are subordi-
nate already”, those who have embraced this subordination “then 
 11 It is worth noting that in Yoder’s personal life he greatly abused his 
own power, which may cause some to question his work on the subject. 
I think this is fair though I contend that the value of his insight stands 
alone. The idea of “revolutionary subordination” is particularly prob-
lematic when read in light of Yoder’s preying on female subordinates 
and often sexually assaulting them. It might also be said that “revolu-
tionary” is strong of a term as the moves envisioned by writers like Peter 
may have smaller and more gradual societal changes in mind, which 
seems to fit well with Jesus’ parable of the mustard seed. Also see Yoder 
quote from Ibid., 186. Rightly understood though, it is the powerful, 
it seems in Yoder’s thought, though clearly not in his life, who ought 
to find occasions to subordinate themselves, just as Jesus did. That is 
revolutionary. For an extended account of Yoder’s sexual predation see 
Rachel Waltner Goosen, “‘Defanging the Beast’: Mennonite Responses 
to John Howard Yoder’s Sexual Abuse” in Mennonite Quarterly 
Review, No. 89, January 2015. http://www.bishop-accountability.org/
news5/2015_01_Goossen_Defanging_the_Beast.pdf 
 12 Feminist scholars, such as Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza have taken par-
ticular exception to Yoder’s account. And they are probably right in-
asmuch as only expecting women to submit is indeed problematic and 
leads to abuse. The appropriate change only happens in the church and 
society when free men submit themselves to slaves and women, which 
may have been precisely the case in 1 Peter 5:5. This works its way into 
mutuality and thus erodes oppressive systems, not so much abolishing 
them immediately. Note Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Bread Not Stone: 
The Challenge of Feminist Biblical Interpretation (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1995), 82–83. 
 13 John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1994), 173.
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go on to turn the relationship around and repeat the demand, 
calling the dominant partner in the relationship to a kind of sub-
ordination in turn.” 14 For Yoder, it is precisely because “the call to 
subordination is reciprocal [that it] is once again a revolutionary 
trait.”15 Yoder goes on to write:
The Christian is called to view social status from the perspective 
of maximizing freedom. One who is given an opportunity to exer-
cise more freedom should do so, because we are called to freedom 
in Christ. Yet that freedom can already become real within one’s 
present status by voluntarily accepting subordination, in view of 
the relative unimportance of such social distinctions when seen in 
the light of the coming fulfilment of God’s purposes.16
In other words, Yoder recognizes that what Peter is doing here is 
calling Christians to continue to move toward freedom whenever 
possible, but to also keep in mind that their freedom is tied up 
in the freedom of every other person. It is by choosing to live in 
thoughtfully restrained freedom that Christians are able to offer 
a compelling witness to the world around them, thus exhorting 
their fellow humans to join this way of Jesus that will increase all 
people’s freedom, rather than uphold the structures which oppress 
many while affording autonomy to only a few.
Some might question whether this approach really “works,” but 
this question seems foreign, or at least secondary to Peter and to 
the other New Testament writers. They simply are not utilitarian 
enough because they trust that ultimately God will set all things 
right even if humans fail. However, this does not mean they are 
not concerned with human thriving: the New Testament writers 
articulate a vision for a different sort of society, a society within 
society, lived out in the political community called the church. 
The New Testament writers offer us “reason to hope that the loving 
willingness of our subordination will itself have a missionary 
 impact,”17 but our hope lies not in our own ability to make  history 
turn out right, but in the fact that our witness will be used by 
 14 Ibid., 177.
 15 Ibid., 177.
 16 Ibid., 182.
 17 Ibid., 185.
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God’s Spirit to challenge domineering systems to forsake their 
oppressive ways in exchange for the upside-down Kingdom where 
it is the servants who exemplify honourable behaviour. Again 
Yoder writes:
[Jesus’] motto of revolutionary subordination, of willing servan-
thood in the place of domination, enables the person in a sub-
ordinate position in society to accept and live within that status 
without resentment, at the same time that it calls upon the person 
in the superordinate position to forsake or renounce all domineer-
ing use of that status. This call is then precisely not a simple ratifi-
cation of the stratified society into which the gospel has come. The 
subordinate person becomes a free ethical agent in the act of vol-
untarily acceding to subordination in the power of Christ instead 
of bowing to it either fatalistically or resentfully. The claim is not 
that there is immediately a new world regime which violently re-
places the old; rather, the old and the new order exist concurrently 
on different levels. It is because she knows that in Christ there is 
no male or female that the Christian wife can freely accept that 
sub ordination to her unbelieving husband which is her present lot. 
It is because Christ has freed us all, and slave and free are equal 
before God, that their relationship may continue as a humane 
and honest one within the framework of the present economy, the 
structure of which is passing away.18
With this basic understanding of the way voluntary subordination 
might be a subversive practice (an admittedly at first surprising 
but actually fairly widespread Christian anarchist perspective)19, 
it is now appropriate to define anarchism and anarchy for the 
purposes of this essay then turn to the way in which Peter lays out 
his anarchist vision of subordination and freedom.
Defining Anarchism and Christian Anarchism
Defining anarchism (the ideology) and anarchy (the aim) is some-
times difficult because historically they have had a wide range of 
definitions, and the words themselves are loaded. David Miller 
 18 Ibid., 186.
 19 See Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism: A Political 
Commentary on the Gospel (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011), chapter 4
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writes: “Of all the major ideologies confronting the student of 
politics, anarchism must be one of the hardest to pin down. It 
resists straightforward definition.”20 Anarchy is often misunder-
stood as chaos, “a black monster bent on swallowing everything; 
in short, destruction and violence,”21 and this has led many to dis-
miss the idea of Christian anarchy out of hand, since the Christian 
God is not a God of disorder, but a God of peace.22 The word “an-
archy” was originally used pejoratively to describe English and 
French revolutionaries,23 and many people still use the term in a 
derogatory fashion, as if it were simply synonymous with chaos. 
Again Miller writes: “The prevalent image of the anarchist in the 
popular mind is that of a destructive individual prepared to use 
violent means to disrupt social order, without having anything 
constructive to offer by way of alternative – the sinister figure in 
a black cape concealing a stick of dynamite.”24 However, as this 
essay will demonstrate this is neither the sort of movement that 
Peter, nor contemporary Christian anarchists have in mind.
Moreover, the image Miller describes is still common in the 
minds of many Christians, who therefore see anarchy as in-
compatible with Christianity. Besides, secular anarchists argue 
“Christianity has produced about as hierarchic a structure as can 
be, and anarchism not only rejects any hierarchy but is also often 
fervently secular and anti-clerical.”25 Both views are unfortunate 
because the Bible, particularly the New Testament, contains many 
themes akin to anarchy. Similarly, many theologians and Christian 
leaders from Tertullian to Barth and Tolstoy to Dorothy Day, have 
espoused a range of anarchist-friendly theologies.
 20 David Miller, Anarchism (London: JM Dent, 1984), 2.
 21 Emma Goldman, “Anarchism: What It Really Stands For” in Anarchism 
and Other Essays (New York: Mother Earth Publishing Association, 
1910). Accessed on November 2, 2013 at http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/
anarchist_archives/goldman/aando/anarchism.html
 22 1 Cor 14:33.
 23 Nicolas Walter, “About Anarchy” in Howard J. Ehrlich, Carol Erlich, 
David DeLeon, and Glenda Morris eds., Reinventing Anarchy: What Are 
Anarchists Thinking These Days? (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1979), 42.
 24 Miller, 2.
 25 Christoyannopoulos, 1. 
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While most anarchists agree that society can and should func-
tion without the rule of government, there are disagreements 
about what shape an alternative society would take.26 Anarchists 
ranging from Kropotkin and Goldman, to Randal Amster and 
Mohammed Bamyeh, however, all recognize the themes this essay 
notes in Peter’s first epistle, namely non-coercion, voluntary asso-
ciation, equality of all persons, and subversion of the powers that 
be as central to a future anarchist society.27
 26 John P. Clark, “What is Anarchism?” in J. Roland Pennock and John W. 
Chapman, Anarchism: Nomos XIX (New York: New York University 
Press, 1978), 5. Clark’s essay concisely yet thoroughly explains many 
variations within anarchist thought. 
 27 Peter Kropotkin defines anarchy as “the name given to a principle or 
theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived without gov-
ernment – harmony in such a society being obtained, not by submission 
to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements con-
cluded between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely 
constituted for the sake of production and consumption, as also for the 
satisfaction of the infinite variety of needs and aspirations of a civilized 
being” (Emphasis mine). Peter Kropotkin ed. Marshall Shatz, Conquest 
of Bread and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
233. Emma Goldman defines anarchy as “The philosophy of a new so-
cial order based on liberty unrestricted by man-made law; the theory 
that all forms of government rest on violence, and are therefore wrong 
and harmful, as well as unnecessary” (Emphasis mine). Emma Goldman, 
“Anarchism: What It Really Stands For” in Anarchism and Other Essays 
(New York: Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1910). Accessed on 
November, 2 at http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/goldman/
aando/anarchism.html. Randall Amster argues, “Anarchism is at its root 
a philosophy and set of practices based on the premise that people can 
and should act from a place of freedom from domination and coercive 
force. . . Our self-interest is wholly bound up with the interests of ev-
eryone else, making anarchism in its full dimensions a theory of radical 
egalitarianism as much as one of individual autonomy” (Emphasis mine). 
Randall Amster, Anarchism Today (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012), 2. 
Bamyeh is, perhaps ironically, not as forceful in his definition of anarchy 
at least as it relates to coercion, yet he still seems interested in under-
standing anarchy as a society where coercion is unnecessary. He writes, 
“[Anarchy] does in fact signify order, but one of a very specific type: in its 
most pristine and developed forms anarchy is unimposed order. In a less 
developed but still noble enough form, anarchy is a quest for unimposed 
order – that is, order supported by the minimum necessary use of coer-
cion” (Emphasis mine). Mohammed A. Bamyeh, Anarchy as Order: The 
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One particular variety of anarchism is specifically Christian. 
One way to define Christian anarchy is to begin with a Biblical 
understanding of the powers that be, which are said to be more 
impressed with the god of this age than with the God of eternity.28 
Vernard Eller offers a helpful explanation of the powers and a 
useable definition of Christian anarchy. He writes,
For us, then, ‘archy’ identifies any principle of governance claiming 
to be of primal value for society. ‘Government’ (that which is deter-
mined to govern human action and events) is a good synonym – as 
long as we are clear that political arkys are far from being the only 
‘governments’ around. Not at all; churches, schools, philosophies, 
ideologies, social standards, peer pressures, fads and fashions, 
advertising, planning techniques, psychological and sociological, 
theories – all are arkys out to govern us. ‘Anarchy’ (‘unarkyness’), 
it follows, is simply the state of being unimpressed with, disinter-
ested in, skeptical of, nonchalant toward, and uninfluenced by the 
highfalutin claims of any and all arkys. And ‘Christian anarchy’ 
. . . is a Christianity motivated by ‘unarkyness.’29
Christian anarchy, according to Eller, is not about bullish rebellion, 
but it is a revolution of humble, lamb-like subordination – yet it is 
still a revolution.30 It is about example, particularly about Christians 
embodying the example of Christ, neither being drawn to places 
of power, nor giving the powers special concern, but always being 
faithfully obedient to the Father.31
History and Future of Civic Humanity (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2010), 27.
 28 The Bible tells Christians that “our struggle is not against flesh and 
blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the powers 
of this dark world and against the spiritual forces of evil in the heaven-
ly realms” (Eph 6:12). If the struggle is indeed against the powers and 
rulers, the “archys,” then to say Christians are anarchist seems to make 
perfect Biblical sense. See Luke 12:11, Eph 6:12, Col 2:15, 1 Cor 15:24.
 29 Vernard Eller, Christian Anarchy: Jesus’ Primacy Over the Powers (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 1–2.
 30 Christoyannopoulos discusses this peculiar kind of subversive subordi-
nation advocated by many Christian anarchists in Christian Anarchism, 
chapter 4.
 31 Eller, 3. “For Christian anarchists, then, the goal of anarchy is ‘theonomy’ – 
the rule, the ordering, the arky of God. At this idea, of course, the world 
rises up to insist that the arky of God is just as impositional as (if not 
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Haustafeln as a Literary-Rhetorical Tradition32
A primary interpretive consideration for understanding 1 Peter is 
the hortatory form of the ancient household codes or Haustafeln,33 
more so than) any other arky that might be named. But Christians say 
NO – and that on two counts. First particularly as God has been revealed 
in Jesus Christ, the style of his arky is not that of imposition but of the 
opposite, namely, that of the cross, the self-givingness of agape-love. And 
second, God’s arky, his will for us, is never anything extraneous to our-
selves but precisely that which is most germane to our true destiny and 
being. . . Rather than a heteronomous imposition, God’s arky spells the 
discovery of that which is truest to myself and my world.”
 32 There is a longstanding debate, represented by David Balch and John 
Elliott, about whether relevant sections of 1 Peter are best understood 
in the Haustafeln or Oikonomia tradition. The former is understood as 
specific codes that individuals should follow, whereas the latter is more 
about the way the leader of the house manages everyone in the house-
hold. While there is merit to delineating the debate in this way, it is large-
ly a distinction without much difference. Overall, I am satisfied with the 
use of Haustafeln language, though the one area where the Oikonomia 
language is helpful is in the recognition that Peter is not interested in 
mere capitulation to societal norms, that is the particular codified duties 
that society laid on each person; he is instead interested in reshaping 
those norms over time. I will thus stick to the more common language 
of Haustafeln, while on occasion noting the value of contributions from 
scholars like John Elliott. What is important in this debate is the extent to 
which 1 Peter articulates either resistance or conformity of Christians to 
surrounding society. David G. Horrell does a good job of describing this 
debate, while also suggesting a reading closer to mine, one that allows 
for “conformity and resistance” to be held in tension. David G. Horrell, 
“Between Conformity and Resistance: Beyond the Balch-Elliot Debate 
Towards a Postcolonial Reading of First Peter,” in Reading First Peter 
with New Eyes: Methodological Reassessments of the Letter of First 
Peter, edited by Robert L. Webb and Betsy Bauman-Martin (New York: 
T&T Clark: 2007), 111–143.
 33 Philippa Carter, The Servant-Ethic of the New Testament (New York: 
Peter Lang, 1997), 87. “The Haustafeln texts in the New Testament have 
often been criticized as examples of how early Christianity capitulated 
to social institutions and mores that were burdensome for many people. 
I Peter is perhaps most susceptible to such a critique.” It is also worth 
noting that while Peter’s use of the form does not make up the whole 
letter, it does shape the content of other sections of his exhortations. For 
instance, Troy Martin suggests that “In 5:1–5 the community groups 
of elders and young men are even substituted for these [husband/wife, 
father/child, slave/master] pairs” commonly found in ancient household 
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and the way Peter modifies the form for his purposes. The Haustafel 
was a code that “Stoic and other philosophers commonly used 
. . . to delineate proper relationships with others.”34 The household 
code tradition did not begin with the Stoics though: “Plato and 
Aristotle, as well as other Greek political theorists, were interested 
in the relation between the ‘city’ and the ‘house.’”35 Peter, too, is 
interested in this connection; he first discusses his readers’ rela-
tionship to the rulers of the wider society in 2:13 before he moves 
on to concerns in the home in 2:18.
Aristotle and others were concerned about authority and sub-
ordination in relationships between husbands and wives, fathers 
and children, and masters and slaves because they believed that in 
order for society to function properly people had to fit into their 
natural place in the home or society would become corrupt and 
chaotic.36 Thus it makes sense that these codes had such wide-
spread use and immense importance in Greco-Roman political 
theory, and furthermore why “Any group accused of upsetting 
proper subordination in the household would be criticized by 
those charged with maintaining the constitution [that is order in 
society].”37 Elliott seems to acknowledge this, but argues that 1 
Peter’s concern has more to do with internal cohesion among the 
church, and the distinct identity of Christians than conforming to 
societal expectations regarding order.38
Thus, the Haustafel form was enticing to minority religious 
groups attempting to find ways to interact with society because 
“slandered religious groups sometimes adopted these codes to 
demonstrate that their groups actually supported the values of 
the Roman society; this demonstration was important in com-
bating persecution.”39 If part of Peter’s purpose in writing was 
codes. In Troy W. Martin, Metaphor and Composition in 1 Peter (Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1992), 127.
 34 Keener, 713.
 35 Balch, 15.
 36 Ibid., 61.
 37 Ibid., 61.
 38 John Elliott, 1 Peter: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary. Anchor Bible Commentary. (New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 
2000), 505–511. 
 39 Keener, 713. 
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to demonstrate that Christians did indeed have a concern for the 
common good, and that they could indeed accept many Roman 
values, then it makes sense that he would adopt this form as a way 
to help protect his readers from undue persecution.
Of course, Peter had this purpose in mind, but only to a de-
gree.40 He wrote to help Christians avoid unnecessary persecution, 
while preparing them for the near inevitable persecution they will 
experience,41 but more importantly Peter turns the form on its 
head to express truths about the Kingdom of God.42
The emphasis in many Haustafeln was on those with relative 
power.43 Yet, Peter gives more attention to wives and slaves, as 
well as ordinary citizens. Peter uses the code to express mutual-
ity,44 a fundamental departure from patriarchal societal expecta-
 40 Elliott argues that in fact “such an ‘accommodating’ and conformity-urg-
ing aim of the code material is thoroughly incompatible with exhorta-
tion of 1 Peter as a whole, which urges ‘holy nonconformity, (1:14–17)” 
(Elliott 509). However, Elliott seems to concede on 510 that there is noth-
ing wrong with conformity inasmuch as it “is possible without compro-
mise of one’s loyalty to God.” In other words, Elliott does not provide 
sufficient evidence that Peter might not have had in mind both of what 
Horrell calls “conformity and resistance.”
 41 See Green, 71–72.
 42 Horrell, referring to Scott, notes that for instance, that there are “many 
diverse ways in which subordinates express and practice their resistance 
to oppression, in what he calls ‘the immense political terrain that lies 
between quiescence and revolt’” (Horrell, 118). I am suggesting that the 
kingdom of God occupies this broad terrain. 
 43 This does not necessarily mean that the powerful were always mentioned 
first (Green, 164), only that they were treated as individual moral agents 
as opposed to those under their “rule” who were only told to obey, usu-
ally without further exposition.
 44 Perhaps the mutuality here is implicit because of the mention of Sarah 
and the debate over who listened to whom in her marriage. (See 
Discovering Biblical Equality, 231ff [esp. 234–235]). Also, note his ar-
gument for equality in marriage on 237. “When addressing those with-
out power,” notes Peter H. Davids, the apostle Peter “does not call for 
revolution, but upholds the values of the culture insofar as they do not 
conflict with commitment to Christ. He then reframes their behavior by 
removing it from the realm of necessity and giving it a dignity, either that 
of identification with Christ or of identification with the ‘holy women’ 
of Jewish antiquity. When speaking to the ones with power, however, he 
asks them not to use their power, but to treat those they could dominate 
as their equals – for in fact they are.” (Peter H. Davids, “A Silent Witness 
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tions. According to Boring, “It is striking that when the Haustafel 
enters the Christian stream, even though the patriarchal order 
continues to be presupposed, instruction is given in terms of mu-
tuality and not merely hierarchy. . . In the Christian literature, 
slaves, women, and children are addressed as persons in their own 
right, not merely as subjects to masters, husbands, or fathers.”45 
Balch writes:
Aristotle mentioned masters, husbands, and fathers before slaves, 
wives, or children. . . and addressed only the male – the master, 
husband, and father. In the NT [New Testament], however, the 
wives are addressed, and this is done before the exhortation of 
husbands. Slaves are addressed before masters in Colossians (mas-
ters are not exhorted in 1 Peter). The NT writers emphasize the 
subordinate members who were in a difficult social situation. . . 
Slaves and wives are addressed first by these early Christian mor-
alists because they were the focus of an intense social problem 
between the church and Roman society. Romans frowned on their 
wives and slaves being seduced by bizarre foreign cults, and this 
led the author of 1 Peter to address the household code to those 
who were the focus of the tension.46
Although Balch’s recognition of the differences between Aristotle’s 
and the New Testament writer’s use of the form is significant, his 
assessment is lacking. Peter addresses these folks to dignify them 
inasmuch as he makes claims about their ability to lead folks 
from pagan idolatry into relationship with God. In other words, 
as Horrell puts it, “The weak also exercise agency and power 
though the multifarious means by which they resist their domina-
tion, whether in hidden or overt ways,”47 a fact that Peter seems 
to be acknowledging, at least implicitly, through his instructions 
to them. While wives and slaves were occasionally mentioned in 
other Haustafeln, they were only told how to act without any jus-
tifying rationale. Peter exhorts wives precisely because they have 
in Marriage” in Discovering Biblical Equality, eds. Ronald W. Pierce and 
Rebecca Merrill Groothuis – Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2005, 
p. 238.)
 45 M. Eugene Boring, 1 Peter (Nashville: Abingdon, 1999), 106.
 46 Balch, 96–97.
 47 Horrell, 118.
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the influence to win over their unbelieving husbands. Peter is not 
only making claims about their moral agency, but declaring their 
ability to lead their husbands into right belief.
Likewise, Peter is empowering slaves by using them as an exam-
ple for all Christians. Peter’s use of this form of ethical instruction 
itself bolsters the actual content of his exhortation. It serves at 
once to make it appear as if Christians fit into their society, and to 
call them into a better, alternative society. His instructions are not 
about keeping people in their place, but freeing them to love more 
fully. This ought to be understood as a uniquely anarchist position 
because it does not rely on any sort of paternalistic account of 
a better society whereby one group lifts another out of poverty 
or the like, rather it is a simple rejection of static hierarchies in 
favour of communities that are mutually empowering. Of course, 
in the short term Peter seems to be advocating for his readers to 
live in a particular way within the current hierarchy, all the while 
holding on to the hope that God will use their witness to cre-
ate a more just and mutual society in which fluid hierarchies are 
more accepted.48 This, then, ultimately suggests a rejection of the 
authority of the powers that be because the subordinate persons 
were no longer subject to them, but rather subject to the Lord.
As Randall Amster writes, “The rejection of authority is the 
sine qua non of anarchism. In this view, the imposition of pow-
er through force, coercion, domination and oppression is both 
unconscionable and untenable. . . Anarchism challenges claims 
to authority that are vested with the enforcement power of the 
state.”49 Therefore, Peter’s vision as envisioned in this epistle, par-
ticularly his use of the Haustafeln form is anarchistic inasmuch as 
it does not seek to reform the powers and authorities as much as it 
seeks to see them abolished in this new society that is the church.50 
 48 See Horrell, 120–121. 
 49 Randall Amster, Anarchism Today (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012), 6.
 50 Peter is not interested in destroying the emperor as a person, since he 
does after all say that his readers ought to honor the emperor, rather 
he is interested, it seems, in the slow erosion of oppressive institutions 
including the position of emperor itself. One can honor the person, while 
believing that the office is unnecessary or even oppressive. I take this to 
mean that we are to honor people in places of power simply because they 
are people. We are not to show them special honor, and therefore we can 
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Amster continues by offering some helpful headings in his chap-
ter “Contemporary Anarchist Thought,” which suggest a number 
of interconnected themes which collectively make up anarchy in-
cluding several found in 1 Peter, such as “Anti-authoritarianism, 
“Voluntarism”, “Mutualism”, and “Egalitarianism.”51 The 
 anti-authoritarianism he describes is not against people asserting 
expertise in a particular area, but against someone moving beyond 
that area of expertise to force their authority on others. Amster 
explains that:
As it turns out contemporary anarchism is nuanced enough in its 
values to narrow its anti-authoritarianism to those exercises of 
power that are rigid, reified, and imposed, but not necessarily those 
that are present in healthy communities grounded in equality and 
respect. In an anarchist society, someone with expertise may well 
represent an authority in a certain sphere, without then asserting 
his or her power in another sphere. . . . The critical factor for an-
archists is that “the advice of an expert should only be accepted 
on the basis of voluntary consent,” meaning that the acceptance of 
authority in any particular matter rests with the recipient and not 
the person or group asserting it.52
Peter, it seems, is arguing for this sort of society in the church. He 
allows for expertise to be shared among everyone in the commu-
nity. In the very writing of the epistle, Peter is sharing his expertise 
as an authority, while suggesting that the response to that author-
ity must not be coerced and likewise that the authority may move 
from person to person as the situation demands.53
hope for, and indeed expect, the abolition of all governments as each 
person confesses Jesus as Lord.
 51 Amster, 6, 8, 9, and 12.
 52 Ibid., 7. Amster quotes Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A 
History of Anarchism (New York: Harper Perenial, 2008), 43.
 53 Amster’s brief discussions on mutualism and egalitarianism likewise re-
flect Peter’s own exhortations. Amster, for instance, writes: “Freed from 
compulsion, people learn to act at least in part for the common good, 
since there exists an undeniable recognition of the necessity of human 
community and sociality” (Ibid., 9), which echoes Peter’s words in 
2:15–16 where is exhorts his readers to do good and avoid evil precisely 
because they have the freedom to do so. Like Peter, Amster sees egali-
tarianism (equality of persons) as an outcome of anti-authoritarianism, 
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Non-coercion and Voluntary Association
Anarchists from a variety of traditions ranging from early  thinkers 
like Kropotkin to modern scholars like Randall Amster have 
offered defences of non-coercion and voluntary association as 
foundational to their understanding of anarchism. In the Christian 
anarchist tradition in particular most expositors have tended to 
be pacifists as Ellul articulates when he writes that anarchy is “an 
absolute rejection of violence.”54 He, like Peter, seems to do so 
on principle, but without losing sight of the potential for non- 
coercion to effect change.55 This is reflected in Peter’s  exhortations 
to wives, because it is their disciplined subordination, not an 
attempt at coercive rebellion, which Peter argues may lead their 
husbands in a shift of attitudes and actions.
Likewise, his more general exhortation to the whole Christian 
community to “Live such good lives among the pagans that, 
though they accuse you of doing wrong, they may see your good 
deeds and glorify God on the day he visits us” (2:12) suggests that 
it is through living morally persuasive lives that people are won 
over to a particular group. Peter desires that people freely choose 
Christianity because they have been around those who have “tast-
ed that the Lord is good” (2:3).
This is also reflected in Peter’s opening line when he calls his 
readers “exiles” (παρεπιδήμοις) in this world (1:1).56 At first glance, 
volunteerism, and mutualism. Amster writes: “An anarchist social order 
that eliminates coercion and domination promises to cultivate self-gov-
erning individuals who exhibit voluntary behaviors that are often mutu-
ally beneficial, ideally creating a horizontal network of productive enter-
prises and self-managing communities that could subsume the material 
and emotional necessities of life” (12). This seems to reflect Peter’s words 
in 4:8–10 in which he exhorts readers to love one another, offer hospital-
ity, and share their gifts with others for the sake of the good of the whole 
community. 
 54 Jacques Ellul, Anarchy and Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1991), 11. See also Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, chapter 1.
 55 Ellul argues that disciplined nonviolence is often more effective in this 
regard than violence. 
 56 Peter also uses similar language in 2:11. It seems to suggest that Christians 
are not to demonstrate loyalty to any given nation or government. It is 
worth noting that Balch and Elliot differ on whether this term is a meta-
phorical one or a literal one. 
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such a term seems to evoke images of coercion, as one rarely goes 
into exile on one’s own accord. Yet, this is precisely the paradox 
of Christian faith. In spite of the impending persecution in their 
view,57 Peter’s audience chose to join a movement that rejected 
the use of coercive force, and advocate extreme avoidance of such 
force by encouraging its members to favour places of lowliness 
rather than power. The witness of the community and their keryg-
ma, a Greek word that is best translated as proclamation, that 
Jesus had indeed overcome the most oppressive forces of all, sin 
and death (1:3), was sufficient to draw people to the faith. Peter’s 
use of the word παρεπιδήμοις is indicative of both his belief in the 
attractive power of God’s Spirit, inasmuch as people chose to take 
on the lowly position of exiles because they were persuaded by the 
beauty and goodness of Christian faith, and the basis for his lat-
er exhortations regarding the church’s peculiar witness, as those 
who have become exiles in this world, of equality of persons and 
subversion of the powers.
Near the end of the letter, Peter offers an admonition to church 
leaders. Verses 5:1–5 are a return to the form of the Haustafel. 
Once again Peter co-opts the form to undermine conventional 
conceptions of authority; leadership in the church is not about 
coercive power, but example.58 Likewise, and totally foreign to 
the Greco-Roman world, while it is true that “Peter advocates 
submission to the ruling elders [5:1]” it is important to note that 
“he also urges – against Greco-Roman society’s ideals – mutual 
humility [5:5].”59
Peter addresses leaders as a fellow elder. This is important be-
cause “Whatever hierarchical mode of thinking might be discern-
ible in Peter’s self-representation or in his talk of ‘elders’ is vacated 
by. . . Peter’s refusal of special privilege by locating himself as an 
 57 This is reflected not only in Peter’s letter, but in Christ’s own words. “If 
they persecuted me they will also persecute you” (John 15:20).
 58 There is not adequate space to explore this in this essay, but leadership by 
example is found throughout Peter’s letter, both explicitly and implicitly. 
Christ is the example for all (2:21). Peter is the example for his readers, 
particularly the elders (5:1). Wives are examples for their husbands (3:1). 
Shepherds are examples for their flocks (5:3). 
 59 Keener, 721.
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elder alongside other elders.”60 Though Peter has already identified 
himself as an apostle (1:1), “Additional evidence that, in instruct-
ing his audience, Peter is not exercising conventional authority is 
his apparent refusal to distribute directives simply on the basis 
of his apostolic office.”61 Peter voluntarily humbled himself, rely-
ing not on his office for authority in the community, but on his 
communion with local church leaders, and on his experience as a 
witness (μάρτυς) testifying to Christ’s sufferings.
Peter’s own conduct implores church leaders to humble them-
selves and view their position not as an opportunity to lord power 
over others, but as a chance to use their gifts in service. In 5:1–3, 
those revered as leaders are counselled to live in exemplary fash-
ion, and charged with the care of their congregations.
Peter applies the language of shepherding to church leaders.62 
As Keener notes, “The image of a ‘shepherd’ is that of a concerned 
guide, not of a severe ruler,”63 an image that hearkens back to 
Peter’s identification of Jesus as shepherd and overseer (2:25). It is 
to be a ministry of example rather than an exercise of dominion 
(5:3).
The metaphor is then extended, and qualified, in light of the 
fact that every member of the church is a sheep under the care of 
the “Chief Shepherd” (5:4). This is further evidenced in the next 
verse as all members of God’s household are exhorted to wear 
the same clothing of humility toward one another (5:5), as sheep 
all wear the same warm wool. It is not coercion that binds the 
Christian community, but a common humility.
It is also striking that Peter explicitly offers the elders the choice 
to “serve as overseers,” rather than do so because they are obli-
gated (5:2). It is not societal pressure, nor money, nor ego that 
 60 Green, 164.
 61 Ibid., 164.
 62 John 21:16. See Everett Ferguson, The Church of Christ: A Biblical 
Ecclesiology for Today (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 319. This lan-
guage is perhaps reminiscent Peter’s own experience with Jesus when 
Jesus gave Peter the charge to shepherd Jesus’ sheep. Ferguson notes, 
“The work of shepherds is in looking after sheep – protecting them, lead-
ing them to water and pasture, caring for their injuries, seeking them 
when lost” (321).
 63 Keener, 720–721.
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implores shepherds to assume their post; Peter exhorts them to this 
ministry because they are willing and eager to serve. Achtemeier 
comments on Peter’s rhetoric in 5:2, writing,
“The contrast between ‘not under compulsion’ (μὴ ἀναγκαστῶς) 
and ‘willingly’ or ‘freely’ (ἑκουσίως) apparently exhorts elders to 
accept their responsibilities without undue coercion. . . The sec-
ond antithesis qualifies the first, in that the second term προθύμως 
(‘eagerly’), is virtually a synonym for ἑκουσίως, and the first term, 
μὴ αἰσχροκερδῶς (‘not in a way characterized by desire for base 
gain’), may be a concrete instance of the kind of compulsion to be 
avoided.”64
As is typical in this letter, instructions to a particular party serve 
to instruct the larger church community. If even those who hold 
leadership roles are expected to humbly serve others then it fol-
lows that all members ought to follow that example. Thus, Peter 
instructs the younger people in the community to “subordinate” 
(ὑποτάσσω)65 themselves to the elders because the elders have pro-
vided a compelling, imitable example. Bamyeh says that anarchy 
has a type of order that is not imposed, and that order means 
“(1) that the agreements that organize social life are voluntary 
in nature and (2) that whatever authority may exist is conceived 
of as practical rather than absolute or permanent authority.”66 
That is the case here in Peter’s discussion about the leadership of 
elders as a sensible structure for these early Christian  communities, 
so long as they recognized that their positions were not those of 
domination or their right, but simply as positions that they could 
use to serve others, even subjugating themselves to “lesser” members 
of the community when necessary.
 64 Paul J. Achtemeier, 1 Peter: A Commentary on First Peter (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg Fortress, 1996), 326.
 65 The importance of this particular word will be examined in the following 
section. 
 66 Mohammed A. Bamyeh, Anarchy as Order: The History and Future of 
Civic Humanity (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 27. 
He further suggests that the role of these authorities is to help move sub-
ordinate members into a place where mutuality is possible. A child learns 
to be independent of the parent and the student learns to teach. (28)
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It is precisely because people are inclined to seek power,67 and 
abuse it, that an anarchist voice is necessary. Hence Peter’s insis-
tence that non-coercion and voluntary association are requisite 
expectations of the Christian community. Christians reject the 
temptation to wield coercive power, and the allure of associating 
too closely with folks who do; they set an example by choosing 
to associate with others who, like Christ, elect to serve not be 
served.68 It may or may not prove to be an effective social strategy, 
though Peter assumes it will indeed influence people, but the rejec-
tion of coercive force is inseparable from Peter’s larger anarchist 
vision.
Equality of Persons
A cursory reading of the text, specifically the Haustafel in 2:13–
3:8, might suggest that Peter favoured forms of subjugation that 
were in line with the culture in which he lived,69 yet a closer 
reading suggests that Peter has a high regard for the equality of 
persons.70
The first of the three potentially problematic of exhortations 
in Peter’s Haustafel revolves around Christians’ relationship to 
government. It begins with the command to “submit” to govern-
ing authorities. However, an exploration of the Greek reveals that 
many English translations do not convey the best rendering of the 
text.
 67 Achtemeier points to the fact that “the warning against the desire for 
money is a regular part of [Christian] advice” (326), which is true, but it 
is reasonable, based on the all of 5:1–5, that similar warnings against the 
desire for power should also be acknowledged. 
 68 Matt 20:28, Mark 10:45. 
 69 Some scholars have suggested such a reading. See Karen H. Jobes, 1 Peter 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005); Simon J. Kistemaker, Exposition 
of the Epistles of Peter and of the Epistle of Jude (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
1987). Below I will articulate why such a reading is incorrect, and why 
an anarchistic reading of the text is more appropriate.
 70 Peter seems to be following the Pauline tradition. See for example Gal. 
3:27. Likewise he might be recalling his own vision about clean and un-
clean animals in Acts 10:9–19.
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One issue raised by exploring the Greek text (Ὑποτάγητε πάσῃ 
ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει [which Actemeier rightly translates as “Be sub-
ordinate to every human creature”71]) is the precise meaning of 
the word κτίσει, which is often translated as “authority,” “institu-
tion,” or “ordinance.” Such renderings are neither literal nor con-
textually appropriate. The primary meaning of κτίσις is “creation” 
or “creature,” and the context attests to the accuracy of this sort 
of translation here. Achtemeier writes that “‘human being,’ [is] a 
translation to be preferred to ‘human order’ or ‘institution,’ since 
the latter meaning is nowhere to be found in Greek literature, 
and the examples that follow – emperor, governors – are human 
beings not institutions.”72 This rendering of κτίσις suggests that 
Peter has an expectation that Christians willingly “submit” them-
selves to all people, an expectation that puts all humanity on an 
equal plane, undermining the claims to authority made by ruling 
powers. Rendering ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει as “human creature” is more 
faithful to the meaning of the word κτίσις, and supports the claim 
that Peter’s concern is indeed the equality of persons.73 It challeng-
es the prevailing arguments that this passage is primarily about 
submission to governing institutions, and thus disaffirms common 
arguments that Christians look favourably upon ruling powers.74
Another issue raised by the Greek text is the meaning of 
Ὑποτάγητε,75 which is often translated as “submit” or “be sub-
ject.” It may appear that it has connotations of obedience since 
the word is related to ὑπακοή. However, as Boring notes ὑποτάσσω 
is “a broader and more flexible word,” and therefore its specif-
ic meaning may be determined by context.76 Achtemeier argues 
that “Its meaning is closer to ‘subordinate’ than to ‘submit’ or 
‘obey,’ and advocates finding one’s proper place and acting 
 71 Achtemeier, 179.
 72 Ibid., 182.
 73 Unfortunately there is not space to expand this brief word study, but 
Elliott’s own study regarding translation and meaning is helpful. See 
Elliott, 486 fn 92.
 74 The case for this translation is strengthened by Peter’s later exhortation 
to show proper respect to everyone (2:17).
 75 Although this is not the lexical form, I have chosen to leave the verb form 
here because of its imperatival force. The lexical form is ὑποτάσσω.
 76 Boring, 108.
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 accordingly rather than calling upon one to give unquestioning 
obedience to whatever anyone, including governing authorities, 
may command.”77
Peter’s exhortation follows the Pauline tradition, which calls 
Christians to consider others better than themselves (Phil 2:3). 
Boring points out that considering others better than oneself does 
not necessarily require obedience, nor losing one’s identity. He 
writes, “What is called for here is not mindless robotic obedience 
or servile cowering that denies one’s own identity and sense of 
worth, which is provided not by status in society but by rebirth 
and incorporation into God’s saving plan for history as members 
of the holy people of God.”78 David Lipscomb argues,
[Ὑποτάγητε]. . . carries the idea that the person or body that sub-
mits, is entirely distinct and separate from and in antagonism to 
the person or body to which it submits. The Christian then is not 
part of the body to which he submits, or to which he brings himself 
under subjection. . . We cannot be said to submit to ourselves, or to 
a body of which we are a part and parcel, and with which we are 
in harmony, and which we aid to conduct or manage. Submission 
carries the idea of antagonism and opposition which are restrained 
and held in abeyance. This is the relationship everywhere defined 
as that which connects the Christian with the governments under 
which they live.79
 77 Achtemeier, 182.
 78 Boring, 108.
 79 David Lipscomb, On Civil Government: Its Origin, Mission and Destiny 
and The Christian’s Relation to It (Indianapolis: Doulos Christou Press, 
2006), 75. The objection could be raised that Lipscomb’s definition is 
problematic since the same word is used to describe the husband/wife 
relationship and the master/slave relationship. Lipscomb recognizes this 
and offers an extended response, part of which is quoted here. “It is ar-
gued against this, that we are commanded to submit to God – children 
to their parents, wives to their husbands. . .. Therefore antagonism is not 
involved in the expression. Antagonism in all these relationships is the 
ground of the admonition. Were there none, there would be no need of 
the admonition. . . But in these relations to God, to the parents, to hus-
bands. . . still other terms as love, honor, are added. . . [W]e are told not 
only to submit to God but to love him with all the soul and the mind and 
the body, this leads to active, hearty, soul-felt participation in carrying 
forward his government. So the child is commanded to love the parent, 
the wife her husband, and all the members of the church must have a care 
Subordination and Freedom 155
Therefore, according to Lipscomb, when Peter calls Christians to 
Ὑποτάγητε he is suggesting that they are in some way in conflict 
with the body to which they “submit,” but this does not imply an 
ontological superiority on the part of the ruling body. In other 
words, Christians are free to submit or subordinate themselves to 
government because they realize their own distinct identity apart 
from the powers, and furthermore that they realize that this dis-
tinct identity is equally true of every other person.
The exhortation to “Be subordinate to every human creature” 
is directly followed by an important modifier – “on account of 
the Lord” (διὰ τὸν κύριον). Again, Achtemeier writes, “The moti-
vation for such subordination, ‘because of the Lord,’ confirms the 
basis of such subordination in Christian faith. . . That phrase also 
qualifies subordination by placing it within the larger context of 
obedience to God; one is not to be subordinate in matters that go 
counter to God’s will.”80 One cannot rightly “obey” a presumed 
authority for the Lord’s sake if the authority is rebelling against 
that very Lord.
For centuries, commentators who have understood 2:13 as a 
command to obey governing authorities have struggled to recon-
cile that interpretation with the oppositional instruction in 2:16 
to “live as free men.”81 Even if one understands the material in 
for one another, they were to be members of one another, and to labor 
together for their mutual good, the advancement of their common cause, 
to love as brethren and be true children of God. . . But as no higher or 
closer relation than submission is required toward civil government, all 
the Christian can do in that relation, is to refrain from active antagonism 
and conflict, and to quietly and passively submit within the prescribed 
limits, but no intimation of obligation or license to participate in or in 
anywise fellowship and support is found” (75–76).
 80 Achtemeier, 182.
 81 Martin Luther, Commentary on Peter & Jude, trans John Nichols Lenker. 
Grand Rapids: Kregel Classics, 1990). For instance, Luther writes, “since 
ye have done all that was necessary to attain to true faith and you hold 
your body in subjection, let this now be your first business, to obey the 
civil authorities” (116). While on the other hand, he writes, “Christians 
yield themselves to the control of God’s Word; they have no need of civ-
il government for their own sake” (119). Furthermore, he claims, “Our 
conscience is enlightened and has become free from human ordinances 
and from the control which they had over us, so that we are no longer 
obliged to do what they have commanded under peril of our salvation” 
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2:13 to be essentially a command to obey authorities, as some 
do, one still must contend with this seemingly contrary exhorta-
tion.82 Here Peter radically diverges from the Haustafel tradition 
because he is not concerned about upholding the hierarchies be-
lieved to hold society together. Furthermore, the Greek text (ὡς 
ἐλεύθεροι) is more accurately rendered “as free [men/people],” 
which assumes the freedom of Peter’s audience whether they live 
into that freedom or not. This is not to say that they are free to do 
whatever they please because their freedom is afforded to them as 
slaves to Christ, and it is to persuade others to join the Christian 
faith.83
Therefore, subordination is a choice, a free choice of a free hu-
man, whose allegiance is to God, not something that governments 
can demand. It is this freedom that ultimately strips authority 
from the principalities and powers because they become unneed-
ed and unwanted by people who view all others as equal. This is 
the example of Jesus, who Peter points to in 2:21, the One with 
all authority who voluntarily subordinated himself to the pow-
ers who were to crucify him.84 Here Jesus demonstrated that he 
would rather die than take power by force, that he would rather 
count himself among the criminals and outcasts than the pow-
erful elites. Jesus is the model of overcoming by subordination, 
the leader of this anarchist revolution of the upside-down king-
dom that disarms abusive systems not by reforming them, but by 
offering an alternative, the alternative of a cruciform revolution 
(120). Though it is clear that Luther difficulty with this tension, he does 
provide great insight for Christians dealing with the paradoxical exhor-
tations of Peter in his statement, “For Christ’s followers are to be led and 
ruled only be the Spirit. . . Henceforth, they are under obligation to do 
nothing but good to their neighbor, helping him with all they have, as 
Christ has helped them” (120).
 82 See Kistemaker and/or Jobes.
 83 This is a paradox that many, Christians and non-Christians, find difficult 
to grasp. See my argument in the essay “What About Those Men and 
Women Who Gave Up Their Lives so that You and I Could be Free? 
On Killing for Freedom” in A Faith Not Worth Fighting For (Eugene: 
Cascade Books, 2012), 92–94.
 84 Matt 26:42. Jesus subordinated himself to the governing bodies to the 
point of death, not because of their inherent authority, but because he 
was bearing witness to God’s great love.
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whereby subordination to the powers in the name of God will 
ultimately make a spectacle of their very existence.85
English translations diverge from the Greek text again in Verse 
2:17, suggesting a different meaning than the one in Peter’s origi-
nal words. This verse is best translated as “Honor all [men]. Love 
the brotherhood. Fear God. Honor the king/emperor.” Achtemeier 
rightly suggests that “The use of ‘honor the emperor’ in 1 Pet 2:17 
as a direct parallel to ‘honor all people’ specifically divests the 
emperor of any and all trappings of divine authority and power.”86 
Actually, this structure suggests an even more radical meaning be-
cause it not only “divests the emperor. . . of divine authority and 
power,” it suggests that there is no inherent difference between 
even the emperor and a slave.87 Later Achtemeier moves this direc-
tion, writing, “The contrast of the first and last clauses indicates 
that the initial command to honor all implies such honor is not to 
be reserved for the mighty; no creature of God is unworthy of it, 
whatever his or her station in pagan society.”88
 85 See Col 2:15
 86 Achtemeier, 181.
 87 This reflects Luke’s comment that God is no respecter of persons (Acts 
10:34). If Christians are to follow that example then they too must refuse 
to show favor. 
 88 Achtemeier, 188. Peter of course finds himself in a difficult place where 
he must simultaneously instruct his readers about the anti-hierarchical 
nature of the Kingdom of God, while not drawing unnecessary attention 
to his words from those who are looking for reasons to attack Christians, 
as well as attempting to redefine concepts of honor and shame for his 
readers. Peter’s letter serves a paraenetic function, in that it offers mor-
al exhortations intended to socialize converts to this new religion (Troy 
W. Martin, Metaphor and Composition in 1 Peter. [Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1992], 103–118). Paraenesis, and its resulting socialization, in the 
hierarchical Greco-Roman society was intended to cause one to live in 
such a way that “one could attain δόξα (glory)” (Martin, 108). For Peter’s 
audience, however, in attempting to follow the teachings of Jesus they 
have been maligned, scorned, and persecuted. According to Martin, “This 
problem sets up the rhetorical situation for the author of 1 Peter and 
explains the unique paraenetic feature of eschatology. . . in this letter 
. . . . The author of 1 Peter has resorted to eschatological ideas in his 
paranaesis to resolve this problem of a non-realization of δόξα (Martin, 
111–112). Martin is largely correct, but Peter doesn’t so much “resort” 
to using eschatological arguments as much he simply continues in the 
tradition of Jesus’ own teaching, perhaps recalling Jesus’ words that his 
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The individual sections of this pericope each suggest a read-
ing sympathetic to an anarchistic equality of persons under and 
before God. The same is true of the whole pericope, 2:13–17. 
Achtemeier writes:
The inclusio formed by the two imperatives that begin (Ὑποτάγητε, 
‘be subordinate’) and end (τιμᾶτε, ‘honor’) the passage, and by the 
opening and closing references to the emperor, shows it to be a care-
ful literary composition. One must therefore pay attention to the 
deliberate limitations placed here on the status of civil  government: 
the emperor is a ‘human creature’ to whom subordination is due 
as an example of general subordination on the part of Christians 
within civil society.89
Peter’s construction challenges notions that Christians were ene-
mies of the empire, while simultaneously subverting it by giving 
each person equal respect.
A brief caveat is necessary here to explain the importance of 
assessing the structure of a text in the field of biblical exegesis. In 
an attempt to understand the text inductively, that is to attempt 
to understand the text on its own grounds rather than imposing 
meaning on the text, exegetes often look for structural relation-
ships in the text that may make authorial intent more apparent. 
One of the structures seen often in the biblical text is called inclu-
sio. “Inclusio is the repetition of words of phrases at the beginning 
and end of a unit, thus creating a bracket effect. At the boundaries 
inclusio establishes the main thought of the book (passage), point-
ing to the essential concern of the book (or passage). One should 
note the relationship between these bracketing statements and the 
intervening material in order to identify the semantic relationship 
followers would indeed experience persecution for being his disciples, 
and later Paul’s words that it was after Jesus’ suffering and shame that 
Jesus received the joy of glory (e.g. Phil 2:6–11, Heb 12:2). Thus, Peter is 
saying precisely what he means, but only one who is in on the redefinition 
of terms in the Christian tradition would understand this reappropria-
tion. Peter uses the common social framework of glory/honor and shame, 
but reinterprets the concepts through the lens of the uniquely Christian 
assertion that suffering comes before glory, and glory only comes, at least 
in fullness, when God resurrects and redeems the faithful.
 89 Achtemeier, 180.
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with which an inclusio is used.”90 In other words, this is simply 
a form of parallelism, which is commonly used in many types of 
literature in order to emphasize a given point or to highlight the 
similarities in a variety of connected clauses.
“Thus the bracketing statement is a general claim that is spelled 
out, or particularized, in the intervening material,” note Bauer and 
Traina.91 In this case, Peter makes the general statements regard-
ing subordination and honour, but spells out the parameters re-
garding the way in which his readers are to submit to and honour 
others, including his seemingly contradictory claim that they are 
to live as free people. This pericope seems to be a paradox in that 
by honouring the authorities they are shamed. According to Peter 
in the verse that precedes this pericope, the contrast of the good 
behaviour of Jesus’ disciples, largely epitomized by enduring un-
just suffering for Christ’s sake, with the idolatrous, self-serving 
behaviour of the powers, will expose the corruption and injus-
tice meted out by the imposturous and rebellious powers of this 
world.
While the focus of this analysis has been primarily on the rhe-
torical structure of this pericope, the brief segues into theological 
and social issues strengthen the claims regarding Peter’s shrewd 
composition. Like other writers who find themselves vulnerable 
because they are at odds with a society’s values, Peter employs 
cunning rhetorical and theological moves that those socialized 
into early Christianity could understand and appreciate while 
those outside this “chosen people” (2:9) would not find immedi-
ately threatening. The following section of exhortations directed 
at slaves, then wives and husbands should further illumine the 
sort of double meaning potentially bound up in Peter’s letter by 
exposing more of the ways in which different inferences might be 
made by those inside church and those on the outside. With this 
in mind it is possible to see the subversive nature of Peter’s next 
set of instructions.
 90 David R. Bauer and Robert A. Traina, Inductive Bible Study: A 
Comprehensive guide to the Practice of Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2011), 117. 
 91 Ibid, 118.
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Peter moves into exhortations directed at slaves, then wives and 
husbands. Though specific parties are addressed, Peter never loses 
sight of the whole community. His instructions to these specif-
ic parties serves a double purpose, to help these particular per-
sons find their place as individual moral agents and bearers of the 
Imago Dei, and to use them as examples of Christlikeness. “Since 
2:13–3:7 doesn’t cover all cases and classes, instructions to slaves 
and wives are to be taken as illustrative. . . The whole community 
is to learn from what is said to slaves and wives.”92
On slaves
Again, Peter’s modified use of the Haustafel dignifies slaves by as-
suming their moral agency, yet it is disturbing to modern readers 
that he takes no umbrage with slavery itself. However, a closer 
reading of the text suggests that Peter is merely taking a more cal-
culated and ultimately subversive approach. By revisiting themes 
of subordination to all people (Ὑποτάγητε πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει) 
and being as free people, then setting slaves up as examples to 
the rest of the Christian community, and directly connecting them 
with Christ, Peter turns the social order on its head, a reality al-
ready coming to fruition in early Christian communities.
Two relevant clauses point readers back to Peter’s previous 
discussion. First, Peter uses the word “subordinate,” in this case 
(ὑποτασσόμενοι),93 a direct parallel to his earlier use in 2:13. Peter’s 
use of “subordinate” to slaves here is a particularization of his in-
struction for all Christians to do so. Second, Peter points back to 
his discussion about the freedom of all Christians, including those 
in slavery, as those who choose to live as “God’s slaves” (θεοῦ 
δοῦλοι). As Boring remarks, “all Christians are free, all are slaves. 
As those already freed and accepted before God, their identity 
does not depend on the social status others attribute to them.”94
 92 Boring, 107.
 93 The lexical form is ὑποτάσσω.
 94 Ibid., 111. It should be noted however that some ancient writers like 
Seneca recognized slaves as having the same inherent value as all other 
humans, but he still supported slavery so long as masters treated their 
slaves well.
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Peter cunningly subverts social values, asserting the equality of 
persons. As Joel Green writes, “[I]t is obvious that Peter’s theo-
logical perspective (particularly his identification of his Christian 
audience, including slaves [v. 17], as ‘free persons’ [v. 16], his em-
phasis on ‘honoring all persons,’ including slaves, and his specific 
address to slaves as moral agents [v. 18]) must trigger the unravel-
ing of the institution of slavery – at least insofar as this institution 
rested on arguments from inherent nature and incarnate status in 
the Greco-Roman world.”95
Peter not only dignifies slaves by addressing them as moral 
agents, he sets them up as examples to the rest of the Christian 
community. This at once serves to uplift slaves and call those in 
higher social classes to seek a certain downward mobility, thus 
moving closer to a society where all people not only have theoret-
ical, but realized, equality.
It is noteworthy that “Romans reacted negatively when Jewish 
and Christian slaves – the first group to do so – rejected the wor-
ship of their masters’ gods, insisting on an exclusive worship of 
their own God”96 because these slaves are examples of godliness 
in the face of potentially awful consequences. Those who other-
wise have little or no power are empowered to lead the rest of 
the Christian community by example.97 This means that other 
Christians are not to subjugate those in slavery, but to look to 
them as exemplars of Christian discipleship.
Most important is the fact that, as Keener notes, “Although an-
cient society was very status-conscious and associated power with 
greatness, Peter identifies Christ with unjustly treated slaves.”98 
This comparison undermines conventional ways of thinking and 
challenges readers to live the values of Jesus’ upside-down king-
dom. That is to say, by comparing Christ to slaves, Peter dignifies 
lowliness and exhorts his readers to take on servant roles because 
they are free to do so in Christ. In this way, it is important to note 
 95 Green, 79.
 96 Balch, 74.
 97 It is at least conceivable that slaves could be elders in the early church, 
and as the discussion earlier about shepherds suggests they would be 
potentially great candidates. 
 98 Keener, 715.
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that the particulars of a slave’s experience are at the fore, and thus 
the suffering of the slave is not meant to be downplayed. There is 
no sort of “All Lives Matter” move being made here. Peter clarifies 
that “Slave Lives Matter.”
On Wives and Husbands
Peter’s instructions to wives carry some complex socio-cultural 
baggage, but they, along with instructions to husbands, offer in-
sight into understanding the equality of persons in Peter’s thought. 
Women in much of the ancient world had little power and were 
often viewed as property, and agents of seduction leading men 
astray from their religious/societal duties.99
The women Peter addresses had already broken with tradition 
choosing to worship their own God instead of their husbands’ 
gods, something that Peter unequivocally commends, exhorting 
wives to lead their husbands to Christian belief. This is a rever-
sal of the typical expectations, stated by Plutarch: “A wife ought 
not make friends of her own, but to enjoy her husband’s friends 
in common with him. The gods are the first and most important 
friends. Therefore it is becoming for a wife to worship and know 
only the gods that her husband believes in, and to shut the front 
door tight upon all queer rituals and outlandish superstitions. For 
with no god do stealthy and secret rites performed by a woman 
find any favour.”100
For the wives Peter is addressing there is no expectation that 
women are required to follow their husbands into any religion, but 
that women had the power to lead their husbands into worship 
of the true God. Likewise, Peter’s instruction to wives necessitates 
 99 The fact that Peter feels compelled to address wives with specific instruc-
tions to subordinate (ὑποτασσόμεναι) themselves to their own husbands 
(3:1), a practice already expected of women in Greco-Roman society, 
suggests that these women had already begun embracing the freedom 
found in Christ, though it seems that they may have been choosing to use 
that freedom in unwise ways.
 100 Found in Balch, 85. 
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that their worship not be done in secret, and more importantly 
that God would indeed find favour in their worship.101
Some might point to Peter’s use of Sarah as an example of wife-
ly obedience to undermine the above interpretation, but one need 
only look briefly at the story Peter is referencing, both in its bib-
lical and extrabiblical contexts, to see that Sarah and Abraham’s 
relationship was more complicated than might initially appear. 
Peter could be referring to Gen 18:12, which shows “Sarah was 
hardly the paradigm of the servile housewife, but was laughing 
out loud.”102 Rather than being obedient to Abraham, she was in 
fact sometimes disrespectful. “Moreover, in the relevant material 
in Genesis, it is easier to find evidence that Abraham obeyed Sarah 
more than the other way around.”103 On the other hand, Peter also 
says that Sarah called Abraham “Lord,” which could suggest that 
husbands may rightly subjugate their wives. However, “[Lord] 
was not an unusual expression on the lips of Sarah, but was the 
way in which all women of the period referred to their husbands 
(probably with as little reflection on it as a modern woman gives 
to the term ‘husband).”104 My wife, for example, refers to me as a 
husband to others, but does occasionally call me husband directly 
as well.
 101 This perhaps reflects Peter’s more general exhortation that Christians live 
such good lives among their pagan counterparts that the pagans would 
see these good works and glorify God (2:12). 
 102 Boring, 125–126.
 103 Green, 96. Green remarks, in footnote 79, that in Genesis God actually 
tells Abraham to obey Sarah at one point, but the reverse is never seen in 
Genesis. 
 104 Peter H. Davids, The First Epistle of Peter (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1990), 120–121. In fact Davids contends elsewhere that, “bible transla-
tions divide over whether to translate this term according to its use in 1 
Peter or within the context of Genesis. Like the NRSV, the NAB translates 
the term contextually as “my husband.” The NKJV follows the traditional 
AV rendering of “my lord.” The NIV has “my master” with the alter-
native “husband” in a note. The NLT compromises with “my master—
my husband.” Davids, “A Silent Witness in Marriage: 1 Peter 3:1–7” in 
Discovering Biblical Equality: Complementarily without Hierarchy edited 
by Ronald W. Pierce and Rebecca Merrill Groothuis with Gordon D. Fee 
(Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2005), 231.
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However, it could very well be the case that Peter does not, 
primarily at least, have the Genesis text in mind, but extrabiblical 
stories familiar to the Jewish people. It seems that commentators 
around Peter’s time were actually discussing the significance of 
Abraham and Sarah’s interactions.105 Peter, once again, might be 
“splitting the difference” inasmuch as his reliance on the Genesis 
text would likely lead to one conclusion, but his reliance on the 
extra-biblical literature would point to a different conclusion. 
Perhaps he has both in mind, as this essay has shown, was his 
general way of helping Christians avoid persecution while eroding 
away the very systems that were the source of that persecution.
Peter’s reference is not to convince wives of their inferiority, but 
rather to encourage them to choose subordination as a witness 
to the God who is faithful to make all things right. Furthermore, 
“These [including Sarah] were ‘holy women,’ not because of 
their specific moral virtue, but because they were heroines of the 
Scriptures.”106 Sarah’s particular heroism, as it relates to Peter’s 
purposes, was in the hope she placed in God, specifically as an 
alien and stranger in a foreign land.
Perhaps Peter uses Sarah to poke fun at unwitting pagans who 
believed that the natural order required wives to do what their 
husbands command. At first glimpse, they would have likely seen 
Peter’s words as essentially endorsing Greco-Roman values, but 
those familiar with the story of Sarah would be inclined to see her 
as a more complex example of faithful hope rather than simply 
wifely obedience. Peter has in view a people who would put their 
hope in God, exhorting them to treat all people with reverent 
dignity.
Likewise, calling wives the weaker vessel is sometimes viewed 
as an ontological statement about women’s strength of character, 
emotional stability, or intended place in society and marriage.107 
 105 Davids, “A Silent Witness,” 233.
 106 Ibid., 119.
 107 See for example, Wayne Grudem, 1 Peter (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2002), 143–145. Grudem argues that women are “weaker vessels” in at 
least three ways. First, he says they have less physical strength than men. 
Second, according to Grudem, women are weaker in that they have less 
authority in marriage. Third, he argues, women are more emotionally 
vulnerable, which he says is a weakness that can also be a strength. Also, 
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This view fails on at least two counts. First, and perhaps most 
notably, the reference to females as “weaker” directly follows six 
full verses that speak specifically about the strength of character 
required of Christian women, and the behaviours expected from 
women as fully human moral agents.108
Second, the most contextually appropriate reading of the text 
shows Peter’s awareness of the ways in which women were vul-
nerable in his readers’ context. As Jean Bethke Elshtain writes, 
“Human beings are soft-shelled creatures. All bodies are fragile. 
But some bodies, in some circumstances are more vulnerable than 
others.”109 Peter reminds husbands that this is the situation for 
their wives in the patriarchal Greco-Roman world. These wives 
are more susceptible to abuse in the male-dominated culture, and 
therefore Christian husbands have a responsibility to counter 
these societal norms by treating their wives as equal heirs to all 
that God offers.
For Peter, the point of Christians choosing to live into the free-
dom of Christ is that they live holy lives that others find strangely 
compelling. As people adopt Christianity, the expectation is that 
they treat all others equitably as Jesus did. Peter is proposing a 
social strategy whereby Christians would move the world toward 
an embrace of anarchist principles, perhaps the most important of 
which is the equality of persons.110 In short, “The servant-ethic of 
see Martin Luther Commentary on Peter and Jude (Grand Rapids: Kregel 
Classics, 1990), 140. Luther writes that “the wife is weaker bodily, as 
well as more timid and more easily dispirited.” Davids notes, 123, that it 
was common in the Greek and Hebrew world for women to be viewed 
as “weaker in mind or morally inferior” by citing Plato (Leg 6.781b) and 
noting that other places in scripture use similar wording to talk generally 
about human moral failings (Rom 5:6) and an irresolute conscience (1 
Cor 8:7–11; Rom 14:1).
 108 See Davids, 123.
 109 Jean Bethke Elshtain, “The Equality of Persons and the Culture of 
Rights,” University of St. Thomas Law Journal: Vol. 1: Iss. 1. (2003), 5. 
Available at: http://ir.stthomas.edu/ustlj/vol1/iss1/2
 110 There is no doubt that equality of persons could, by itself, fall under 
progressive or Marxists ideologies, but the way I believe Peter is using it 
is thoroughly anarchist because his vision involves no coercion or benev-
olent dictator or government program that will bring about his desired 
outcome. Rather, Peter proposes a society where people by their own 
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I Peter, then, is strategic. In essence, it seeks to turn enemies into 
friends.”111
Subverting the Powers
Hopefully, the subversive nature and power of non-coercion, vol-
untary association, and the equality of persons has begun to be-
come apparent in this overview of 1 Peter. That being the case, it is 
pertinent to only highlight the points of contact that these themes 
make with the Petrine message of subversion of the powers.
When one experiences unjust suffering, oppression unleashed 
by the powers, there is a temptation to lash out against those forc-
es or to rebel in hopes of establishing a new order. This approach 
simply perpetuates the power struggles, shifting the power from 
one person or group to another.
Peter offers no such option to Christians. He suggests an alter-
native way of being in the world. He writes:
Above all, love each other deeply, because love covers over a mul-
titude of sins. Offer hospitality to one another without grumbling. 
Each of you should use whatever gift you have received to serve 
others, as faithful stewards of God’s grace in its various forms. 
If anyone speaks, they should do so as one who speaks the very 
words of God. If anyone serves, they should do so with the strength 
God provides, so that in all things God may be praised through 
Jesus Christ. To him be the glory and the power for ever and ever. 
Amen (4:8–11).112
free choice extend a hand of friendship to enemies precisely because they 
have their own free moral agency and can choose to use it in this way. 
Nor is Peter’s concern primarily economic; he is simply articulating the 
larger NT vision that in the Kingdom of God there will not be divisions 
based on race, gender, or social status, but all people will be invited to 
participate in the community as they choose. 
 111 Carter, 89.
 112 Much could be drawn out from this specific passage, but one of the most 
compelling arguments for the power of subversion Peter has in mind 
one might focus on his call to hospitality. See Christine D. Pohl, Making 
Room: Recovering Hospitality as a Christian Tradition (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1999). Pohl writes, “Although we often think of hospitality 
as a tame and pleasant practice, Christian hospitality has always had a 
subversive countercultural dimension. ‘Hospitality is resistance,’ as one 
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This is the alternative Peter offers for subverting the powers while 
avoiding being drawn into them. It is an important word because 
as Ellul writes, “When the church has been seduced by the rul-
ing classes, becoming a power or being obsessed with politics, 
this is tantamount to its possession by the prince of this world 
himself.”113
First Peter is a manifesto of sorts in which Christianity is set 
against the powers. These powers, the ones upholding the hier-
archies Christ came to destroy, are undermined by this band of 
aliens and strangers who claim Jesus is Lord. Peter’s epistle is an 
archetype of Ellul’s statement that “Biblically, love is the way, not 
violence. . . Not using violence against those in power does not 
mean doing nothing. . . Christianity means a rejection of  power 
and a fight against it. . . There remains the anarchism which acts 
by means of persuasion, by the creation of small groups and 
 networks, denouncing falsehood and oppression, aiming at a true 
overturning of authorities of all kinds as people at the bottom speak 
and organize themselves.”114 Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, 
 drawing from Peter Brock writes, “the state may be valid for non- 
Christians, but if ‘all truly followed in Christ’s footsteps it would 
wither away.’ God uses the state in his ordering of the cosmos 
only because his commandments for a peaceful and just society 
are not being followed.”115 Thus, the church’s witness of subordi-
nation is intended to draw people into the Christian faith which 
ought to have the side effect of the dissolution of oppressive pow-
er structures.
Peter’s letter maintains that Christians subvert the powers not 
by violence, or rebellious revolution, but through the faithful wit-
ness of righteous suffering. Non-coercion and voluntary associ-
ation, and the equality of persons are part and parcel of such a 
witness. Each calls into question the legitimacy of the powers, and 
Catholic Worker observed. Especially when the larger society disregards 
or dishonors certain persons, small acts of respect and welcome are po-
tent far beyond themselves. They point to a different system of valuing 
and an alternate model of relationships” (61).
 113 Jacques Ellul, The Subversion of Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1986), 180.
 114 Ellul, A&C, 13–14.
 115 Christoyannopoulos, 153–154.
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exposes their sinfulness, challenging each person to glorify God 
rather than self.
Social Location and Christian Witness
Peter is making the radical claim that it is not the powerful, the 
violent, the coercive, nor the privileged who wield true influence 
in the world.116 It is the ones who are humble, by choice or by 
circumstance, the ones who take up crosses upon their shoulders, 
who are able to bear witness to the true, eschatological reality 
that the powers, even death itself, have been overcome by Jesus.117 
Rather than pursuing power, for Green, “Christians should expect 
to be treated as those who are powerless. . . knowing, however, 
that their appropriate conduct would have a redemptive effect 
akin to that of Jesus.”118
As Boring puts it, “Throughout [1 Peter], the emphasis is on 
mission, not on submission. As in the example of Christ (2:21–
25), submission is for the sake of mission.”119 The mission is tak-
en up voluntarily with a purpose in mind, not because the social 
order demands it, nor because one group is necessarily inferior 
or supposed to be subservient to another. The message here is 
that by choosing submission Christians follow the example of 
Christ. Speaking to the disenfranchised, Peter honours their con-
tributions to the Christian mission and shames the powerful who 
would impede that mission. He also suggests that it is not the 
powerful of this world who are most like Christ, but those who 
find their place in humble, seemingly powerless, service to others. 
Therefore, Peter seems to be arguing that Christians effect change 
in the world, not by using power over others, but by bearing wit-
ness to the eschatological hope and truth of Jesus. Near the end of 
 116 More evidence of Peter’s concern with social location can be seen in his 
address to wives regarding their dress. Peter argues against the notion 
that it is displays of wealth or beauty that show one’s value. Davids 
writes, “[Peter’s] critique would apply mainly to upper-class women who 
could afford more than the simplest dress (and perhaps to the aspirations 
of other women).Thus it is a critique of the whole culture” (117–118).
 117 See Col 2:15.
 118 Green, 72.
 119 Boring, 113.
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his specific instructions to the congregations regarding righteous 
subordination and its effects, Peter writes: “Humble yourselves, 
therefore, under God’s mighty hand, that he may lift you up in 
due time” (4:6).
Peter’s vision of Christian witness was not of rebellion, but that 
they model a different society, one not predicated on hierarchies 
and coercion even as they choose to subversively subordinate 
themselves to these forces that are already present, but on loving 
relationships where each person honours the dignity of others. 
Two millennia after it was written, Peter’s epistle still offers an 
implicit yet compelling vision for an alternative society, a soci-
ety that embraces anarchist values of non-coercion, voluntary 
association, and the equality of persons all as a way to subvert 
the powers intent on maintaining their perceived control of the 
world. Paradoxically, it is not the powers that have power over 
the world’s destiny, but the One and ones who choose humble 
subordination that declare the triumph of love.
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Restoring Anarcho-Christian Activism : From 
Nietzsche’s Affirmation to Benjamin’s Violence
Christos Iliopoulos
Independent scholar
This chapter approaches the issue of activism through the prism 
of the pacifism/violence debate within Christian anarchist  circles. 
Based on two philosophical critiques – Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
critique of Christianity and Walter Benjamin’s critique of violence – 
I challenge the main anarcho-Christian theses that favour a  pacifist/
passive model of action, providing an alternative context for the 
interpretation of the relevant biblical passages and, ultimately, 
offering a restored version of anarcho-Christian activism, beyond 
dogmatic pacifism and fetishistic violence. The first critique looks at 
those Christian features that have turned Christianity into self-ne-
gation, and promotes an affirmative life stance. The second critique 
presents a qualitative approach to violence, distinguishing between 
two types – mythical and divine – out of which the latter revises the 
role of violence in Christian anarchist practices. Resistance to evil 
and secular authority can now acquire a new meaning, affirmative 
and active instead of passive and resentful.
The seeming paradox posed by the term “Christian anarchism” 
is due to the historical conflict between anarchist and Christian 
thought and practice that emerged at the end of the eighteenth 
century. This is the epoch when anarchism gradually builds a more 
coherent philosophy, obtaining an essential identity in the middle 
of the next century through the works of the classical anarchists. 
Christianity, on the other hand, not only has long overcome the 
fierce persecution by the Roman Empire by the nineteenth  century, 
but also stands in both East and West as the prevailing religion, 
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whose official leaders either openly practice political authority (in 
western Europe through the Catholic Church) or join hands with 
it (in eastern Europe through the Orthodox Church).
This chapter treats anarchism not as an ideology but rather as 
an open-ended set of ideas and practices which primarily promote 
antiauthority, solidarity and freedom. In turn, Christianity is not 
seen as a closed, dogmatic religion but as the way of life exempli-
fied by Jesus, based on love, brotherhood and life-affirmation. No 
matter how general and vague the above “definitions” may seem, 
I intend to demonstrate more clearly the way I approach both in 
the main part of my essay where the conjunction between anar-
chism and Christianity takes place in the face of anarcho-christian 
activism.
Anarchism, taking many of its basic principles from the 
Enlightenment, seemed to oppose any metaphysical perception of 
reality and, due to its antiauthoritarian nature, any form of power 
that attempts to manipulate, exploit and enslave the individual. 
Prominent anarchist thinkers like Bakunin, Kropotkin, Stirner, 
and Goldman, challenged the role religion played, particularly 
the Christian church, in mollifying popular displeasure and ex-
cusing poverty and exploitation by regarding kings and emperors 
as the fulfilment of the divine will. At the same time, they saw 
religion discouraging revolutionary action, instead waiting for 
an oncoming restoration, through the Second Advent of Christ, 
and the establishment of “God’s Kingdom” on earth. Kropotkin, 
for example, describes how the Church, after a quite promising 
start, gradually became more and more alienated from the origi-
nal teaching of Jesus, coming to the point where it made a com-
plete alliance with the rulers to the extent that even the teachings 
of Jesus came to be regarded as dangerous by the Church itself.1 
Kropotkin’s view is depicted well by another Russian who in his 
early years participated in socialist circles: Fyodor Dostoyevsky, 
in his masterpiece The Brothers Karamazov, describes how “the 
Grand Inquisitor” encounters Jesus upon his return to earth, and 
condemns him for the gift of free will to humanity. Moreover, he 
 1 Peter Kropotkin, Ethics, Origin and Development (Bristol: Thoemmes 
Press, 1993), p. 121.
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proclaims the collaboration of the Church with secular author-
ities, with the kingdoms of the earth, Satan himself, in order to 
secure mankind’s happiness.2 For Bakunin, Christianity manifests 
“the impoverishment, enslavement, and annihilation of human-
ity”;3 it is “the bourgeois religion par excellence”,4 whereas ac-
cording to Goldman, “the Fathers of the Church can well afford 
to preach the gospel of Christ. It contains nothing dangerous to 
the regime of authority and wealth”.5
Moreover, Christianity, as the “official” religion of the western 
world, obtains a secular character by supporting, through theo-
logical argument, the authority that made it the sole dominator 
in the field of spiritual matters. Consequently, any subversion of 
the social/political scene, like the one preached by anarchists, was 
condemned without second thought as a revival of Lucifer’s mu-
tiny against God and of Adam and Eve’s disobedience that drove 
them out of Eden.6 The harsh criticism and violent oppression of 
most millenarian movements by the Church is an indicative exam-
ple of this approach.7
Apart from the historical reality, many arguments concern-
ing the incompatibility between Christianity and anarchism also 
come from the “theoretical” frame of the Christian faith, as it has 
been formed through the books of the Old and New Testament. 
Here we can find texts that support patriarchy,8 submission to 
authority and to rulers9 and the perpetuation of exploitation.10 
Of course, each side attributes a different value to these passages. 
 2 Fyodor Dostoyevski, The Brothers Karamazov (New York: Bantam Dell, 
2003), pp. 334, 343.
 3 Mikhail Bakunin, God and the State (n.p.: Create Space, 2011), p. 9.
 4 Bakunin, p. 39.
 5 Emma Godman, The Failure of Christianity, http://theanarchistlibrary.
org/library/emma-goldman-the-failure-of-christianity.pdf, [20 Mar 
2016], p. 2.
 6 Genesis 3. King James Version.
 7 See Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary 
Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1970), especially chapters 12 and 13.
 8 Genesis 16:1–6. 19:6–8, 1 Corinthians 14:34–36, 1 Timothy 2:11–15.
 9 Exodus 15:26, Matthew 22:15–22, Luke 6:27–30, Romans 13:1–7, Titus 
3:1–2, 1 Peter 2:13–17.
 10 1 Corinthians 7:20–22, Ephesians 6:5–8.
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Anarchists consider them examples of reactionary politics, where-
as Christians regard them primarily as fundamental to obedience 
to God’s will – which for Christians is a different primary con-
cern, and not intended to be reactionary. However, what I am par-
ticularly interested in is locating the basic obstacles to the effort 
of uniting anarchism with Christianity, obstacles that many (an-
archo) Christian scholars have tried to overcome in two key ways.
The first way involves the articulation of multiple “anti- 
paradigms” using the same books of the Holy Bible11 relied 
upon by patriarchal interpreters, but to emphasise support for a 
 communal way of life with clear anarcho-communist features,12 
disobedience towards secular authorities,13 the overcoming of the 
Law,14 the project of freedom,15 the abolition of social, national 
and cultural norms,16 and the merciless critique of the rich and the 
exploiters.17 Later, I will also refer to some radical practices and 
discourses of Jesus, as they are presented in the most important 
part of the New Testament, the four Gospels.
The second approach consists of the effort to give an alter-
native interpretation to the “anti-anarchist” passages mentioned 
above, to turn them around and make them part of an antiau-
thoritarian and liberating view. This reading denies the idea that 
Christianity and anarchism are incompatible and thus elaborates 
some of the basic principles of the current of thought and practice 
called Christian anarchism.18
 11 We can come across such approaches in the works of Jacques Ellul 
(Anarchy and Christianity (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1991), 
especially part II, chapter 1), Thanassis Papathanasiou (Κοινωνική 
Δικαιοσύνη και Ορθόδοξη Θεολογία – Μία Προκήρυξη [Social Justice and 
Orthodox Theology – A Proclamation] (Athens: Akritas, 2001)) and 
Giorgio Agamben (The Time that Remains – A Commentary on the 
Letter to the Romans (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005)). 
 12 Acts 2:44–46. 4:32–37.
 13 Acts 5:28–30.
 14 Romans 7:6, Galatians 2:16.21. 3:19–20.
 15 Galatians 5:2–6, Colossians 2:16–23, 1 Timothy 4:4–5.
 16 Philippians 3:4–11, Colossians 3:11.
 17 James 5:1–6.
 18 Here I refer to the views of various thinkers (discussed further down in 
this chapter) as presented in Alexandre Christoyannopoulos ‘Responding 
to the State: Christian Anarchists on Romans 13, Rendering to Caesar, 
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In contrast to these approaches, this chapter advances a dif-
ferent argument, consisting of two other components. The first 
is related to the foundation of this second way of overcoming the 
obstacles, a foundation which, in my opinion, is a false one. In 
the main, these efforts are based on the implied authenticity of 
the Apostles, and especially of Paul, and a uniformed and indivis-
ible perception of what constitutes “the” Christian tradition. The 
consequences seem problematic, even disastrous: on the one side, 
we have the exaggerated and hasty effort to justify Paul’s many 
“anti-anarchist” sayings, and on the other, we deprive ourselves 
of a creative, active and critical reading of the Scripture. What 
I mean by this “critical and active reading” is a radical interpre-
tation based on a creative bridging of the Bible’s contradictions, 
 instead of a mainstream and dogmatic perception which  eliminates 
such a possibility, based on a rigid and uniform reading that 
neglects or even denies the existence of such contradictions.
The second component expresses exactly this need for a dif-
ferent reading of both the biblical texts (and especially the New 
Testament) and the teaching and life of Jesus, aiming for a to-
tally different interpretative framework in order to restore an-
archo-Christian activism, lead it back to what it was before a 
religious status quo emerged. This framework draws on two inspi-
rational and valuable tools. The first one is Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
critique of Christianity as a faith favouring death instead of life. 
Nietzsche unveils the self-denying spirit of Christianity since the 
present (earthly life) must be sacrificed in favour of the future 
(afterlife). According to him, praising Jesus’ death on the cross as 
a means of escaping this life for the sake of heaven is a stance at-
tributed to Paul and characterizes the Christian worldview which, 
in turn, generates a miserable and passive attitude towards sec-
ular authority. The second tool is Walter Benjamin’s critique of 
violence. Although pacifism occupies a central place in (anarcho) 
Christian rhetoric, Jesus seems to have made use of violent means 
that go beyond this pacifistic reading. Benjamin’s distinction be-
tween pure and impure violence stresses the difference between 
and Civil Disobedience’, in Religious Anarchism, New Perspectives ed. 
by Alexandre Christoyannopoulos (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2009), pp. 106–44.
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violence that liberates and violence that enslaves. Whereas the sec-
ond type is norm-positing and norm-imposing, the first manifests 
norm-breaking, a violence of pure means which serves no ends.
Both approaches, Nietzschean and Benjaminian, are used in 
this paper only as methodological tools without touching upon 
any further implications of the two thinkers for either Christianity 
or anarchism. Nietzsche’s hostility towards anarchism and reli-
gious faith in general, Benjamin’s theology-soaked libertarian 
Marxism, as well as the elective affinity between Nietzsche and 
Benjamin and indeed between the two of them and anarchism19 
are all very interesting themes related to this essay, but going far 
beyond its narrower objectives. The Nietzschean and Benjaminian 
angles presented here, offer an opportunity for Christian anar-
chists to redefine their resistance towards the antichrist state and 
authority by turning their passive and self-negating stance into an 
active and life-affirmative practice.
Paul and the problematic “Paulodicy”
Paul, also known as Saul of Tarsus, is an emblematic figure in the 
history of Christianity. A Hebrew with a pharisaic, religious ed-
ucation, and an extremely cultivated member of the Judaic com-
munity, he undertakes the persecution of Christians who are con-
sidered blasphemous towards Yahweh.20 He very soon changes 
sides21 and moves from being a merciless persecutor of Christians, 
to becoming one of the most important heralds of Jesus’ mes-
sage, founding churches across the Roman Empire, and taking 
on a central pastoral role through his epistles to these church 
communities. Moreover, he clashes with the Judaic component of 
 19 For a more detailed view into this elective affinity between Nietzsche, 
Benjamin and anarchism see Christos Iliopoulos, Nietzsche and 
Anarchism: an elective affinity, and a Nietzschean reading of the 
December ’08 revolt in Athens, PhD thesis, Loughborough University, 
2014, http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.631586. 
 20 Acts 7:58, 8:1–3.
 21 Acts 9:1–19.
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Christianity,22 arguing that the newly formed Christian communi-
ty must be perceived not as a Judaic heresy but as a superseding 
of Judaism.
The central role of Paul in the evolution of the new church had 
a problematic consequence: he was either overestimated by those 
who looked upon his sayings, considering them to be of an un-
questionable authenticity, or he was criticized, by those who held 
him responsible for driving Christianity away from Jesus’ original 
teaching, institutionalizing the church and turning it into a means 
of a spiritual escapism. In both cases, Paul was charged with a 
burden that surely exceeded him, since neither was he infallible 
nor was he exclusively responsible for the supposed departure of 
the Church from its original spirit.
This second category includes thinkers like Tolstoy, Kropotkin 
and Nietzsche, each for individual reasons. Tolstoy criticized Paul 
from a Christian point of view, Kropotkin from an anarchist one, 
and Nietzsche challenged him in the name of a joyful philosophy 
of life. Taken together, they unleashed a biting critique that, on the 
one hand, seems to overlook certain historical and psychological 
factors while, on the other, constitutes a special yeast for the criti-
cal approach to Christianity and the overcoming of the incompat-
ibilities concerning the Christianity-anarchism conjunction which 
I wish to explore.
What scandalizes (Christian) anarchists in the teaching of Paul 
is mainly the passage from the Letter to Romans that not only 
calls for submission to secular authorities but also considers them 
a godsend.23 These approaches to Paul’s sayings by Christian an-
archists fall into the two aforementioned types of approach.
The first is expressed as the rejection of Paul as a distorter of 
Jesus’ teaching (Tolstoy’s view), or with the rejection of these texts 
as inauthentic, or by highlighting the many counter examples 
from his life and teaching that show Paul probably had something 
else in mind when he was praising secular authorities so provoc-
atively. This last view is shared by James Redford and Timothy 
Carter – as Alexandre Christoyannopoulos shows24– who urge us 
 22 Acts 15:1–21.
 23 Romans 13:1–7.
 24 See Christoyannopoulos, ‘Responding to the State’, pp. 106–44.
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to take into account the historical context under which the letter 
to Romans is written, stressing the idea that Paul was trying to 
protect the Roman Christian community from a pogrom by the 
imperial authority. This approach is the most realistic since the 
frequency of Paul’s radical stances against the law, and in favour 
of freedom and equality, should lead us to reject a monolithic 
reading of his epistles, making greater demands on our interpre-
tative procedures in reading between the lines and trying to reach 
an overall, coherent, picture of his writings by bridging any am-
biguities. Additionally, this can also be confirmed from a detail in 
his letter to Titus, where Paul suggests that he should behave in a 
way that will leave no room for any accusations,25 which implies 
that one of Paul’s primary concerns was to avoid provoking the 
authorities, something that could justify such a blunt praise in his 
letter to Romans.
On the other side, we have the second type of approach that 
causes serious problems not only to Paul and his posthumous 
fame but to Christian anarchism as well. This other type of 
“Paulodicy” – that is the need to justify Paul for his sayings – 
consists in the effort of interpreting his anti-anarchist and “au-
thoritative” views in a way that reinforces an anarchist Christian 
perspective instead of opposing it. Hence, for Vernard Eller, Peter 
Chelcicky, Archie Penner and others,26 Paul’s submission to au-
thority is a force of subversion through forgiveness, love, patience, 
and trust in God’s plan for justice. These views deny that Paul 
might have had a human weakness in taking on the widespread 
beliefs of his time concerning (state) authority, or that he was just 
practicing a “smart” and thoughtful move27 that, nonetheless, led 
(anarcho) Christianity to resign from fighting for life and turn 
to an after-death justification of earthly hardships. I will return 
 25 Titus 2:7–9.
 26 The detailed arguments of all these thinkers are also presented 
Christoyannopoulos, ‘Responding to the State’.
 27 In this case, which seems quite likely, it is understandable that Alain 
Badiou and Slavoj Žižek called Paul the “Lenin of the Church”, and Lenin 
“St. Paul of Communism”, an apt connection but not very flattering, at 
least from a Christian anarchist perspective. For this connection between 
Paul and Lenin, made by Badiou and Žižek, see Roland Boer, Lenin, 
Religion and Theology (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 2.
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in detail to this second type of approach, exploring Nietzsche’s 
critique of these features and his understanding of the tendencies 
of Christianity that have turned it from a practice of fighting and 
living, into a theology of resignation and death.
Nietzsche and Christianity: Dionysos versus (?) the 
Crucifix
Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity is based on its negation and 
nihilistic attitude towards existence and life: original sin, fall, 
guilt, the repression of the instincts, the vanity of earthly life, the 
acknowledgement of the hereafter as the returning to a heavenly 
condition, the returning to “real” life.
Since the formation of the first church, Paul’s main concern, 
what has been praised, and what has been used as the foundation 
stone, is “the God on the Cross”.28 The sorrow (we need only to 
remember the hurtful way that, after the original sin, man will be 
fed from the earth and woman will give birth29) is a “crown wit-
ness” against life, a life that is guilty, unfair, something that has to 
be justified.30 The redemption of life, its justification, must follow 
the narrow path of a new sorrow, and redemption means that 
someone – and all his followers – will pass through this hurtful 
narrow path: God on the Cross. The Crucifix will take the respon-
sibility for the sins of the entire world, will redeem life: Jesus is 
crucified in order to resurrect, so that humans will return to “real” 
life, the life of the hereafter.
The binary sorrow-punishment and sorrow-ransom for 
Nietzsche is a machinery that internalizes sorrow, and turns it 
against the self, creating the bad, the sinful, and the guilty con-
science. It is the machinery through which the Christian acts ni-
hilistically, negating life: on the one hand the construction of guilt 
and sin, and on the other hand the multiplication of sorrow as the 
ransom that will “buy the sorrow” of this fallen life.31 Even when 
 28 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, §51.
 29 Genesis 3:16–19.
 30 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2002), 
p. 15.
 31 Ibid.
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Christianity praises life and love, in these hymns lie hatred and 
negation, since “love” refers to a castrated, mutilated and dying 
life with moral rules and “musts”, with instincts oppressed and 
denied, a life that is nothing but a blurred shadow of the here-
after’s “real” life.
For Nietzsche, being is also anguish but for a different reason. 
It is pain and anxiety because of the severance of humans from 
the primal unity, individualization and the struggle for survival. 
Humans need the creation of an Apollonian illusion, they need 
art as a conscious illusion that will ease the pain and make them 
live life as an aesthetic phenomenon. Dionysos comes to coop-
erate with Apollo by dissolving every now and then the illusions 
of the latter, by throwing humans into dancing and singing, and 
the intoxication of the Dionysian wine. The two gods coop-
erate and create Tragedy, this aesthetic weapon that will ease 
the anguish of existence.32 Moreover, Tragedy will become the 
springboard for affirming existence, for accepting and praising 
life here and now.
Dionysos, the god of joy and wine, dancing and laughter, is 
the same Dionysos that was cut into pieces by the Titans, offered 
as dinner to the Olympians and was then reborn – resurrected 
through Demeter. He is the god that justifies pain with his life 
instead of justifying life with his pain. That means that pain is 
accepted as an ingredient of life, not as a prerequisite. We live 
and therefore feel pain, which is justified because we affirm life in 
all its aspects, adversities and hardships. However, justifying life 
with pain would mean that we live for feeling pain rather than feel-
ing pain because we are alive. Hence, Dionysos does not internalize 
pain, life is just per se “affirming even the hardest pain”.33
According to Nietzsche, humans lost their innocence when 
they denied what they are, when they repressed their instincts in 
the name of a revealed morality, when they demonized pain by 
identifying it with punishment, and asked to project it on gods 
that would bear this pain on their behalf;34 when, by internalizing 
their pain, they created for themselves a bad, guilty conscience. 
 32 See Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy.
 33 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, IV, §1052.
 34 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, II, 7.
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In combination with the praising and beatitude of the weak and 
the “wrecks of life”, with the reverse of values (now the strong is 
selfish and arrogant whereas the weak and scared is modest and 
humble) and the repression of their instincts, this bad conscience 
led them to resentment: the venom that poisons existence and de-
fines the “good” (weak, slave) in relation to the “bad” (strong, 
master). From now on, humans are hetero-defined, they no lon-
ger build their morality on their own but crawl ascetically and 
miserably behind a morality that promises a reward in the other 
world equal to the suffering of this one. They are like a “poor 
Lazarus” that finds himself in the arms of Abraham only because 
he suffered under the table of the indifferent rich man. In short: 
Dionysos versus the Crucifix.
However, Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity differs from his 
critique of Jesus. For the German philosopher whatever followed 
the crucifixion was a distortion of the Crucifix’s life and work. 
“Even the word ‘Christianity’ is a misunderstanding, there was 
really only one Christian, and he died on the cross. The ‘evangel’ 
died on the cross. What was called ‘evangel’ after that was the 
opposite of what he had lived: a ‘bad tidings’, a dysangel”.35
Of course, Nietzsche’s basic objections (reversal of values, 
subversion of the robust Rome, beatitude of the weak) remain 
valid. The difference is that on the one hand, he recognizes 
Jesus as the human type strong enough to ruin a morality and 
self-institutionalize his own – that is, a true generator of values – 
and on the other hand, he openly questions the originality and 
Christlikeness of certain passages from the gospels and the rest 
of the New Testament, especially those referring to punishments, 
judgments and asceticism.36
Let me underline, at this point, the distinction between an end 
and a cause. I distinguish between Christ and Jesus. I distinguish 
between the crucifixion that took place aiming at the resurrection 
of Christ and the opening of a road for the “other world”, and the 
crucifixion that took place because of the way Jesus lived, because 
 35 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, §39.
 36 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, §45.
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of his choice to clash with this world’s authorities, a clash that 
ended with the cross.
Jesus lived with an aim to make his life an example of affirming 
and approving the present existence. He wanted, like Nietzsche, 
to make humans carriers of new, subversive values, he consorted 
with the pariahs of his society, neither to keep them hemmed in 
the margin – in the way that even today the Church arguably 
does through charity, for example – nor to make them embrace 
the dominant values that he was rejecting. He wanted to renovate 
humans within the standards of a liberating and immoral moral-
ity, to make them love what they can be, what they can become, 
or as Nietzsche used to say, “you have to become who you are”.37 
Therefore, Jesus justified his death with his life.
On the other hand, Christ died in order to resurrect, in order to 
expose the reversal of the last nihilistic obstacle: death. He died 
in order to confirm the existence of the hereafter only as a per-
spective and continuation of this life, not in terms of judgment 
and punishment but in terms of affirmation, of the “Sacred Yes” 
to life,38 to naturalism, to everything that constitutes human na-
ture. Is this not, after all, what the events of the violent ousting 
of the merchants from the temple39 or the approval of the chil-
dren’s innocence40 show? In the first case, we have the release of 
Christ’s feelings and thus, without any sentimental repression tak-
ing place, the poisoning of the resentment effect is avoided; this 
instant expression of wrath leaves no place inside him for feelings 
of hatred to flourish. In the second case, he applauds children’s 
innocence and, in fact, approves their lack of integration to the so-
cial and psychological norms and even the cruelty children some-
times display, because this cruelty is not directed personally to 
their neighbour but is a hearty, impulsive and sincere expression 
of specific feelings in time and space. Therefore, Christ justified 
hereafter with his death.
 37 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, aphorisms 270 and 335.
 38 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I, “Of the Three 
Metamorphoses”.
 39 Matthew 21:12–13.
 40 Mark 10:13–16.
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Jesus and Christ are unified under the personality of the God-
man, a being that is a perfect God and a perfect human at the 
same time. His monolithic perception, like that of the Church 
from his crucifixion onwards, turns Christianity into a carrier of 
negation, resignation and dislike of life and human naturalism. 
There cannot be a resurrected man other than as an affirmation of 
the here-living man, like resurrected Christ who is the affirmation 
of Jesus from Nazareth.
Theses and Antitheses for restoring Anarcho-Christian 
Activism
Through the prism of the Nietzschean critique a new road opens 
before our eyes: the active reading of the Bible and the utilization 
of its contradictions in order to construct a different (anarcho) 
Christianity; a different reading that interprets Christianity as a 
struggle in favour of life, thus making possible and creative the 
conjunction of anarchism and Christianity.
Using the Nietzschean critique and the anarchist view as an 
apparatus, I will now critically re-approach some basic points of 
anarcho-Christian thinkers, presented in Christoyannopoulos’ 
overview, that I believe inhibit anarcho-Christian activism.
Through an extended effort of understanding/justifying the 
scandalous passage of Romans 13, prominent thinkers and 
 anarcho-Christians who do not dismiss Paul altogether reach, 
more or less, three basic and related conclusions:
a) Secular authorities are an inevitable evil that act in the 
world with God’s tolerance and as his tool for maintaining 
the world’s order for those that have not answered his call.
b) Anarcho-Christians ought to submit to the state due to 
love, having, however, always in mind that God’s will 
comes before secular authority.
c) The subversion of the state and authority must take place 
in terms of patience, passive resistance and love, preferably 
never through illegal acts (unless in direct contradiction to 
God’s will), and individuals must always be ready to suffer 
the consequences of disobedience. After all, even “prison is 
186 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume II
a kind of resting place in today’s world, a ‘new monastery’ 
in which Christians can ‘abide with honour’”.41 The vin-
dication of our stiff upper lip together with the vengeance 
and the just punishment of the authoritarians, all belong to 
God.
As far as the first conclusion is concerned, God’s tolerance of 
something that is “evil” is definitely an example of respect for 
human free will. Nevertheless, there is a problem with the second 
component. If we accept that dominance is something bad for 
anarcho-Christian morality, then how is it possible for a “virtu-
ous” God to use “evil” means in order to achieve his goals and, 
even more, to maintain an order that daily, in all its expressions, 
produces inequalities and exploitation (the classical dilemma of 
“theodicy”)? Let us not forget that every “nation”/state obtained 
its linguistic idiosyncrasy – one of its fundamental characteristics – 
as a result of human arrogance, according to the story of the 
Tower of Babel in the Old Testament.42
The interpretation that an activist anarcho-Christian can give 
to this point, is mainly the sincere answer that God’s will is un-
known and every effort for theodicy can end up being an even 
greater parody than Paulodicy. Nevertheless, this does not imply 
an agnostic resignation, but rather that the initiative belongs to 
the anarcho-Christian subjects who are called, through an active 
interpretation, to self-define (based on their interpretation) and 
not hetero-define (based on the supposed divine intentions) their 
actions. Hence, the existence of dominance can hardly be attribut-
ed to, or be legitimized by, a divine will.
The second conclusion tends to confuse love with passivity 
and mildness. The mistake in this case is that a mellow and mod-
erate stance does not always presuppose feelings of love but, as 
Nietzsche says in his critique, can become the spring of resentful 
and vengeful feelings. The other way around, a critical, emotional-
ly charged, attitude does not exclude love and interest for the one 
who stands opposite us. If, for example, we accept the fact that 
 41 Christoyannopoulos, ‘Responding to the State’, p. 135.
 42 Genesis 11:1–9.
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Jesus not only did not feel any hatred but, on the contrary, loved 
everyone, then his harsh critique of the Pharisees43 or his violent 
entrance to the Temple of Jerusalem44 are stances diametrically 
opposed to the passivity anarcho-Christians call for in relation to 
the state and the authorities.
Moreover, it is implied that when authority clashes with God’s 
will, then anarcho-Christians should side with the latter, without 
second thoughts (of course, again through a patient and passive 
resistance). However, what also seems to be ignored, is that the 
existence of state, nation and dominance per se, directly contra-
dict the basic features of human “nature” that are supposed to be 
synonymous with those of the supposedly loving, virtuous and 
just God that created humans in his image.45 Hence, rupture and 
clash with the state do not need excuses or further justification. 
The existence of dominance is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for subverting it since it opposes God’s love and justice.
The third conclusion justifies the Nietzschean critique of quit-
ting life, in favour of a hereafter, and of nourishing sentiments of 
resentment and vengeance, what Nietzsche calls a bad conscience. 
(Anarcho) Christians seem to underestimate the importance of 
their earthly presence, considering it as a short passage to the real, 
after-death life. Additionally, they look towards a divine justifica-
tion of their practice – meaning, they do not act authentically or 
unselfishly – and, even worse, put their hopes on God for the pun-
ishment of those who harmed them – an anticipation poisoned 
by the venom of revenge that has nothing to do with love and 
forgiveness.
Furthermore, the rejection of disobedience whenever it is ex-
pressed through “illegal acts” seems rather inappropriate to those 
who believe that laws are often incompatible with justice. Besides, 
we should never forget the incident in the Old Testament during 
the Exodus of the Jews from Egypt:46 God advises Moses that 
all Jews, before leaving, should borrow clothes and objects of 
 43 Matthew 23:1–33.
 44 John 2:13–17. This passage will be analysed in more detail further down, 
in relation to the matter of violence. 
 45 Genesis 1:26–27.
 46 Exodus 3:21–23.
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great value from their Egyptian neighbours with no intention of 
ever returning them! The third conclusion would imply that this 
action is thievery and therefore illegal. Nonetheless, Thanassis 
Papathanassiou gives the different and quite radical interpreta-
tion of St. Irenaeus for this incident, cancelling every false dilem-
ma between “legal” and “illegal” procedures. That is, St. Irenaeus 
opines that what God actually does is to urge Jews to regain a part 
of all the things that were stolen from them during their slavery 
in Egypt.47 At the very least, God does not always urge passive or 
lawful obedience.
In conclusion, a restored anarcho-Christian activism calls 
for a crystallized, responsible and morally autonomous action, 
with love towards the earthly existence and without feelings of 
vengeance.
The Debate on Pacifism
What is common in all three of the above conclusions is the strict 
adoption of pacifist means of action to the extent that any use 
of violence is viewed as incompatible with an anarcho-Christian 
perspective. Therefore, I would like to deal separately with this 
matter since I believe that any fixed position (violence – non vi-
olence) is a dangerous dogmatism within Christian anarchism.48
Any reference to Christianity as a pacifist current is the conclu-
sion of a reasoning based on Jesus’ teaching about love from the 
New Testament. There are, however, at least two representative 
passages of the Gospel, together with a crucial “intervention” of 
Walter Benjamin regarding the distinction between violence that 
liberates and violence that subdues, which subverts the pacifist ax-
iom making us revise and “restore” violence within Christianity.
 47 Thanassis Papathanassiou, Κοινωνική Δικαιοσύνη και Ορθόδοξη Θεολογία – 
Μία Προκήρυξη [Social Justice and Orthodox Theology – A Proclamation], 
p. 27.
 48 This conversation takes place in the chapter of Christoyannopoulos 
mentioned above. Nevertheless for a more detailed reasoning see the ex-
ceptional work of the same author in Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, 
Christian Anarchism, A Political Commentary on the Gospel (Exeter: 
Imprint Academic, 2010), and especially sections 2.8 and 4.5.1.
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The first incident is the narration of Jesus’ entrance into the 
Temple of Jerusalem, the overturning of the merchant’s tables and 
their ousting. This incident is mentioned by all four evangelists, 
and if we omit the rather “neutral” narration of Luke49 the oth-
er three50 are quite colourful. On one level, all three agree that 
Jesus overthrows the merchants’ goods and drives them out of the 
Temple calling them thieves.51 Then, we have the following slight 
variations: Mark says that Jesus “would not suffer that any man 
should carry any vessel through the temple”, whereas John says 
that “when he had made a scourge of small cords, he drove them 
all out of the temple, and the sheep, and the oxen; and poured out 
the changers’ money, and overthrew the tables”.52
It cannot be denied that Jesus acted violently. The overturn of 
the tables, the casting out of the merchants, the blockage of any 
exchange, the fear and uneasiness that he probably caused to the 
merchants, are actions of physical and psychological violence.
The interesting point – after highlighting features of violence 
in Jesus’ behaviour – is that the conversation shifts towards the 
“degree of violence” taking place and the aspect that this violence 
was “extremely limited and [. . .] never directed at people”.53 The 
truth is that the relevant passages do not mention the act of phys-
ical violence against the merchants but do not consider it impos-
sible either. As Adin Ballou says “as I have an equally good right 
to imagine how Jesus acted on the occasion, I shall presume that 
he did nothing unworthy of the principle, the character, and spirit 
that uniformly distinguished him”54 To this, Christoyannopoulos 
adds: “Although there can be no definitive proof either way, given 
Jesus’ main teaching, the absence of violence is more probable 
than its presence”.55 Before exposing the reasons for which Ballou 
is mistaken to support the non-physical clash between Jesus and 
 49 Luke 19:45–48.
 50 Matthew 21:12–13, Mark 11:15–17, John 2:13–17.
 51 In fact, this is mentioned in Matthew and Mark, whereas according to 
John, they are accused of turning the Temple into a shopping centre, but 
this is still a negative characterization.
 52 John 2:15.
 53 Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, p. 105.
 54 Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, pp. 105–106, quoting Ballou.
 55 Ibid.
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the merchants as more probable, I will interject the inspired dis-
tinction that Benjamin makes about violence.
In his work, Critique of Violence, Benjamin introduces the dis-
tinction between Mythical and Divine Violence. The former is the 
violence used as a cold means for the fulfilment of a goal, no 
matter if this goal is about the preservation of an existing law or 
the creation of a new one. The latter is the violence expressed as 
a manifestation, a discharge, without being the means of a certain 
goal. It tends to lead to emancipation, liberation, and not to dom-
ination. Benjamin writes:
Just as in all spheres God opposes myth, mythical violence is con-
fronted by the divine. And the latter constitutes its antithesis in 
all respects. If mythical violence is lawmaking, divine violence is 
law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter bound-
lessly destroys them; if mythical violence brings at once guilt and 
retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, 
the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without 
spilling blood.56
Let me note here that divine violence is not just a “pressure valve” 
that will, later on, let reality return to its lawful and suppressive 
conditions. When Benjamin leaves an “open window” for these 
personal relationships that are not characterized by violence but 
love, compassion and comradeship57 he wants to point to the 
construction of a revolutionary community, where divine vio-
lence will have subsided. Besides, as examples from the French 
and Russian revolutions suggest, if a revolutionary process results 
in legislative and institutionalized norms, then the divine violence 
degenerates into the mythical violence, shifting from a liberating 
and redemptive force against tyranny, to a means of oppression 
and vengeance, a new tyranny. This may also answer the logical 
question that rises and constitutes a weak point of Benjamin’s 
reasoning: what are the limits of a redeeming violence? What 
happens when such a manifestation leads to the loss of a human 
 56 Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), p. 297.
 57 Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 289.
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life? For Christian anarchists, every such loss is equally painful. 
However, taking action cannot and must not be suspended be-
cause of such a probability. Only complete inaction, isolation and 
stagnation can guarantee the eclipse of harmful effects. It is the 
intentions – as with the example with Jesus in the Temple – that 
must draw our attention and interest.
This critique of violence by Benjamin completes the critique 
made by Nietzsche. The violent manifestation of Jesus, the in-
nocent and pure cruelty of children, is nothing but approval 
and respect for human nature and protection from the venom 
of resentment. Hence, when Jesus overthrows the tables of the 
merchants in the Temple, he is probably confronting them at a 
physical level too. It would be more than strange for a group of 
people that had turned their commercial and gainful activity in 
the Temple into a status quo, not to react to the damage of their 
fortune by someone who did not possess any official authority, 
religious or political. Even the previous, triumphant, entrance of 
Jesus in Jerusalem could not have ensured him any immunity for 
such an aggressive action against the long lasting and widely ac-
cepted practice of the merchants, and their fortunes. Therefore, 
unlike Ballou, I think that what took place was most probably 
a severe physical conflict between Jesus and his disciples, and 
the merchants, a conflict that does not necessarily contradict his 
overall teaching.
According to this Benjaminian logic, his deed is a violent ac-
tion that, nonetheless, does not seek to punish the merchants. 
Moreover, it is not the means for a goal that could be described as 
“restoration of the law that regulates the proper usage of the tem-
ple” (through the punishment of those who broke it), but rather 
a striking against the “law” the merchants had instituted with the 
open tolerance of the priesthood – that is, divine and not mythical 
violence.
Jesus’ action is a manifestation of a redeeming violence for the 
overwhelming rage he feels when he sees the pathetic commer-
cialization of his father’s homestead. He does not use his whip to 
give a divine punishment but to awaken the merchants from the 
lethargy caused by their vice. From a Benjaminian angle, there-
fore, the complementary objection of some Christian anarchists 
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about violence, an objection that rejects violence as adoption of 
the same means used by the state,58 is irrelevant.
The second incident refers to the context of Jesus’ arrest in 
Gethsemane.59 The most colourful narration is that of Matthew, 
according to which when one comrade of Jesus cuts with his 
sword the ear of the high priest’s servant, Jesus asks him to put his 
sword back, highlighting that “all they that take the sword shall 
perish with the sword”, while he reminds him that if he wished 
for any help, he could, at any time, ask the angels.
Jesus’ comment on the sword underlines the need for a com-
plete realization of one’s deed; that actors must always take full 
“ownership” and conscience of their actions. This realization, and 
not an a priori “moral imperative”, will be the moral criterion for 
the action. Jesus does not reprimand his comrade for his hasten-
ing to defend him with his sword but because he knows that his 
comrade’s action is not conscious, something which is proved just 
after his arrest, when all of his frightened comrades abandon him. 
Hence, he gives a warning concerning the realization of the action 
and not its moral substratum.
On the other hand, the fact that Jesus refers to the legions of 
angels suggests that under different circumstances he would not 
deny his physical defence against his armed prosecutors. His vol-
untary surrender has to do with the imminent and definitive crush 
of death, through his resurrection, and not with the fulfilment of 
an anti-violent fetishism.
Finally, my main point is that non-violence does not constitute 
an essential ingredient of an anarcho-Christian outlook, just like 
violence does not either. It is, of course, true that non-violence 
seems to be the main trend in Christian anarchism as well as in 
Jesus’ teaching. However, we have certain historical  anti-paradigms 
from the millenarian revolutions of the Middle Ages,60 and we 
have the dynamic entrance of Jesus into the Temple and his stance 
 58 Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, p. 209.
 59 Matthew 26:47–56, Mark 14:43–52, Luke 22:47–53, John 18:1–11.
 60 See for example Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: 
Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).
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during his arrest. These do not “legitimize” a Christian violent 
practice, but equally, they do not reject it. What I have argued in 
this chapter is that the interpretation of Jesus’ life and  teaching 
remains open and that an alternative reading favours a  challenge 
of the prevailing pacifistic theses, in a Christian anarchist 
 context, based on both historical and (theo)logical arguments. 
Subsequently, this open interpretation and alternative reading 
can redefine the Christian anarchist resistance against the State 
and secular authority by getting rid of the weight of the violence/
non-violence pseudo-dilemma and adopting an active rather than 
a passive stance.
Conclusion
This chapter aims at presenting the points of the anarcho- 
Christian argument that drive Christian anarchism to hibernation 
and, eventually lead to an overall negation of life. These points are 
the passive (resi)stance and the obsession with a pacifist action, in 
the name of Jesus’ teaching and the supposed divine intentions. 
On the contrary, a Nietzschean reading offers an analysis of the 
distinction between Jesus’ life/death and its perception by Paul 
and the mainstream Church, giving an alternative perspective 
of the connection between Jesus and life before and after death. 
Consequently, it leads to a restored (anarcho) Christian activism 
calling for an interpretation of the Scripture and the Christian 
tradition based on our relationship with our comrades, as well as 
with Jesus himself. This interpretation should not be dogmatic, or 
be by revelation but experiential and active, aiming at accepting 
life after death only as an affirmation of the earthly life, and not 
the other way round.
An important stop in this journey, apart from the critique made 
by Nietzsche, is the treatise of Benjamin that sheds a different light 
on the issue of violence which constitutes a special debate in the 
circles of Christian anarchism. By recognizing that violence is an 
essential characteristic of human “nature”, also present in Jesus’ 
practice even if not unambiguous, we can approach it through a 
different lens and restore it as a Christian anarchist practice that 
will not be essential but neither rejectable.
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Nietzsche’s reading of Jesus’ death not as a prerequisite for an 
afterlife but, primarily, as an outcome of his self-affirmative life 
against the authorities of his time, as well as Benjamin’s critique 
of violence, which overcomes the false dilemma between violence 
and non-violence, redefines Jesus’ life and violent practices respec-
tively. Given that Christian anarchists cannot but draw on Jesus’ 
example in order to resist evil and secular authority, redefining 
this example means to offer a new meaning to this resistance 
which now becomes active and affirmative instead of passive and 
resentful.
However, this journey’s most important feature cannot be other 
than our will, as Christian anarchists, to realize here, now, every-
where and for ever the values of Christianity and anarchy and 
drive the ship that is called Ecclesia towards the open sea of God’s 
Kingdom on earth.
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Blessed Are the Peacemakers : The 
Contribution of Christian Nonviolence to 
Anarchism
Sam Underwood 
Memorial University of Newfoundland
Although Christian anarchists are typically committed to 
 pacifism, in the broader anarchist literature pacifism is a  decidedly 
 minoritarian position. It may be argued on this basis that 
Christian anarchists are pacifists on account of their Christianity 
rather than their anarchism, and that non-Christian anarchists, 
in not sharing Christians’ commitment to following Jesus, have 
no similar reason to accept pacifism. However, this paper argues 
that the radical nonviolence defended by Christian anarchists 
is as consistently anarchist as it is Christian, for in Christian 
non violence we find anarchistic commitments to mutual aid, 
prefiguration, and attention to ‘the least of these’. The paper 
therefore also suggests that the criticisms of violence articulated 
by Christian anarchists might actually speak to non-Christian 
anarchists too, and that nonviolence is in fact a central element 
of anarchist prefiguration.
What contribution can Jesus and his followers, especially those 
followers of Jesus who call themselves anarchists and pacifists, 
make to anarchist discussions of nonviolence? Is the position of 
radical nonviolence that is typically adopted by Christian anar-
chists simply a requirement of their being Christian, rather than 
having anything to do with their also happening to be anarchists? 
If so, then Jesus and his followers would have no contribution to 
make to anarchist discussions of nonviolence. On the other hand, 
if part of that which is seen in the teachings of Jesus as anarchistic 
by these Christian anarchists is precisely his radical nonviolence, 
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there may in fact be a connection between Christianity, anar-
chism, and nonviolence. In the present paper, I will argue for this 
connection. Specifically, I will argue that the biblically based ar-
gument for nonviolence – drawing primarily on the teachings of 
Jesus – is ultimately an anarchist case for nonviolence, insofar 
as it is consistent with anarchist calls to rethink normativity and 
fulfils the prefigurative principle, and, as such, deserves serious 
consideration by both Christian and non-Christian anarchists.
Before proceeding, I should say something about how I am using 
the present volume’s guiding terms, ‘religion’ and ‘anarchism.’ As the 
editors note in the introduction, both terms are quite difficult, if not 
impossible, to define in such a way that leaves no room for objection. 
Without attempting to offer exhaustive or wholly non-problematic 
definitions, then, I will simply indicate what I have in mind when I 
employ these terms.
Regarding ‘religion,’ my own inclination is to call ‘religious’ 
those traditions, texts, beliefs, and practices which attempt to say 
 something about and/or foster communion with the ‘divine,’ ‘ sacred,’ 
or ‘transcendent.’1 And I understand ‘anarchism’ to be a political 
philosophy which brings together radical  anti-authoritarianism 
and radical egalitarianism.2 More specifically, in Peter Kropotkin’s 
words, anarchism is “the no-government system of socialism,”3 
which seeks to maximize what Emma Goldman calls the “twin 
forces” of “individual liberty and economic equality,”4 through the 
 1 Of course, these last three terms are themselves so broad and indefinite 
as to admit of a multitude of interpretations, but it seems that the phe-
nomenon of religion is itself so marked by a multitude of interpretations 
that this difficulty is not only unavoidable but instead a defining feature 
of religion. 
 2 I am indebted to my friend and former teacher, Nathan Jun, for this ar-
ticulation of the essential formula for anarchism. For a fuller discussion 
of this issue, see Nathan J. Jun, Anarchism and Political Modernity (New 
York: Continuum, 2012). 
 3 Peter Kropotkin, “Anarchist Communism: Its Basis and Principles,” in 
Anarchism: A Collection of Revolutionary Writings, edited by Roger N. 
Baldwin, (Mineola: Dover Publications, Inc., 2002) 46.
 4 Emma Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays (Second, Revised Edition), 
(New York/London: Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1911), available 
from https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/emma-goldman-anarchism- 
and-other-essays#toc4. 
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dismantling of hierarchical structures of power and the reorgani-
zation of society along non-hierarchical, democratic lines.5
I. Christian Nonviolence
The case for Christian nonviolence is a familiar one: Jesus blesses 
the peacemakers,6 warns that those who live by the sword die 
by the sword,7 and overturns lex talionis – “an eye for an eye” – 
instead teaching nonviolent resistance.8 This final point is particu-
larly important and is made by appealing to a proper translation 
of the Greek verb that Jesus uses for “resist.” Walter Wink, for 
example, argues in Jesus and Nonviolence, that the verb is most 
accurately understood to refer to “violent rebellion, armed revolt, 
sharp dissention.”9 “Support for this [Wink’s] translation,” writes 
Kurt Willems, “is not unwarranted as antistēnai is the word re-
peatedly used in the Greek version of the Hebrew Bible as ‘war-
fare’ and is also used in Ephesians 6:13 in the context of active 
military imagery.”10
Jesus exemplified nonviolent resistance in his life and teaching. 
For although he never violently aggressed another person – even 
to the point of not resisting his executioners – Jesus was, in John 
Howard Yoder’s words, “a social critic and an agitator.”11 And 
Bart Ehrman points out that in the empire, “only two known peo-
ple were specifically called ‘the son of God.’ The emperor was one 
 5 Beyond this, several different visions have been proposed for what specif-
ic form such a society should take, including mutualist, communist, and 
syndicalist forms of organization. For an overview of these differences, 
see Ruth Kinna, Anarchism: A Beginner’s Guide, (Oxford: Oneworld 
Publications, 2005).
 6 Matthew 5:9 (NRSV).
 7 Matthew 26:52.
 8 Matthew 8:38–39.
 9 Walter Wink, Jesus and Nonviolence: A Third Way, (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2003), 13.
 10 Kurt Willems, “Nonviolence 101 – Resistance is Futile. . . or the Meaning 
of ἀντιστῆναι (part 2),” available from http://www.patheos.com/blogs/
thepangeablog/2011/02/07/nonviolence-101-resistance-is-futile-or-the-
meaning-of-ἀντιστῆναι-part-2/ (accessed 2 August 2014), para. 7.
 11 John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus (2nd. Ed.), (Grand Rapids: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1994), 1. 
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of them, and Jesus was the other.”12 Jesus was boldly proclaiming 
the coming kingdom of God, of which he (Jesus) would be the 
king. It does not get much more subversive than that. “This was 
the message he delivered to his disciples,” writes Ehrman, “and in 
the end, it was the message that got him crucified.”13 Jesus was not 
passive or a quietist or an apolitical teacher of private religious 
morality. He was a nonviolent revolutionary.
This same line of argument is taken up by Christian anarchists, 
who argue that, as Alexandre Christoyannopoulos writes, because 
“The state is founded on the very thing Jesus prohibits”14 – namely 
violence – the state too must be rejected by Christians as immoral. 
The most obvious Christian objections raised against this posi-
tion are the “render unto Caesar” passage, Jesus’ cleansing of the 
temple, Jesus’ arrest when he tells his disciples to arm themselves, 
and Romans 13. All of these passages have been dealt with at 
length by various authors and so, with the exception of the temple 
cleansing which is discussed in section four below, they will not 
be addressed here.15 Suffice it to say that Christian anarchists see 
the logical conclusion of Jesus’ teachings on nonviolence to be 
anarchism – anarcho-pacifism, to be precise.
Anarcho-pacifism, however, is a minority position in the an-
archist community. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear pacifism 
condemned by anarchists in the strongest terms. Albert Meltzer 
writes, for example, that while “phoney anarchism contains a 
large streak of pacifism,” such radical nonviolence is ultimately 
no better than “militant liberalism,” insofar as it “renounce[es] 
any form of positive action for anarchism,” and is, therefore, 
 12 Bart D. Ehrman, How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish 
Preacher from Galilee, (New York: HarperOne, 2014), 225.
 13 Ibid., 128.
 14 Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism: A Political 
Commentary on the Bible, [Abridged Edition], (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 
2011), 44.
 15 See, for example, Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism. Kevin Daugherty, 
in “Romans 13 and the State” (available from http://mennonerds.com/ 
romans-13-and-the-state/), argues that Romans 13 may not be referring to 
governing authorities at all, but rather to spiritual authorities. 
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“authoritarian.”16 If Meltzer is correct, by no means can we con-
sider Christian nonviolence – or any position of nonviolence, for 
that matter – to be inherently anarchist. What Meltzer’s view fails 
to appreciate, however, is the fact that it is possible to draw a 
stronger line between Christian nonviolence, Christian anarchism, 
and the broader anarchist tradition.
II. Normativity, Anti-Normativity, and Prefiguration
The question of ethics is potentially an insurmountable barrier 
separating Christian and non-Christian anarchists. After all, it 
seems obvious that the Christian, qua Christian, is expected to 
follow a very specific set of moral laws, in obedience to the great-
est authority of them all, God. Anarchists, on the other hand, have 
historically spurned normative ethics as necessarily authoritarian. 
This is not to say that anarchists advocate some form of amorality 
or moral relativism, but, as Nathan Jun explains in Anarchism 
and Political Modernity,
In the place of normativity, the anarchists offer two alternatives: 
first, a sophisticated anthropological, sociological, and evolution-
ary analysis of the origins and functions of moral systems; and 
second, a pragmatic and procedural theory of action referred to as 
‘prefiguration.’17
The most obvious example of the first alternative is Peter 
Kropotkin’s work, Mutual Aid, in which he argues that, “Sociability 
is as much a law of nature as mutual struggle.”18 Countering the 
modern-day form of individualism that insists upon a greedy, 
self-interested human nature, Kropotkin argues,
The very persistence of the clan organization shows how utterly 
false it is to represent primitive [humankind] as a disorderly ag-
glomeration of individuals, who only obey their individual pas-
sions, and take advantage of their personal force and cunningness 
 16 Albert Meltzer, Anarchism: Arguments For & Against (6th Second Revised 
Edition), (San Fransisco: AK Press, 1996), 25.
 17 Jun, 129.
 18 Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, Inc., 2006), 5.
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against all other representatives of the species. Unbridled individ-
ualism is a modern growth, but it is not characteristic of primitive 
[humankind].19
As to the second alternative that Jun cites, there are many exam-
ples in anarchist literature, but perhaps the most pithy statement 
of anarchist prefiguration is found in Jean Grave’s “Means and 
Ends,” in which he writes, “[t]he surest means of making Anarchy 
triumph is to act like an anarchist.”20 Jun develops this theme, 
writing that “The ‘prefigurative principle’ demands coherence be-
tween means and ends. That is, if the goal of political action is the 
promotion of some value, the means and methods employed in 
acting must reflect or prefigure the desired end.”21 In short, means 
must be consistent with ends. Coercive means cannot be expected 
to lead to non-coercive ends.
How can such an approach to morality possibly be squared 
with the approach wherein morality is a function of God’s com-
mandments? Rather than “No gods, no masters,” it seems that 
Christian anarchists simply proclaim, “No other gods, no other 
masters, besides God,” which, while it may yield some interesting 
political implications in its own right, certainly sounds antitheti-
cal to anarchism. However, I will argue that both of these alterna-
tives to normativity – the evolutionary and the prefigurative – can 
in fact find a good deal of support in the teachings of Jesus, partic-
ularly when we pay close attention to Jesus’ declaration that, “the 
kingdom of God is among (or within) you.”22
(a) Mutual Aid and the Unkingdom
In Mutual Aid, Kropotkin notes that, “Even the new religions 
which were born from time to time” in the shadow of empires,
 19 Ibid., 71.
 20 Jean Grave, “Means and Ends,” in Anarchism: A Documentary History 
of Libertarian Ideas, Volume One: From Anarchy to Anarchism (300CE 
to 1939), edited by Robert Graham, (Montreal/New York/London: Black 
Rose Books, 2005), 157.
 21 Jun, 129.
 22 Luke 17:21
202 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume II
found their first supporters among the humble, in the lowest, 
down-trodden layers of society, where the mutual-aid principle 
is the necessary foundation of every-day life; and the new forms 
of union which were introduced in the earliest Buddhist and 
Christian communities, in the Moravian brotherhoods and so on, 
took the character of a return to the best aspects of mutual aid in 
early tribal life.23
It is tempting (and I think rightly so) to read this alongside Jesus’ 
words, “Blessed are you who are poor, for yours is the kingdom 
of God.”24 If the kingdom of God is among us, and belongs princi-
pally to the poor, it seems that Jesus and Kropotkin may (however 
unwittingly) be striking a similar chord. For what “kingdom” is 
found among the lowly and downtrodden of society? As David 
Graeber notes, we tend to find more empathy, compassion, and 
solidarity among the working classes – where mutual dependence 
is among the greatest of life’s necessities – than we do among the 
wealthy, where cooperation is too often cast off in favour of com-
petition and personal gain.25
Jesus’ kingdom is the one that belongs to the poor, and, in a 
sense, we might say that Kropotkin’s is as well. But this is not, of 
course, a kingdom in the familiar sense of the word, but some-
thing more like what Mark Van Steenwyk calls an Unkingdom.26 
And if Jesus is the king, we could not but call him an “Unking,” 
for his “rule” (or “unrule,” as it were) is one not of violence and 
conquest, but of love, hospitality, and nonviolent resistance. 
Accordingly, when Jesus says that, “My kingdom is not of this 
world,” we can read him not as declaring the existence of an oth-
erworldly kingdom, located elsewhere in the universe or beyond, 
but rather as proclaiming a coming earthly kingdom that looks 
nothing like the kingdoms of this present world. As W.H. Auden 
 23 Kropotkin, 247.
 24 Luke 6:20
 25 David Graeber, “Caring Too Much. That’s the Curse of the Working Classes,” 
available from http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/26/ 
caring-curse-working-class-austerity-solidarity-scourge?CMP=fb_gu. 
(accessed 31 July 2015). 
 26 Mark Van Steenwyk, The UNkingdom of God: Embracing the Subversive 
Power of Repentance, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2013).
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writes, “Jesus said My Kingdom is not of this world. He did not 
say of the world.”27
Thus, we find – perhaps surprisingly, given Kropotkin’s  hostility 
to religion – a connection between the teachings of Jesus and 
Kropotkin. Jesus preaches a kingdom of love and compassion and 
declares not only that it is among us but also that it belongs to the 
poor. Kropotkin draws upon evolutionary science to argue that 
human beings are cooperative by nature, and that this principle of 
mutual aid is found particularly well preserved among the poor, 
who are, not surprisingly, those praised by Jesus for their prox-
imity to the kind of politics he seeks to illustrate. We certainly 
should not conflate the teachings of Jesus with Kropotkin’s writ-
ings, considering the obvious and dramatic differences between 
the two. All I mean to draw out here is the specific compatibility 
between Jesus’ Unkingdom and Kropotkin’s writings on mutual 
aid and show how a Christian and non-Christian anarchist can 
find common ground.
By this account, then, we have good reason to say that the 
Unkingdom of God and the principle of mutual aid are naturally 
compatible: mutual aid is typically found among the downtrod-
den (to whom Jesus points), and is indeed an essential character-
istic of an anarchist society such as Jesus’ Unkingdom. Therefore, 
the “sophisticated anthropological, sociological, and evolutionary 
analysis of the origins and functions of moral systems” which an-
archists prefer to a religious ontology in fact meets the political 
recommendations that follow from that ontology on the question 
of ethics.
Of course, there are some anarchists – probably individualists 
in the fashion of Max Stirner in particular – who may take issue 
with Kropotkin’s argument and thus will not be interested in the 
question of whether or not it is compatible with the Unkingdom. 
The question then becomes: should we accept that Kropotkin’s 
basic view of ethics – as a result of our evolutionary development 
as social creatures – is a necessary component to any and all an-
archist accounts of ethics? This is of course a thorny issue because 
 27 W.H. Auden, quoted in Richard Kearney, Anatheism: Returning to God 
After God, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 135.
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any talk of “the” anarchist view on something – anything – is by 
its very nature extremely difficult. Accordingly, I would respond 
to anti-Kropotkin objectors with two main points: first, I would 
agree with Jun that this approach to ethics can reasonably be con-
sidered a basic component of historical anarchist approaches to 
ethics; and second, as work in contemporary evolutionary biology 
frequently shows, there are good grounds for taking Kropotkin’s 
arguments seriously.28 Accordingly, while I would certainly con-
cede that it is difficult if not impossible to assert any view as “the” 
anarchist position, I would argue that anarchists have very good 
reason to accept Kropotkin’s argument both as historically im-
portant for anarchism as well as important for such contempo-
rary debates as to whether or not human beings can live peaceably 
without hierarchy or centralized government.
(b) Prefiguring the Unkingdom
Jesus paradoxically preaches a kingdom already-come and an 
apocalyptic kingdom to-come. And herein, I want to argue, lies 
Jesus’ prefigurative principle. Jesus calls his followers to make this 
coming kingdom ever more real through concrete acts of love and 
hospitality. Lee Camp refers to this as living “proleptically”: “If 
the Kingdom of God has broken in . . . then the church is to live 
proleptically according to the now-present-and-coming Kingdom. 
To live proleptically means to live now according to something 
that is still yet in the future[.]”29
We find the clearest expression of how we are to live prolep-
tically in the Sermon on the Mount, wherein we find Jesus’ most 
explicit teachings of radical love, forgiveness, and nonviolence: 
“Do not resist an evildoer,”30 “Give to everyone who begs from 
you,”31 “Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute 
 28 See, for example, Frans de Waal, The Age of Empathy.
 29 Lee C. Camp, “What About Romans 13: ‘Let Every Soul Be Subject’?”, in 
A Faith Not Worth Fighting For: Addressing Commonly Asked Questions 
About Christian Nonviolence, edited by Tripp York and Justin Bronson 
Barringer, (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2012), 142.
 30 Matthew 5:39.
 31 Matthew 5:42.
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you,”32 “do not worry about your life, what you will eat or what 
you will drink.”33
But surely, we object, we must defend ourselves against aggres-
sors? Surely we cannot be expected to give to everyone who begs 
from us? Surely we cannot love terrorists? Surely we have to plan 
for retirement?
Maddeningly, however, Jesus offers no exception clauses. 
Indeed, Leo Tolstoy insists that when Jesus taught nonviolence, 
he “meant neither more nor less than what he said.”34 D. Stephen 
Long similarly writes,
Nowhere does Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount suggest that it is only 
for individuals. There is no footnote or proviso where Jesus says, 
‘You are to live this way except when it comes to the defence of 
your neighbours, then you must use the violence at your disposal 
to protect them.’ In fact, the Sermon on the Mount is not private 
instruction for individual consciences; it is the political platform 
for the new kingdom or city that Jesus proclaims, the city that is to 
be ‘set on a hill’ and illumine the world (Matt 5:14–16).35
Gustav Landauer, as anarchists are fond of repeating, argues 
that “The state is a relationship between human beings, a way 
by which people relate to one another; and one destroys it by 
entering into other relationships; by behaving differently to one 
another.”36 With this in mind, the Sermon on the Mount is a call 
to radically rethink and reorient our relationships with one anoth-
er in a way that prefigures the Unkingdom of God. It may seem 
impossible, but, as Jesus says, “for God all things are possible.”37
 32 Matthew 5:44.
 33 Matthew 6:25.
 34 Leo Tolstoy, What I Believe, translated by Huntington Smith, (Guildford: 
White Crow Books, 2009), 16.
 35 D. Stephen Long, “What About the Protection of Third-Party Innocents? 
On Letting Your Neighbors Die,” in York and Barringer, 21.
 36 Gustav Landauer, “Destroying the State By Creating Socialism,” in 
Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas, Volume One: 
From Anarchy to Anarchism (300CE to 1939), edited by Robert Graham, 
(Montreal/New York/London: Black Rose Books: 2005), 165.
 37 Mark 10:27
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What does this Unkingdom look like? Or to ask in John 
Caputo’s provocative words,
What would it be like were there a politics of and for the chil-
dren, who are the future; a politics not of sovereignty, of top–
down power, but a politics that builds from the bottom up, where 
ta me onta (I Cor 1:28) enjoy pride of place and a special privi-
lege? What would a political order look like if the last are first, if 
everything turned on lifting up the lowliest instead of letting relief 
trickle down from the top? What would it look like if there were 
a politics of loving one’s enemies, not of war, let alone, God for-
bid, of preemptive war?38
In short, I would follow the many Christian anarchists who have 
argued39 that it would look like anarchy.40 And Jesus does not say 
that his teachings in the Sermon on the Mount are simply meant 
to indicate how we will live once the Unkingdom has arrived, 
some distant day in the future, for the Unkingdom has arrived.41 
It is already amongst us in the communality of the poor and 
lowly, and it is realized in every concrete act of love, hospitality, 
and forgiveness. Accordingly, there are no exception clauses or 
provisos. Jesus is teaching a new way of being for the here and 
now – a new way of being that prefigures the already-here-yet-
still-to-come Unkingdom. We are to care for the poor today, to 
welcome strangers and love our enemies today, and to put away 
our swords today. For, as Richard Kearney says,
The kingdom is present in the ‘[l]east of these,’ just as Christ is 
present in the giving of a cup of cold water. That means that in every 
moment, there is the possibility of good and the possibility of non-
good. There’s the possibility of love; there’s the possibility of hate, 
violence, aggression. We’re choosing constantly. And every moment 
we are actualizing the kingdom or not-actualizing the kingdom.42
 38 John D. Caputo, What Would Jesus Deconstruct? The Good News of 
Postmodernity for the Church, (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), 87.
 39 See Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism. 
 40 Caputo in fact refers to this as “sacred anarchy,” but by this he does not 
have anything like political anarchism in mind.
 41 That is, it has arrived as per our blending of Jesus and Kropotkin above. 
 42 Richard Kearney, “Theorizing the Gift,” in Debates in Continental 
Philosophy: Conversations with Contemporary Thinkers, edited by 
Blessed Are the Peacemakers 207
Caputo similarly says that the kingdom of God “is feeding the 
hungry. . .visiting the imprisoned, curing the sick. That is the king-
dom of God.”43
Otherwise, if we are to play no role in the establishment of 
the kingdom, but are rather expected simply to sit and wait for 
God to come down and do it all for us, I think we render both 
ourselves and Christ impotent. For we can neither do anything on 
our own and neither will following the way of Christ do us any 
good either. Both our actions and Christ’s teachings are essentially 
useless. We fall into this trap by thinking that we face an either/or: 
either we establish the kingdom, or God does. But this has dan-
gerous implications. For one thing, such a move seems to result 
in an absolute, unbridgeable chasm between God’s transcendence 
and our immanence. In other words, we end up with an essential-
ly Gnostic separation between the utterly depraved, corrupt, and 
fallen world, on the one hand, and the absolutely perfect, unblem-
ished spiritual world on the other. Clayton Crockett warns us of 
the danger here:
Any time one posits two planes, a plane of transcendence and a 
plane of immanence, the problem becomes the mediation, in both 
ontological and metaphysical terms, between the two planes. If 
God is simply located on a transcendent plane, then knowledge 
of God is impossible and religion is reduced to the problem of 
political obedience.44
The alternative is to follow Caputo and Kearney in saying that 
we in fact participate with God in the realization of the kingdom, 
and that Christ did in fact intend for his teachings to be followed. 
As Kearney says, “We actualize what God possibilizes and God 
possibilizes what remains impossible for us.”45 According to this 
view, God could not establish the kingdom without us, for there 
would be no one to give flesh to the kingdom through following 
Richard Kearney, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 291.
 43 John Caputo, “On the Event in Christianity,” available from https://you-
tu.be/R2nq8baHDFY (accessed 29 November 2015).
 44 Clayton Crockett, Radical Political Theology, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), 68. 
 45 Kearney, 293.
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Christ’s teachings and example – “God can’t create the kingdom 
unless we create the space for the kingdom to come,” as Kearney 
says46 – just as we could not establish the kingdom without God, 
for then the impossible would remain impossible.
The greatest biblical examples of this are to be found in the par-
able of the sheep and the goats47 and Jesus’ appearing as a stranger 
on the road to Emmaus.48 The argument of both of these passages 
is that when we welcome the stranger we welcome Christ, and 
when we deny the stranger we deny Christ, which is to say that 
Christ does not appear if we do not act. Kearney draws a connec-
tion here between Matthew 25 and Jesus’ famous words that “no 
one comes to the Father but through me”49 in the following way: 
“You can only come to the Father if you come through me. Who 
am I? I am every stranger who asks for food and water.”50 Christ 
is in the face of the stranger, which means that his kingdom – his 
Unkingdom – is built by welcoming the stranger.
This does not mean that Christ is ours to control, however, for 
when we welcome Christ we welcome the one who possibilizes 
what is for us impossible. Once again, it is not a strict either/or. As 
Kearney says elsewhere, “I don’t believe there’s an absolute God 
out there and then a completely compromised humanity here. I 
think there are constant to-ings and fro-ings.”51 Besides love and 
hospitality, my argument in this paper is that nonviolence is an-
other way that we spurn the worldly logic of tit-for-tat violence 
and create a space in which Christ’s impossible Unkingdom can 
be realized, opening a door for these “to-ings and fro-ings.”
But how can we say, as was done above, that “for God all 
things are possible”? How does this not negate all that has 
been said thus far and land us back at square one, with the 
case for Christian nonviolence ultimately resting upon calls 
 46 Ibid., 286.
 47 Matt. 25:31–46.
 48 Luke 24:13–43.
 49 John 14:6.
 50 Richard Kearney, “Anatheism,” interview by Josef Gustafsson and David 
Capener, Freestyle Christianity, 17 February 2016, available from: http://
www.freestylechristianity.se/podcast/richard-kearney-anatheism/ (ac-
cessed 31 May 2016).
 51 Kearney, “Theorizing the Gift,” 287.
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to obey an authoritarian God? Are we not abdicating human 
responsibility?
According to 1 John, “God is love.”52 Based upon this simple 
yet profound claim, Ellul writes, “the true face of the biblical God 
is love. And I do not believe that anarchists would be too happy 
with a formula that runs: No love, no master.”53 Furthermore, as 
Caputo reminds us, “love is a how, not a what,”54 meaning God, 
too, “is a how, not a what.” 55 This may be a provocative and 
controversial statement, but it helpfully reminds us that God is 
not necessarily an extrinsic deity, a distant ruler ‘out there.’ The 
Kingdom of God – the Unkingdom ruled by Jesus Christ – is prin-
cipally a Kingdom of love. And love does not hand down laws 
with an iron fist or mete out punishment to those who disobey. 
“There is no fear in love,” writes the author of 1 John, “but per-
fect love casts out fear; for fear has to do with punishment, and 
whoever fears has not reached perfection in love.”56 Nor, howev-
er, does love allow us to stand idly by and allow injustice to go 
unchallenged.
Much like Caputo’s notion of God as a weak force, which lays 
an absolute claim upon us, but does so without an army to en-
force its claim;57 or Kearney’s God-Who-May-Be, who cannot be 
unless we act in the world to bring God about in concrete mo-
ments of love and hospitality,58 love commands with more power 
than any force in the world, and yet is utterly powerless to act on 
its own, without our choosing it. It will not allow passivity any 
more than force. This weak force, or may-be, is Christ’s broken 
body on the cross, contrasted with the authoritarian state. “[T]he 
 52 1 John 4:16b.
 53 Jacques Ellul, Anarchy and Christianity, translated by Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley, (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2011), 35.
 54 John D. Caputo, On Religion, (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 
134.
 55 Ibid., 135.
 56 1 John 4: 18.
 57 John D. Caputo, “Spectral Hermeneutics,” in After the Death of God, 
edited by Jeffrey W. Robbins, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007). 
 58 Richard Kearney, The God Who May Be, (Bloomington & Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2001). 
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ways of the world are the ways of power,”59 says Caputo. And 
Christ’s weakness on the cross is the absolute reversal of this pow-
er. It is not merely that Christ hides or restrains his power on the 
cross; rather, as Caputo insists, it is precisely in Christ’s genuinely 
helpless state that we find the sacredness of the crucifixion:
The sacredness lies in the cries of protest that rise up from the 
scene. The event to be willed here is the depth of outrage at the 
injustice of imperial power, of the crushing of the Kingdom by 
worldly forces. The divinity lies in the identification of the name 
of God, for Jesus was the eikon of God, not with Roman power 
but with an innocent victim of that power, not with retribution 
but with the act of forgiveness that is attributed to Jesus by the 
evangelists.60
The name of God, then, is not the name of a supreme, all-powerful 
alpha-Being, but rather of “a restive possibility that makes the world 
restless with hope for justice and impatient with injustice, while the 
actuality or the realization is assigned to us[.]”61 To say that God is 
love is to say that God does not deal in the worldly ways of power 
and force, but rather that God disturbs these all-too-human ways 
of being and calls for something new – challenging us to be the 
ones to actualize this something new. This is a radically  covenantal 
understanding of God. Indeed, Kearney argues that a more  faithful 
translation of the Hebrew ’ehyeh asher ’ehyeh – God’s words 
to Moses in Exodus 3:14, typically translated as “I am who I am” – 
is “I am who may be.”62 Accordingly, Kearney argues that God 
should be read here as promising to be, on the condition that we 
uphold our end of the bargain: “Be what? . . . Be what is promised 
as it is promised. And what is that? . . . A kingdom of justice and 
love.”63
Like Caputo, Kearney insists that the most important word 
when speaking of God is perhaps. And perhaps does not mean 
 59 Caputo, “Spectral Hermeneutics,” 63.
 60 Ibid.
 61 Ibid., 64.
 62 Kearney, The God Who May Be, 22.
 63 Kearney, 38.
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that God is impotent, but it does mean that God is weak as op-
posed to the all-too-human obsession with power and sovereignty 
that seems to dominate the current political and theological are-
nas. There is nothing divine about demanding constant, absolute 
control – a demand which is the truer mark of fear and insecurity, 
it seems. Divinity, rather, is to be found in the faces of power’s 
victims, of the lowly and downtrodden, who do not allow us 
to turn a blind eye to injustice. “Truly I tell you,” Jesus says in 
Matthew 25, “just as you did it to one of the least of these who 
are members of my family, you did it to me.”64
If, then, instead of saying that God commands, what Christians 
say is actually that love commands, then non-Christian anar-
chists might find it easier to agree, and this does not conflict with 
anarchist commitments to antiauthoritarianism. For, as Errico 
Malatesta writes, “ours is a struggle inspired by love.”65 Most 
Christians will obviously not want to say that this is all that it 
means, nor will atheist anarchists want to say that love is “the true 
face of the biblical God.” My suggestion is simply that both could 
find common ground with this notion of God as love. Christian 
anarchists, then, could somewhat daringly describe prefiguration 
of an anarchist community of mutual aid as the very embodiment 
of God – indeed of the Body of Christ.66
 64 Matt. 25.
 65 Errico Malatesta, “Violence as a Social Factor,” in Anarchism: A 
Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas, Volume One: From Anarchy 
to Anarchism (300CE to 1939), edited by Robert Graham, (Montreal/
New York/London: Black Rose Books: 2005), 163.
 66 It is interesting to note, as an aside, the similarity between this position 
and that of death of God theologians, who argue in Hegelian fashion 
that the dialectic of God the Father and God the Son has, following the 
crucifixion of Christ (in whom God’s entire being had been emptied via 
radical kenosis), found its resolution in the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit, 
according to this view, manifests itself in the church, such that the church 
is, quite literally, the body of Christ immanent in the world. (For a help-
ful, more in-depth discussion of this view, see Homebrewed Christianity’s 
interview with Christopher Rodkey here: http://homebrewedchristianity.
com/2015/07/18/when-a-radical-theologian-gets-in-the-pulpit/) 
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III. Enemy-Love
But can this love be reasonably expected to extend to our 
enemies – viz., our oppressors – as Jesus teaches? I would  argue 
that all that has been said thus far leads most naturally to 
 radical, Christ-like enemy-love. For the love that Jesus teaches – 
the love that prefigures the Unkingdom – is indiscriminate. As 
Søren Kierkegaard argues in Works of Love,
Your neighbor is every man [sic], for on the basis of distinctions 
he is not your neighbor, nor on the basis of likeness to you as 
 being different from other men. He is your neighbor on the basis 
of equality with you before God: but this equality absolutely every 
man has, and he has it absolutely.67
And, consequently, “by being a Christian he does not become free 
from distinctions, but by winning the victory over the temptation 
of distinctions he becomes a Christian.”68 It is therefore impos-
sible, from a Christian perspective, to distinguish between those 
who deserve our love and those who do not. Human life must be 
taken to be inviolable, and there can therefore be no hierarchising 
of who is more or less valuable and therefore deserving of love, 
forgiveness, and hospitality. There can be no adjudicating between 
one’s “goodness” and “badness.” Again, Jesus offers no exception 
clauses. If we are to value any one human life indiscriminately, 
we must value them all the same. To do otherwise would be to 
deny the inherent value, dignity, and equality of every human per-
son, and to admit that human value can be earned and forfeited. 
Walter Wink is particularly helpful on this point:
Commitment to justice, liberation, or the overthrow of oppression 
is not enough, for all too often the means used have brought in 
their wake new injustices and oppressions. Love of enemies is the 
recognition that the enemy, too, is a child of God [or Love]. The 
enemy too believes he or she is in the right, and fears us because 
we represent a threat against his or her values, lifestyle, or afflu-
ence. When we demonize our enemies, calling them names and 
 67 Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, translated by Howard and Edna 
Hong. (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 72.
 68 Ibid., 81.
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identifying them with absolute evil, we deny that they have that 
of God within them that makes transformation possible. Instead, 
we play God.69
Wink reminds his readers that even one’s worst enemy is a person 
too. First and foremost, therefore, we should seek reconciliation, 
rather than further alienation and fragmentation of our already 
damaged relationships with one another. In fact, if reconciliation 
is not achieved, the conflict will likely be perpetuated indefinitely, 
continuing the cycle of violence, until one side manages — 
 probably through sheer brute force – to dominate the other into 
submission. Wink continues:
Unless these people are exterminated in a genocidal war or an end-
less guerrilla insurrection, they must be converted. And no one can 
show others the error that is within them .  .  . unless the others 
are convinced that their critic first sees and loves the good that is 
within them.70
IV. Two Types of Objections
There are two obvious standpoints from which objections to my 
argument can be raised. First, objections may be levelled against 
my biblical argument for nonviolence – viz., it may be object-
ed that the Bible (specifically Jesus’ teachings as found in the 
Gospels) does not in fact lend itself to my radical nonviolence 
thesis. Second, it may be objected that nonviolence does not in 
fact work. I will attempt to address each of these in turn.
(a) Biblical Objections
There are three main New Testament passages that are cited in 
objection to biblically based arguments for nonviolence: Jesus’ 
cleansing of the temple, Jesus’ telling his disciples to arm them-
selves, and Paul’s admonition to obey the governing authorities 
 69 Walter Wink, Jesus and Nonviolence: A Third Way, (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2003), 59.
 70 Ibid., 62.
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in Romans 13. As stated above, the latter two in particular (as 
well as the “render unto Caesar” passage) have been skilfully ad-
dressed many times over by Christian anarchists and pacifists and 
so will not be considered here. I will, however, consider the temple 
cleansing as doing so serves a dual purpose – namely, it allows the 
response to the biblical objection as well as addresses the larger 
question of civil disobedience and property destruction.
According to the Gospel of John, “In the temple [Jesus] found 
people selling cattle, sheep, and doves, and the money chang-
ers seated at their tables. Making a whip of cords, he drove all 
of them out of the temple, both the sheep and the cattle.”71 At 
first blush, this passage appears to show Jesus acting violently. 
However, Christian anarchists and pacifists have convincingly ar-
gued that this passage is in fact consistent with the view of Jesus 
as a nonviolent revolutionary.
All four Gospel writers recount Jesus’ cleansing of the temple, 
but it is only in John that we are told of a whip. This may have 
something to do with the fact that, as John Dear writes, “Most 
scholars agree that John deliberately paints Jesus as a righteous 
prophet in the tradition of Jeremiah, who engaged in similar dra-
matic actions.”72 John would therefore have a greater interest in 
emphasising just how filled with righteous anger Jesus was. But 
did Jesus’ anger lead him to strike people and animals with his 
makeshift whip? Christian pacifists argue that such an interpreta-
tion would be erroneous.
John Dear insists that Jesus’ becoming violent in this episode 
“would be entirely inconsistent with the Jesus portrayed through-
out John’s Gospel, as well as the Synoptics.”73 We should therefore 
be wary from the outset of any translation that depicts a violent 
Jesus. Indeed, Andy Alexis-Baker skilfully argues that a careful 
study of the Greek demonstrates that the most faithful translation 
is the one cited above: “he drove all of them out of the temple, 
both the sheep and the cattle” (emphasis added). In other words, 
 71 John 2:14–15
 72 John Dear, “Didn’t Jesus Overturn Tables and Chase People Out of the 
Temple with a Whip?” in York and Barringer, 188.
 73 Ibid., 189.
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at most Jesus’ whip is used against the animals but never against 
any people.
But the suggestion that Jesus would whip the animals is simi-
larly troubling for Christian pacifists. However, as Alexis-Baker 
goes on to argue,
We might go further and deny that Jesus committed ‘violence’ 
against the sheep and cattle, since a makeshift whip of rope would 
hardly do much more than get them moving out the door. . .in a 
real sense, the narrative does not depict Jesus beating the animals; 
but instead he saves their lives from sacrificial slaughter in a mon-
etary and religious system.74
In other words, Jesus was liberating both humans and animals 
from the economic system of slaughter. His overturning of the 
moneychangers’ tables is symbolical of his overturning the calcu-
lating kingdoms of the world and inaugurating a new Unkingdom 
marked by the free gifts of love, grace, and forgiveness.
We are left with the reality of property destruction in this pas-
sage, but this should not be seen as problematic. It is not uncom-
mon in the 21st-century to hear property destruction lumped under 
the category of ‘violence’ alongside violence committed against 
persons. Such a disturbing trend seems to suggest that broken 
windows and broken bones are essentially the result of the same 
offenses – viz., ‘violence.’ Uri Gordon’s Anarchy Alive! provides 
a helpful discussion of the way in which this reclassification 
of property destruction as ‘violence’ is essentially a divide-and- 
conquer strategy. If the actions of activists can be divided between 
categories such as legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, 
non-violent and violent – where ‘violent’ may mean nothing more 
than a broken window – citizens and activists can be effectively 
divided against one another and, consequently, more easily con-
trolled and pacified.
The crucial question to ask is, why is a brick thrown through 
a window ‘violent’ and the police officers’ use of tear gas, water 
cannon, etc. on the brick-throwers not? Such a division of vio-
lent and nonviolent along the lines of illegal and legal is highly 
 74 Andy Alexis-Baker, Violence, Nonviolence and the Temple Incident in 
John 2:13–15,” in Biblical Interpretation 20 (2012), 94.
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suspect. Gordon suggests that the motivation here is “strongly 
connected to a fear of the uncontrollable, the abnormal and the 
criminal,”75 and that order-preserving violence therefore comes 
to be seen as justified, legal, and, ultimately, nonviolent, whereas 
action that threatens the social order is classified as unjustified, 
illegal, and violent (these words becoming synonymous at this 
point). Social movements consequently become much more easily 
fractured, weakened, and delegitimized, insofar as they are carved 
up into ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ camps, often contributing to 
internal discord as well as turning the public against the ‘violent’ 
and ‘illegitimate’ groups.
We should therefore see the classification of property destruc-
tion as another form of ‘violence’ as nothing more than an attempt 
to further demonize civil disobedience and protect the established 
order. Indeed, if we follow the common anarchist argument that 
the law exists primarily – if not exclusively – to protect private 
property (and private property, as Proudhon teaches, is theft), 
then the property-destruction-is-violence move clearly favours 
plutocracy over democracy.
In a passage often used to denounce Christian nonviolence and 
condone the state’s violent protection of property, then, we in fact 
find yet another instance of Jesus’ radical, nonviolent subversion 
of the established order. The temple cleansing serves as a reminder 
that, in Dear’s words, “the nonviolent Jesus was decidedly not 
passive.”76 And neither should we be. Jesus shows why pacifism 
and nonviolence should not be confused with passivism and 
non-resistance.
(b) Practical Objections
Perhaps the most common objection levelled by both Christians 
and non-Christians, anarchists and non-anarchists, is that non-
violence simply does not work. Ward Churchill, for example, 
condemns the common methods of nonviolent protest, in which 
“[o]ne will find hundreds, sometimes thousands, assembled in 
 75 Uri Gordon, Anarchy Alive! Anti-Authoritarian Politics from Practice to 
Theory, (London & Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2008), 83.
 76 Dear, 185.
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orderly fashion, listening to selected speakers calling for an end to 
this or that aspect of lethal state activity, carrying signs ‘demand-
ing’ the same thing,”77 and it is indeed hard to deny that these 
are generally unsuccessful in effecting immediate and meaningful 
structural change.
However, perhaps the solidarity that is cultivated and the teach-
ing and raising of public awareness can allow even these seeming-
ly useless protests to have an impact. It does not mean that other 
tactics will not be open to and even necessary for loving nonvio-
lence (or what Keith Hebden helpfully refers to as “compassionate 
activism”78). Nonviolence can take many forms, such as teaching, 
writing, feeding the homeless, and starting community gardens, 
all of which challenge state violence and coercion through build-
ing a new world in the shell of the old. And sometimes it might 
be necessary to flip some tables over, so to speak – i.e., to engage 
in nonviolent direct action which denounces the state’s abuse of 
political, economic, military, and religious power. This is, after all, 
wholly consistent with Jesus’ life and teachings.
More specifically, one of the most important ways that Christian 
anarchists respond to this type of objection is by arguing that 
nonviolence is the only way to escape the cycle of violence. Quite 
simply, it is argued, responding to violence with further violence 
only increases the amount of violence in the situation, and the 
cycle of tit-for-tat violence will continue indefinitely. Equating 
violence with slavery, Tolstoy writes, “all attempts to abolish 
 slavery by violence are like extinguishing fire with fire, stopping 
water with water, or filling up one hole by digging another.”79 
This basic argument is repeated again and again in the Christian 
anarchist literature.80 Jacques Ellul, for example, lists this as one of 
 77 Ward Churchill, Pacifism As Pathology, (Oakland: AK Press, 2007), 
61–62.
 78 Keith Hebden, Seeking Justice: The Radical Compassion of Jesus, 
(Washington: Circle Books, 2013), 16.
 79 Leo Tolstoy, “The Slavery of Our Times,” in Government is Violence: 
Essays on Anarchism and Pacifism, edited by David Stephens, (London: 
Phoenix Press, 1990), 145.
 80 See Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, for a helpful and thor-
ough overview.
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his laws of violence: “Violence begets violence — nothing else.”81 
Furthermore, Ellul writes, “once we consent to use violence our-
selves, we have to consent to our adversary’s using it, too.”82 In 
other words, not only do we enter the cycle of violence when re-
sponding violently, we in fact affirm this cycle insofar as we affirm 
that violence is an effective means to our desired end.
Accordingly, when Peter Gelderloos condemns nonviolence as 
racist, statist, patriarchal, and otherwise in line with the status 
quo,83 Christian anarchists can respond that, insofar as violence 
is the primary way in which this racist, statist, patriarchal status 
quo is enforced, nonviolence is in fact a powerful challenge to the 
status quo – a means of not being conformed to the ways of the 
world.
Furthermore, nonviolence can arguably unmask state vio-
lence more effectively than violence can, as when, for example, 
we see sit-down protestors being attacked by police84 or nonvio-
lent Palestinian protestors gunned down by Israeli forces. Recent 
headlines – such as Sharif Abdel Kouddous’ article for The Nation 
entitled “Palestinians Engaged in Nonviolent Protest. Israel 
Responded With a Massacre,”85 or The Real News Network’s in-
terview with Michael Omer-Mann entitled “IDF Prepares to Kill 
More Peaceful Protesters in Gaza on Friday”86 – appear to appeal 
 81 Jacques Ellul, Violence: Reflections From A Christian Perspective, trans-
lated by Cecilia Gaul Kings, (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2011), 100.
 82 Ibid., 99.
 83 See Peter Gelderloos, How Nonviolence Protects the State, available 
from http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/peter-gelderloos-how-nonviolence- 
protects-the-state 
 84 James Crugnale, “UC Davis Police Pepper Spray Student Occupy Protestors, 
University Investigating Incident,” Mediaite, 19 November 2011. Available 
from http://www.mediaite.com/online/uc-davis-police-pepper-spray-student- 
occupy-protestors-university-investigating-incident/. Accessed 31 July 2015.
 85 Kouddous, Sharif Abdel. “Palestinians Engaged in Nonviolent Protest. Israel 
Responded With a Massacre,” The Nation, 17 May 2018. Available from 
https://www.thenation.com/article/palestinians-engaged-in-nonviolent- 
protest-israel-responded-with-a-massacre/ (accessed 17 May 2018).
 86 The Real News Network, “IDF Prepares to Kill More Peaceful Protesters 
in Gaza on Friday,” 17 May 2018. Available from https://therealnews.
com/stories/idf-prepares-to-kill-more-peaceful-protesters-in-gaza-on- 
friday (accessed 17 May 2018).
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precisely to the sense of injustice that can be aroused within read-
ers in the face of such violent responses to nonviolent protestors. 
To be sure, it would be an unhelpful oversimplification to say, 
definitively, that violent protest never has and never could have 
similar impacts on public awareness, or that nonviolence always 
has and always will. But I argue that when the protestors are non-
violent, the violence of the state is brought into uniquely sharp 
relief and is therefore more easily identified as excessive not only 
by those who already sympathize with the protesters’ cause, but 
also by those who might otherwise accept the legitimacy of state 
violence. For, in such instances, the state’s violence stands fully 
exposed, unable to dull itself against images of aggression on the 
part of the protesters or to hide behind justifications of ‘self-de-
fence’ or ‘keeping the peace.’
Thus, contrary to someone such as Chu Minyi, who goes so 
far as to argue that “assassination will help arouse revolution-
ary agitation and quicken social revolution,”87 I argue that it is 
rather these instances of nonviolent resistance that are most likely 
to awaken the public to injustice. Violent acts such as physical 
attacks or assassinations, on the other hand, often serve only to 
confuse the moral sensibilities of a public for whom the state’s 
violence is so normalized that it hardly appears as violent at all – 
and, indeed, it will appear to be only that much more justified 
when wielded as a form of defence against violent dissent.
Therefore, while we should heed Gordon’s warning to avoid 
playing into the divide-and-conquer strategy of carving up rad-
ical groups into ‘violent/illegitimate’ and ‘nonviolent/legitimate’ 
camps, nonviolence in these situations has the pragmatic advan-
tage of, first, not alienating the public, and second, allowing the 
state’s violence to stand alone and therefore be unmasked as un-
necessary and illegitimate. Christian anarchists and pacifists have 
long argued that the story of Jesus’ crucifixion accomplishes pre-
cisely this, insofar as it is the story of a state’s crushing nonviolent 
dissent, and Jesus’ persistent nonviolence, love, and forgiveness 
 87 Chu Minyi, “Universal Revolution,” in Anarchism: A Documentary 
History of Libertarian Ideas, Volume One: From Anarchy to Anarchism 
(300CE to 1939), edited by Robert Graham, (Montreal/New York/
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exposes the Roman government’s use of force as excessive and 
brutal. Read from this perspective, then, the church’s historical 
support for, and participation in, state violence is a betrayal of 
Jesus’ message.88
Importantly, the pragmatic appeal to nonviolence should be 
distinguished from consequentialism. As Benjamin Franks argues, 
a rejection of consequentialism is one of the key points of differ-
entiation between anarchist direct action and other, non-anarchist 
forms of civil disobedience:
[D]irect action is prefigurative, the means have to be in accordance 
with the ends. Civil disobedience is not prefigurative, and it is fre-
quently consequentialist. . .It is this rejection of consequentialism 
that particularly marks direct action out as especially anarchic.89
Prefiguration allows us to take seriously the consequences of our 
actions while also recognising that those consequences – the ends – 
are inextricably linked to the means. It strikes me as all too easy 
for consequentialism – at least as it is articulated by those like 
Minyi – to slip into justifying the sacrificing of a few for the many 
in the name of a greater end, and thereby instrumentalising human 
life in a way similar to the instrumentalization wrought by states 
and capitalism.
The radical and uncompromising affirmation of the inherent 
value, dignity, and equality of every human person is one of the 
most subversive and anarchic revolutionary acts. Jesus under-
stood this. It is upon this very affirmation that the Unkingdom 
that he preached turns. The Unkingdom is embodied in such affir-
mation and it is the way that we are not conformed to the ways 
of this world but rather live according to the present-and- coming 
Unkingdom. Only prefigurative nonviolence, in other words, 
which privileges neither means nor ends, but rather recognizes 
the necessary agreement between the two, can allow us to wholly 
 88 See Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism. 
 89 Benjamin Franks, “The Direct Action Ethic,” in Anarchism: A Documentary 
History of Libertarian Ideas, Volume Three: The New Anarchism (1974–
2012), edited by Robert Graham, (Montreal/New York/London: Black 
Rose Books: 2005), 86.
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escape the cycle of violence that results from, and perpetuates, the 
instrumentalising, tit-for-tat logic of state and capitalism.
We may also hope that the illegitimacy of state violence 
effected by this unmasking will be made apparent not only to 
the protestors and others watching, but even to the aggressors 
themselves. Indeed, Richard Gregg argues that in this sense 
 nonviolence is “a sort of moral ju-jitsu.”90 The attacker,  according 
to Gregg,
suddenly and unexpectedly loses the moral support which the usu-
al violent resistance of most victims would render him. . .He feels 
insecure because of the novelty of the situation and his ignorance 
of how to handle it. He loses his poise and self-confidence.91
The aggressor can no longer refer to their victim, or the situation 
more generally, as violent; it becomes clear that only the aggressor 
is acting violently. Such a realization is disorienting and destabilizes 
the aggressor’s moral security.
It may be objected, however, that such an argument depends 
upon the assumption of some basic level of moral decency on the 
part of the attacker. However, as Wink argues, “Had Jesus waited 
for the Romans to achieve a minimum moral level, he never would 
have been able to articulate the message of nonviolence to begin 
with. On the contrary, his teaching does not presuppose a thresh-
old of decency, but something of God in everyone.”92 Recalling 
our discussion above of hearing ‘love’ when we speak of ‘God,’ 
Wink’s argument is quite powerful:
There is no one, and surely no entire people, in whom the image of 
God has been entirely extinguished. Faith in God means believing 
that anyone can be transformed, regardless of the past. To write 
off whole groups of people as intrinsically racist and violent is to 
 90 Richard Gregg, quoted in Nicolas Walter, “Direct Action and the New 
Pacifism,” in in Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas, 
Volume Two: The Emergence of the New Anarchism (1939–1977), edit-
ed by Robert Graham, (Montreal/New York/London: Black Rose Books: 
2009), 200.
 91 Ibid.
 92 Wink, 67.
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accept the very same premise that upholds racist and oppressive 
regimes.93
It may certainly be true that institutions can be, and often are, 
inherently racist and oppressive, but Wink cautions us against 
forgetting that the people who act on behalf of these institutions 
are still people. Oppressive institutions such as the state are in the 
business of taking the easy ways out of imprisonment and exe-
cution in response to dissent, condemning rather than engaging 
persons and groups of persons in their entirety. It should be the 
business of Christians and anarchists to instead choose the more 
difficult paths of forgiveness and reconciliation, which demand 
that we recognize the humanity of even our worst enemies.
Perhaps a more powerful criticism of nonviolence, however, is 
that spontaneous violence provides a means for repressed bodies – 
especially black, brown, female, non-binary, and queer bodies – to 
wrench themselves free from the state’s grasp and deny the state 
the ability to control them. This line of argument is hinted at, for 
example, in “Reflections on the Ferguson Uprising,” when one of 
the anarchists being interviewed says, “having those moments of 
uncontrollability or possibility open up. . .will entail violence.”94 
This is a very important argument given the fact that, in the wake 
of the Ferguson and Baltimore uprisings, it is increasingly common 
to hear the action of a black man who throws a brick through a 
window be condemned as that of a violent ‘thug.’95 Calls to emu-
late Martin Luther King Jr. subsequently ring out as not-so-subtle 
attempts to rein disobedient bodies back into the establishment’s 
control. As Ta-Nehisi Coates points out in an article for The 
Atlantic, “when nonviolence begins halfway through the war with 
 93 Wink, 67.
 94 Crimethinc., “Reflections on the Ferguson Uprising,” 12 August 2015. 
Available from http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/crimethinc-reflec-
tions-on-the-ferguson-uprising.pdf (accessed 29 November 2015). 
 95 According to Columbia University linguist John McWhorter, “the truth 
is that thug today is a nominally polite way of using the N-word.” For 
the full interview, see: http://www.npr.org/2015/04/30/403362626/
the-racially-charged-meaning-behind-the-word-thug 
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the aggressor calling time out, it exposes itself as a ruse.”96 In other 
words, nonviolence does in fact become a means of control and 
repression in this case, which is a large part of Gelderloos’ worry 
cited above. As Coates concludes his article:
When nonviolence is preached by the representatives of the state, 
while the state doles out heaps of violence to its citizens, it re-
veals itself to be a con. And none of this can mean that rioting or 
violence is ‘correct’ or ‘wise,’ any more than a forest fire can be 
‘correct’ or ‘wise.’ Wisdom isn’t the point tonight. Disrespect is. 
In this case, disrespect for the hollow law and failed order that so 
regularly disrespects the community.97
This echoes Gordon’s point discussed above. Nonviolence is 
called for by the greatest perpetrators of violence as a means to 
ensure that the disobedient group remains powerless to effect 
real change. If, on the other hand, the disobedient group does not 
adopt nonviolence, and violence is perhaps escalated even further, 
the state will simply label the actions ‘illegal,’ ‘illegitimate,’ and – 
most importantly – ‘violent,’ and doing so provides an alternative 
method of maintaining control. We thus face a kind of catch-22. 
Both violence and nonviolence can be manipulated in favour of 
the interests of the powerful.
What all of this means, I think, is that there are no simple 
answers. Every situation is different and must be assessed on 
an individual basis. If windows are broken and nonviolence is 
called for, perhaps it is time for both parties involved to sit down 
and attempt to bridge the contentious divide through dialogue. 
Or, perhaps it is time to engage in further civil disobedience. I 
maintain, however, that once violence against persons is resorted 
to, the status quo has been reaffirmed and the cycle of violence 
 re-entered. Violence against persons is seen as perfectly valid in 
the hands of the powerful, and, as Bart de Ligt writes, “it is the 
task of the social revolution to go beyond this violence and to 
 96 Ta-Nehisi Coates, “Nonviolence as Compliance,” The Atlantic, available 
from http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/nonviolence- 
as-compliance/391640/ (accessed 29 November 2015).
 97 Ibid.
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emancipate itself from it.”98 Otherwise we remain captive to the 
instrumental thinking that allows us to see persons as expendable 
and the might-is-right logic that offers justifications for violence 
as a legitimate response to dissent and disagreement.
While I do not agree with those pacifists – Ellul and Tolstoy 
among them99 – who argue that the violence of the oppressed 
against the oppressor is the same as the violence of the oppressor 
against the oppressed, I do argue that violence against persons 
must always be avoided insofar as adopting it opens the road for 
oppressive institutions to do the same and even claim that they are 
the party who can legitimately do so in order to restore order and 
minimise the violence which is spinning out of control.
This may be unsatisfying to many who want to see immediate, 
drastic change, and recognize that violence is often – if not al-
ways – the means for realising such change. But as Yoder writes, 
“Violence is always, apparently, the shortest and surest way . . . 
[a]nd in the long run that appearance always deceives.”100 It does 
not create a new world, it does not change our relationships, and 
it does not address the problem of having such a violent society 
in the first place. What the use of violence does do, according 
to Christian anarchists, is affirm the superiority of violence over 
love – to, in other words, deny the possibility of overcoming vi-
olence with love. And while it is true that nonviolence will not 
always give us the quick results that violence promises, as Walter 
Wink writes, “[t]he issue . . . is not just which works better, but 
which fails better. While a nonviolent strategy also does not al-
ways ‘work’ in terms of pre-set goals – though in another sense 
it always ‘works’ – at least the casualties and destruction are far 
less severe.”101
All of this comes back to prefiguration. If we want a nonvio-
lent, non-coercive world, we would be miscalculating to hope to 
achieve it through violence and coercion. For “it is impossible,” 
 98 Bart de Ligt, The Conquest of Violence: An Essay on War and Revolution, 
(Winchester: Pluto Press, 1989), 168.
 99 See Ellul, Violence, 97.
 100 John Howard Yoder, quoted in Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism: 
A Political Commentary On the Gospel, 40.
 101 Wink, 54.
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writes Bart de Ligt, “to educate people in liberty by force, just as 
it is impossible to breathe by coal gas.”102
V. Conclusion
Christ calls his followers to participate in the new kingdom that 
he is inaugurating – the Unkingdom, which operates in every way 
counter to the way the worldly kingdoms operate. This, I think, is 
one of the most powerful ideas that Christ and his followers can 
offer to anarchism. I maintain that Christ calls his followers to 
live according to the Unkingdom right now, to not be conformed 
to the ways of the world, as Paul says, but to live otherwise. At 
no point does Jesus say that this will be easy – indeed, he ex-
plicitly says the opposite. And it must surely be admitted that, 
according to worldly standards of practicality, living according to 
the Unkingdom could not possibly be more impractical. But, in 
another way, such living is supremely practical insofar as it is the 
only way to realize the Unkingdom. In other words, we must live 
according to the paradoxically now-and-to-come Unkingdom, 
both because it is here and because it is still to come. Adopting 
the radical nonviolence that Jesus teaches in the Sermon on the 
Mount is one of the most important ways that we can do so. It 
may seem crazy at first blush – and, again, it is crazy from the 
standpoint of maintaining the status quo – but it is in fact the only 
way to escape the cycle of violence and to prefigure a more loving, 
peaceful, and just society, an anarchist society.
I submit that if we take the Sermon on the Mount as a dai-
ly guide for transforming ourselves as well as our relationships 
with others – viz., as a guide for prefiguring the Unkingdom – 
that is where the deepest and longest lasting change will begin. 
As Tolstoy writes, “in our world everybody thinks of changing 
humanity, and nobody thinks of changing himself [sic].”103 As so-
cial creatures, to change ourselves is at the same time to change 
our relationships with others. And – going back to Landauer – it 
 102 De Ligt, 72. 
 103 Leo Tolstoy, “On Anarchy,” in Government is Violence: Essays on 
Anarchism and Pacifism, edited by David Stephens, (London: Phoenix 
Press, 1990), 70.
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is through changing our relationships with others, through coun-
tering the violence, hatred, and greed of the present world with 
love, forgiveness, and nonviolence, that we will build a new world 
in the shell of the old.
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Prisons of Law and Brothels of Religion : 
William Blake’s Christian Anarchism
Duane Williams
Liverpool Hope University
This chapter demonstrates how both anarchistic and religious 
 tendencies are fused in William Blake’s work. While  acknowledging 
biographical and historical approaches to Blake scholarship, the 
methodological approach is foremost hermeneutical. Highlighting 
how Blake can be understood as a Christian anarchist by inter-
preting the significance of key beliefs and arguments found in his 
work, the chapter also explores Blake’s opposition to both judicial 
and moral law, which underpins his questioning of the authority 
and rule of king and priest. The chapter consists of two sections. 
First it analyses Blake’s complete mistrust of institutional state 
religion, along with its establishment of priests who, Blake main-
tained, cruelly bound and thus enslaved believers with moral law, 
then it examines Blake’s view of Jesus as a transgressor of this law, 
through his unique insight concerning the mutual forgiveness of 
sins that places love and liberty above all else.
Introduction
It has been said of William Blake that he is an: ‘Uncompromising 
supporter of freedom from all institutions, laws, and moral codes; 
he is a Christian anarchist.’1 However, while Blake scholarship is 
multifarious, very little appears to have been written on Blake in 
 1 Victor, N. Paananen, William Blake, (New York: Twayne Publishing, 
1996), p. xiii. 
How to cite this book chapter:
Williams, D. 2018. Prisons of Law and Brothels of Religion : William Blake’s 
Christian Anarchism. In: Christoyannopoulos, A. and Adams, M. S. (eds.) 
Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume II. Pp. 232–277. Stockholm: 
Stockholm University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16993/bas.h. License: 
CC-BY.
Prisons of Law and Brothels of Religion 233
direct relation to anarchism. Therefore, we might not immediately 
make a connection between the two. This said, where themes such 
as ‘dissent’, ‘radicalism’, ‘revolution’, and ‘antinomianism’ have 
preoccupied Blake scholars they have indirectly characterised 
some of the anarchistic elements of his thinking. Exceptions that 
focus explicitly on Blake and anarchism include the short book 
by Peter Marshall, William Blake: Visionary Anarchist, and an 
essay by Christopher Z. Hobson titled, ‘Anarchism and William 
Blake’s Idea of Jesus.’2 My aim in this essay is to show how Blake 
can be understood as a Christian anarchist. That Blake can be 
understood as a Christian anarchist is different from saying that 
he identified himself as one, and this is a subtle and important 
qualification that I will develop in the conclusion.
Before I begin it might be helpful to provide some explanatory 
notes on how I intend to approach the essay. While I incorporate 
some fairly well trodden areas in Blake studies, my intention is 
to gather them under one overarching theme in order to gain an 
all-round picture of how anarchistic and religious tendencies are 
fused in Blake’s work. My aim is not to highlight potential prob-
lems with what I deem to be Blake’s Christian anarchism. I ap-
preciate that problems may arise in readers’ minds, but my desire 
foremost is to expound and celebrate what I see as a significant, 
if speculative, facet of Blake’s work while seeking to anticipate 
potential issues.
I will refer chiefly to Blake’s writings, and occasionally to his vi-
sual art. Barring a few editorial symbols, I will also quote his writ-
ings without intervention as they are faithfully copied in David V. 
Erdman’s, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake.3 In 
terms of interpreting Blake’s poems, although I am aware of the 
dramatic context of speeches some of them contain, I will never-
theless tend to attribute words directly to Blake. Although this 
might serve in simplifying the poems, I do it on the assumption 
 2 See Peter Marshall, William Blake: Visionary Anarchist, (London: 
Freedom Press, 1988), and Christopher Z. Hobson, ‘Anarchism and 
William Blake’s Idea of Jesus’, The Utopian, vol. 1, 2000.
 3 One of the anonymous reviewers of this essay said of Blake’s frequent and 
significantly irregular punctuation and syntax: ‘Anarchism is inscribed at 
the level of textuality, too, and Blake’s singularity should stand.’
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that ultimately Blake is using figures to express his own views. I 
say this regarding what Blake calls ‘mental deities’,4 mindful that 
according to the journalist Henry Crabb Robinson (who knew 
him in later life) Blake maintained: ‘that in asserting the actuality 
of spirits he was giving personality to ideas as Plato had done be-
fore.’5 Or what Blake’s friend, Frederick Tatham, called his ‘peo-
pled Thoughts.’6 In places I will draw attention to the chronology 
of Blake’s writings, but frequently I will overlook this because the 
meaning of the text will be my chief concern.7
This brings me to my methodological approach. Ideally I would 
include a biographical and historical perspective, exploring the 
different facets of religious dissent and political radicalism that 
arguably influenced Blake’s thinking. But part of my reason for 
not doing so is that the extent to which Blake was influenced by or 
belonged to these movements is an endless source of speculation, 
and even questioned.8 While I acknowledge the significance of 
 4 William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 11, The Complete 
Poetry and Prose of William Blake, Edited by David V. Erdman (New 
York: Anchor Books, 1988), p. 38.
 5 G. R. Bentley, Jr., Blake Records (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 363.
 6 Richard Holmes, Blake’s Songs of Innocence and Experience, (London: 
Tate Publishing, 1992), p. 6.
 7 I appreciate, however, that there are dangers here because it overlooks 
how a younger Blake was different from an older Blake. Nevertheless, I 
will do this with a consistency in mind regarding Blake’s outlook.
 8 See, for example, Keri Davies and David Worrall, ‘Inconvenient Truths: 
Re-historicizing the Politics of Dissent and Antinomianism’, and, ‘Christ 
and the Bridal Bed: Eighteenth-Century Moravian Erotic Spirituality as 
a Possible Influence on Blake’, in Re-Envisioning Blake, Edited by, Mark 
Crosby, Troy Patenaude, and Angus Whitehead (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012). Davies and Worrall question Blake’s connection with 
Dissenter and Antinomian movements. Blake has often been linked 
through his mother to the Moravians who in turn have been interpreted 
as being Dissenters. But Davies and Worrall write: ‘The Moravians saw 
themselves in no sense dissenters from, but, on the contrary, as a sister 
church of, the Church of England.’ Davies and Worrall, ‘Inconvenient 
Truths’, p. 37. And furthermore that: ‘The dissenting churches viewed 
the Moravian Brethren with hostility.’ Davies and Worrall, ‘Inconvenient 
Truths’, p. 40. Atwood writes: ‘In 1749, the British Parliament official-
ly recognized the Moravian Church as a legitimate ecclesiastical body 
(rather than a dissenting group)’ Atwood, ‘Christ and the Bridal Bed’, 
p. 162. But while the Moravians viewed themselves as not being 
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the biographical and historical approaches to Blake scholarship, 
my methodological approach is foremost hermeneutical. This is 
partly down to space, but also as a philosopher and theologian I 
confess to being more comfortable in this area (and more interest-
ed if I am completely honest) whereas with the biographical and 
historical I am more dependent on the scholarship of others.9 This 
said, where necessary I will incorporate some of this scholarship. 
Concerning the hermeneutical, my main task is to highlight how 
Blake can be understood as a Christian anarchist by interpreting 
the significance of key beliefs and arguments found in his work. I 
will do this by exploring how Blake was opposed to both judicial 
and moral law thus questioning the authority and rule of king and 
priest. However, given the theme of this essay I will tend to focus 
more on the moral and priestly angle. To this end my essay will 
consist of two sections. I will begin by exploring Blake’s complete 
mistrust of institutional state religion, along with its establishment 
of priests who, he maintained, cruelly bound and thus enslaved 
Dissenters, Davies and Worrall claim that they were forced to register 
their churches as dissenting meeting-houses. With the above in mind I 
wish to avoid what Davies and Worrall call the critical and biographical 
commonplace that Blake was a Dissenter, although I keep an open-mind 
that he still may have been one either through influence or allegiance. See 
Davies and Worrall, ‘Inconvenient Truths’, p. 40. Highlighting key texts 
that have identified Blake as a Dissenter and following what they take to 
be sound evidence that opposes this, Davies and Worrall write: ‘The easy 
labelling of William Blake as a dissenter has next to no  validity.’ Davies 
and Worrall, ‘Inconvenient Truths’, p. 44. But of course given the nature 
of academia, at some point in the future there may be further evidence 
unearthed that seeks to argue there is validity. Until that time, Davies and 
Worrall write: ‘Blake the Dissenter can now only ever be someone else’s 
unmarked grave in Bunhill Fields. It certainly is not that of William Blake, 
1757–1827, late of Fountain Court.’ Davies and Worrall, ‘Inconvenient 
Truths’, p. 47.
 9 I am also mindful of a point made by Davies and Worrall that says ‘the 
current character of Blake studies is generally historicist.’ Davies and 
Worrall, ‘Inconvenient Truths’, p. 31. This they add, drawing on conclu-
sions made by the Research Assessment Exercise of 2008, is the current-
ly dominant approach to all research in English departments regarding 
orientation and method. Davies and Worrall, ‘Inconvenient Truths’, p. 
31. I do not wish to add to this dominant historicist criticism, nor am 
I qualified to do so. Also I am not from an English department, but a 
department of Theology, Philosophy, and Religious Studies.
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believers with moral law. And in the next section I will examine 
Blake’s view of Jesus as a transgressor of this law, through the lat-
ter’s unique insight concerning the mutual forgiveness of sins that 
places love and liberty above all else.
We can view these two sections as each referring to what are for 
Blake different interpretations of religion, namely, a false one and 
a true one. Briefly, for Blake, false religion is that which preaches 
vengeance for sin based on judicial and moral laws of good and 
evil, which are universally applied to all individuals thereby cir-
cumscribing their freedom and authorizing punishment for their 
transgressions. For Blake, general prohibitive laws like the Ten 
Commandments are oppressive and inherently unjust. In contrast, 
true religion subverts such cruel systems of law through mutual 
forgiveness that counteracts sin and engenders a universal human-
ity or divine body living as members of One Man – Jesus Christ.
Finally, I would just like to say a few words about my own 
approach to the concepts of ‘anarchism’ and ‘religion.’ If I was 
to think of one word that encapsulated the essence of both these 
subjects it would be ‘liberty.’ It might be argued that anarchy and 
religion both offer freedom in their differing contexts from those 
things that rule us, be that monarchs, government, laws, desires, 
suffering, ignorance, and so forth. And in some cases the con-
cepts of anarchism and religion are arguably fused through a fig-
ure concerned with one of the topics listed above, Lao-Tzu and 
government, for example. Likewise, in this essay anarchism and 
religion will be argued to come together through Blake’s interpre-
tation of Jesus as a radical visionary and religious transgressor.
Institutionalised Religion and Priesthood
In relation to Blake, reference is often made to the publisher 
Joseph Johnson who had been associated with a network of reli-
gious dissenters and political radicals in London since the 1760s. 
Johnson had agreed to publish a poem by Blake titled, The French 
Revolution.10 Johnson’s radical circle included Thomas Paine, 
 10 This was in seven books, but either due to government pressure or 
 because of the foretold inaccuracy of the work the publication did not 
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Mary Wollstonecraft, William Godwin and Joseph Priestley. Some 
Blake scholars and biographers have argued that Blake attended 
weekly dinners above Johnson’s bookshop, where he may have 
met and befriended such figures. Others, however, have argued 
that according to the evidence Blake probably only ever attended 
one of these dinners. While it is tempting to place Blake among the 
circle around Johnson and to assume he would be at home there, 
Peter Ackroyd notes insightfully that Blake was quite different to 
them in many respects, especially when it came to views on reli-
gion.11 Alexander Gilchrist says: ‘Himself [Blake] a heretic among 
the orthodox, here among the infidels he was a saint and staunch-
ly defended Christianity – the spirit of it – against these strangely 
assorted disputants.’12 Frederick Tatham, Blake’s friend in later 
life, is also quoted to have said: ‘In one of their conversations, 
Paine said that religion was a law & a tye to all able minds. Blake 
on the other hand said what he was always asserting, that the 
religion of Jesus, was a perfect law of Liberty.’13 For me Tatham’s 
recollection, accurate or not, serves in drawing our attention to a 
crucial distinction in Blake’s thinking. For when it came to institu-
tionalised religion, priesthood, and moral law, Blake would have 
no doubt agreed with Thomas Paine’s sentiments. But regarding 
what Blake saw as the true religion of Jesus he would certainly 
have disagreed with Paine. The rest of this essay will consider this 
distinction.14
To a certain extent then Blake would have accepted Paine’s 
view that ‘religion was a law and a tye to all able minds’, but to 
happen. All that remains of the poem is the page proofs of the first book. 
The remaining six are lost.
 11 Peter Ackroyd, Blake (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1995), p. 159. 
Ackroyd speculates that it would be an error to see Blake as a part of 
Johnson’s group dining above the shop, and that they probably only saw 
him as a journeyman engraver with eccentric views. 
 12 Alexander Gilchrist, Life of William Blake, ed. Ruthven Todd (London 
and New York, 1942), p. 94.
 13 Bentley, Blake Records, pp. 530–1.
 14 Regarding his thoughts on Paine, it is worth reading Blake’s ‘Annotations 
to An Apology for the Bible, by R. Watson, Bishop of Landaff. London, 
1797’, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, 
pp. 611–20.
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Blake’s thinking it was only a corrupted and perverted form of 
religion that did this. It was institutionalised, state religion, com-
prising (in a Christian context) the established churches and their 
priests who bound and restricted believers with moral law, just as 
the crown and government did with judicial law. We can perhaps 
draw attention here to Jesus’ words when he says of the scribes 
and Pharisees: ‘. . . they bind heavy burdens and grievous to be 
borne, and lay them on men’s shoulders.’15 Whereas, in contrast, 
Jesus invites those who feel the burden of their sins: ‘Take my 
yoke upon you, and learn of me; . . . for my yoke is easy, and my 
burden is light.’16
In Blake’s poem, ‘The Chimney Sweeper’, one of his Songs 
of Experience that appeared in 1794, the sweep is asked of the 
whereabouts of his parents? His reply is that they are in the 
church praying: ‘And are gone to praise God & his Priest & King / 
Who make up a heaven of our misery.’17 Blake’s religious, social, 
and political sentiments are all captured in his well-known poem 
titled, ‘London’, again from Songs of Experience. This poem also 
connects the chimney sweeper and Church through the lines: ‘How 
the Chimney-sweeper’s cry / Every blackning Church  appalls.’18 
Alfred Kazin argued that getting the soot out of the church was 
an impossible task for the boy in the poem, and asserts how 
the church is black with ‘dogma and punitive zeal’ and made all 
the blacker by the chimney sweeper’s suffering. And turning to the 
word ‘appalls’ he observes how the church is not appalled by the 
plight of the boy and this makes the church appalling.19
Blake held the resolutely independent position that questioned 
the necessity of going through the institution of the Church to get 
to God. He writes: ‘Henceforth every man may converse with God 
 15 Mt 23: 4. KJV.
 16 Mt 11: 29–30. KJV.
 17 Blake, ‘The Chimney Sweeper’, Songs of Experience, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 23.
 18 Blake, ‘London’, Songs of Experience, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry 
and Prose of William Blake, p. 27.
 19 Alfred Kazin, The Portable Blake (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1946), pp. 14–15.
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& be a King & Priest in his own house.’20 John Beer links Blake’s 
assertion to: ‘Theophilus Evan’s millenarian statement that once 
man regains the perfection of Adam, the Law will be ‘writ in ev-
ery Man’s heart, so that  . . . every Man should be Priest unto 
himself’.’21 There are perhaps also echoes of Jesus’ exchange with 
the woman of Samaria at the well, where Jesus says: ‘But the hour 
cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the 
Father in spirit and truth: for the Father seeketh such to worship 
him.’22
Much of Blake’s writing condemns what he perceives to be the 
false institutional religion, and champions in turn what is for him 
true religion. A perfect example of this distinction is found in the 
following lines from Blake’s work, The Marriage of Heaven and 
Hell:
The ancient Poets animated all sensible objects with Gods or 
Geniuses, calling them by the names and adorning them with the 
properties of woods, rivers, mountains, lakes, cities, nations, and 
whatever their enlarged & numerous senses could perceive. And 
particularly they studied the genius of each city & country. placing 
it under its mental deity; Till a system was formed, which some 
took advantage of & enslav’d the vulgar by attempting to real-
ize or abstract the mental deities from their objects: thus began 
Priesthood, Choosing forms of worship from poetic tales. And at 
length they pronounced that the Gods had ordered such things. 
Thus men forgot that All deities reside in the human breast23
 20 Erdman, ‘Annotations to An Apology for the Bible, by R. Watson, Bishop 
of Landaff. London, 1797’, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William 
Blake, p. 615.
 21 John Beer, William Blake: A Literary Life (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), p. 22.
 22 Jn 4: 23, KJV.
 23 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 11, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 38. S. Foster Damon 
links the last line to Lavater’s 398thAphorism: ‘Let none turn over books 
or roam the stars in quest of God, who sees him not in man.’ S. Foster 
Damon, A Blake Dictionary (Hanover and London: University Press of 
New England, 1988), p. 322. Also note the similarity of Blake’s passage 
with Coleridge’s lines from ‘The Piccolomini’: ‘The intelligible forms of 
ancient poets, / The fair humanities of old religion, / The power, the Beauty, 
and the Majesty / That had their haunts in dale or piny mountain, / Or 
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Blake confirms this last point in the same work when he later 
writes: ‘God only Acts & Is, in existing beings or Men.’24 And then 
again: ‘The worship of God is. Honouring his gifts in other men, 
each according to his genius. and loving the greatest men best, 
those who envy or calumniate great men hate God, for there is 
no other God.’25 As will become more significant as we proceed, 
this tells us that for Blake: ‘God is not in some unknown world 
elsewhere.’26 Blake referred to God understood in this metaphys-
ical way as, ‘Nobodaddy’, which S. Foster Damon translates as 
meaning, ‘nobody’s daddy.’27 Although I wonder if it might equal-
ly mean, ‘no body daddy’ in the sense of a god with no body, or 
‘nobody daddy’ in the apophatic sense of a god that is nothing. 
In his poem ‘To Nobodaddy’, Blake writes of what he (as we will 
come to see) deems to be a false god:
Why art thou silent & invisible
Father of Jealousy
Why dost thou hide thyself in clouds
From every searching Eye
Why darkness & obscurity
In all thy words & laws
That none dare eat the fruit but from
The wily serpents jaws28
Damon writes: ‘The abstract God of the Anglican Prayer Book, 
“without passion or parts,” was for Blake a mere logical abstrac-
tion without significance.’29 Here Blake accords with Johann 
Kaspar Lavater, who in one of his Aphorisms on Man writes: ‘He, 
who adores an impersonal God, has none; and, without guide 
forest, by slow stream, or pebbly spring. / Or chasms and watery depths.’ 
Thomas Bulfinch, Bulfinch’s Mythology (London: Spring Books, 1967), p. 5.
 24 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 16, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 40.
 25 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 22, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 43.
 26 Paananen, William Blake, p. 54.
 27 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 301.
 28 Blake, ‘To Nobodaddy’, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 471.
 29 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 159.
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or rudder, launches on an immense abyss that first absorbs his 
powers, and next himself.’30 In his annotation to this aphorism, 
Blake responds with: ‘Most superlatively beautiful & most affec-
tionately Holy & pure would to God that all men would consider 
it.’31
Blake loathed the mental and corporeal cruelties enacted by the 
Church in the name of this systematized and abstracted God, and 
he set out to denounce them. An example of the Church’s cruelty 
according to Blake is found in his poem, ‘A Little Boy Lost’ from 
Songs of Experience. The boy we can assume is lost in more ways 
than one, but especially perhaps because found and seized by the 
Church. In the poem the boy asserts:
Nought loves another as itself
Nor venerates another so.
Nor is it possible to Thought
A greater than itself to know:32
Here the boy is demanding the right to assert his own thoughts 
and desires.33 This, I believe, also connects with Blake’s dislike 
of an impersonal God that supersedes and possibly absorbs our 
own identity. For Blake, the personal or the human is not to be 
overlooked in the name of metaphysical abstraction. The boy in 
the poem then asks his father, how can I love you or any of my 
brothers more than this? However, a priest overhears the child 
and seizes him with ‘trembling zeal’ by the hair, to which Blake 
with a stinging criticism designed to expose both the action of 
the priest and the inaction of those standing by, sarcastically 
adds: ‘And all admir’d the Priestly care.’34 Meanwhile the weep-
ing child cannot be heard and twice Blake says that the parents 
weep in vain, suggesting the overriding power and influence of 
 30 Lavater, Aphorism 552, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 596.
 31 Blake, ‘Annotations to Lavater’, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and 
Prose of William Blake, p. 596.
 32 Blake, ‘A Little Boy Lost’, Songs of Experience, in Erdman, The Complete 
Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 28.
 33 Kazin, The Portable Blake, p. 41.
 34 Blake, ‘A Little Boy Lost’, Songs of Experience, in Erdman, The Complete 
Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 28.
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the Church. Following this the boy is stripped to his little shirt 
and bound in an iron chain. The final verse says that he is then 
burned where many have been burned before, and closes with 
the line: ‘Are such things done on Albions shore.’35 The impli-
cation is that on a subtle level such things are done by priests, 
as well as by parents, teachers, politicians, and monarchs. All 
in all, and capturing the essence I think of Blake’s thinking, the 
boy is guilty of wanting to be autonomously himself and is in 
turn punished for it. Here Blake is deliberately inverting what is 
commonly taken to be the truth, this being that all our problems 
come as a result of defying the divine laws, whereas on the con-
trary: ‘Blake believed many of the ills of the world to result from 
a loss of imagination and an unwillingness to cultivate human 
energies in freedom.’36
Blake loathed the notion of universal laws applicable to all. 
Such laws ignore what Blake took to be fundamentally true – 
that we are all different. A difference crushed under the rule of 
One God, One King, and One Law. With reference to universal 
law, Damon tells us that to Blake the Ten Commandments were: 
‘Negative generalizations drawn up regardless of the individual . . . 
Blake was emphatic that human happiness should not be sacri-
ficed to the traditional rules, the individual should always be con-
sidered first.’37 Hence Blake ends The Marriage of Heaven and 
Hell with the line: ‘One Law for the Lion & Ox is Oppression’38 
Elsewhere, Bromion (characterising reason) asks: ‘And is there not 
one law for both the lion and the ox?’39 While similarly Tiriel 
(representing the body and the decay of materialism) asks: ‘Why is 
one law given to the lion & the patient ox?’40 After this particular 
 35 Blake, ‘A Little Boy Lost’, Songs of Experience, in Erdman, The Complete 
Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 29.
 36 Beer, William Blake: A Literary Life, p. 97.
 37 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 90.
 38 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 24, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 44.
 39 Blake, Visions of the Daughters of Albion, 4: 22, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 48.
 40 Blake, Tiriel, viii: 10, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 285.
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line Blake had written before deletion: ‘Dost thou not see that 
men cannot be formed all alike.’41
This I would argue is not so much a question mark against 
equality, but against the One Law that judges us to be equal be-
fore it. As metaphors for types of people the lion and ox are in-
deed different, but their equality should stand in being equally 
free to be what it is they are. Where we do not have equal ways, 
we should have equal rights to those ways. Blake advocated lib-
erty, equality, and fraternity, but he did not advocate uniformity. 
Marshall argues: ‘He felt that no law could cover the multitude of 
individual acts and is thereby inherently unjust.’42
Blake often refers to childhood play in his poems and paint-
ings to depict the liberty and joy that rules and laws suppress.43 
This might also be influenced by Jesus telling his disciples that 
unless they are converted and become like little children they 
will never enter the kingdom of heaven, and that of such is 
the kingdom of heaven.44 In his poem, ‘The Garden of Love’, 
again from Songs of Experience, Blake tells us that he went to 
the garden of love and sees that a chapel now stands where he 
used to play on the green. The immediate indication appears 
to be that the chapel puts an end to love and play. The poem 
continues:
And the gates of this Chapel were shut,
And Thou shalt not. writ over the door;
So I turn’d to the Garden of Love,
That so many sweet flowers bore.
And I saw it was filled with graves,
And tomb-stones where flowers should be:
 41 Blake, Tiriel, viii: 10. Note that the deleted line is still printed in, Geoffrey 
Keynes, The Complete Writings of William Blake (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1966), p. 109. 
 42 Marshall, William Blake: Visionary Anarchist, p. 42.
 43 See, for example, ‘The Echoing Green’, ‘Laughing Song’, and ‘Nurse’s 
Song’ in Songs of Innocence, and ‘The School Boy’ in Songs of Experience.
 44 Mt 18: 3; 19: 14, KJV.
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And Priests in black gowns, were walking their rounds,
And binding with briars, my joys & desires.45
In the Gospel of John, Jesus says that he will destroy the temple 
and raise it up in three days. The Jews then ask how he can do this 
when the temple took forty-six years to build. But as we know 
Jesus is speaking in this instance of the temple of his body.46 Blake 
may be making a similar analogy with reference to the chapel. The 
gates of the chapel, our body, have been shut by religious prohi-
bition that cruelly demands ‘thou shalt not.’47 Elsewhere and with 
allusions perhaps to Plato’s cave allegory, Blake famously writes: 
‘If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would ap-
pear to man as it is: infinite. For man has closed himself up, till 
he sees all things thro’ narrow chinks of his cavern.’48 The ‘doors 
of perception’ refer to the five senses, which Blake understood to 
be: ‘The chief inlets of Soul in this age.’49 Being closed up, every-
thing appears finite and corrupt instead of infinite and holy. The 
cleansing of the doors of perception, says Blake, will come to pass 
by an improvement of sensual enjoyment. But as we have heard 
in the Garden of Love, Blake tells us that priests in black gowns 
are binding with briars his joys and desires.50 Referring elsewhere 
to joys, Blake asserts: ‘As the caterpillar chooses the fairest leaves 
 45 Blake, ‘The Garden of Love’, Songs of Experience, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 26.
 46 Jn 2:19–21, KJV.
 47 Incidentally, Emanuel Swedenborg is said to have had a vision where he 
saw a magnificent temple with the words Nunc Licet written over the 
doorway. This translates as, ‘now it is permitted’. For Swedenborg this 
meant ‘Now it is permitted to enter intellectually into the mysteries of 
faith.’
 48 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 14, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 39.
 49 See, Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 4.
 50 A briar refers to the pipe made of ‘tree heath’ that many priests of the 
time smoked. It might moreover refer by association to the rope-like 
smoke of the pipe. Briar is also the name of a wild thorny rose, which 
could also imply the crown of thorns worn by Jesus as a cruel means of 
torture.
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to lay her eggs on, so the priest lays his curse on the fairest joys.’51 
While with regard to desire he says: ‘Those who restrain desire 
do so because theirs is weak enough to be restrained; and the 
restrainer or reason usurps its place & governs the unwilling.’52 
And in what on the surface appears to be one of his most shocking 
statements, he argues: ‘Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than 
nurse unacted desires.’53 Blake also writes:
 51 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 9, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 37. He uses a simi-
lar image in his poem ‘The Human Abstract’, when he says: ‘And the 
Catterpiller and Fly, / Feed on the Mystery.’ Blake, Songs of Experience, 
in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 27.
 52 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 5, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 34. Similarly Friedrich 
Nietzsche argued that the vices of some grow lazy, and they call that vir-
tue. He adds: ‘There are others who are like household clocks wound up; 
they repeat their tick-tock and want people to call tick-tock – virtue. And 
again, there are those who hold it a virtue to say: ‘Virtue is necessary’; but 
fundamentally they believe only that the police are necessary.’ Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (London: Penguin, 1961), translated 
by, R. J. Hollingdale, pp. 118–119.
 53 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 10, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 38. This proverb has 
been the subject of much debate. I have always read it in the most shock-
ing way to mean that it is far worse to not act on desires than it is to 
murder an infant in a cradle. But it is probably more subtle than this. 
Marshall says of this proverb: ‘He means that repressed desires can make 
a person permanently cruel and destructive.’ Marshall, William Blake: 
Visionary Anarchist, p. 48. It would seem therefore that it is better to 
murder the infant than nurse the person that would result from unacted 
desires. Similarly Beer writes of the proverb: ‘This has attracted criticism 
from some critics, who take it as an injunction to follow one’s desires 
however inhuman and cruelly murderous they may prove. But  . . . the 
logic needs to be read backwards rather than forwards. Acted desires are 
being compared to infants reared in proper freedom. It will be impossible 
for such desires to be inhuman or murderous, because they will by their 
very nature be the expression of a freedom which is fully human, em-
bodying a full vision of human potentiality. It is unacted desires that are 
likely to fester, and which will then resemble children whose development 
has been thwarted by ill usage.’ Beer, William Blake: A Literary Life, 
pp. 59–60. Thus it is better to murder in the cradle what would otherwise 
become unacted desires nursed.
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Let the Priests of the Raven of dawn, no longer, in deadly black, 
with hoarse note curse the sons of joy. Nor his accepted brethren, 
whom, tyrant, he calls free; lay the bound or build the roof. Nor 
pale religious letchery call that virginity, that wishes but acts not!54
Similar in some respects to the poem ‘The Garden of Love’ is a 
poem from Blake’s notebook, commonly called, ‘The Chapel of 
Gold’:
I saw a chapel all of gold
That none did dare to enter in
And many weeping stood without
Weeping, mourning, worshipping
I saw a serpent rise between
The white pillars of the door
And he forcd & forcd & forcd
Down the golden hinges tore
And along the pavement sweet
Set with pearls & rubies bright
All his slimy length he drew
Till upon the altar white
Vomiting his poison out
On the bread & on the wine
So I turnd into a sty
And laid me down among the swine55
Beer says of this poem: ‘The very chapels in which abstinence was 
preached were caricatures of the bodily organ of sexual desire that 
had been made secret, and their adherents reaped a cruel crop.’56 
Typically in Blake’s poems, the serpent represents the priest. I 
believe the poem evinces what the Church had reduced sex to. 
The serpent is penis and priest. The chapel is vagina and church: 
 54 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 27, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 45.
 55 Blake, ‘The Chapel of Gold’, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose 
of William Blake, pp. 467–8.
 56 Beer, William Blake: A Literary Life, p. 67.
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‘Is it a symbol of priesthood polluting the most sacred things of 
life?’57 Perhaps serving to confirm this and again connecting the 
chapel with the body, Blake also produced a pencil sketch titled, 
‘The Golden Chapel’ depicting a woman with a gothic chapel 
for a vulva.58 In a fragment from his notebook titled, ‘Merlin’s 
Prophecy’, Blake says:
The harvest shall flourish in wintry weather
When two virginities meet together
The King & the Priest must be tied in a tether
Before two virgins can meet together59
Where sexual continence is encouraged by the Church in the 
forms of complete sexual abstinence and the prohibition of ex-
tra-marital sex, it creates a defiled perception of sex as impure 
and sinful. Thus licentiousness and adultery come into being as 
debauched negatives, where before they were simply joyfully nat-
ural sex, namely, ‘the garden of love’ that bears so many sweet 
flowers. Blake, however, is not writing erotica. He is not seeing sex 
as something filthy and offensive and used therefore to defy social 
convention. Rather he is being open and sincere about something 
natural, and thereby opposing the anomalous restraint of desire, 
the ashamed need for surreptitiousness, the general fear of living, 
and the warped character that follows such forsaken self-deceit.60 
Perceptively Kazin said of Blake that he was able to foresee:
The danger that is exactly present in our modern eroticism, which 
has the same relation to the failure of love that totalitarian solu-
tions have to the failure of society. When we compare Blake with 
an artist like D. H. Lawrence, or an oratorical rebel like Henry 
Miller, we can see how much the obsessiveness, the cringing 
over-emphasis on sex in the most advanced modern writing is 
 57 S. Foster Damon, William Blake: His Philosophy and Symbols (Whitefish, 
Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 2006), p. 287. Damon adds that the sty 
is a cleaner place than the polluted temple.
 58 See from Vala, or the Four Zoas, ‘The Golden Chapel’, pencil, c. 1797.
 59 Blake, ‘Merlin’s Prophecy’, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 473.
 60 Kazin, The Portable Blake, p. 37.
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due to the inability of these writers to treat sex naturally in the 
whole frame of the human organization. As the dirty story pays 
homage to puritanism, so our modern eroticism wearily proclaims 
that the part which has been dislodged from the whole shall now 
be the key to experience. The limitations of eroticism have exactly 
the same character, in life and in art: it divorces sex from human 
culture.61
Concerning the negative views of sex that Blake felt the Church 
had created and the consequences of this, he tells us that just as 
Prisons are built with stones of Law so Brothels are built with 
bricks of Religion.62 This appears to argue that we only have pris-
ons because of law, and only have brothels because of religion. 
Or as Paananen rather neatly puts it: ‘For Blake the institutional-
ized moral prohibition in fact creates the vice that it condemns.’63 
Marshall likewise says that Blake understood: ‘Laws require pris-
ons to enforce them as much as repressive morality creates the 
need for prostitutes.’64 But in Blake’s time the law did more than 
build prisons. It also built the gallows that could even be used to 
hang children.
Damon notes that Blake’s proverb: ‘Prisons are built with 
stones of Law, Brothels with bricks of Religion’, must have been 
inspired by Paul’s words: ‘By the law is the knowledge of sin.’65 
If so Blake is, it would seem, applying his own twist to Paul. For 
when Paul writes: ‘Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall 
no flesh be justified in his sight: for by the law is the knowledge 
of sin’66, he means that our obedience to the law may justify us in 
the eyes of ourselves and other people, but not in the eyes of God 
 61 Kazin, The Portable Blake, p. 38.
 62 See Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 8, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 36.
 63 Paananen, William Blake, p. 51.
 64 Marshall, William Blake: Visionary Anarchist, p. 42.
 65 Rom 3: 20, KJV. Damon adds that upon this passage grew one of the 
Gnostic heresies: ‘Epiphanes . . . wrote a book On Justice . . . asserting . . . 
that the law, by introducing the distinction of meum and tuum, was the real 
author of the sin of theft and adultery.’ (Mansel’s Gnostic Heresies, VIII). 
Quoted from, Damon, William Blake: His Philosophy and Symbols, p. 320. 
Note that ‘meum’ and ‘tuum’ translate roughly as ‘mine’ and ‘yours’.
 66 Rom 3: 20, KJV.
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before whom we are always guilty owing to the universal corrup-
tion in our nature. We are thus unlike Adam in his innocence or 
Christ whose works were perfect, because we are sinful. Thus our 
obedience to the law is always imperfect in God’s eyes despite any 
justification by our own works.67 And so to say, ‘by the law is the 
knowledge of sin’, means for Paul that the very existence of the 
law lets us know we are sinners. If Blake was inspired by Paul’s 
line, his aim may have been to take its conclusion and apply to it 
an opposite logic so as to say no law, no sin.68 This is because for 
Blake it is only the law itself that makes us sinners. Thus Marshall 
argues: ‘It is law which alone defines a crime, invites people to 
commit it, and promises dire punishment.’69 The gist here is that 
for Blake law is not the cure for social and moral problems, but 
the main reason behind those problems.70
In some respects Blake was opposed to the notion of Sin, which 
he took to be a false infringement based on a manufactured code 
of morality designed to punish people for following their natural 
energies. However, as will become clear, Blake also realized that 
without Sin there could be no forgiveness. We might be justified 
in arguing that if there was no concept of Sin to begin with then 
there would be no need for forgiveness. Nevertheless there is a 
concept of Sin, which, as we shall see, forgiveness serves to coun-
teract. This concept of Sin was important to Blake because if one 
is pure they cannot taste the sweets of the forgiveness of sins and 
if holy cannot behold the tears of love.71 With reference to Sin 
Blake writes: ‘Satan thinks that Sin is displeasing to God he ought 
to know that Nothing is displeasing to God but Unbelief & Eating 
 67 My thoughts on Paul are guided here by Matthew Henry’s Concise 
Commentaries, and John Gill’s Exposition of the Entire Bible.
 68 In a related way Nietzsche writes: ‘No morality has any value in itself.’ 
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, (London: Penguin, 1968), Translated by, 
R. J. Hollingdale, p. 100. While elsewhere he similarly writes: ‘There are 
no moral phenomena at all, only a moral interpretation of phenomena.’ 
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, (London: Penguin, 1973), Translated 
by, R. J. Hollingdale, p. 96.
 69 Marshall, William Blake: Visionary Anarchist, p. 42.
 70 Marshall, William Blake: Visionary Anarchist, p. 42.
 71 See, for example, Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 60, in Erdman, The Complete 
Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 211.
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of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil.’72 We will explore 
why for Blake eating of the tree of the knowledge of Good and 
Evil is so significant in due course, but suffice to say that for Blake 
this is why there is a concept of Sin that demands forgiveness in 
the first place.
Regarding the ‘natural energies’ mentioned earlier that we are 
punished for following, Blake writes: ‘Energy is the only life and 
is from the Body and Reason is the bound or outward circumfer-
ence of Energy. Energy is Eternal Delight.’73 While Blake lived in 
a time that called itself, ‘The Age of Reason’, he himself was more 
inclined to live in an ‘Age of Imagination’, ‘Age of Inspiration’ or 
‘Age of Energy.’ Reason, for Blake, was represented by his god, 
Urizen. The name is said by many to be a pun for ‘Your Reason’, 
while others derive it from the Greek ουριζειν, meaning ‘to limit’ 
which is the root of the English ‘horizon.’ It could of course mean 
both for the point would appear to be that as a horizon your rea-
son sets limits and bounds to your energy. For Blake, the typical 
depiction of Urizen is as an old man with a white beard, and we 
are perhaps meant to identify him with the, ‘isolated paternal deity 
of traditional Christian iconography.’74 Setting bounds to our en-
ergies he is the contrary to imagination, or Blake’s god, Urthona. 
Urizen is the avenging god of punitive law. He is also known as an 
architect and uses a compass to draw his circumscribing lines and 
boundaries.75 Blake might be influenced here by Milton, who says 
of the Creator that he: ‘Took the Golden Compasses, prepared / 
In God’s eternal store, to circumscribe / This Universe, and all 
created things.’76 In his note-book of 1808–11, Blake writes in the 
 72 Blake, A Vision of the Last Judgment, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry 
and Prose of William Blake, p. 564.
 73 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 4, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 34.
 74 Robert Ryan, ‘Blake and Religion’, The Cambridge Companion to 
William Blake (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 156.
 75 Hence Blake’s reference to the brethren of priests who ‘lay the bound or 
build the roof’ that was quoted earlier from The Marriage of Heaven and 
Hell. See Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 27, in Erdman, 
The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 45.
 76 John Milton, Paradise Lost, vii, 225–7, quoted from, The Annotated 
Milton: Complete English Poems, (Ed.), Burton Raffel, (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1999), p. 351.
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following lines titled, ‘To God’: ‘If you have formd a Circle to go 
into / Go into it yourself & see how you would do’77
Blake’s most vehement attack on institutionalised religion and 
its view of sexuality is perhaps found in his poem, Visions of the 
Daughters of Albion. Robert Ryan says of the poem:
Oothoon, the victim of rape, having been scorned by the rapist 
and rejected by the man who once loved her, delivers a searing in-
dictment of the entire moral system in which she has been trapped, 
concluding with a bold advocacy of free love. In lines that still 
have power to shock, she speaks of masturbatory acts and asks, 
“Are not these the places of religion? the rewards of continence? / 
The self enjoyings of self denial?”78
Referred to as ‘the frankest literary work on this subject before 
our times’,79 I would maintain that it is still relevant today owing 
to the strict religious moral laws that in some parts of the world 
still see, for example: rape victims accused of adultery, adulteress-
es disfigured or stoned to death, and homosexuals hanged. And 
lest we forget, we might also mention the sexual abuse of children 
by abstinent priests. Speaking of Oothoon’s reference to mastur-
bation, Paananen writes: ‘Not only is masturbation the usual out-
come of the sexual denial that both Blake and Oothoon oppose, 
but it is the physical manifestation of a society that denies rela-
tionship and commodifies the opposite sex, thereby creating the 
tormenting object and the private, secretive subject that Blake and 
Marx saw to be definitive features of bourgeois society.’80 In an-
other speech Oothoon: ‘traces the connection between Christian 
theology and clerical privilege and the social injustices they foster, 
moving in quick imaginative progression from tithes to marriage 
as related manifestations of the same oppressive system.’81 The 
speech is as follows:
 77 Blake, ‘To God’, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William 
Blake, p. 516.
 78 Ryan, ‘Blake and Religion’, p. 157.
 79 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 438.
 80 Paananen, William Blake, p. 70.
 81 Ryan, ‘Blake and Religion’, p. 157.
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With what sense does the parson claim the labour of the farmer?
Where are his nets & gins & traps. & how does he surround him
With cold floods of abstraction, and with forests of solitude,
To build him castles and high spires. where kings & priests may 
dwell.
Till she who burns with youth. and knows no fixed lot; is bound
In spells of law to one she loathes82
In an epigraph to his poem The Four Zoas, Blake used the fol-
lowing statement from Paul: ‘For we wrestle not against flesh and 
blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers 
of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high 
places.’83 However, while Blake follows Paul here, in his view: 
‘Paul’s chief error was his hostile attitude to sex that reduced it 
to a physical need.’84 Thus Paul writes: ‘It is good for a man not 
to touch a woman . . . But if they cannot contain, let them marry, 
for it is better to marry than to burn.’85 Whereas Blake, on the 
contrary, quite beautifully writes in a poem often referred to as 
‘Eternity’: ‘He who binds to himself a joy / Does the winged life 
destroy / But he who kisses the joy as it flies / Lives in eternity’s 
sun rise.’86
 82 Blake, Visions of the Daughters of Albion, Plate 5, in Erdman, The Complete 
Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 49.
 83 Eph 6: 12.
 84 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 323.
 85 I Cor 7: 1–9.
 86 Blake, ‘Eternity’, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William 
Blake, p. 474. The actual extent of Blake’s own sexual liberty is un-
known. Ackroyd says of Blake’s wife Catherine that she harboured: ‘A 
more general discontent with her husband’s opinions on sexual matters.’ 
Ackroyd, Blake, p. 81. Some biographers of Blake mark how he suggest-
ed having sexual relations with a concubine, which is usually understood 
to be one of their maids. Others suggested that the third woman was 
Mary Wollstonecraft. Whoever the proposed concubines were, Blake is 
said to have changed his mind on seeing Catherine cry in response to this 
suggestion. However, other biographers dismiss the third woman as no 
more than conjecture. Ackroyd writes: ‘There is no evidence that Blake 
was ever unfaithful to his wife.’ Ackroyd, Blake, p. 82. But James King 
draws attention to Alexander Gilchrist’s mysterious words about Blake 
and Catherine: ‘There had been stormy times in years long past, when 
both were young; discord by no means trifling while it lasted. But with 
the cause (jealousy on her side, not wholly unprovoked), the strife had 
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Transgression and the Forgiveness of Sins
In one of his annotations, Blake remarks:
All Penal Laws court Transgression & therefore are cruelty & 
Murder / The laws of the Jews were (both ceremonial & real) the 
basest & most oppressive of human codes & being like all other 
ceased also.’ James King, William Blake: His Life (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1991), p. 130. Kazin says that Blake’s writings show that 
he was: ‘Tormented by her jealousy and that he thought marriage was 
the devil.’ Kazin, The Portable Blake, p. 36. In his note book 1800–3, 
Blake writes: ‘When a Man has married a Wife / he finds out whether / 
her knees & elbows are only / glued together’ Blake, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 516. Of what he perhaps 
expected from a wife, Blake writes in his notes: ‘In a wife I would desire / 
What in whores is always found / The lineaments of Gratified desire’ 
Blake, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, 
p. 474. But perhaps the truth of the matter is contained in Blake’s poem, 
‘My Pretty Rose Tree’: ‘A flower was offerd to me; / Such a flower as May 
never bore. / But I said I’ve a Pretty Rose-tree: / And I passed the sweet 
flower o’er. / Then I went to my Pretty Rose-tree; / To tend her by day 
and by night. / But my Rose turnd away with jealousy: / And her thorns 
were my only delight.’ Blake, ‘My Pretty Rose Tree’, Songs of Experience, 
in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 25. On 
a lighter note, the Blake Records give the following account of Blake’s 
liberalism in the form of his and Catherine’s nudity: ‘One story in par-
ticular he [Thomas Butts] was fond of telling . . . At the end of the little 
garden in Hercules Buildings there was a summer-house. Mr Butts calling 
one day found Mr. And Mrs. Blake sitting in this summer-house, freed 
from “those troublesome disguises” which have prevailed since the Fall. 
“Come in!” cried Blake; “it’s only Adam and Eve, you know!” Husband 
and wife had been reciting passages from Paradise Lost, in character, and 
the garden of Hercules Buildings had to represent the Garden of Eden; a 
little to the scandal of wondering neighbours, on more than one occasion.’ 
Bentley, Blake Records, pp. 53–4. For a recent discussion on what may 
have influenced Blake’s views on sexuality, see, Craig D. Atwood, ‘Christ 
and the Bridal Bed: Eighteenth-Century Moravian Erotic Spirituality as 
a Possible Influence on Blake’, in Re-Envisioning Blake, Edited by, Mark 
Crosby, Troy Patenaude, and Angus Whitehead (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012). For example, Atwood writes: ‘It is possible, and per-
haps even likely, that some of the more intriguing aspects of Blake’s art, 
poetry, and spirituality have roots in the radical religious piety his mother 
experienced in the Moravian Church in Fetter Lane. Eighteenth-century 
Moravian hymns, liturgies, and sermons are replete with sexualized im-
agery.’ Atwood, ‘Christ and the Bridal Bed’, p. 161.
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codes given under pretence of divine command were what Christ 
pronounced them The Abomination that maketh desolate, i.e. 
State Religion which is the Source of all Cruelty.87
Ryan commenting on this passage writes: ‘To Blake’s apocalyptic 
imagination the Established Church was a tool, if not an embodi-
ment of Antichrist.’88 Similarly Blake writes:
Man must & will have Some Religion; if he has not the Religion of 
Jesus, he will have the Religion of Satan, & will erect the Synagogue 
of Satan. calling the Prince of this World, God; and destroying all 
who do not worship Satan under the Name of God. Will any one 
say: Where are those who worship Satan under the Name of God! 
Where are they? Listen! Every Religion that Preaches Vengeance 
for Sin is the Religion of the Enemy & Avenger; and not the 
Forgiver of Sin, and their God is Satan . . . This was the Religion of 
the Pharisees who murdered Jesus.89
Elsewhere Blake tells us: ‘There is a God of This World. A God 
Worshipd in this World as God & set above all that is calld God.’90 
For Blake then, echoing Paul in II Corinthians 4: 4, Satan is the 
God of this world. Satan takes possession of this world when 
Adam and Eve eat the fruit from the tree of knowledge of good 
and evil, thus bringing judgment based on moral values into the 
world. However, with what appears to be a Gnostic tinge Blake 
also understood the angry creator God of the Old Testament to 
be a false and cruel God. He says of this God: ‘Thinking as I do 
that the Creator of this World is a very Cruel Being & being a 
 87 Blake, ‘Annotations to An Apology for the Bible by R. Watson, Bishop of 
Landaff. London, 1797’, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 618. The term ‘abomination that maketh desolate’ is 
found in Dan 9: 27, 11: 31 and 12: 11. See also, Ezek 11: 18 and 21. It is 
also referred to explicitly by Jesus in, Mt 24: 15 and Mk 13: 14. 
 88 Ryan, ‘Blake and Religion’, p. 153. Note that Blake uses the term 
‘Antichrist’ to refer to a number of things. See Damon, A Blake Dictionary, 
p. 25.
 89 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 52, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 201.
 90 Blake, ‘Annotations to An Apology for the Bible by R. Watson, Bishop of 
Landaff. London, 1797’, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 618.
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Worshipper of Christ I cannot help saying the Son O how unlike 
the Father . . . First God Almighty comes with a Thump on the 
Head Then Jesus Christ comes with a balm to heal it.’91 In later 
life Blake had stopped calling the Old Testament God ‘Jehovah’, 
and referred to the creator of the natural world as ‘Elohim.’ Henry 
Crabb Robinson discussed this notion of a false God with Blake 
pointing out that the Bible is the work of God, and it begins by 
saying that God created the heaven and earth, but Robinson then 
adds: ‘I gained nothing by this for I was triumphantly told that 
this God was not Jehovah but the Elohim.’92
What does Blake mean by the difference between Jehovah and 
Elohim, and what is its significance? Damon (drawing on the 
rabbinical tradition) writes: ‘Elohim (an honorific plural) is the 
Creator in Genesis [1]. It represents God in his aspect of Justice, 
as contrasted with Jehovah, the aspect of Mercy. Sometimes the 
word ‘Elohim’ should have been translated simply “judges”.’93 For 
this reason commentators like Moses Maimonides refer to the line 
in Genesis 3: 5 as: ‘Ye shall be as gods [judges], knowing good and 
evil.’ The reading that refers to Adam and Eve becoming as ‘judg-
es’ by eating from the tree in the midst of the garden, reinforc-
es what Blake takes to be the Original Sin, namely, establishing 
oneself as a judge by dividing human realities into good and evil. 
Immediately after eating the fruit from the tree, Adam and Eve 
see they are naked and in shame cover themselves. Whereas be-
fore this they are naked and not ashamed, which literally means, 
not covered with clothes. For Blake then, Original Sin is to know 
good and evil and to judge others by moral values. Hence Adam 
and Eve can now see and judge, for example, their own and one 
another’s nakedness. This is a revolutionary reading in itself ow-
ing to the fact that the distinction between good and evil is typi-
cally used to judge those who are deemed to have sinned, whereas 
 91 Blake, ‘A Vision of the Last Judgment’, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry 
and Prose of William Blake, p. 565.
 92 Bentley, Blake Records, p. 545.
 93 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 119. In his poetry and art, Blake often 
equates Elohim with one of the gods from his own mythology, namely, 
Urizen. As discussed above, Urizen symbolizes (among other things) rea-
son and law-making.
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clearly for Blake, this judging based on the knowledge of good 
and evil is the actual sin. Thus, according with Jesus who crucial-
ly preached, ‘Judge not’,94 Blake writes: ‘Who dare to Judge but 
God alone?’95 The knowledge of good and evil, begetting judicial 
and moral law, is what banishes humankind from Eden, whereas 
Jesus’ gospel of the forgiveness of sins serves as we shall explore 
to reverse this.
Interestingly Blake associated the tree of the knowledge of good 
and evil with the gallows at Tyburn, which he called ‘Albion’s fa-
tal tree.’96 The fatal fruit of this tree, what Blake also calls ‘a Tree 
deadly and poisonous’,97 allows humankind to establish itself as 
Elohim (gods or judges). Kazin writes: ‘To him the tree in Eden is 
the gallows on which freedom-seeking man is hanged by dead-
souled priests.’98 While Jon Mee says of the gallows at Tyburn, 
they are: ‘The place where the unity of the nation is built upon the 
judicial murder of some of its members. The gallows for Blake are 
a place where difference is suppressed so that the bogus integrity 
of the nation may be preserved.’99 Damon writes, for Blake: ‘It is 
the system of Morality, the false church of Mystery, the whore 
of Babylon. On this tree Jesus was crucified.’100 For Blake then, 
Christ is crucified on the tree of the knowledge of good and evil 
in the midst of the garden, i.e. crucified by law and judgment. 
 94 Mt 7: 1.
 95 Blake, ‘Annotations to An Apology for the Bible’, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 619.
 96 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 82, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 240. Damon writes: ‘Tyburn was the site of the famous 
gallows in London. It was situated about the lower corner of Edgware 
Road, just to the north of Hyde Park, which was adjoined by Kensington 
Gardens. As the name indicates, Tyburn was near a brook, which crossed 
Oxford Street a little to the east of the present Marble Arch, and flowed 
through St. James’s Park, then plunged underground at the intersection 
of Stratford Place and South Molton Street, which is “Calvary’s foot.” 
Elsewhere, Blake thrice associated Tyburn and Golgotha.’ Damon, A 
Blake Dictionary, p. 413.
 97 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 38, in Erdman The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 185.
 98 Kazin, The Portable Blake, p. 11.
 99 Jon Mee, ‘Blake’s Politics in History’, The Cambridge Companion to 
William Blake (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 146.
 100 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 410.
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Referring to this fatal tree and seeing Albion as the punisher and 
judge, Blake writes:
He sat by Tyburns brook, and underneath his heel, shot up!
A deadly tree, he nam’d it Moral Virtue, and the Law
Of God who dwells in Chaos hidden from the human sight101
Nevertheless when it comes to his take on good and evil, Blake 
is ambivalent. On one level he is not looking to rid us of good 
and evil entirely for he saw these as fundamental to the  dialectical 
nature of reality, which is made up of a ‘dynamic interplay of 
opposing forces.’102 Blake called these Heraclitean forces, ‘ contraries.’ 
He writes:
Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, 
Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human 
Existence.
From these contraries spring what the religious call Good & Evil. 
Good is the passive that obeys Reason[.] Evil is the active spring-
ing from Energy.
Good is Heaven. Evil is Hell.103
Blake was wanting us to see that evil is as equally important as 
the good. Moreover by inverting these terms Blake appeared to 
see his notion of evil as the more positive aspect and good as 
the negative: ‘Heaven and its angels, the “Good,” are simply the 
unthinking orthodox. But Hell and its devils, the “Evil,” required 
revaluation.’104 With reference to Milton’s Paradise Lost, Blake 
asserts: ‘The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of 
Angels & God, and at liberty when of Devils & Hell, is because 
he was a true poet and of the Devil’s party without knowing it’105 
 101 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 28, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 174.
 102 Marshall, William Blake: Visionary Anarchist, p. 20.
 103 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 3, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 34.
 104 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 262.
 105 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 6, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 35.
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In this context, Devils for Blake are the source of all creative and 
revolutionary energy, while Angels passively obeying reason are 
‘restricting spirits of conventionality.’106 In this way then Blake 
is to a certain extent a moralist who akin to Nietzsche sought a 
revaluation or transposition of values.
But on another level beyond human existence, there are for 
Blake no moral precepts like good and evil because the forgiveness 
of sins preached in the Gospel cancels them out. In The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell Blake writes: ‘Every thing possible to be believ’d 
is an image of truth.’107 This would include the distinction between 
good and evil that turn humans into moralizing judges, which do 
not reflect how things truly are from a divine and therefore infinite 
viewpoint. Hence in his work Jerusalem, Blake writes:
What seems to Be: Is: To those whom
It seems to Be, & is productive of the most dreadful
Consequences to those whom it seems to Be: even of
Torments, Despair, Eternal Death; but the Divine Mercy
Steps beyond and Redeems Man in the Body of Jesus Amen
And Length Bredth Highth again Obey the Divine Vision 
Hallelujah.108
For Blake, moralizing law based on a conventional or orthodox 
interpretation of good and evil was an error. He writes: ‘And Man 
himself Become a Fiend, wrap’d in an endless curse, Consuming 
and consum’d for-ever in flames of Moral Justice. . . . Under pre-
tence of Moral Virtue, fill’d with Revenge and Law.’109 And we 
can add to this that, as far as Blake was concerned, Jesus shared 
the view that moralizing law was an error in that he was willing 
to subvert moral rules. We have quoted Blake above who said 
that without realizing it Milton was a true poet and so of the 
devil’s party. Blake it has been said was the same knowingly, and 
 106 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 103.
 107 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 8, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 37.
 108 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 32, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 179.
 109 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 36, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 182.
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so too, as he more than implies, was Jesus.110 Accordingly Blake 
held a view of Jesus diametrically opposed to that of orthodox 
Christianity. Blake is to his mind righting an inverted Jesus, hence 
he says: ‘The Modern church Crucifies Christ with the Head 
Downwards.’111 Ryan writes:
Blake proclaimed what he understood to be the true religion of 
Jesus, the distinguishing qualities of which were a radical demand 
for social justice, the cultivation of mutual love and  forgiveness, 
and the fostering of creative freedom in religion, morality, and 
the arts. The difficult mission that Blake undertook was to 
combat the deformed Christianity that had become the national 
religion of Britain, to take religion back from the priests who had 
subordinated it to the political, economic, and cultural agenda 
of the ruling classes, and to make it a truly revolutionary force 
in society.112
Although, like other religions, Christianity had come to be  controlled 
by clergy who represented and maintained the  status quo, in Blake’s 
eyes it had in truth originated with a radical  visionary who had 
little time for either priests or conventions. For Blake, Jesus was 
an iconoclast who sided with artists and revolutionaries and who 
was about liberation rather than repression and submission. For 
this reason his religion of Jesus does not concern dogma, ritual, and 
moral lore.
When referring to Jesus’ life Blake never believed in his super-
natural conception, but saw him as the son of an unidentified 
human father, and begotten out of wedlock.113 Related to this, and 
 110 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 103.
 111 Blake, A Vision of the Last Judgment, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry 
and Prose of William Blake, p. 564.
 112 Ryan, ‘Blake and Religion’, p. 154.
 113 And yet according to Blake, Jesus is God owing to his claim that: ‘I and 
my Father are one.’ Jn 10: 30, KJV. Blake saw Jesus as the ‘Human God’ 
or ‘divine human’, but only in the sense that he was created in God’s im-
age as indeed we all are according to Genesis 1: 27. Thus Blake is said to 
have asserted that: ‘Jesus is the only God . . . And so am I and so are you.’ 
Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 158. Appearing to border on Humanism, 
Blake anticipating Nietzsche also writes: ‘Thou art a Man God is no 
more, / Thy own humanity learn to adore’ Blake, The Everlasting Gospel, 
in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 520. 
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with a hint of anti-Semiticism, Blake says of his vision of Christ: 
‘Thine has a great hook nose like thine / Mine has a snub nose like 
to mine.’114 Likewise in his notebook he writes: ‘I always thought 
that Jesus Christ was a Snubby or I should not have worshipd 
him if I thought he had been one of those long spindle nosed 
rascals.’115 Begotten out of wedlock, Jesus was seen from birth to 
be an offense against the Law. Blake believed that Jesus’ mother 
Mary was: ‘Innocently gay & thoughtless, not being among the 
condemned because ignorant of crime in the midst of a corrupted 
Age.’116 In his poem Jerusalem, Blake reads between the lines of 
the Gospel account that says Mary was found with child while en-
gaged to Joseph, but before they came together; and with Joseph 
being a righteous man and not willing to expose her to public 
disgrace he was going to divorce her secretly.117 Blake creatively 
imagines the following conversation between Mary and her es-
poused Joseph:
If thou put me away from thee
Dost thou not murder me? Joseph spoke in anger & fury. Should I
Marry a Harlot & an Adulteress? Mary answerd, Art thou more pure
Than thy Maker who forgiveth Sins & calls again Her that is Lost
Tho She hates. he calls her again in love. I love my dear Joseph
But he driveth me away from his presence. yet I hear the voice of God
In the voice of my Husband. tho he is angry for a moment, he will not
Utterly cast me away. if I were pure, never could I taste the sweets
Of the Forgive[ne]ss of Sins! if I were holy! I never could behold 
the tears
However, Blake’s position is probably more akin to something between 
orthodox Deiformity and heretical Deification, for he also writes: ‘God is 
Man & exists in us & we in him.’ Blake, ‘Annotations to Berkeley’s Siris’, 
in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 664.
 114 Blake, The Everlasting Gospel, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and 
Prose of William Blake, p. 524.
 115 Blake, ‘Miscellaneous Prose’, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose 
of William Blake, p. 695.
 116 Blake, A Vision of the Last Judgment, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry 
and Prose of William Blake, p. 559.
 117 See Mt 1;18–19.
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Of love! of him who loves me in the midst of his anger in the furnace 
of fire.118
In response, Blake has Joseph weep and hold Mary in his arms. 
Joseph then tells Mary:
I heard his voice in my sleep & his Angel in my dream:
Saying, Doth Jehovah Forgive a debt only on condition that it shall
Be Payed? Doth he Forgive Pollution only on conditions of Purity
That Debt is not Forgiven! That Pollution is not Forgiven
Such is the Forgiveness of the Gods, the Moral Virtues of the
Heathen, whose tender Mercies are Cruelty. But Jehovahs Salvation
Is without Money & without Price, in the Continual Forgiveness 
of Sins,
In the Perpetual Mutual Sacrifice in Great Eternity! for behold!
There is none that liveth & Sinneth not! And this is the Covenant
Of Jehovah: If you Forgive one-another, so shall Jehovah Forgive 
You:
That He Himself may Dwell among You.119
By reading Matthew 1: 18–25 in this way, we can see that Blake 
went far beyond the traditional ‘Hate the sin but love the sinner.’ 
Furthermore, when Blake writes: ‘If you Forgive one-another, so 
shall Jehovah Forgive You: that He Himself may Dwell among 
you’, it seems that for Blake the very act of our forgiving one- 
another is simultaneously God’s act of forgiving us. This puts 
a completely different emphasis on the following in the Lord’s 
Prayer: ‘And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.’120 
This is to say that God forgives us our debts in the very act of us 
forgiving our debtors. They are not distinct acts. Hence immedi-
ately after the Lord’s Prayer it reads: ‘For if ye forgive men their 
trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you. But if you 
forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive 
your trespasses.’121 Elsewhere Blake writes: ‘Where Mercy, Love & 
 118 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 60, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 211.
 119 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 60, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, pp. 211–12.
 120 Mt 6: 12. KJV. Italics mine.
 121 Mt 6: 14–15. KJV.
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Pity dwell, / There God is dwelling too.’122 Interpreting these lines, 
Hobson argues: ‘God and Jesus, for Blake, are humanity, when 
and where it can live by these virtues.’123 This puts into greater 
perspective our quoting Blake earlier as saying: ‘men forgot that 
All deities reside in the human breast’124 and likewise: ‘God only 
Acts & Is, in existing beings or Men.’125
Returning to Blake’s view that Mary was an adulterer, impor-
tantly this makes her a Transgressor and thus the fitting mother 
of Jesus who, for Blake, was the greatest of all Transgressors.126 In 
The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Blake has a devil say:
If Jesus Christ is the greatest man, you ought to love him in the 
greatest degree; now hear how he has given his sanction to the 
law of ten commandments: did he not mock at the sabbath, and 
so mock the sabbath’s God? murder those who were murderd be-
cause of him? turn away the law from the woman taken in adul-
tery? steal the labor of others to support him? bear false witness 
when he omitted making a defence before Pilate? covet when he 
pray’d for his disciples, and when he bid them shake off the dust 
of their feet against such as refused to lodge them? I tell you, no 
virtue can exist without breaking these ten commandments: Jesus 
was all virtue, and acted from impulse: not from rules.127
Similar views are expounded in Blake’s unfinished poem The 
Everlasting Gospel, which shows that as a revolutionary fighting 
 122 Blake, ‘The Divine Image’, Songs of Innocence, in Erdman, The Complete 
Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 13.
 123 Hobson, ‘Anarchism and William Blake’s Idea of Jesus’, p. 49. Similarly, 
Hobson writes: ‘In Jerusalem  . . . the “Divine Vision” sings a song of 
oppression and endurance; the poem’s narrator closes by saying, “This is 
the Song of the Lamb, sung by Slaves in evening time.” Jerusalem, 60: 5, 
38. We must be careful not to assume that Blake means slaves’ songs are 
like the divine vision; he is saying slaves’ songs are the divine vision and 
the song of the Lamb (that is, Jesus); Jesus is slaves singing of freedom.’ 
Hobson, ‘Anarchism and William Blake’s Idea of Jesus’, p. 50. 
 124 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 11, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 38.
 125 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 16, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 40.
 126 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 264.
 127 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plates 22–24, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 43.
Prisons of Law and Brothels of Religion 263
against the established political and religious order, Jesus is will-
ing to defy moral principles and break the Ten Commandments. 
The poem therefore sets out Blake’s understanding of Jesus as a 
transgressor of the judicial and moral law. In one fragment, Blake 
writes: ‘The Vision of Christ that thou dost see / Is my Visions 
Greatest Enemy.’128 He also says of Christ: ‘Thine loves the same 
world that mine hates, / Thy Heaven doors are my Hell Gates’129 
And referring to scriptural exegesis: ‘Both read the Bible day & 
night, / But thou read’st black where I read white.’130
We cannot overlook that in the Old Testament Jehovah is 
 responsible for a long list of deeds that can appear evil to our eyes. 
Thus as Damon notes Jesus’ understanding of Jehovah as: ‘the lov-
ing Father of all was a revolutionary concept. He was no longer 
the God of vengeful Justice but the God of Mercy.’131 Elsewhere 
Damon says: ‘The universal paternity of the  all-loving Father 
 signifies the Brotherhood of Man, the only basis for a peaceful 
society. But this must rest upon the freedom and  development of 
the Individual.’132 Blake himself writes: ‘What is Liberty without 
Universal Toleration.’133 Toleration then points to the ‘forgive-
ness of sins’, which Blake understood to be Jesus’ revolutionary 
abrogation of the system of justice and punishment.134 Thus 
Blake asserts: ‘The Gospel is Forgiveness of Sins & has No Moral 
 128 Blake, The Everlasting Gospel, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and 
Prose of William Blake, p. 524.
 129 Blake, The Everlasting Gospel, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and 
Prose of William Blake, p. 524.
 130 Blake, The Everlasting Gospel, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and 
Prose of William Blake, p. 524.
 131 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 205.
 132 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 214. Hobson explores Blake’s notion of 
Jesus as the Brotherhood of Man in some depth in his essay, ‘Anarchism 
and William Blake’s Idea of Jesus.’ However, there is the danger here of 
an overriding tendency to see Jesus as universal humanity, and not bal-
ance this with the view that universal humanity is likewise Jesus. That is, 
for Blake, one cannot simply be reduced to the other.
 133 Blake, ‘Annotations to Boyd’s Historical Notes on Dante, Dublin, 1785’, 
in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 635.
 134 For Blake this was the unique insight of Jesus, and according to Damon 
was completely overlooked by the classical Pagan philosophers, such as, 
Plato and Aristotle. Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 141.
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Precepts’135 Consequently, as mentioned earlier, rather than any-
one establishing themselves as judges and dividing human reality 
into good and evil, Jesus instead asserts: ‘Judge not, that ye be not 
judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and 
with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.’136
As we have seen, for Blake a significant example of the  forgiveness 
of sins was that of Joseph forgiving Mary her  alleged adultery. This 
is later echoed in what is perhaps the most  outstanding  example 
of the forgiveness of sins, namely, the Pericope Adulterae found 
in Chapter 8 of the Gospel of John. Here Jesus saves a woman 
(who Blake associates with Mary Magdalene) from being stoned 
to death in accordance with Mosaic Law for also  committing 
adultery. Wishing to see how Jesus reacts to the law, the scribes 
and Pharisees ask him his view on the matter. Exposing their hy-
pocrisy, Jesus famously replies: “He that is without sin among 
you, let him cast the first stone at her.”137 Starting from the elders, 
they depart one by one until Jesus is left alone with the woman. 
He asks her if any man has condemned her, and when she says 
no, Jesus then tells her that he does not condemn her either.138 
 135 Blake, ‘Annotations to An Apology for the Bible, by R. Watson, Bishop of 
Landaff. London, 1797’, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 619.
 136 Mt 7: 1–2. Again Blake might read this to mean that our judging or not 
judging is simultaneously God’s judging or not judging. Before this, Jesus 
questions the lex talionis, saying: ‘Ye have heard that it hath been said, 
An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye 
resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to 
him the other also.’ Mt 5: 38–39, KJV. And following this says: ‘Ye have 
heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate 
thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies.’ Mt 5: 43–44, KJV.
 137 Jn 8: 7, KJV.
 138 It is interesting to note that during this exchange with the scribes and 
Pharisees, Jesus bends down twice to write in the ground with his finger. 
Nothing is said about this in the text, but it may be a reference to the 
following in Jeremiah: ‘O LORD, the hope of Israel, all that forsake thee 
shall be ashamed, and they that depart from me shall be written in the 
earth, because they have forsaken the LORD, the fountain of living wa-
ters.’ Jer 17: 13, KJV. Tradition has it that Jesus is actually writing out the 
sins of the scribes and Pharisees after asking them to cast a stone if they 
are without sin. I also wonder if Jesus is writing in the ground to show 
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Jesus often questions and denounces the scribes and Pharisees 
for being advocates of a narrow legalism who, without purity of 
soul, outwardly comply with conventional morality: ‘Woe unto 
you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For ye are like unto whit-
ed sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are 
within full of dead men’s bones, and of all uncleanness.’139 In The 
Everlasting Gospel, Blake says of the Pericope Adulterae:
Was Jesus Chaste or did he
Give any Lessons of Chastity
The morning blushd fiery red
Mary was found in Adulterous bed
Earth groand beneath & Heaven above
Trembled at discovery of Love
Jesus was sitting in Moses Chair
They brought the trembling Woman There
Moses commands she be stoned to Death
What was the sound of Jesus breath
He laid His hand on Moses Law
The Ancient Heavens in Silent Awe
Writ with Curses from Pole to Pole
All away began to roll140
Blake then has Jesus say to the scribes and Pharisees:
. . . Come Ye forth
Fallen Friends of Heavnly birth
That have forgot your Ancient love
And driven away my trembling Dove
You shall bow before her feet
that the spirit of the law is not engraved in stone tablets as is the letter of 
the law. 
 139 Mt 23: 27, KJV.
 140 Blake, The Everlasting Gospel, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and 
Prose of William Blake, p. 521. Beer writes: ‘The Jesus revealed in this 
poem is someone who does not adhere slavishly to the law but who in-
terprets experience in a more humane manner, understanding that the 
adulterous woman has at least the virtue of living by love. Other passages 
show him failing to fulfil any suggestions that he showed humility – or 
even gentility – so far as relations with his fellows were concerned.’ Beer, 
William Blake: A Literary Life, p. 188.
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You shall lick the dust for Meat
And tho you cannot Love but Hate
Shall be beggars at Loves Gate141
Finally, Blake says of Jesus:
The Publicans & Harlots he
Selected for his Company,
And from the Adulteress turn’d away
God’s righteous Law, that lost its Prey.142
E. P. Thompson says of Blake: ‘In shedding the prohibitives of the 
Moral Law; Blake held fast to the affirmative: Thou Shalt Love. It 
is because this affirmative remains an essential need and quest of 
our own times that William Blake still speaks with such power to 
us.’143 Accordingly Blake asserts:
Mutual in one anothers love and wrath all renewing
We live as One Man; for contracting our infinite senses
We behold multitude; or expanding: we behold as one,
As One Man all the Universal Family; and that One Man
We call Jesus the Christ: and he in us, and we in him,
Live in perfect harmony in Eden the land of life,
Giving, receiving, and forgiving each others trespasses.144
By a continual forgiving of each other’s trespasses, Hobson points 
to Blake’s belief in human imperfection, which, he argues, is par-
adoxically the key to Blake’s idea of nonauthoritarian society. If 
we recall, we quoted Blake as saying: ‘There is none that liveth & 
Sinneth not!’145 The notion of perfectibility is said to be deeply en-
trenched in radical thought. The argument is that because people 
 141 Blake, The Everlasting Gospel, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and 
Prose of William Blake, p. 522.
 142 Blake, The Everlasting Gospel, in Keynes, Blake: Complete Writings 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 757. Note that this passage 
does not appear in Erdman’s text.
 143 E. P. Thompson, Witness Against the Beast: William Blake and the Moral 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 128.
 144 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 34, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 180.
 145 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 61, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 212.
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are not perfect they need to be shaped from above by a more perfect 
leadership.146 Hence communism can soon become totalitarianism. 
Blake was aware of such regimes from England’s religious history 
(Cromwell, for example), and witnessed it in his own life with the 
French Revolution that replaced one form of tyranny with another. 
Hobson writes:
In place of the French “republic of Virtue”, which led to vesting 
supreme power in virtue’s guardians, Blake offered the idea of con-
tinual forgiveness of sins . . . By implication, if there is continual 
forgiveness of sin, the ideological justification for a hierarchy of 
social guardians vanishes, a crucial step in convincing people to 
abolish the hierarchies in reality.’147
We noted above that the only basis for a peaceful society rests 
upon the freedom and thus development of the individual. Blake 
writes: ‘The worship of God is. Honouring his gifts in other men’148 
Appearing to echo Jesus’ command to: ‘Love your enemies’149, 
Blake insightfully and quite beautifully suggests that: ‘Opposition 
is true Friendship.’150 This is not to my mind a simple call to ‘live 
and let live’, but more subtly and profoundly says, ‘let live and 
live.’ For as Blake affirms: ‘Mutual Forgiveness of each Vice / Such 
are the Gates of Paradise’151 This is to say that through the mutual 
forgiveness of those that trespass against one another liberty is 
granted to each in the process. Consequently all life is increased in 
 146 Hobson, ‘Anarchism and William Blake’s Idea of Jesus’, p. 53.
 147 Hobson, ‘Anarchism and William Blake’s Idea of Jesus’, p. 53.
 148 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 22, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 43.
 149 See Mt 5: 44.
 150 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 20, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 42. Incidentally, this line 
of Blake’s brings to mind the following passage from Pierre Teilhard de 
Chardin: ‘In any domain – whether it be the cells of a body, the members 
of a society or the elements of a spiritual synthesis – union differentiates. 
In every organised whole, the parts perfect themselves and fulfil them-
selves.’ Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, (London: Collins, 
1955), p. 40.
 151 Blake, For the Sexes: The Gates of Paradise, in Erdman, The Complete 
Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 259.
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recognition that: ‘Every thing that lives is Holy’152 Paradoxically, 
it seems that tolerated difference through forgiveness not only 
brings about liberation for all, but also allows for a more genuine 
harmony, which, as we saw above, equates for Blake with Eden – 
the land of life. It also equates with Jerusalem, which as the Holy 
City of Peace always represents ‘liberty’ for Blake. This perhaps 
gives renewed emphasis to Blake’s famous lines:
I will not cease from Mental Fight,
Nor shall my Sword sleep in my hand:
Till we have built Jerusalem,
In Englands green & pleasant Land.153
While I have referred above to society resting upon the liberty 
and development of the individual, we must be careful here and 
stress that Blake’s anarchism does not simply serve to promote 
individual choice and thus freedom. This is more a means than an 
end. Blake’s vision is not about the individual self and certainly 
does not advocate what we might call a subjective or private take 
on religion. Blake’s vision is radically social. The love between 
people is a mutual love made ‘in the Perpetual Mutual Sacrifice 
in Great Eternity!’154 It is through the forgiveness of sins that we 
become a Universal Humanity or Divine Body living as One Man – 
Jesus Christ. As Blake says: ‘General Forms have their vitality in 
Particulars: & every particular is a Man; a Divine Member of 
the Divine Jesus.’155 And elsewhere: ‘The Eternal Body of Man is 
THE IMAGINATION. God himself / that is / The Divine Body 
 . . . [Yeshua] JESUS we are his Members.’156 These citations  almost 
certainly appear to echo Paul when he says: ‘Now ye are the Body 
 152 Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Plate 27, in Erdman, The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, p. 45.
 153 Blake, Milton, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William 
Blake, pp. 95–6.
 154 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 61, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 212.
 155 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 91, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 251.
 156 Blake, Laocoön, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William 
Blake, p. 273.
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of Christ, and members in particular.’157 There also appears to be 
a trace of Paul’s reference to God being, ‘all in all.’158 Likewise 
Paul’s description of the true Christ who: ‘is before all things, and 
by him all things consist.’159 And there are clearly parallels with 
Jesus when he says: ‘Again I say unto you, That if two of you shall 
agree on earth as touching any thing that they shall ask, it shall be 
done for them of my Father which is in Heaven. For where two 
or three are gathered together in my name, there I am in the midst 
of them.’160
Another crucial point to consider is that the mutual forgive-
ness of sins should not be taken as another moral law or divine 
command used to bind people in terms of ‘thou shalt.’ And of 
course there is the added danger that this warning in the form of 
should not is also taken as yet another prescriptive demand to 
counter the initial danger. These are indeed dangers that miss the 
point and rightly court transgression. The doctrine of forgiveness 
(if it is a doctrine) must stem from self-sacrifice and love. To rule 
by judicial or moral law that you must, for example, tolerate 
does not bring about toleration. It becomes yet another moral 
code used to enslave and judge people. Blake’s advocacy of love 
and forgiveness represents God in His aspect of Mercy – not 
Justice. A genuine forgiveness of sins repeals moral precepts. It 
 157 1 Cor 12: 27. KJV.
 158 1 Cor 15. 28, KJV.
 159 Col 1: 17, KJV. Another figure who was greatly influenced by Paul was 
Teilhard de Chardin, and Blake’s Divine Body of Christ consisting of 
particular members is akin to Teilhard’s Cosmic Christ. Throughout his 
work Teilhard argues that ‘union differentiates’, which is to say that in 
any organized whole the parts become more autonomous not less so and 
form a harmonized complexity rather than becoming lost in the great 
whole. For example, he writes: ‘Now, what is the only way in which 
a centre can be formed and sustained as such? Is it by breaking down 
the lower centres which fall under its governance? Indeed it is not – it 
is by strengthening them in its own image. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, 
Christianity and Evolution (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace and 
Company, 1969), p. 117.
 160 Mt 18: 19–20. KJV. I am indebted in this paragraph to the essay, ‘William 
Blake and Life in the Divine Body’, by Christopher Rowland in, Paul, 
Grace, and Freedom: Essays in Honour of John K. Riches, edited by, Paul 
Middleton, Angus Paddison, and Karen Wenell (London and New York: 
T & T Clark International, 2009), pp. 119–130.
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is a case of putting love before the letter of the law, as we saw 
with the woman taken in adultery. Through mutual forgiveness 
Jesus is among us as us, that is ‘he in us, and we in him.’161 Thus 
mutual forgiveness mirrors Paul’s call for unity indicating: ‘One 
God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in 
you all.’162
A significant question, I believe, emerges when we ask how 
Blake’s view of Jesus as a transgressor of rabbinical law squares 
with the following words attributed to him: ‘Think not that I 
come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to de-
stroy, but to fulfil.’163 It is argued that selections of the sayings of 
Jesus were in circulation before the Gospels were produced, and 
some were preferred by stricter Jewish Christians: ‘Such a selec-
tion of sayings could be drawn up in accordance with the outlook 
of those who compiled it; sayings which in themselves appeared 
to support that outlook would be included, while others which 
appeared to go contrary would be omitted.’164 Matthew is said 
to have not limited himself to one selection. However the source 
said to draw from ‘a more legally minded Christian circle’165 is 
often labelled M because it only features in Matthew’s Gospel, 
while a more comprehensive selection is referred to as Q. An ex-
ample here is the verse that follows the one just quoted, which has 
Jesus say: ‘For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, 
one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be 
fulfilled.’166 The scholar T. W. Manson argued that coming from 
the M form this was a revision of the original wording designed 
to bring it in line with rabbinical doctrine. Whereas Luke’s version 
of the saying, ‘It is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one 
tittle of the law to fail’167 came from the Q form and was closer 
to the original. Furthermore Manson argues that: ‘The saying in 
 161 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 34, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 180.
 162 Eph 4: 6, KJV.
 163 Mt 5: 17, KJV.
 164 Walter C. Kaiser Jr., and, Peter H. Davids, F. F. Bruce, Manfred T. Brauch, 
Hard Sayings of the Bible (Illinois, IVP Academic, 1996), p. 355.
 165 Kaiser, et al., Hard Sayings of the Bible, p. 355.
 166 Mt 5: 18, KJV.
 167 Lk 16: 17, KJV.
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its original form asserts not the perpetuity of the Law but the un-
bending conservatism of the scribes’ and is not meant to be ‘sound 
Rabbinical dogma but bitter irony.’168 Thus interpreted correctly 
Manson understands Jesus to be saying to the scribes: ‘The world 
will come to an end before you give up the tiniest part of your 
traditional interpretation of the law.’169
It is apparent that Jesus did not adhere to the rabbinical inter-
pretation of the law. And when the scribes and Pharisees accuse 
his disciples of transgressing the tradition of their elders by not 
washing their hands before eating bread, Jesus replies: ‘Why do ye 
also transgress the commandment of God by your tradition?’170 
Yet crucially, and surely Blake would have agreed, for Jesus cir-
cumstances could alter cases in that (taking an obvious example): 
‘The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath.’171 
But Jesus does not ignore the necessities of God’s law nor encour-
age his followers to be less just, as the ensuing verse confirms: 
‘That except your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the 
scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter in the kingdom of 
heaven.’172 When he is left alone with the woman taken in adul-
tery and it is confirmed that no man including himself condemns 
her, Jesus does not simply tell her to go, but rather to go ‘and sin 
no more.’173 But crucially this I would argue is not to be seen as a 
condition for forgiveness. We quoted Blake earlier as saying:
Doth Jehovah Forgive a debt only on condition that it shall
Be Payed? Doth he Forgive Pollution only on conditions of Purity
 168 T. W. Manson, The Sayings of Jesus (Reprint; Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1979), p. 135.
 169 Manson, The Sayings of Jesus, p. 135.
 170 Mt 15: 3, KJV.
 171 Mk 2: 27, KJV.
 172 Mt 5: 20, KJV. From another point of view Jesus’ fulfils the law which 
he sees as the expression of God’s will because obeying or disobeying the 
law begins in the heart. He constantly called the scribes and Pharisees 
hypocrites because they only followed the law outwardly and not in-
wardly. Jesus’ mind and will is to do the will of God and: ‘where this is 
so, there will be an emphasis on the inward spiritual aspects of ethics 
and religion, rather than on outward and material aspects.’ Kaiser, et al., 
Hard Sayings of the Bible, p. 357.
 173 Jn 8: 11, KJV.
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That Debt is not Forgiven! That Pollution is not Forgiven
Such is the Forgiveness of the Gods, the Moral Virtues of the
Heathen, whose tender Mercies are Cruelty. But Jehovah’s 
Salvation
Is without Money & without Price, in the Continual Forgiveness 
of Sins174
Yet significantly Blake goes one step further and has Mary add 
to her sin of adultery the sin of blaspheming Love and Jesus. In 
so doing he twists the notion of what it is to sin. For Mary her 
added sin occurred because she concealed her true nature, and so 
speaking to Jesus she refers to her:
Dark pretence to Chastity
Blaspheming Love blaspheming thee
Thence Rose Secret Adulteries
And thence did Covet also rise
My Sin thou hast forgiven me
Canst thou forgive my Blaspehemy175
In Blake’s interpretation of Joseph forgiving Mary her alleged 
adultery it would seem that in line with the rabbinical tradition, 
Elohim as Justice and Jehovah as Mercy are correlated as Elohim 
Jehovah. This is because for Blake, as we touched upon earlier, 
Elohim as Justice and Jehovah as Mercy are necessary to each 
other in that sin can only be forgiven when it is first judged to be 
sin.176 For Blake: ‘Justice, the punishment of (or vengeance for) 
sin . . . was the Contrary of Mercy, the forgiveness of sin. It was the 
Old Dispensation of Moses, annulled by the New Dispensation 
of Jesus.’177 And perhaps this New Dispensation is precisely how 
Jesus, in Blake’s view, fulfils the law.
 174 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 60, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 212.
 175 Blake, The Everlasting Gospel, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and 
Prose of William Blake, p. 522.
 176 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 119.
 177 Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 227.
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Conclusion
I have tried to show that to a certain extent Blake can be under-
stood as an anarchist in that he advocated all forms of liberation 
and rebelled against all authority – State and King, Church and 
God, Master and Mammon, Parent and Teacher. However I have 
not referred to Blake simply as an anarchist, but as a Christian an-
archist. The advocacy of liberation from authority was for him best 
expressed in what he deemed to be the true spirit of Christianity, 
namely, Jesus’ subversion of all judicial and moral law. And so 
while Blake was arguably a heretic among the orthodox, he was 
nevertheless a Christian in his anarchism in that among political 
radicals he staunchly defended what he saw as the true religion of 
Jesus and thus true spirit of Christianity. Accordingly he attacked 
religion that was a law and a tye to minds, but always asserted 
that the religion of Jesus was a perfect law of liberty.178
Yet we have seen that Blake was also an anarchist in his 
Christianity. For Blake the views of Jesus were diametrically op-
posed to the orthodox views of the Church in that Jesus had little 
respect for priests, laws or conventions. Arguably Blake sought to 
do battle with a distorted Christianity and make it a revolutionary 
force in society by taking it back from the priests who had subor-
dinated it to the political, economic and cultural agendas of the 
ruling classes.179 He mistrusted institutional state religion, which 
for him was the source of all cruelty, and attacked its priests for 
binding believers with law. Blake saw Jesus as a transgressor of 
law through his insight into the mutual forgiveness of sins, which 
repealed the system of justice and punishment. We saw that for 
Blake law is not a remedy for social disorder and moral chaos, 
but one of its principal causes.180 In Blake’s view human ills are 
not due to our transgressing divine law but because of the loss of 
imagination to restrictive reason, and our unwillingness to culti-
vate human energies in freedom.181 He wanted individuals to be 
free to cultivate their own mind and imagination, and to become 
 178 See Ackroyd, Blake, p. 159.
 179 See Ryan, ‘Blake and Religion’, p. 154.
 180 See Marshall, William Blake: Visionary Anarchist, p. 42.
 181 See Beer, William Blake: A Literary Life, p. 97.
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king, priest and artist in their own home.182 Radically inverting 
our notion of good and evil, Blake understood that the good who 
passively obey reason are the unthinking orthodox and restricting 
spirits of conventionality.183 While the evil are those who actively 
follow the creative and revolutionary energies that reason always 
seeks to circumscribe and limit. In Blake’s eyes it appears that the 
latter is represented best by true artists and poets who are never 
fettered, but like Jesus seek to pursue and advocate the revolution-
ary liberty that constitutes the true spirit of religion. Through his 
own artistic freedom and religious spirit Blake it seems sought to 
undo institutionalised Christianity, which he felt perverted Jesus’ 
original anarchistic message of love and liberty.
But does all I have discussed above make Blake a Christian 
anarchist? I noted in the introduction that understanding Blake 
as a Christian anarchist is different from saying that he identified 
himself as one. For me Blake is only a Christian anarchist by im-
plication. Christian anarchism, either as a movement or a concept, 
is not something he consciously identified with and subscribed 
to. The scope of this essay has made it easier to view Blake as a 
Christian anarchist by drawing relevant samples of his writing 
together that fit this description. But I think we should be cautious 
here, while nevertheless acknowledging Blake’s tacit Christian 
anarchist tendencies. It is not my intention then to thoughtlessly 
claim that Blake was a Christian anarchist in the strictest sense 
of the term. Blake is tautologically Blake to such an extent that 
categorising him as anything other than Blake is a mistake in my 
view. And given his temperament, even this is a box he would 
have likely wished to leap out of. Consequently, he refuses to be 
pinned down and claimed for any particular cause.184 Beer says: 
‘No doubt there were shifts in Blake’s attitudes, corresponding 
to the dominant tone of the work he was producing at any giv-
en time, but his personality cannot be contained within any sin-
gle one of them.’185 Similarly Ackroyd argues: ‘Blake did not join 
clubs or circles and, for similar reason of temperament, he rarely 
 182 Marshall, William Blake: Visionary Anarchist, p. 9.
 183 See Damon, A Blake Dictionary, p. 103 and p. 262.
 184 See Beer, 2007, p. 24.
 185 Beer, 2007, p. 36.
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became attached to ideas or suggestions other than those that he 
formulated for himself. But he was immensely receptive to beliefs 
which might confirm his own sense of life.’186
Tellingly, Blake has his god Los say in the poem Jerusalem: ‘I 
must Create a System or be enslav’d by another Man’s.’187 A lit-
tle further Blake refers to Los: ‘Striving with Systems to deliver 
Individuals from those Systems.’188 While P. H. Butter adds that 
Los must also: ‘Create new systems so as not to be enslaved by 
his own.’189 I think these three positions evince Blake’s character 
and serve to indicate how he was indeed anarchistic. It is this utter 
spirit of liberty guided by his religious vision that is perhaps testa-
ment to his Christian anarchism – to the extent that he fits such a 
label precisely by escaping it.
This last remark may intrigue and yet tantalise. It announces 
a paradoxical relationship between Blake’s work and anarchist 
positions. What is this paradox? What is it in anarchist thought 
that Blake’s work resonates with, and in what sense does his work 
escape that dimension? It is themes evident in his work, such as, 
‘dissent’, ‘radicalism’, ‘revolution’, ‘antinomianism’, ‘transgres-
sion’, and ‘liberty’, that indirectly characterise anarchism and thus 
associate him with anarchistic thought.
Yet Blake was too much of an anarchist to be labelled an an-
archist. Just as a genuine existentialist might escape the label ‘ex-
istentialist’ on the grounds of authenticity, so Blake might elude 
the title ‘anarchist’ on the grounds of liberty. His spirited temper-
ament, complex character, and visionary imagination prevent his 
strict conformity to any type. In short, he was one of a kind. Thus 
any type used beside his name has to conform as much to him. A 
category, even the category ‘anarchist’, defines and so sets limits 
like the circumscribing compass of Urizen. And, as we saw, Blake 
is loath to step into any such circles. It is this unrestrained and 
 186 Ackroyd, 1995, p. 88.
 187 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 10, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 153. Los is a god in Blake’s pantheon, and represents 
the poetic spirit in humankind.
 188 Blake, Jerusalem, Plate 11, in Erdman, The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, p. 154.
 189 P. H. Butter, William Blake: Selected Poems (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 
1982), p. xxvii.
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boundless liberty that, for me, characterises his anarchism, an an-
archism given its central focus on Jesus that we might cautiously 
call a Christian anarchism.
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Occult Features of Anarchism
Erica Lagalisse
London School of Economics
By exploring the hidden correspondences between classical an-
archism, Renaissance magic and occult philosophy, this chapter 
advances the critical study of Left-political attachment to the 
‘secular’, wherein Western anarchist and socialist cosmologies 
have been mystified.   By historicizing Western anarchism and 
‘the revolution’, it highlights the development of Left theory and 
praxis within clandestine masculine ‘public’ spheres of the radi-
cal Enlightenment, and how this genesis proceeds to inflect anar-
chist understandings of the ‘political’. Inspired by ethnographic 
research among contemporary anarchist social movements in the 
Americas, this essay questions anarchist ‘atheism’ insofar as it has 
posed practical challenges for current anarchist-indigenous coa-
lition politics. Moreover, in its treatment of ‘secret societies’ this 
essay has pedagogical utility for today’s political activists as well 
as scholars of anarchism.  Where popular fear of ‘secret societies’ 
is widespread, charting the construction of the secret society in 
European history has practical political importance. By attending 
to this history, we also witness the co-evolution of modern mas-
culinity and secularized social movements as a textured historical 
process, and observe the privatization of both gender and religion 
in the praxes of radical counter-culture, which develops in com-
plex dialectic with the “privitization” of gender and religion by 
the modern nation-state.
Let us explore the hidden correspondences between classical an-
archism, Renaissance magic and occult philosophy, and other 
hidden features of anarchism besides. Let us historicize Western 
anarchism, whose genesis within clandestine masculine ‘public’ 
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spheres of the radical Enlightenment continues to inflect anarchist 
understandings of the ‘political’ even today. As I have related in 
my previous work concerning the exclusion of indigenous women 
and their concerns from anarchist public spheres, anarchist “athe-
ism” can pose practical problems for current anarchist-indigenous 
coalition politics: our concern is beyond academic.1 By illustrat-
ing the cosmology of classical anarchism I hope to complicate 
present-day anarchist attachments to “secular” analyses, in which 
anarchist theology is simply displaced and mystified. By attending 
to the same story, we witness the co-evolution of modern mascu-
linity and secularized social movements as a textured historical 
process. We observe the privatization of both gender and religion 
in the praxes of radical counter-culture, which develop in com-
plex dialectic with the “privatisation” of gender and religion by 
the modern nation-state (as above, so below).
Given its topic, this essay also necessarily engages with the his-
tory of “secret societies”, wherein I have crafted my treatment to 
have pedagogical utility for today’s political activists, as well as 
scholars of anarchism. Popular discussion of “secret societies” is 
currently widespread in the English-speaking world (and beyond), 
such that charting the construction of the secret society – both 
real and imagined – in European history arguably has practical 
political import, beyond being required for the particular academ-
ic task at hand.
It is therefore explicit that I come to the historical work at hand 
methodologically as an anthropologist, and for the purposes of 
practical intervention within social movements and politics today. 
It is from being a participant (2000–2005), and later ethnogra-
pher (2005–2015), within contemporary anarchist social move-
ments myself that I consider it important to unpack the history of 
“anarchism”. While charting instances of “anarchy” throughout 
 1 The previous work I refer to is: Lagalisse, Erica ‘“Marginalizing Magdalena”: 
Intersections of Gender and the Secular in Anarchoindigenist Solidarity 
Activism’. Signs – Journal of Women in Culture and Society. Vol 36, No. 3. 
(2011). For a lengthier rehearsal of the present essay and discussion of 
its relation to my previous work the reader may look to Lagalisse, Erica 
(2018) Occult Features of Anarchism – With Attention to the Conspiracy 
of Kings and Conspiracy of the Peoples (Oakland: PM Press).
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time and space is a valid political project, there is also much to 
be gained by charting the emergence of “anarchism” as a distinct 
“ism” – and to do so does not necessarily detract from the afore-
mentioned project, but rather keeps us honest as we proceed.2
I thus purposefully engage the past from the perspective of the 
present, tacking back and forth between diverse times and places 
to unearth bits and pieces of buried anarchist history based on 
an ethnographic imagination, using both secondary and primary 
sources. The interdisciplinary activity necessarily involved in such 
a project means that diverse specialists will be inspired, hopefully, 
to add some qualification, and thus lend their own knowledge and 
methodological strengths to the problem. Strangely, or perhaps 
not so strangely, the particular metaphysics of modern anarchism 
and its relation to social and historical context has not so far re-
ceived the attention it deserves. This is no doubt partially due 
to the bias of many anarchists against religion, and the bias of 
many scholars against anarchism, but is perhaps also because the 
topic requires delving into the relationship between anarchism, 
occult philosophy and “secret societies” – all charged topics, even 
independently.
First Premises: The Theology of Politics
Carl Schmitt’s general point that modern politics embodies secu-
larized theological concepts is of basic relevance here. Schmitt also 
remarks, while pursuing his particular question regarding sover-
eignty, that every political idea “takes a position on the ‘nature’ 
 2 With respect to the questions of definition discussed in the introduction 
to this volume, I thus place myself among those who treat “anarchism” as 
a historical object; considering both “anarchism” and “religion” as dis-
courses and practices developed in a certain social and historical context 
is a necessary precondition for this essay. Beyond my own proceeding 
exposition, with respect to “anarchism” as historical see also Carl Levy, 
‘Social Histories of Anarchism’, Journal for the Study of Radicalism, 4 
(2010), pp. 1–44 (p. 8–10); with respect to “religion” as historical see 
also e.g. Gil Anidjar, ‘Secularism’, Critical Inquiry, 33 (2006), pp. 52–76: 
“it was in the context of the colonial encounter that Christendom granted 
 other communities and traditions the name it had only ever given itself – 
 religion – and reincarnated itself as ‘secular’.”
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of man”, presupposing that “he is either ‘by nature good’ or ‘by 
nature evil’”, and that to “committed atheistic anarchists, man is 
decisively good”.3 This essay will dovetail with Schmitt’s summa-
ry remark in only some ways; for our purposes a more nuanced 
discussion of the transcendence vs. immanence of divinity in the 
history of ideas within Western philosophy is crucial. I am inclined 
to point to Marshall Sahlins’ work on The Native Anthropology 
of Western Cosmology.4 Sahlins suggests that the theological pre-
occupations underlying European political theory and science can 
be traced back at least as far as St. Augustine, and the quarrel 
among Pagan, Platonic, and Gnostic positions with that of the 
emerging Church authorities regarding the transcendence versus 
immanence of divinity, i.e. whether nature and humanity, whether 
together or separately, are wholly, partially, or latently divine, or 
are merely borne from the divine.
Cast in Sahlins’ light, the persistent dualist conundrum in 
Western politics and social theory appears as a spiralling repe-
tition of this same theological concern: There is Lust, which is 
not of God; there is Matter, distinct from Spirit; there is Desire, 
as opposed to Reason. Those who suggest some coercive force 
stops (or must stop) us from pursuing our “animal” desires follow 
the logic of a transcendent divinity. Since we are by nature so 
evil and base, God – or something else “out there” conceptually 
 derived from Him – must keep us in line. For St. Augustine it 
was the State of Rome, for Hobbes any Sovereign will do (his 
“self- interest” clearly evolving from Augustine’s “desire”). The 
“ individual” vs. “society” polarity evident in most social theory 
is only another manifestation of the same – here God becomes 
“society” (rather than “the State”). One could go further and point 
out, for example, that in Durkheim’s work the transcendent force 
appears as the “social fact” – from a mass of pre-social individuals 
 3 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology – Four Chapters on the Concept of 
Sovereignty, (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1985), here pp. 56.
 4 Marshall Sahlins, ‘The Sadness of Sweetness: The Native Anthropology 
of Western Cosmology’, Current Anthropology, 37 (1996), 379–418. 
(This particular history of ideas was first presented to me in the form of 
David Graeber’s lecture notes from Dr. Marshall Sahlins’ theory seminar 
ca. 1990.)
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and desires emerges “society” which then serves to restrain these 
desires. Furthermore, note that in methodological individualism 
desire creates and governs society, whereas in cultural determin-
ism desire creates the society that then governs desire, but it is 
always the same terms in play. In short, the transcendent God of 
theological dualism can be found just beneath the surface of ev-
ery argument for centralized authority, including most canonical 
social theory (which anarchists, we may note, tend to recognize as 
“authoritarian”).
What if we approached modern “anti-authoritarianism” with 
the same lens? I propose that a particular theological thread like-
wise runs through it. The same cultural baggage in tow, develop-
ing in dialectic with its opposite, modern anti-authoritarianism 
grapples with the same theological dilemma, yet attempts to re-
solve it differently by re-arranging the terms and with recourse to 
various pagan traditions and syncretic Christian hereticism itself. 
In other words, whereas many have located “anarchist” elements 
in Christian millenarianism and non-Western traditions, I wish 
to draw attention to the latter as elements of “anarchism” itself. 
Modern anarchism has never been purely atheist except in name, 
and rather develops based on overlapping syncretic pagan cos-
mologies that behold the immanence of the divine. In fact, utopian 
socialism, anarchism and Marxism each rely (in ways both similar 
and different, which I will tease out below) on a specific syncretic 
cosmology that is incipient in the Middle Ages, changing and crys-
tallizing in the Renaissance, and gradually given a scientific make-
over throughout the Enlightenment up to the 20th century. Just as 
the secularization of the modern state privatizes religion but con-
tinues to embody a particular theology in its structure and ideolo-
gy, the social movements that resist this dominant power structure 
go through a similar process of secularization in parallel, wherein 
gender and religion are displaced from “politics”.
A Heretical Account of the Radical Enlightenment
Standard histories of modern anarchism often locate its  precursors 
in the heretic movements (e.g. Anabaptists, Ranters and Diggers) 
that articulated combined critiques of Church authorities, the 
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 enclosures of private property and forced labour during the feu-
dal period and early capitalist order.5 These movements often 
called for communal ownership in Christian idiom, e.g. by ele-
vating “grace” over “works”, yet the form and content of these 
heretical social movements was different than the Christian mille-
narian movements that preceded them.6 Millenarian movements 
were spurred on by a charismatic individual or momentous event, 
whereas the heretical movements had defined organizational struc-
tures and programmes for change, leading at least one historian to 
call them the “first proletarian international”.7 What happened to 
effect the shift? And what does it mean that anarchist historians 
easily recognize such movements as “anarchist” when they are lo-
cated safely in the past – as “precursors” – yet as soon as modern 
anarchism proper is articulated, religious levelling movements are 
seen as backward, if not heretical to anarchism itself?
The shift from the spontaneous millenarian movement to the 
organized heretic one had much to do with their incorporation of 
non-Christian ideas and mystical doctrines that began circulating 
in Europe during the Crusades. Platonic philosophy, Pythagorean 
geometry, Islamic mathematics such as Algebra, Jewish mystical 
texts and Hermetic treatises were all “rediscovered” via Muslim 
Spain and translated into Latin during this time. It is well known 
 5 see e.g. Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible – a History of 
Anarchism (London: Fontana Press, 1993); Atindranath Bose, A 
History of Anarchism (Calcutta: World Press, 1967); George Woodcock, 
Anarchism – a History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements (Cleveland: 
The World Publishing Co. 1962). 
 6 See Bose 1967; Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down – 
Radical Ideas During the English Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1975); Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra : 
Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary 
Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000); Sylvia Federici, Caliban and the 
Witch – Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation (New York: 
Autonomedia, 2004); Peter Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern 
Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.) Norman Cohn, 
The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical 
Anarchists of the Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1970).
 7 Federici 2004, p. 33. See also Cohn 1970; Henry Charles Lea, A History 
of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages, (London: Macmillan, 1922); 
Malcolm Lambert, Medieval Heresy: Popular Movements from the 
Gregorian Reform to the Reformation, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992).
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that the creative re-composition of this ensemble inaugurated the 
Renaissance and later the “Enlightenment” on the level of high 
culture, but how the composite led to new levelling projects from 
below has received less attention. The Hermetica in particular is 
probably the least recognized fount of the modern Left, and yet 
an important thread running through it.8 The Hermetic tradition 
beholds a unified universe of which man is a microcosm (“As 
above, so below”), and wherein cosmic time beholds a pulsation 
of emanation and return. The Hermetic cosmos is hierarchically 
arranged in symmetrical diachronic and synchronic bifurcations 
(dyads) and trifurcations (triads), but a web of hidden “corre-
spondences” and forces – alternately “energy” or “light” – cut 
across and unify all levels; in duration everything remains inter-
nally  related – “All is One!” Significantly, humanity participates in 
the regeneration of cosmic unity – our coming to consciousness 
of this divine role is a crucial step therein. God and creation thus 
 become one and the same, with the inevitable slip that our cre-
ative power –  including intellectual power – is divine. The initiate 
must first purge himself of false knowledge in order to be able 
to receive the true doctrine; at any given moment only some are 
ready. Hermes himself explains that he “keeps the meaning of his 
words concealed” from those who are not.9
 8 The Hermetica or Corpus Hermeticum is a collection of texts written 
in the 1st or 2nd centuries A.D., yet during the Renaissance they were 
held to be the work of Hermes Trismegistus (“Thrice Greatest Hermes”) 
imparting the mystical insights of ancient Egypt. Egypt was held to be an 
‘original’ and thus superior civilization, one that nourished the philos-
ophy of the Greeks, for example, such that the discovery of these texts 
was especially prized. When a monk arrived in Florence from Macedonia 
in 1460 carrying some of the Hermetic texts, Cosimo de Medici ordered 
his translator to drop Plato’s dialogues immediately and turn his at-
tention to them. See Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic 
Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 12, passim. 
For the Corpus Hermetica itself see Brian Copenhaver, Hermetica: The 
Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius in a New English 
Translation with Notes and Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge U. 
Press, 1992).
 9 See Copenhaver 1992, p. 58. The quotation is from Corpus Hermeticum 
16.
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The Hermetica has proved adaptable to a variety of projects. 
Its neat metaphysical geometry, which arrived alongside algebra 
and the Pythagorean theorem, helped form a composite that lent 
itself to a massive investment in mathematical forms and under-
standing. Mathematics became the hidden architecture of the cos-
mos, the most permanent and basic truth, and revelation of these 
secrets certainly did permit an ability to build and create in ways 
never before imagined — providing both cathedrals and calcu-
lus, for example. A variety of mystical doctrines proliferated from 
the interaction of this composite with pre-existing natural philos-
ophy, alchemy being only the most famous. Hermetic logic can 
also be discerned in a variety of other eclectic doctrines that de-
veloped throughout this period, such as Joachimism, Eckhartean 
mysticism, Paracelcism, the mathematics of John Dee, the arts of 
Ramon Lull, Rosicrucianism, vitalism (followed by spiritualism, 
mesmerism and more) all of which behold secret cosmic “corre-
spondences” and sacred geometry, and in turn inspired the “scien-
tific revolution” of the Enlightenment.10 To offer just one example, 
calculus was but the caput mortuum of Newton’s search for the 
Philosopher’s Stone (if not the Stone itself), his theory of aether 
“hermetic cosmogony in the language of science”.11 The concep-
tual vocabulary of his physics (e.g. “attraction”, “repulsion”) was 
adopted from the Hermeticist Böhme via famous alchemist Henry 
More.12 The “disenchantment tale” of the Enlightenment is just 
 10 See the work of Frances Yates – The Art of Memory (London: Routledge, 
1966); The Rosicrucian Enlightenment, (London: Routledge, 2002 
[1972]), as well as Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, cited 
earlier; see also Richard S. Westfall, ‘Newton and the Hermetic Tradition’, 
in Science, Medicine and Society in the Renaissance, ed. Allen G. Debus 
(New York: Science History Publications, 1972). To review primary 
sources see Brian Copenhaver’s The Book of Magic – From Antiquity to 
Enlightenment (NY: Penguin, 2015), which includes substantial material 
from Renaissance figures (Pico, Ficino, Agrippa, Dee, Bruno, and more). 
See also lengthier discussion in Lagalisse (2018).
 11 Klaus Vondung, ‘Millenarianism, Hermeticism, and the Search for a 
Universal Science’, in Science, Pseudoscience, and Utopianism in Early 
Modern Thought, ed. Stephen McKnight (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1992), p. 138.
 12 See Ernst Benz, The Theology of Electricity. trans. Wolfgana Taraba 
(Allison Park: Pickwick Publications, 1989). 
286 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume II
that – a tale. The persecution of “magic” and “witches” among 
the poor during this period is rather best understood as a dis-
ciplinary measure directed specifically at the peasantry – and at 
women especially – insomuch as it served to enforce the logic of 
private property, wage work, and the transformation of women 
into producers of labour. As Sylvia Federici explains, fears around 
a declining population (work force) and the reproductive auton-
omy of lower-class women (practicing birth control) was what 
distinguished the witch from the Renaissance magician, who de-
monologists consistently passed over.13 Indeed the alleged devilish 
activities of the “baby-killing” witch were often plagiarized from 
the High Magical repertoire.
The Hermetica was also fundamental to the emergence of 
new social movements against systemic power, specifically 
Freemasonry and the revolutionary brotherhoods that proliferat-
ed during the 18th and 19th centuries. Unlike the millenarian and 
heretic movements before them, these social movements consist-
ed of literate radicals more so than peasants, and were decisively 
masculine public spheres. Women’s power within the peasant and 
heretic movements was ambiguous and never unchallenged, but 
women were actively involved, partially because renovated and 
 13 Federici 2004. See also Ulinka Rublack’s The Astronomer and the Witch – 
Johane Kepler’s Fight for his Mother (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), where we behold one ‘magical’ man given the status of Imperial 
Mathematician while his ‘magical’ mother is imprisoned for witchcraft.
Fig 1. “Figura Mentis” and “Figura Intellectus” drawn by Giordano Bruno, 
Prague, 1588. [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bruno_Figura_mentis.jpg; https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bruno_Figura_intellectus.jpg.
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Fig 2. The compass is associated with power (in a geometrically gendered 
arrangement) by William Blake in Europe: A Prophecy (1794) —‘When 
he sets a compass upon the face of the deep’ (Proverbs 8: 27). [Public 
domain], via Wikimedia Commons https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Europe_a_Prophecy_copy_K_plate_01.jpg.
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syncretic Christian cosmologies granted them new footholds, and 
partially because women had the most to lose in the privatization 
of the commons.14 Freemasonry, on the other hand, is what so-
cial movements look like after the witch hunts: Just as Alchemists 
played at the creation of life while arresting feminine control over 
biological creation, speculative Masonry emerges in which elite 
males worship the “Grand Architect” upon the ashes of artisans’ 
guilds while real builders were starving. By the establishment of 
the Grand Lodge in London in 1717, the trade secrets of operative 
masons had become the spiritual secrets of speculative ones, lodge 
membership now thoroughly replaced by literate men lured by the 
ceremony, ritual, and a secret magical history supposedly dating 
back to the time of King Solomon and the Grand Architect of his 
temple, Hiram Abiff – Freemasonry itself has always involved a 
fantastic pastiche of Hermetic and Kabbalistic lore.15
 14 Op cit. 
 15 Regarding Hermeticist currents in speculative Masonry see Jean Tourniac, 
‘Vie et perspectives de la franc-maçonnerie traditionelle’ [2nd edition], 
(Paris: Dervy-Livres, 1978); Regarding the specific links Freemasons 
made between ancient Egypt and freemasonry, see for example the min-
utes of Le Conseil de l’Ordre du Grand Orient, April 25 1887, reprinted 
in Christian Lauzeray, L’Égypte ancienne et la Franc-Maçonnerie (Paris: 
Éditeur Guy Trédaniel 1988). J. P. Dubreuil in his Histoire des franc-
maçons, (Bruxelles: H.I.G. François, 1838) analyzes ritual form, dress, 
ceremonial objects, art and catechism to suggest allegories shared in the 
Egyptian, Jewish and Freemasonic traditions. See also Claude-Antoine 
Thory, Histoire de la fondation du Grand Orient de France (Paris, Chez 
P. Dufart, libraire, Quai Voltaire, N°. 19, de l’imprimerie de Nouzou, 
rue de Clery , No. 9, 1812). Further references in English regarding the 
social history of Freemasonry include Margaret Jacob, ‘Freemasonry 
and the Utopian Impulse’, in Millenarianism and Messianism in English 
Literature and Thought, ed. R.H. Popkin (NY: E.J. Brill, 1988), as well 
as Margaret Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment – Pantheists, Freemasons 
and Republicans (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), J. M. Roberts, 
The Mythology of the Secret Societies (London: Secker and Warburg, 
1972), and the (bibliography of) primary source materials offered with-
in Dr. William Wynn Westcott’s A Catalogue Raisonné of Works on the 
Occult Sciences, Vol III – Freemasonry, A Catalogue of Lodge Histories 
(England), with a Preface (London: F.L. Gardner, 1912). Note that there 
are significant differences between the social development and organi-
zation of Freemasonry in England vs. on the European continent, yet as 
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One Hermetic aspect of the Masonic cosmology that is key for 
our discussion, and discussed further below, is the notion that 
man and society tend toward perfection. The work of Spinoza 
(1632–77) was also, together and separately, an inspiration in 
this regard. In his ‘Theological Political Treatise’ (1670), Spinoza 
arguably provides the founding text of modern liberalism by 
 effectively conflating the ‘chosen people’ and the chosen ‘state’ 
or ‘society’, and by relativizing the gift of prophecy as an imagi-
native (vs rational) capacity of men and women of all traditions 
(‘gentiles’).16 The imports of Spinoza’s complete oeuvre, across 
time and audience, are of course diverse (and contested), yet it is 
clear that with the Treatise he equipped contemporary European 
radicals with a dynamic philosophy that unified, divinised and 
animated the universe as well as honoured a deterministic  vision 
of man and nature, thus providing a new religious vision and a 
renovated foundation for social resistance at once, which con-
temporaries named “pantheism”.17 This word, apparently first 
used by John Toland (1670–1722), was taken up during the 
 period in question to refer to a metaphysics that re-emphasized 
the vitalistic, spirit-in-matter qualities of nature, and tended 
to deify the material order in the process.18 This new faith in 
 scientific progress encouraged the conception of temporal insti-
tutions both as permanent, and as vehicles for enacting fantasies 
their consideration is not crucial to our present study these will be brack-
eted here.
 16 See Benedict de Spinoza, Theological Political Treatise, edited by Jonathan 
Israel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 [1670]), especially 
Chapter 2, “On the Prophets”, [1], [3]; Chapter 3, “On the Vocation of 
the Hebrews”, [8], [9], passim.
 17 Op cit. See also Benedictus de Spinoza, Ethics. (NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), Benedictus de Spinoza, The Cartesian principles and 
Thoughts on metaphysics. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). Regarding 
the role and charges given Spinoza’s work within the culture of the 
‘radical Enlightenment’ see Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), Jonathan Israel, A Revolution of Mind – 
Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), as well as Jacob, The Radical 
Enlightenment, regarding contemporary articulations of “pantheism” in 
particular, and their relation to Spinoza’s ideas.
 18 See e.g. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment, p. xi; 32–3.
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of progress: A new heaven on earth would be manifest through 
the works of men themselves.
The Traité des Trois Imposteurs that Masons circulated clan-
destinely during the 18th century refers to Moses, Jesus and 
Mohammed as the three “Imposters” in question, yet the coterie 
who printed it included Toland, who in his Pantheisticon (1720) 
elaborated a new ritual that claimed to combine the traditions 
of Druids and ancient Egyptians and included the following call-
and-response: “Keep off the prophane People/ The Coast is clear, 
the Doors are shut, all’s safe/ All things in the world are one, And 
one in All in all things/ What’s all in All Things is God, Eternal and 
Immense/ Let us sing a Hymn Upon the Nature of the Universe.” 
Masons imagined themselves simultaneously the creators of a new 
egalitarian social order and protagonists of cosmic regeneration, 
all articulated in the language of sacred architecture. Their society 
was anti-clerical, yet espoused a pantheism that infused their so-
cial levelling project with sacred purpose. Theirs was a pyramidal 
initiatic society of rising degrees and reserved secrets, but one in 
which all men met “upon the level”.19
The Masonic levelling project was not altogether radical. It is 
true that Masonic lodges were frequented by elite men who in-
strumentalised them to further consolidate their power, and that 
the Masonic project was one of limited reforms, one to which 
Jews, women, servants and manual labourers were denied entry.20 
 19 See Jacob, ‘Freemasonry and the Utopian Impulse’, pp. 127–130; regard-
ing the Traité des Trois Imposteurs, see Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment, 
chapter 7; the quotation from the Pantheisticon is on pp. 122–123; see 
also xiii. See also J. M. Roberts, The Mythology of the Secret Societies 
(London: Secker and Warburg, 1972), Chapter 2. Regarding Freemasons 
beholding a new heaven on earth, see also “SONG II” in The Universal 
Masonic Library, Vol. III – Preston’s Illustrations of Masonry, (NY: 
W.Leonard & Co., Aferican Masonic Agency, 1855, pp. 364–5), a work 
which begins with a section titled “Reflections on the Symmetry and 
Proportion in the Works of Nature and on the Harmony and Affection 
among the various Species of Beings”: “. . .But, ungrateful unto Heaven/ 
The rebel was from Eden driven. [Verse 4] From thence proceeded all our 
woes/ Nor could mankind one comfort cheer/ Until Freemasonry arose/ 
And form’d another Eden here. . .”.
 20 See e.g. Alberto Valín Fernández, ‘De masones y revolucionarios: una 
reflexión en torno de este encuentro’, Anuario Brigantino, 28 (2005), 
Occult Features of Anarchism 291
It is also true that the Masonic ideal of merit as the only fair 
distinction allowed room to critique the tension between formal 
ideals and actual practice, and that Masonic lodges were the first 
formal public association in 18th century Britain to take up the 
cause of the “workers’ question” – albeit on a purely philanthrop-
ic level – by founding hospices, schools and assistance centres for 
proletarian workers.21 In pre–revolutionary France, lodges first 
began accepting small artisans then proletarian workers as well, 
lowering fees and abolishing the literacy requirement for entrance 
to this end. By 1789 there were between 20,000 and 50,000 mem-
bers in over 600 lodges, and it was no longer possible for partic-
ipants to reasonably claim they were manifesting an egalitarian 
social order by merely gathering to discuss literature, science, and 
the cultivation of Masonic wisdom.22
173–98, as well as his monograph length work, Alberto Valín Fernández, 
Masonería y revolución – del mito literario a la realidad historica (Santa 
Cruz de Tenerife: Ediciones Idea, 2008). In the words of one Bordeaux 
lodge master (1745), “le privilege de l Égalité deviendroit [sic] un abus 
bien dangereux, si sous ce prétexte on admettrait indifferément tous les 
états”, cited in Roberts, p. 50, who is citing W. Doyle, ‘The Parlementaires 
of Bordeaux at the End of the Eighteenth Century 1775–1790’, (Oxford: 
Oxford, PhD diss., 1967) p. 338. According to another contemporary 
Freemason (1744), the sister lodges organized for women were but for 
“immoral purposes” and “beguiling” them “into thinking they had pen-
etrated the secrets”, in Roberts, pp. 50–51, who cites in turn La Franc-
maçonne ou révélation des mystères des franc-maçons (Brussels, 1744), 
p. 11–15.
 21 See Jacob, ‘Freemasonry and the Utopian Impulse’, especially p. 142; 
Valín Férnandez, 2005, discusses Freemasonic philanthropy related to 
the “workers question” on p. 182.
 22 Regarding the reforms in favour of proletarian workers, see Valín 
Férnandez, 2005, p. 183; Valín Férnandez is following the work of 
André Combes – see, e.g., André Combes, Les trois siècles de la franc- 
maçonnerie française (Paris: Dervy, 2006). The figures given regarding 
lodge membership in 1789 are from Daniel Mornet, Les origines intellec-
tuelles de la révolution française (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1933), 
and Daniel Ligou, ‘La Franc-Maçonnerie Française Au XVIII Siècle 
 (positions des problèmes et état des questions)’, Information Historique 
(1964). One overview of this process in English is Margaret Jacob, 
Strangers Nowhere in the World – the Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early 
Modern Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).
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The Revolutionary Brotherhoods
Here we arrive at the question of “conspiratorial” revolutionary 
brotherhoods that has been exploited in paranoid intrigue. 23 On 
one hand, due to the utopian rhetoric developed in the Masonic 
“public” sphere, some members became directly involved in revo-
lutionary activities, both in France before the Revolution, as well 
as throughout Europe in the years immediately following. On the 
other hand, it is true that many revolutionaries who were not 
necessarily Masons made use of the lodges’ existing infrastruc-
ture and social networks to further their cause. Yet others simply 
adopted Masonic iconography and organizational style, which 
had accrued a measure of symbolic power and legitimacy, in de-
veloping their own revolutionary associations. It is not possible 
in retrospect to distinguish entirely between these phenomena, 
the salient point being that the revolutionary brotherhoods that 
proliferated at the turn of the 19th century derived much of their 
power from their association with perennial secrets and magical 
power, and that this imaginary and their related style of social 
organization were fundamental to the development of what we 
come to recognize as modern revolutionism.24
 23 There is a more written on the connection between Freemasonry and 
revolutionary movements in French, Spanish, Italian and German than 
in English. Valín Fernández offers a substantial bibliography of Spanish, 
French and Italian sources (pp. 173–98). Roberts offers further sources in 
French, Italian and German. In English one does well to follow Margaret 
Jacob, yet she does not concern herself with revolutionary movements on 
the continent. 
 24 I proceed to summarize below, yet note that a detailed genealogy of the 
revolutionary brotherhoods in question (e.g. The Corresponding Society, 
the Conspiracy of Equals, the League of the Just, the Communist League, 
the Fraternal Democrats, etc.) can be found in Julius Braunthal, History 
of the International, Vol. 1 – 1864–1914, (NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1967), Chapters 4–6. Valín Férnandez, 2005, also treats the question of 
descent, vs. imitation, vs. overlap. Note that Eric Hobsbawm’s Primitive 
Rebels – Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 
20th Centuries (NY: Norton, 1959), although inflected with a critical 
Marxist bias, is also a further resource in English for an overview of rev-
olutionary fraternities and their rituals. Roberts also discusses the “seed-
time of the political secret societies” in Chapter 7.
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Adam Weishaupt (1748–1830), a young Bavarian professor 
who founded the Illuminati in 1776, was one of few convinced 
egalitarians of his day. His revolutionary agenda involved the 
complete dismantling of the State, Church and institution of pri-
vate property, all justified by a revamped Christian millenarianism 
affected by readings of J.J. Rousseau and the Eleusinian myster-
ies, and organizationally inspired by the secret association of 
the Pythagoreans.25 According to Weishaupt, our true “fall from 
grace” was our submission to the rule of government:
“Let us take Liberty and Equality as the great aim of [Christ’s] 
doctrines and Morality as the way to attain it, and everything 
in the New Testament will be comprehensible. . . Man is fallen 
from the condition of Liberty and Equality, the STATE OF PRE 
NATURE. He is under subordination and civil bondage, arising 
from the vices of man. This is the FALL, and ORIGINAL SIN. The 
KINGDOM OF GRACE is that restoration which may be brought 
about by Illumination.”26
Yet “Do you really believe it would be useful”, he asked, “as long as 
countless barriers still remain, to preach to men a purified religion, a 
superior philosophy, and the art of self-government?”, “[s]hould not 
all these organizational vices and social ills be corrected gradually 
and quietly before we may hope to bring about this golden age, and 
wouldn’t it be better, in the meanwhile, to propagate the truth by way 
of secret societies? Do we not find traces of the same secret doctrine 
 25 See René Le Forestier, Les Illuminés de Bavière et la franc-maçonnerie 
 allemande (Genève: Slatkine Megariotis Reprints, (1974 [1914]) or 
Israel, A Revolution of Mind, (who both cite further sources in German), 
or Roberts who refers to Le Forestier. (Roberts is most concerned with 
the mythology that developed around “secret societies” rather than their 
objective history.)
 26 Weishaupt in communiqué titled “Spartacus to Cato” (Spartacus 
was Weishaupt’s pseudonym), quoted by John Robison in Proofs of a 
Conspiracy against All the Religions and Governments of Europe, Carried 
on in the Secret Meetings of Freemasons, Illuminati, and Reading Societies 
(Dublin: W. Watson and Son, 1798), pp. 92–3. To consult original German 
see “Spartacus to Cato” (5 March 1778) in Richard van Dülman, Der 
Geheimbund der Illuminaten (Stuttgart: Verlag, 1975), pp. 220.
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in the most ancient schools of wisdom?”27 For Weishaupt, only 
the “immanent revolution of the human spirit” (die bevorstehende 
Revolution des menschlichen Geistes), driven by a “widely propo-
gated universal Enlightenment” (verbreitete allgemeine Aufklärung) 
will break the chains of tyranny, yet repressive political conditions 
required a discreet Enlightened revolutionary elite in the meantime.28
Weishaupt had joined a Masonic lodge in 1774 but had left 
shortly after, not satisfied with the level of critique he found there-
in. A year after founding his more radical group however, the mem-
bers together decided in 1777 to join lodges once more in order 
to find new recruits, and the strategy worked. The Illuminati grew 
from Weishaupt and five students in 1776 to fifty-four members 
in five Bavarian cities by 1779, and eventually extended to Italy, 
Lyon and Strasbourg to include figures such as Goethe, Schiller, 
Mozart and Herder. The pyramid structure of the network, mod-
elled on Masonic form, was organized into three grades (the 
Minervale, Minervale Illuminato, and inner circle of Areopagites) 
and became both an agency for the transmission of commonplace 
Enlightenment ideas and attitudes and a “quasi-religious sect” 
at once, in which men met to contemplate the utopian regener-
ation of society.29 Its growth was short-lived however. In 1783, a 
Minervale Illuminato left the order discontented and shared its 
radical ideas with his employer, a duchess of the Bavarian roy-
al family. Ensuing suspicions that the Illuminati were connected 
 27 Le Forestier’s French translation of the full passage from German is as 
follows, “Croyez-vous qu-il serait utile, tant que d’innombrables obsta-
cles ne seront levés, de prêcher aux hommes une religion épurée, une 
philosophie supérieure et l’art de se gouverner soi-même?. . .ces vices 
d’organisation et ces tares sociales ne doivent-ils pas être corrigés peu 
à peu et sans bruit, avant qu’on puisse espérer amener cet âge d’or et 
ne vaut-il pas mieux, en attendant, propager la vérité par le moyen des 
sociétés secretes? . . .Trouvons-nous des traces d’une pareille doctrine se-
crete dans les écoles de sagesse les plus anciennes. . .? Ne remarquez-vous 
pas qu’une telle institution d’éducation progressive a existé depuis les 
temps les plus anciens?”, in Le Forestier, pp. 283. The English translation 
above is mine.
 28 See Israel, pp. 78; Israel cites Adam Weishaupt, ‘Anrede an die neu aufzu-
nehmenden Illuminatos dirigentes’ in van Dülman.
 29 See Roberts, pp. 118–124; Israel, pp. 73–80. The direct quote is from 
Roberts, p. 122. 
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with an Austrian plot to annex the Electorate (and perhaps worse) 
alarmed the government, and a repressive campaign began. By 
the end of the 18th century, stories vilifying the Illuminati and the 
Freemasons – who were all “under its control” – were in full force. 
Fearing the death penalty, members went into hiding or exile.30
The turn of the century saw a proliferation of other revolu-
tionary societies across Europe that mimicked the forms of 
Freemasonry and the Illuminati, including the Charbonnerie and 
Carbonari, the Mazzinians and le Monde, all constituting an in-
ternational network of revolutionary movements that had certain 
ideological, if not organizational, solidity. The politics of Babeuf 
(1760–1797), who was imprisoned in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution as the prime agent of the “The Conspiracy of Equals” 
(and anticipated Proudhon’s argument that “Property is Theft” 
by forty-three years) as well as the politics of Phillipe Buonarotti 
(1761–1837), who founded the Sublime Perfect Masters in 1809, 
likewise bear a family resemblance.31 It did make certain practical 
 30 As writes Jonathan Israel, “Contemporary observers like the ultra- 
reactionary court official Ludwig Adolf Christian von Grolman (1749–
1809) – who published a well-known collection of secret documents of 
German Illuminatism, die Neuesten Arbiter des Spartacus und Philo in 
1793 – protested that the highest grades of the order were, in effect, a 
clandestine vehicle for the propagation of materialist and atheistic ideas 
and that at the core of the highest mysteries of the organization’s first 
grade, the so-called Philosophengrad (philosopher’s grade), lay unadul-
terated Spinozismus (Spinozism). . .that everything that exists is matter, 
that God and the universe are the same, and that all organized religion is 
a political deception devised by ambitious men”. See Israel, pp. 74, who 
cites in turn Martin Mulsow “Adam Weishaupt as Philosoph”, in Die 
Weimarer Klassik und ihre Geheimbünde, edited by W Müller-Seidel and 
W. Reidel (Würzburg, 2003), 27–66; W. Reidel, “Aufklärung und Macht. 
Schiller, Abel und die Illuminaten” in Weimarer Klassik. For overview in 
English see also Roberts, pp. 125–128.
 31 Regarding Babeuf see R.B. Rose, Gracchus Babeuf – the First 
Revolutionary Communist (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), 
or Albert Fried and Ronald Sanders, Socialist Thought – a Documentary 
History (NY: Anchor Books, 1964). Regarding Buonarotti see Elizabeth 
L. Eisenstein, The First Professional Revolutionist: Filippo Michele 
Buonarotti (1761–1837) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). 
During his trial defense, Babeuf explained that “[t]he institution of pri-
vate property is a surprise that was foisted upon the mass of simple and 
honest souls. The laws of this institution must necessarily bring about the 
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sense to organize in a clandestine fashion, as proposed by both 
Babeuf and Buonarotti (beyond Weishaupt) at the turn of the cen-
tury, as following the French Revolution the feudal dynasties of 
Russia, Austria, Prussia, Italy and Spain, with powerful allies in 
all other European countries and the Catholic church, had formed 
their own international organization, pledging themselves to forc-
ible action within states in which absolute sovereigns felt threat-
ened by, in the words of Tsar Nicholas, “revolutionary inroads”.32 
These conservative governmental powers formalized themselves 
as the “Holy Alliance” at the Congress of Vienna in 1814, and 
proceeded to cooperate in international publication bans, sur-
veillance and repression of militants. This posed serious practical 
problems. To suggest the prevailing political mood, consider the 
Fraternal Democrats’ reply to the Brussels Democrats (then led 
by Karl Marx) in 1846: “[Marx] will tell you with what  enthusiasm 
we welcomed his appearance and the reading of your address 
. . . We recommend the formation of a democratic congress of all 
nations, and we are happy to hear that you have publicly made 
the same proposal. The conspiracy of kings must be answered 
with the conspiracy of the peoples. . .”. 33
existence of the fortunate and unfortunate of masters and slaves. The law 
of heredity is supremely abusive. . .it follows that this possession by a few 
is usurpation. . .whatever an individual hoards of the land and its fruits 
beyond what he needs for his own nourishment has been stolen from 
society”, in Fried and Sanders, pp. 63–4). Buonarotti had a low opinion 
of established freemasonry, but nevertheless admitted only Masons into 
the brotherhood for the express purpose of using established lodges as a 
nursery for revolutionary ideas in a Christian language. Every candidate 
for supreme command of the Sublime Perfect Masters had to infiltrate a 
masonic lodge and rise through its hierarchy to a key position, successful-
ly altering the structure of lodges in Tuscany, Piedmont and Lombardy by 
adding a third grade that dovetailed the lodges’ hierarchy with their own. 
See Eisenstein, The First Professional Revolutionist, p. 45, passim). Louis 
August Blanqui (1805–1881) shifted from espousing republicanism to 
radical democracy under Buonarotti’s influence, and later created his very 
own sect – the Society of the Seasons. For further discussion of Blanqui 
and his influence on revolutionary practice and the work of Karl Marx in 
particular see Braunthal, Chapter 6, especially pp. 46–52.
 32 Cited in Braunthal, pp. 39.
 33 Cited in Franz Mehring, Karl Marx: The Story of His Life, (London: 
Fitzgerald, 1936), pp. 142–3. Regarding the Holy Alliance see Braunthal, 
Occult Features of Anarchism 297
In other words, the pyramidal structure of all the revolutionary 
organizations, in which each level of the pyramid would know 
only its immediate superiors, clearly had a practical function in-
somuch as it protected revolutionaries from repression in this era 
of increasingly consolidated state power and surveillance. The 
resemblances were not necessarily due to ex-Illuminati members 
starting up new groups, but rather partially due to the fearful 
accounts thereof propagated by governments at the time, which 
had the ironic effect of inspiring others to try the strategy.34 The 
specific organization and ritualization of all this revolutionary 
activity clearly had other functions as well: the Brotherhoods 
affirmed and unified the aspirations of illuminated men whose 
purpose it was to steer mankind toward achieving perfection on 
(this) earth. Bakunin, 32nd degree Mason himself, appeared to feel 
the same calling when he founded his own secret “International 
Brotherhood” in Florence in 1864 that mirrored Weishaupt’s vi-
sion almost exactly one hundred years later.35 The main difference 
between the two was that Bakunin’s Brotherhood was meant to 
infiltrate the First International and wrest it from the authoritar-
ian socialists’ control, as opposed to infiltrate Masonic lodges in 
order to wrest them from Liberals’ control. This is far from the 
only way in which Masonry and the International Workingman’s 
Association (IWA) coincide.
Chapter 5 – “The Counterrevolutionary International”, especially 
pp. 37–43. 
 34 As Julius Braunthal writes, for example, it was in fact Buonarotti’s book 
Babeuf and the Conspiracy for Equality, which “conveyed to posteri-
ty the ideas and methods of the Babeuvists. It appeared in Brussels in 
1828 and two years later in Paris. In 1838 the Chartist leader, Bronterre 
O’Brian, published an English translation. Marx read the book in 1844 
and, together with Engels, considered arranging for a German edition, to 
be translated by Moses Hess.”, pp. 35–6. See also Arthur Lehning, From 
Buonarroti to Bakunin – Studies in International Socialism (Brill: Leiden, 
1970).
 35 Bakunin became a member of the order during the 1840s in Paris; 
see Nunzio Pernicone. Italian Anarchism, 1864–1892. (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 1993 pp 16, passim) for discussion of both 
Bakunin’s masonry and activities in Florence.
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Illuminism in the IWA
By the mid-19th century many members of Masonic society had 
come to feel the proletarian struggle coincided with their great-
er cause, and the use of Masonic organizations as a cover for 
revolutionary activity was now a long tradition, as was the ten-
dency to use Masonic rites, customs, and icons to emblematically 
symbolize the values of equality, solidarity, fraternity, and work.36 
Pierre–Joseph Proudhon, a Mason who lived to see the formation 
of the IWA, wrote that “The Masonic God is neither Substance, 
Cause, Soul, Monad, Creator, Father, Logos, Love, Paraclete, 
Redeemer. . .God is the personification of universal equilibrium”.37 
In Proudhon’s day, the British lodges were admitting increasing 
numbers of proletarian members – particularly skilled and lit-
erate workers – and had come to support the workers’ struggle 
to the extent that the first preparatory meeting of the IWA on 
August 5, 1862, attended by Karl Marx among others, was held 
in the Free Masons Tavern.38 Many of those in attendance were 
“socialist Freemasons”, a phrase applied at the time to the mem-
bers of the small lodges founded in 1850 and 1858 in London by 
exiled French republicans, and which involved many members of 
diverse national backgrounds – the “Memphite” lodges, named 
 36 See Valín Fernandez, 2005, pp. 181.
 37 This is Proudhon writing in Of Justice in the Revolution and the Church 
(1858), cited in Heleno Saña, El Anarquismo, De Proudhon a Cohn-
Bendit (Madrid: Indice, 1970), p. 40. It is arguably telling of bias in an-
archist historiography that many English language reprints of Proudhon 
do not include such material; as just one example, L.S. Edwards and 
Elizabeth Fraser, Selected Writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (London: 
Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1969) includes excerpts from Of Justice and the 
Revolution in the Church and cut out this part, preferring Proudhon in 
the following mode: “God is stupidity and cowardice; god is hypocrisy 
and falsehood; god is tyranny and poverty” (1846). For further discussion 
and references regarding the religiosity of figures such as Proudhon and 
Kropotkin, see Harold Barclay, “Anarchist Confrontations with Religion” 
in New Perspectives on Anarchism (Lanham: Lexington, 2010), (note the 
relationship is one of “confrontation”), as well as the synthetic overview 
and multiple further sources offered in Alexandre Christoyannopoulos 
and Lara Apps, “Anarchism and Religion” in The Palgrave Handbook of 
Anarchism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
 38 See e.g. Valín Férnandez, 2005, pp. 182.
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after the sacred Egyptian burial ground. The immediate objectives 
of the Memphite programme were twofold: The struggle against 
ignorance through education, and helping the proletarians in their 
struggle for emancipation by way of Proudhonian mutual aid as-
sociations. Louis Blanc was among the members of the Memphite 
lodges (the Loge des Philadelphes in particular) along with at 
least seven other official founders of the IWA. In Geneva also, 
the local wing of the IWA was often called the Temple Unique 
and met in the Masonic lodge of the same name.39 Many present 
at the time observed that the incipient IWA’s organizing power 
was so weak that if it were not for the organizing efforts of so-
cialist Freemasons, the official founding meeting of the IWA on 
September 28th 1864 would never have come to pass.40
Communist and anarchist symbolism, such as the red star and 
the circle-A, date back to this period and also have Masonic ori-
gin. The star, which hosts an endless charge of esoteric meanings 
in both the Hermetic and Pythagorean traditions, had been adopt-
ed in the 18th century (some say 17th) by Freemasons to symbolize 
the Second Degree of membership in their association – that of 
Comrade (Compañero and Camarade in my sources). Among so-
cialists, it was first used by members of the Memphite lodges and 
then the IWA. Regarding the Circle–A, early versions like the 19th 
century logo of the Spanish locale of the IWA are clearly com-
posed of the compass, level and plumbline of Masonic iconog-
raphy, the only innovation being that the compass and level are 
arranged to form the letter A inside of a circle.41
 39 Op cit. pp. 179, 182–4.
 40 See Valín Férnandez, 2005, p. 182–3. See also his main source in this 
regard, Max Nettlau, La anarquía a través de los tiempos (Barcelona: 
Editorial Antalbe, 1979 [1929]), who references accounts written by 
those present at the time.
 41 See Valín Férnandez, 2005, pp. 180–88. Valín Férnandez’ original intu-
ition was that he might find the Level as symbol of egalitarianism dating 
back to the Levellers of the English Revolution, but neither the Levellers, 
Diggers or any other pre-Masonic movement used these tools to sym-
bolize their struggle and values; they are clearly taken from the Masonic 
repertoire. The logo of the Spanish locale of the IWA presented in Fig. 1 
is reprinted in Valín Férnandez, 2005, pp. 183.
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Over time these symbols have developed a new complement of 
meanings – many 21st century anarchists don’t even know that the 
star used by communists, anarchists and Zapatistas alike is the 
pagan pentagram, and are not reminded of the mathematical per-
fection of cosmogony when they behold it, just as they do not nec-
essarily realize there is a genealogical link between the (neo)pagan 
Mayday celebration and today’s anarchist Mayday  marches.42 In 
the 19th century, however, these symbolic associations were well 
known by those involved, and their adoption reflected how much 
they resonated with mystical and historical weight. Even Bakunin, 
while he rejected the personal God of his Russian orthodox child-
hood, put forward a pantheistic revolutionism. In a letter to his 
sister (1836) he wrote, “Let religion become the basis and reality 
of your life and your actions, but let it be the pure and single–
minded religion of divine reason and divine love. . . [I]f religion 
 42 These of course commemorate the Haymarket massacre (1886), but it is 
no coincidence that there was much upheaval in Chicago that day, be-
cause revolutionaries had been honouring Mayday since before the time 
of the Illuminati, which was also founded on this symbolic day. 
Fig 3. The seal of the Consejo Federal de España de la A.I.T. circa 1870. 
By Vilallonga (Own work, based on AIT.jpg.) [CC BY-SA 2.5 (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5)], via Wikimedia Commons. https://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:FRE-AIT.svg.
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and an inner life appear in us, then we become conscious of our 
strength, for we feel that God is within us, that same God who 
creates a new world, a world of absolute freedom and absolute 
love. . . that is our aim”.43
Throughout the 19th century the only people involved in the 
revolutionary scene who were consistently annoyed by this sort 
of mysticism were Marx and Engels. Proudhon’s ramblings about 
God as Universal Equilibrium were the sort of thing Marx and 
Engels objected to and contrasted with their own brand of “sci-
entific socialism” – “the French reject philosophy and perpetuate 
religion by dragging it over with themselves into the projected 
new state of society”.44 Bakunin and Marx differed on this point 
and a number of others, the most famous being the role of the 
State. Whereas Marx considered a state dictatorship of the prole-
tariat to be a necessary moment in his historical dialectic, Bakunin 
espoused the notion of a secret revolutionary organization that 
would “help the people towards self–determination, without the 
least interference from any sort of domination, even if it be tem-
porary or transitional”.45 Bakunin also wrote that he saw our 
 43 Cited in in Arthur Lehning, Mikhail Bakunin – Selected Writings (Cape: 
University of Michigan Press, 1973), pp. 34–5. Bakunin is much better 
known among anarchists living today for his reversal of Voltaire’s fa-
mous aphorism – “if God really existed, it would be necessary to abol-
ish him”; see Mikhail Bakunin, God and the State, ed. Paul Avrich (NY: 
Dover Publications Inc., 1970).
 44 See Friedrich Engels, ‘Progress of Social Reform on the Continent’, in 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels – Collected Works, Vol. 3, ed. Robert 
Tucker (NY: International Publishers, 1975), pp. 392–408, p. 407.
 45 Cited in Lehning, Mikhail Bakunin, p. 191–2. The reasons for which 
Marx and Bakunin came to different conclusions are complex; both were 
students of Hegel and worked within his dialectical tradition yet read 
him differently (see Robert M.Cutler, Mikhail Bakunin – from out of the 
Dustbin – Bakunin’s Basic Writings, 1869–71 [Michigan: Ardis, 1985], 
as well as fn. 71 of the present work on this point. Bakunin’s quarrel with 
Marx also arguably had much to do with elevating the revolutionary 
status of Slav peasants vs. German proletarians. While anarchist trans-
nationalism cannot be reduced to a function of patriotism, Levy makes 
a valuable point: “Even if anarchists and anarchism are assumed to be 
anti-thetical to nationalism and national movements, they, like socialists 
and the ideology of socialism (and even Marxism) lived in close (one 
could say dialectical) relationship to both nationalism and the nation 
302 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume II
“only salvation in a revolutionary anarchy directed by a secret 
collective force”: “We must direct the people as invisible pilots, 
not by means of any visible power, but rather through a dicta-
torship without ostentation, without titles, without official right, 
which in not having the appearance of power will therefore be 
more powerful.”46
The “dictatorial power” of this secret organization only rep-
resents a paradox if we do not recognize the long tradition, and 
larger cosmology, within which Bakunin is working. Revolution 
may be “immanent” in the people, but the guidance of illumi-
nated men working in the “occult” was necessary to guide them 
in the right direction. Members of his International Brotherhood 
were to act “as lightening rods to electrify them with the current 
of revolution” precisely to ensure “that this movement and this 
organization should never be able to constitute any authorities”.47
Theosophy, the Dialectic, and Other Esoterica of 19th 
Century Socialism
Beyond Bakunin himself, Robert Owen (1771–1858), Charles 
Fourier (1772–1837) and Saint–Simon (1760–1825) are also 
often cited as forefathers in standard histories of anarchism.48 
The Owenites were distinctly anticlerical, attacking all forms of 
“religion”, but Owen himself was a spiritualist in admiration 
of Emmanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772), who taught the arriv-
al of an “internal millennium”. The first Owenite communes in 
America were based largely on Swedenborg’s teachings.49 Charles 
state” (Carl Levy, ”Anarchism, Internationalism and Nationalism in 
Europe, 1860–1939.” Australian Journal of Politics and History [2004, 
50, 3, pp. 330–342], here pp. 331). For further analysis of the rivalry 
between Marx and Bakunin in the IWA see Braunthal, History of the 
International; Wolfgang Eckhardt, The First Socialist Schism: Bakunin 
vs. Marx in the International Working Men’s Association, (CA: PM Press, 
2016).
 46 Bakunin cited in Saña, El anarquismo, p. 106.
 47 Bakunin cited in Robert M. Cutler, Mikhail Bakunin, p. 28.
 48 See e.g. Bose; Marshall; Woodcock; fn. 6 of present work. 
 49 See e.g. Alfred J. Gabay, The Covert Enlightenment – Eighteenth Century 
Counterculture and Its Aftermath (West Chester: Swedenborg Foundation 
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Fourier, for his part, based his political project on what he called 
the Law of Passional Attraction – a series of correspondences 
in nature that maintain harmony in the universe and could be 
applied to human society.50 Saint-Simonians aimed at reforming 
existing institutions, but Fourierists and Owenites rejected the 
existing system altogether. Rather than a mere “changing of the 
guard”, they advocated the creation of new forms of indepen-
dent organization within the existing system; hence their “pre-
cursor” status to anarchism, perennially defined by the notion 
of building a new world within the shell of the old, whether via 
“networks”, communes or syndicates, and primarily defined by 
its rejection of state power.
Darwin’s treatise on evolution also lent itself to theories of so-
cial change that dovetailed with revolutionary thought – a dis-
tinction between evolution and revolution in 19th century utopian 
socialism would be rather forced. The insight that the natural 
world was characterized by evolving beings blended easily with 
the concept of cosmic regeneration – adaptive “process” became 
“progress”, a tendency toward perfection. Indeed many extend-
ed the idea from plants and animals to human society, the most 
famous version of such a move being “Social Darwinism”, trace-
able to Herbert Spencer who was the actual author of the phrase 
“survival of the fittest”.51 Here Darwin is recuperated within the 
transcendentalist tradition to lend weight to the Hobbesian con-
ception of the state of nature – the “war of each against all” con-
venient to capitalist ideology. Anarchist natural philosophers of 
the 19th century read Darwin differently. Piotr Kropotkin posited 
“Mutual Aid” as a prime “Factor of Evolution” (1914), which 
we ourselves can manifest as we lead civilization toward egal-
itarian harmony.52 It is also worth noting that Kropotkin’s key 
Publishers, 2005), pp. xiv, 153–4; Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, 
Utopian Thought in the Western World (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1979), p. 585.
 50 See Manuel and Manuel, chapter 27.
 51 See Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1964 [1859]); Herbert Spencer, Principles of Biology. 
(London: William and Norgate, 1864).
 52 Piotr Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (Boston: Extending 
Horizons Books, 1955 [1914]).
304 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume II
contribution to anarchist theory was heavily influenced by 
Mechnikov, who was in turn inspired by a long stint in revolu-
tionary Japan, and who had written of the world being divided into 
three spheres – inorganic, biological and sociological, each gov-
erned by its own set of laws but with enough correspondences 
between them that human society could be read as a continuously 
evolving expression of a unified whole.53
The theosophy of Helena Pavlova Blavatsky (1831–1891), 
which intrigued many anarchists, involves a teleology of divine 
evolution represented by successive “root races” and whose final-
ity was cosmic union.54 Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910), a Theosophist 
and anarchist himself, also admired Fedorov (1828–1903) who 
wrote that the common task of humanity was to use science to 
resurrect its dead fathers from particles scattered in cosmic dust.55 
Chulkov, Berdyaev and Ivanov, contemporaries of both Fedorov 
and Tolstoy during the Russian occult revival, all posited a “mys-
tical anarchism” that equated political revolution with realign-
ment in the cosmic sphere.56 In England, union organizer and early 
 53 See Sho Konishi, ‘Reopening The “Opening of Japan”: A Russian-
Japanese Revolutionary Encounter and the Vision of Anarchist Progress’, 
American Historical Review, 112 (2007), 101–30, as well as his mono-
graph, Sho Konishi, Anarchist Modernity: Cooperatism and Japanese-
Russian Intellectual Relations in Modern Japan. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2013). 
 54 Find Blavatsky’s theory in Helena Pavlova Blavatsky, ‘An Abridgement 
of the Secret Doctrine’, ed. Elizabeth Preston and Christmas Humphreys 
(Illinois: The Theosophical Publishing House, 1966). 
 55 See Leo Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of God is Within You: Christianity Not 
as a Mystical Doctrine but as a New Understanding of Life”, in The 
Kingdom of God and Peace Essays, (New Delhi: Rupa, 2001), as well as 
discussion in Christoyannopoulos and Apps, Anarchism and Religion. 
Regarding the ‘anarchist religion’ inspired by Tolstoy in Japan, see 
Konishi (2013). Regarding Tolstoy and the occult revival in Russia see 
also Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, ‘Introduction’, in The Occult in Russian 
and Soviet Culture, Ed. Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal (Ithica and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1997), 11, 22; James Webb, The Occult 
Establishment, (Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1976) 157, 174–5.
 56 See Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, ‘Political Implications of the Early 
Twentieth-Century Occult Revival’, in The Occult in Russian and Soviet 
Culture, ed. Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal (Ithica and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), pp. 379–418 (p. 382); Webb, 196.
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feminist Annie Besant, who organized women match-makers and 
fought to open the Masonic lodges to women, was convinced she 
was the reincarnation of Giordano Bruno, and it was Theosophy 
that inspired her to fight for Home Rule in India, as well as how 
she met Jawaharlal Nehru, himself a member of the Theosophical 
Society.57 Just as socialists were attracted to the occult, spiritualists 
and mediums of all kinds, who were disproportionately women, 
were led by their spiritual views to engage the “social question”.58
Further examples from the anarchist diaspora include the 
 story of Greek utopian socialist Plotino Rhodakanaty, often 
credited as being the first European “proselytizer” of anarchism 
to arrive in Mexico, whose first task upon arrival was to draft 
pamphlets titled Neopanteísmo (1864) while working with Julio 
Chávez Lopez to foment uprisings in the Chalco valley, after 
which he founded the Escuela del Rayo y del Socialismo, (which 
translates, somewhat ungracefully, as ‘School of Socialism and 
Lightening’ [and/or] ‘the Ray’ [‘of Light’]).59 Rhodakanaty later 
went on to form La Social, a 62-branch network of agitators in 
contact with the IWA, who formed Falansterios Societarios in 
 indigenous communities.60 Fifty years later, the politics of Ricardo 
Flores Magón (1874–1922) were immortalized in his newspa-
per titled Regeneración, while his comrades called each other 
 57 Andrée Buisine, ‘Annie Besant, Socialiste et mystique’, Politica Hermetica, 
9 (1995); Peter van der Veer, Imperial Encounters – Religion and 
Modernity in India and Britain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001), chapter 3.
 58 Nicole Edelman, ‘Somnabulisme, Médiumnité et socialisme’, Politica 
Hermetica, 9 (1995). See also Claudio Lomnitz, The Return of Comrade 
Ricardo Flores Magón. (New York: Zone Books, 2014), pp. 31–7, 
271–5).
 59 Inspired by Spinoza, Hegel, Fourier and Proudhon, Rhodakanaty called 
his political pantheism “pantheosophy”; see John Hart, Anarchism and 
the Mexican Working Class, 1860–1931 (Austin: UT Press, 1978, here 
pp. 19–20); Angel Cappelletti, ”Prólogo y cronologia – Anarquismo 
Latinoamericano.” In El Anarquismo en America Latina, edited by 
Carlos and Angel Cappelletti Rama (Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1990, 
pp. ix-ccxvii; here p. clxxvii); Carlos Illades, Rhodakanaty y la formación 
del pensamiento socialista en México (Rubi: Anthropos, 2002).
 60 See John Hart, Anarchism and the Mexican Working Class, Chapter 1.
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“co–religionaries”.61 Further south, Augusto César Sandino of 
Nicaragua (who later became the icon of the ‘Sandinista’  revolution 
in the 1970s and 1980s), was enthralled by the Magnetic-Spiritual 
School, Theosophy, and Zoroastrian, Hindu and Kabbalist lore, 
fusing all these ideas together with communist ones in such a way 
that he was refused entry to the Third International as a 
 consequence – they had heard rumours that he flew a seven-striped 
rainbow flag alongside the red and black.62 I could go on, but do 
not have the space to treat so many complex stories of diverse 
colonial encounters with the attention to specificity they deserve. 
I merely present these few suggestive examples to remind us that 
the cross-pollinations of diverse cosmologies underlying modern 
revolutionism does not necessarily stop, and perhaps find only 
their latest expression, in present-day anarchists’ selective fascina-
tion with indigenous cultures and cosmologies.63
 61 On Magón’s Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM) and its relationship with 
syndicalist movements and transnational anarchist organizing see e.g. 
Lomnitz, Cappelletti, and Hart (cited previously) as well as Ruben Trejo, 
Magonismo: utopia y revolucion, 1910 – 1913. (Mexico, D.F.: Cultura 
Libre, 2005), Javier Torres Parés, La Revolución sin Frontera: el Partido 
Liberal Mexicano y las relaciones entre el movimiento obrero de México 
y de los Estados Unidos, 1900–1923 (Ediciones Hispánicas, 1990); and 
Eduardo Blanquel, “El anarco-magonismo.” Historia Mexicana (13 [3], 
pp. 394–427, 1964). Lomnitz in The Return of Ricardo Flores Magon 
provides a unique ethnographic entry into the political culture and every-
day life of the PLM and the Regeneración press; the reference to “co- 
religionaries” cited above is taken from a letter co-written by 
Ricardo Flores Magon which is itself titled “To Esteemed Friend and 
Correligionary”, February 11, 1904, cited in Lomnitz (pp. 198). Lomnitz 
also discusses Freemasonry in connection with the Mexican revolutionary 
movement (pp. 96–7), as well as the influences of Theosophy and Spiritism 
among PLM members.
 62 See Donald Hodges, Sandino’s Communism – Spiritual Politics for the 
Twenty-First Century (Austin: UT Press, 1992), chapter 6.
 63 I explore contemporary anarchist solidarity campaigns with indigenous 
peoples movements in a more critical vein in Erica Lagalisse, “Good 
Politics”: Property, Intersectionality, and the Making of the Anarchist 
Self” (PhD diss., McGill University, 2016); see especially Chapter 3: “an-
archism’s peasants and indigenous people fill a certain ‘savage slot’. . . 
that has always served to justify anarchist politics whether or not real 
peasants or indigenous people are liberated in the process” (137). See 
also e.g. K. Johnson and K. E. Ferguson, “Anarchism and Indigeneity” 
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Not every anarchist was a theosophist or enamoured with the 
occult. Emma Goldman, for example, wrote an entirely scathing 
account of Krishnamurti’s arrival in America as the supposed 
Theosophical avatar.64 However, the fact that Goldman’s Mother 
Earth and a variety of other anarchist periodicals bothered to 
 criticize Theosophy at all should tell us something – nothing is 
forbidden unless enough people are doing it in the first place. Even 
the sceptics often grudgingly recognized that they were  kindred 
spirits. As anarchist C.L. James wrote in 1902: “However ill we 
may think of [Swedenborgian] dogmas, their influence is not to 
be despised. They have insured, for one thing, a wide diffusion of 
tendencies ripe for Anarchistic use. Scratch a Spiritualist, and you 
will find an anarchist.”65 Indeed it was none other than the  president 
of the American Association of Spiritualists that  published the 
first English translation of The communist Manifesto in 1872.66
We can imagine how much this annoyed Marx. But Marx’s 
anticipation of a Communist millennium after the overthrow 
of capitalism, brought about by a mixture of wilful effort and 
inbuilt cosmic fate, isn’t actually that different from the idea 
of the unfolding New Age. The major difference, and the one 
that prompted Marx and Engels’ to distinguish their utopian 
vision as “scientific” compared to the others, was their notion 
of the dialectic, which preserved the form, if not content, of the 
Hegelian one.67
in The Palgrave Handbook of Anarchism, Eds. C. Levy, M. S. Adams, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), for contemporary discussion 
(construction) of affinities between “anarchism” and “indigeneity”.
 64 Cited in Veysey, The Communal Experience – Anarchist and Mystical 
Counter-Cultures in America (New York and London: Harper and Row, 
1973), p. 45–6.
 65 C.L. James, Origins of Anarchism (Chicago: A. Isaak, 1902), cited in 
Veysey.
 66 see Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, “Introduction.” In The Occult in Russian 
and Soviet Culture, edited by Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, (Ithica and 
London: Cornell University Press, pp. 1–34, 1997), here p. 22.
 67 See e.g. Karl Marx, ‘The German Ideology’, in The Marx-Engels Reader, 
ed. Robert Tucker (NY: W. W. Norton & Company, [1932] 1978), 
pp. 146–200 (p. 154); and Capital Vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1990 [1876]), 
especially pp. 494, fn. 4.
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Hegel’s dialectic cast history as a dynamic manifestation of 
the Idea, the unfolding of consciousness itself, in which every-
thing is but a mode and attribute of a single universal substance.68 
Meanwhile Hegel’s Logic (1812) features an obsession with em-
anation and return by way of neat geometrical constructions of 
all kinds, while in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), the Idea 
issues in nature, which issues in Spirit, which returns to Idea in 
the form of Absolute Spirit.69 Marx breaks with Hegel in conceiv-
ing consciousness as inextricable from material social processes, 
rather than as a first premise, however the material and the ideal 
remain indissoluable, his logic is dialectical, and the eschatology 
of his historical dialectic can be traced back to Joachim de Fiore 
as much as Hegel’s can. While one of the main defining attributes 
of anarchism is its anti-Marxism, many Hermetic features of 
Marxist thought remain preserved (as abstract content) as well as 
transcended within anarchism’s concrete form.70
 68 Certain ‘non-metaphysical’ readings of Hegel aside, it is commonly noted 
that Hegel’s philosophy is pantheistic (or monist, as opposed to dualist), 
following Spinoza; see e.g. Frederick Beiser, Hegel (London: Routledge, 
2005).
 69 I follow Glenn Alexander Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition 
(Ithica and London: Cornell University Press, 2001): Regarding Hegel’s 
subject/object consider Corpus Hermeticum 14, “for the two are all 
there is, what comes to be and what makes of it, and it is impossible to 
separate one from the other”; likewise, with Hegel’s dialectic of desire 
and recognition in mind, consider Corpus Hermeticum 10: “For God 
does not ignore mankind; on the contrary, he recognizes him fully and 
wishes to be recognized.” ; see Copenhaven, pp. 56, 33; Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit. trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1977 (1807)). Hegel’s system of logic is a triad, each 
further divided into three chief moments, analyzed in turn into three 
other constitutive moments, which are split in turn into another three; 
see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic. trans. George 
Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 (1812)). As 
Magee writes, “The dove of [Hegel’s] Spirit emerges from a God-created 
nature, and circles back to God” (pp. 212). see also Magee, chapter 7. 
Regarding Hegel’s relationship with Freemasonry see Susan Buck-Morss, 
‘Hegel and Haiti’ in Critical Inquiry, Vol 26., No. 4 (summer 2000), 
pp. 821–865.
 70 Marx distinguished his dialectic from that of Hegel as being materi-
alist rather than Idealist, yet in both of their systems the resolution of 
the dialectical contradiction comprehends not only the destruction and 
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The fact that Marx builds on Hegel who builds on the Hermetica 
does not necessarily mean they are wrong; it simply means that a 
vast amount of “rational” social theory relies on archetypes and 
geometries of thought stemming from a specific, historically situ-
ated cosmology – as does the notion of “rationality” itself.71
Socialism and occultism developed in complementary (as well 
as dialectical) fashion during the 19th century, yet the cosmolog-
ical grounding of 19th century anarchists’ politics is generally 
downplayed, or treated as epiphenomenal, in retrospect: Just as 
transcendence of the thesis by the anti-thesis but also its preservation. 
In Bakunin’s system, the Positive and the Negative destroy one another 
entirely, leading to the transcendence of both and preserving nothing. 
Bakunin established the Negative as the motive force of the dialectic as 
opposed to Marx and Hegel whose dialectic began – and ended – with 
the Positive (thesis). Insomuch as Hegelian philosophy informed the po-
litical analyses and calls to action of each Marx and Bakunin, here we 
can see one of the reasons they parted opinion over the role of the state. 
Bakunin sociomorphized the Positive into Social Reactionaries and the 
Negative into Social Revolutionaries; the state, as part of the (Positive) 
old order, would be destroyed and transcended entirely by the social rev-
olution; no aspect of the existing society, including the state, would sur-
vive the insurrection. Both Marx and Bakunin believed that Democracy 
was the motive force of history, the real form of Hegel’s world-historical 
Spirit. They also agreed with Hegel that Monarchy was the generic form 
of the state. For Bakunin, this meant that “the State had to be destroyed 
in a general conflagration. For Marx, however, the essence of the State 
was Democracy itself; he conceived Democracy to be embodied in a con-
stitution hierarchically superior to other political forms, and therefore 
concluded that the State had to be realized to its highest degree” (21, 
author’s emphasis). See Cutler, Mikhail Bakunin, for further discussion, 
especially pp. 18–21, here pp. 21) 
 71 Beyond the discussion presented here, the reader may wish to consult the 
following in regard to the (co)construction of “secularization”, “rational-
ity”, “science”, “magic”, and “religion”: Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: 
An Interpretation (New York: Knopf, 1966); Keith Thomas, Religion 
and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Century England (New York: Penguin, 1982); Owen 
Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth 
Century (the Gifford lectures in the University of Edinburgh for 1973–4), 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); as well as Talal Asad’s 
Formations of the Secular, and Gil Anidjar’s Secularism, cited earlier. My 
strongest recommendation would be to begin with Stanley Tambiah’s 
Magic, Science, Religion and the Scope of Rationality (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1990).
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Newton’s Alchemy is largely ignored in mainstream histories of 
the establishment, so Fourier’s Law of Passional Attraction is re-
written in mainstream histories of the Left as a vision of “a har-
monious society based on the free play of passions”.72 It was only 
when Marxist “scientific socialism” became hegemonic during the 
20th century that the theological understandings of modern revo-
lutionism were buried from consciousness among the popular and 
academic Left.73 During this past century, whenever occult philos-
ophy has been dealt with in its own right, it has generally been cast 
as “comforting” in anxiety-provoking periods of social change, 
or, in certain Marxian style, as a product of capitalist alienation. 
In Adorno’s Theses against Occultism (in which he makes ample 
use of Hegel, somewhat ironically), occultism is both a ‘primitive’ 
holdover and a consequence of ‘commodity fetishism’ at once, 
in a typical circular (and colonialist) argument that suggests the 
occult worldview is wrong because it is animistic and vice versa – 
a “regression to magical thinking”.74 E.P. Thompson, for his 
part, characterized the working class as “oscillating” between the 
“poles” of religious revivalism and radical politics.75 Over and 
over, occult philosophy is portrayed as either inducing apathy 
among the masses or as the territory of elite reactionaries who 
stir them to hatred, rather than having any connection to social-
ism, communism, or anarchism. The symbiosis of Blavatsky’s 
Theosophy with eugenics, and the association of occult narratives 
 72 See Marshall, pp. 149.
 73 The complex historical reasons why certain currents of Marxism vs. an-
archism became more widespread during the 20th century will be brack-
eted here, yet note that contributing factors are necessarily overlapping 
and debatable, with explanations ranging from Eric Hobsbawm’s (in 
Primitive Rebels) which beholds scientific Marxism progressively replac-
ing the more “primitive” anarchism, to Graeber’s which highlights how 
the centralizing logic of state Marxism was practical during the 20th cen-
tury of global war (see David Graeber, “The New Anarchists” in New 
Left Review, 13, 2002, pp . 61–74, here pp. 69); it is of course impossible 
to provide a scholarly analysis (representation) in this regard that is not 
also a (material) political position – Marxists and anarchists can agree on 
this particular point.
 74 Theodor Adorno, ‘Theses against Occultism’, TELOS, 19 (1974), p. 8.
 75 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (NY: Vintage, 
1963), p. 391.
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and iconography with the rise of fascism, for example, are of-
ten pointed out, and of course the connections are there.76 The 
ideas offered within occult philosophy do not necessarily lead 
to revolutionary politics, but they do not necessarily lead away 
from them either. When regarding the relationship of “magic” to 
anti-systemic movements, perhaps any deterministic formula is 
bound to fail. When approached by privileged persons with a lust 
for power, “magic” can serve to justify and advance elite aspira-
tions. But without the influx of so much material charged as “an-
cient magical wisdom” that helped triangulate popular religion, 
 76 See e.g. Nicolas Goodrick-Clarke, The Occult Roots of Nazism: Secret 
Aryan Cults and Their Influence on Nazi Ideology: The Ariosophists of 
Austria and Germany, 1890–1935, (NY: New York University Press, 
1992). Regarding the historical link between occultism and Nazism it is 
key to understand that at the turn of the 20th century (1903), the global 
capitalist oligarchy was blamed on a secretive group of Jewish patriarchs 
(in turn associated with Masonry and magic) in a Russian forgery titled 
“The Protocols of the Elders of Zion”, which was widely distributed in 
decades following (Henry Ford himself distributed 500,000 copies); see 
Victor E. Marsden, ed. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, (Filiquarian 
Publishing LLC, 2006); R.S. Levy, A Lie and a Libel: The History of the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion. (University of Nebraska Press, 1995); 
Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World-
Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1966). The reader may also note that one of the influential 
books to associate “revolutionism” (from the French Revolution to the 
Bolshevik Revolution) with a similar secretive directing force was Secret 
Societies and Subversive Movements (London: Boswell, 1936) by Nesta 
Webster, which relied heavily on the Protocols. There also existed works 
during this time period that did not partake of this specific view of his-
tory, yet wherein anti-Semitism nonetheless defines the analysis, such as 
Mircea Eliade’s The Myth of the Eternal Return – or, Cosmos and History 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974 [1949]), wherein the linear, 
redemptive history that has displaced (true) understanding of cyclical 
time is associated with Judaism. For an analysis of anti-Semitism with 
respect to the Saint-Simonians see Zosa Szajkowski. 1947. “The Jewish 
Saint-Simonians and Socialist Antisemites in France.” Jewish Social 
Studies 9 (1):33–60; compare with Moya, José. 2004. “‘The positive 
side of stereotypes: Jewish anarchists in early twentieth-century Buenos 
Aires’,.” Jewish History 18 (1): pp. 19–48; Levy, Carl. 2011. “Anarchism 
and cosmopolitanism.” Journal of Political Ideologies 16 (3):265–278. 
See Nesta Webster, Secret Societies and Subversive Movements (London: 
Boswell, 1936).
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modern materialism and social discontent in new ways, we may 
never have seen the rise of “anarchism” as we know it. Even this 
quick glance at the history of revolutionism problematizes any 
simplistic dichotomy of New Age spirituality as reactionary (in 
both the senses of conservative and right-wing), vs. a materialist 
worldview as progressive (in both senses of forward-looking 
and leftist). Rather, secularized and “scientized” religion appears 
inherent to modern anti-systemic critique and collective action – the 
West’s attempt to save itself from its impoverished materialism 
through an enchantment “newly reconfigured”.77 The world did 
not have to be “disenchanted” before modern anti-authoritarian-
ism could occur, it had to be re-enchanted: A rejection of material 
exploitation, “materialist values” and materialist philosophy ap-
pear as three sides of the same coin.
To Conclude (and to Begin Anew. . .)
As I explained at the outset, I began this project partly in order 
to clarify how the “atheism” professed by those working in the 
Western anarchist tradition intersects with colonialism, as well 
as embodies a serious misunderstanding of the history of anar-
chism itself. In my previous ethnographic work, I had argued that 
maintaining a neat dichotomy between “spirituality” and “radi-
cal politics” only makes sense within a colonialist rubric wherein 
the religious Other becomes the constitutive limit of the “rational 
West”. The subsequent reception of my work by both academics 
and anarchists has beheld a certain pattern: Many anarchist activ-
ists and scholars agree that we should indeed be more “respectful” 
of “indigenous identity”. This, even though I had taken care to 
emphasize that the operative problem goes beyond a failure to be 
sufficiently polite in the presence of difference. Beyond being “dis-
respectful”, insisting on a disenchanted universe delimits the rad-
ical imaginary in general. To refrain from telling the non-atheist 
activist they are wrong (while continuing to think they are), sim-
ply because he or she is a person of colour, is really very different 
 77 See Thomas Laqueur, ‘Why the Margins Matter: Occultism and the 
Making of Modernity’, Modern Intellectual History, 3 (2006), 111–35 
(pp. 111–12); Webb also makes this point, p. 344–45.
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than self-critically deconstructing one’s colonial mentality that 
treats the religious as Other in the first place.78
Keeping this question in mind, I wonder what the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries in Europe would have looked like if 
militants regarded culture as property the way many anarchists 
and indigenous people do today. Certainly the “occult” history 
of anarchism that I present above could be analysed in terms of 
Orientalism, and of course the cross-cultural dialogues among 
heretics during the Crusades happened in the context of complex 
power relations.79 At this time, however, it was not yet clear who 
would emerge as the dominant party. Is Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid 
“culturally appropriated” because he was inspired by Japanese 
revolutionaries? Perhaps insofar as we don’t know about it, in 
combination with the fact that there is now money to be made off 
Kropotkin-related-commodities. However, reading a concept like 
“cultural appropriation” on to the past would falsely assume that 
the fields of meaning and value at the time can be equated to those 
inflecting today’s self-making projects: During the Renaissance 
“difference” did not have the same currency, and people were 
not ascribed the same identities nor “self-identified” according to 
the categories in play now. It makes sense that a critique of cul-
tural appropriation emerges in the present-day context, wherein 
cultural difference is fetishized and certain people may valorise 
themselves by accessorizing commodified attributes of those they 
 78 See Lagalisse, Marginalizing Magdalena, for my first rehearsal of this 
argument with reference to Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular – 
Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford University Press: California, 
2003), Gil Anidjar (cited earlier), Joan Scott “Sexularism”, RSCAS 
Distinguished Lectures, Florence, Italy, April 23, 2009, Gloria Anzaldúa, 
Borderlands – La Frontera. San Francisco: Aunt Lute, 1987), and Jacqui 
M. Alexander, Pedagogies of crossing: Meditations on Feminism, Sexual 
Politics, Memory, and the Sacred, (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2005), among others – it is perhaps no coincidence that in the ‘memory’ 
of Jacqui Alexander, “everything is interconnected”. See Lagalisse, Good 
Politics, Chapters 7–9, for an in-depth discussion of non-performative 
white anti-racisms among anarchists, and the “insult of courtesy” that 
may characterize praxes of “anti-oppression”.
  See Edward Said, Orientalism, (NY: Vintage, 1978).
 79 See Edward Said, Orientalism, (NY: Vintage, 1978).
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structurally oppress, but we may also lose something in the pro-
cess of applying the logic of property to culture, and to spirituality 
in particular.80 When entire cosmologies are reified as “proper” 
only to specific pre-ordained identities, we are effectively saying 
they are false to the extent that they do not apply across the cos-
mos whatsoever. The sacred is thus rendered as alterity, nothing 
more than a cultural accoutrement in a marketplace as big as the 
universe. Appropriating indigenous spiritual forms without the 
intended content is entirely in line with the logic of capitalist co-
lonialism, but so is marking off and containing everything consid-
ered sacred as property (and thus nothing more).81
In other words, the fact that anarchists are often unable to rec-
ognize the subversive potential of religious sensibilities – whether 
those of indigenous women or Bakunin himself – is disturbing be-
yond anarchists’ failure to respect the “difference” or the “identity” 
of others, and to recuperate such a debate within the parameters 
 80 For discussion of cultural appropriation in this vein see Beverley Skeggs, 
Class, Self, Culture, (London: Routledge, 2004.)
 81 Readers in anthropology might consider how the disciplinary “ontolog-
ical turn” could be read similarly, wherein the anthropologist (finally) 
grants the “reality” of plants that think, clouds that have agendas, and 
spiritual animal protectors, but only by inventing multiple realities in the 
process: ontology (reality) becomes plural such that the white man can 
still enjoy his office without having to worry about the weather; see, e.g. 
David Graeber’s “Radical alterity is just another way of saying ‘reality’: 
A reply to Eduardo Viveiros de Castro” Hau – Journal of Ethnographic 
Theory, Vol 5, No 2 (2015), and Zoe Todd’s “An Indigenous Feminist’s 
Take On The Ontological Turn: ‘Ontology’ Is Just Another Word For 
Colonialism’ Journal of Historical Sociology, Volume 29, Issue 1 (2016). 
Regarding the ‘sacred’, following Durkheim (The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 2008 [1912]) who 
built his theory around the “totem”, the sacred is, by definition and uni-
versally, something “set apart”. Rejoinders such as Asad’s Formations of 
the Secular locate the “sacred” as a specifically Judeo-Christian concept. 
In either case, while most peoples throughout history do create catego-
ries of things, people, and ideas that are set apart from the mundane in 
some form, I here refer to the specific divisibility of the material and the 
‘sacred’ that occurs through processes of commodification and reifica-
tion; see, e.g., Andrea Smith, Conquest – Sexual Violence and American 
Indian Genocide. (Cambridge: South End Press, 2005), Chapter 6; Gloria 
Anzaldúa, Borderlands – La Frontera. (San Francisco: Aunt Lute, 1987), 
pp. 68–9, passim.
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of “identity” and attendant proprieties is arguably racist in and of 
itself. Rather, we must actually consider the synergistic relation-
ship between spirituality, faith and radical political movements, 
whether in present-day Latin America or 19th century Europe, up 
to and including the original “New Age movement” itself from 
whence modern anarchism came.
In so doing, we also appeal to anarchists who do not take a hard 
atheist stance, yet who feel the need to hide their various spiritu-
al inclinations in officially Left-wing spaces: whereas at the turn 
of the 20th century it was possible to say “Scratch a Spiritualist, 
and you will find an Anarchist”, a hundred years later the tables 
have been turned. Other things haven’t changed that much – a 
zine an activist acquaintance of mine published in 2013 is titled 
“Anarchism and Hope” wherein he advises: “Fuck waiting on on 
someone else or some divine force to change shit. Hope means we 
can see how to do it ourselves.”82
I also suggested in my introduction that the story told here is 
important to reflect on because while the patriarchal bias of clas-
sical anarchist theory and practice is often noted in reference to 
its genesis in male proletarian workers’ movements, the gendered 
quality of “anarchism” is arguably more fundamental than that. 
The masculine public sphere of anarchism reaches back even fur-
ther, and articulates with an occult cosmology that is older still. 
As anti-systemic resistance in Europe shifted from the millenarian 
mode to modern socialism, the biggest difference was not, in fact, 
that the former was “religious” and the latter wasn’t, but rather 
that in the latter the paradise of heaven would be manifest on the 
earth, and through the works of men not God – or indeed, men as 
God – and that it was the job of a chosen few who had access to 
“ancient spiritual wisdom” circulating in new secret male orders 
to inspire them to action. To simply argue now that “real” anar-
chism is by definition feminist as well insomuch as anarchism is 
“against all forms of domination” does not engage the ways in 
which the anarchist revolutionary person was constructed vis-à-
vis a variety of exclusions from the outset, especially insomuch as 
 82 see Aaron Lakoff, Anarchism and Hope, Howl! arts collective, Montréal, 
Québec, 2013. 
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these continue unmediated by a certain unacknowledged “van-
guardism”: Revolution may be immanent in the people, but as 
any 21st century anarchist around can see, fluency in a particular 
vocabulary, knowing the names of certain historical figures, and 
being vouched for by someone in the know is all requirement for 
entry into the anarchist club, as is a commitment to a specific 
ideological constellation informed by the history of its practice, 
wherein men’s oppression by the state becomes the prototype for 
power in general.
I may be forcing an analogy by saying that all of this social 
and subcultural capital resembles the “opaque system of signs” 
of 19th century initiatic societies, but the (hidden) correspon-
dence is worth reflecting on.83 Similarly, unless we narrowly de-
fine “vanguard” to mean “political party” per se, the common 
notion among present-day anarchist activists that Marxists are 
“vanguardist”, whereas anarchists are not, does not bear scru-
tiny. Anarchists have always considered themselves purveyors 
of particular insight, and continue to join social movements and 
the general fray to steer it all in a more revolutionary direction.84 
My point is not to criticize such a practice, but to suggest that 
its disavowal and dissimulation within discourses of “solidari-
ty” may be disingenuous.85 While anarchists today carefully skirt 
the phrase “consciousness raising” (it sounds too Marxist), their 
 83 See Lagalisse, Good Politics, Chapter 6, for a lengthier discussion on this 
point and in regard to the changing forms of clandestinity characterizing 
the Left from the 19th to the 21st century. 
 84 To offer just one contemporary example, anarchists participated in the 
Occupy movement (2011), despite its observed “reformist” aspects, to 
prevent it veering in a racist and nationalist direction, and to steer it 
towards a liberatory politics; see e.g. Erica Lagalisse, “Participación e 
influencias anarquistas en el movimiento ‘Occupy Wall Street’.” Periodico 
del CNT (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo), nº 383, noviembre 2011.
 85 For further discussion in this vein see Lagalisse, Good Politics — Anarchist 
activists in the North America today often articulate their actions and 
ideology as “taking lead” from indigenous activists or other marginalized 
groups of people, yet they are also working within a tradition of their 
own.
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various workshops on “anti-oppression” appear to have precisely 
such a purpose: Why so much self-deception?86
Similarly, it should also be significant that today’s anarchist in-
tellectuals generally do not cite indigenous women scholars such 
as Audra Simpson when they are mounting their compelling argu-
ments against the State: Theirs are not the code words for belong-
ing.87 Rather, anarchist activists and scholars who are interested 
in questions of “sovereignty” often prefer to peruse the work of 
Giorgio Agamben who, much like Carl Schmitt, brackets gender 
and race by proceeding as if one can equate “human being” and 
“male citizen of Rome or France”.88
 86 See Lagalisse, Good Politics, Chapter 8, with respect to current discours-
es and praxes of “anti-oppression”.
 87 See e.g. Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus – Political Life Across the 
Borders of Settler States (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2014).
 88 I refer to Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer – Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life, (CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), and Schmitt’s Political 
Theology cited earlier. Agamben presents the inclusion/exclusion of “bare 
life”/sexuality as fundamental to classical-then-modern politics without 
reference to gender, yet indulging de Sade and with prime reference to 
Foucault. The Holocaust concentration camp is presented as epitome of 
the “sacredness” (murderability) of Life and modern bio/thanatopolitics 
by extension – Aimé Cesaire, author of Discourse on Colonialism (NY: 
Monthly Review Press, 2000 [1955]), turns in his grave. The prime con-
tribution of Agamben’s essay appears to be the crafting of a certain gene-
alogy of ideas wherein knowledge is the sovereign domain of European 
male philosophers in contradistinction to feminists and black scholars of 
slavery: In his work these are definitively excluded from philosophy qua 
philosophy in perfect symmetry with how Roman/French women and 
slaves are excluded (as “bare life”) from Agamben’s own analysis. Note 
that Agamben’s book The Coming Community (1993) was influential to 
The Invisible Committee’s The Coming Insurrection (Paris: La Fabrique, 
2007), which has enjoyed popularity among anarchist “insurrectional-
ists” in French, English and Spanish (among other presses). For a feminist 
response to The Invisible Committee/Tiqqun, see e.g. “Further Materials 
Toward a Theory of the Manchild” by Moira Weigel and Mal Ahern 
online at http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/further-materials-toward-a- 
theory-of-the-man-child/. See also Audra Simpson’s rejoinder to Agamben – 
“. . .one does not have to dwell exclusively in the horror of a concen-
tration camp to find life stripped bare to cadastral form. . .” (Mohawk 
Interruptus, pp. 153–4).
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It is not simply sexist reading habits that marginalize indigenous 
women scholars’ work, but also the fact that their words are less 
easily recuperated within the European anarchist tradition, which 
has already decided that religion is bad and whose model of op-
pressive power is the state. For the indigenous women in Andrea 
Smith’s ethnography, “sovereignty” is “an active, living process 
within this knot of human, material, and spiritual relationships 
bound together by mutual responsibilities and obligations”; Audra 
Simpson, for her part, points out the “critical language game” in-
volved here: indigenous mobilizations of “sovereignty” are useful 
to signal “processes and intents to others in ways that are un-
derstandable”.89 These remarks certainly sound different than the 
definitions of “sovereignty” advanced by Schmitt, described by 
Agamben, and critiqued by many anarchists, wherein sovereignty 
is always an (unmarked yet male) fantasy of absolute power via 
the state apparatus (and the practical project of consolidating this 
power as much as possible). But then again, why should Agamben 
or Schmitt be granted sovereign jurisdiction over the (power of) 
the Word? Indigenous women’s mobilizations of “sovereignty” are 
not necessarily rhetorical, but even when they are, this where the 
(performative) magic happens. Following their lead could teach 
us all something about “sovereignty” that Schmitt, Agamben, and 
their anarchist readers fail to notice: European “sovereignty” has 
always involved subsuming women and children as property of 
 89 Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred contends that (native) “sovereignty” is 
premised upon Western notions of the nation–state, with its monopoly on 
violence and agendas of domination, yet Andrea Smith suggests we take 
lead from indigenous women activists who rather remark “sovereignty is 
not a foreign concept brought by the colonizers to Indigenous America. 
We are born as sovereign beings. Our struggle as sovereign peoples is to 
live the laws of creation.”; see Andrea Smith, North Americans and the 
Christian Right, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008), 
here pp. 260–1; Taiaiake Alfred, Wawáse – Indigenous Pathways of 
Action and Freedom (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2005). Audra Simpson 
is supportive of Alfred’s point, yet analyzes the rhetorical politics involved 
in indigenous mobilizations of “sovereignty” (Mohawk Interruptus, 
pp. 105, passim). Note that while the status of Andrea Smith’s indigenous 
identity is currently hotly contested, it is regardless significant that her 
work has also often been ignored. See Lagalisse, Good Politics, Chapter 
9, for an analysis of the debacle over Andrea Smith’s identity.
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male citizens whereas it is male citizens that are subsumed by the 
sovereign.90 And furthermore, the male-philosophy slip between 
(legal) person and human being is also preserved in the anarchist 
response – “autonomy”.91 It is surely significant that the anarchist 
person is imagined as an independent, autonomous, and transcen-
dent (sovereign) being that enters into “mutual aid” with others 
of its kind, much like the modern person writ large – the state. 
And that just as the state characterizes itself as benevolent to its 
citizens, the anarchist considers himself benevolent to the peo-
ple (women) similarly subsumed in his “autonomy” and without 
whom he could not survive.
It should not be a surprise that anarchist academics ask me to 
authorize my texts by citing Carl Schmitt — they do want me to be 
accepted into the club, and kindly offer me the password. Neither 
should it be a surprise that reviewers suggest consecrating my 
work with the latest exegetical ruminations on St. Paul by Simon 
Critchley, whereas it is possible to get through ten years of doc-
toral studies regarding “anarchism” and only find out about Rosa 
Luxemburg afterwards, because of a book that happens to be lay-
ing on Barbara Ehrenreich’s kitchen table: Anarchism has  always 
been a gendered and racialized domain authorized by speculative 
elites as much as real builders.92 In my view, when it comes to 
 90 I rehearse this argument at length elsewhere, with attention to Levi-
Strauss’s work on the universalization and particularization at work in 
combinations of linear and taxonomic hierarchy, Louis Dumont’s theory 
of hierarchy, and David Graeber’s rejoinder regarding the exclusion as 
well as subsumption that is involved in hierarchical arrangements, which 
I adapt with reference to Macpherson’s work on the ‘possessive individu-
al’ (see Lagalisse, Good Politics, Chapter 9).
 91 En lieu of fantasies of absolute state power, “autonomy” involves a fanta-
sy of absolute personal power that must presume a strict independence of 
individuals (or homogenous groups thereof), which must then be mitigat-
ed by a correlate call for “mutual aid” – the other side of the same coin. 
See Lagalisse, Good Politics, as well as Lagalisse (2018) for an in-depth 
discussion of this point, where I discuss how the anarchist ideas of auton-
omy, self-government, and self-management rely on the “self-organizing 
system” of modern life science, with reference to the work of Anna Tsing, 
The Mushroom at the End of the World – On the Possibility of Life in 
Capitalist Ruins. (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).
 92 Simon Critchley’s The Faith of the Faithless (NY:Verso, 2012) does pro-
vide an in-depth analysis on the meanings of religion, sovereignty, and 
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approaching things like “liberty” or “equality”, the work of histo-
rian Jonathan Israel is more compelling than that of philosophers 
such as Agamben or Critchley, in my view, as Israel sets aside ab-
stract propositions and instead works hard to “describe in the con-
texts of history and culture the actual emergence of these ideas”.93 
Perhaps the anthropologist is bound to favour historians such as 
Israel, yet by the same token is left wanting if contextual analysis 
does not comprehend the interesting (and productive) contradic-
tion of ideas like “equality, democracy and individual liberty” ac-
tually emerging within new, secretive, status-restrictive, male-only 
clubs that are often referred to, rather curiously, as the modern 
“public sphere”. How can so many of us pass over the (synchron-
ic) gendered pairing of the Enlightenment Salon and Freemasonic 
Temple, or the (diachronic) gendered series of (“magical”) witches 
and (“rational”) brotherhood ceremonies, and yet claim to prop-
erly understand the form or content of the ideas of either? Not 
with recourse to the logic of ‘history’, whether that of Foucault or 
Hegel (or the Hermetica itself). It seems all ‘earthly perspectives’ 
are bound to be incomplete after all — including my own.
Let us now move to briefly discuss the “secret society”. While I 
originally turned my scholarly attention to the cosmology of anar-
chism on account of my ethnographic research within anarchist and 
indigenous social movement collaborations, at a certain point during 
my research for this project I did consider it my specific responsibil-
ity to acquaint myself with the great flourishing of creative works 
concerning “secret societies” and “the Illuminati” to be found on 
YouTube throughout the past decade. It is clear that in the political 
and historical imagination corresponding to the majority of these 
works — popularly referred to as “conspiracy theories” — the ‘Secret 
Order of the Illuminati’ is understood to be a truly extraordinary 
liberty in the work of Jean-Jaques Rousseau and Left thinkers who fol-
low him, thus offering an argument around ‘mystical anarchism’ and 
faith that dovetails partially with my own; his own exposition advanc-
es by way of literature and logical propositions rather than an ethno-
graphic social history. The book on Rosa Luxemburg I found on Barbara 
Ehrenreich’s table (she had been asked to write a blurb for it) was Kate 
Evans, Red Rosa – A Graphic Biography of Rosa Luxemburg, (NY: 
Verso, 2015).
 93 Israel, A Revolution of the Mind, pp. x.
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organization that has, among other things, achieved the ends of its 
historical enemy, the Holy Alliance, or the “conspiracy of kings”.
It has also become clear during the same time period that most 
self-identified anarchist activists in North America dismiss the 
unsatisfying teleologies of such “conspiracy theories”, especially 
those rife with anti-Semitic or otherwise racist narratives.94 Yet 
such narratives, increasingly prevalent, are arguably the very rea-
son persons concerned with social justice should be paying at-
tention. Respectable researchers may insist that diverse popular 
‘conspiracy theories’ of power are laughably false, yet they ap-
parently contribute to real political effects, such as the growing 
neo-fascist movements in North America, which are not laugh-
able at all. Indeed given the evident charge and influence of the 
“conspiracy theory” in North America today — its forms and 
contents, as well as the powerful rhetorical functions of the (de-
rogatory) discursive category itself, I suggest that anarchists con-
sider engaging, mobilizing and qualifying the popular discontent 
evident in so-called “conspiracy theory”.95 Anti-capitalists of all 
stripes would surely do well to tackle so much curious confusion 
regarding the Left and the Conspiracy of Kings, so many disturb-
ing racialized political imaginaries, and so many ‘bizarre’ origin 
stories of capitalism often found within the works marked “con-
spiracy theory”. We might critically analyse the genre in terms of 
allegory and archetype, narrative and imagery, voice and public, 
authorship and audience, for the express purpose of practical in-
tervention. We might even explore, in the process, how both dom-
inant powers and their “conspiracy theorist” critics make use of 
occult ‘arts of memory’ to compel their publics, and thus how the 
Hermetic tradition continues to inform both Right and Left in the 
 94 I offer a preliminary analysis of the social dynamics surrounding the 
“conspiracy theory” in contemporary anarchist social movement spac-
es in Erica Lagalisse,”Anarchism and Conspiracy Theories in North 
America, or: The Conspiracy Theory as Antidote to Foucault”, presented 
at the American Anthropological Association (AAA) Annual Meeting., 
Denver, CO, December 2015. 
 95 The final chapter of my upcoming monograph-length rehearsal of this 
work (Lagalisse 2018), elaborates further on “conspiracy theory” as both 
an academic and practical political problematic, and explores the related 
question of occult(ed) arts of memory suggested briefly below.
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21st century, albeit not in the way some “conspiracy theorists” 
may suspect. The pantheism I have discussed in these pages may 
indeed equally inspire the fantasies of fascism, the apocalypse of 
the dialectic, and the anarchist faith in an egalitarian social or-
der. We would be wise to not ignore it, because now, as during 
the 19th century, as during the Renaissance period with which 
this essay began, the Hermetica proves ‘adaptable to a variety of 
projects’, including both pyramid and levelling schemes, as well as 
pyramid schemes for levelling — As Above, So Below.
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Anarchism and religion have historically had an uneasy relationship. Indeed, 
representatives of both sides have regularly insisted on the fundamental 
incompatibility of anarchist and religious ideas and practices. Yet, ever since 
the emergence of anarchism as an intellectual and political movement, a 
considerable number of religious anarchists have insisted that their religious 
tradition necessarily implies an anarchist political stance. 
Reflecting both a rise of interest in anarchist ideas and activism on the 
one hand, and the revival of religious ideas and movements in the political 
sphere on the other, this multi-volume collection examines congruities 
and contestations between the two from a diverse range of academic 
perspectives.
The second volume of Essays in Anarchism & Religion includes essays covering 
themes such as Yiddish radicalism, Byzantine theology, First Peter, William 
Blake, the role of violence in anarchism and in Christian anarchism, Spanish 
anarchist-themed film, and the Occult features of anarchism. 
In a world where political ideas increasingly matter once more, and religion 
is an increasingly visible aspect of global political life, these essays offer 
scholarly analysis of overlooked activists, ideas and movements, and as such 
reveal the possibility of a powerful critique of contemporary global society.
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